This application under proviso to section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read with section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed by the petitioner, namely, the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal FA No.78 of 1997 against the judgment and award that was passed on 10.7.96 in Title Suit (MAC) No. 164 of 1995. 2. I have heard Mr.SM Ali, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. Also heard Mr. I. Chakraborty, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 and Mr. P. Deb Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.2. 3. There is no controversy over the fact that the judgment and award which has been impugned in the memo of appeal was passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on 10.7.96. The certified copy of the judgment/ award was furnished to the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd ie the present petitioner on 15.7.96. In course of the submission of the learned counsel for the parties, a question has arisen as to whether the petitioner is entitled to get exclusion of the period which the Tribunal needed for furnishing the copy of the judgment/ award in the matter of computing the period of limitation. Section 168 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (abbreviated hereinafter as the Act) which is relevant for the purpose may, therefore, be quoted as under : "168. (2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the Award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of award." 4. A bare perusal of the provision quoted above makes it clear that it is incumbent upon the Tribunal to cause furnishing of a copy of the judgment/Award to the concerned parties within a period of fifteen days. It has, therefore, become necessary to see as to whether the period of fifteen-days or a period lesser than that which the Tribunal might require for furnishing the copy of the judgment/award to the parties should excluded or not; While assisting Mr. SM Ali, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. It has, therefore, become necessary to see as to whether the period of fifteen-days or a period lesser than that which the Tribunal might require for furnishing the copy of the judgment/award to the parties should excluded or not; While assisting Mr. SM Ali, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. S. Deb; learned senior counsel drew my attention to the provision laid down under section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and has submitted that in view of the provisions laid down under section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period which the Court/Tribunal needed for furnishing the copy of the judgment/Award has to be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under; "12. (2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of die decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded." This provision clearly indicates that the period which will be required for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment/Award shall be excluded for the purpose of computation of the period of limitation. There is no dispute that certified copy of the judgment/award is needed to be filed along with the memo of appeal, Therefore, the period which was needed for supplying the certified copy has to be excluded. In the instant case the provision as laid down under section 168 (2) of the Act has clearly stated that the Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the Award to the parties. This section as has been couched shows that it is mandatory for the Tribunal to cause furnishing the copies of the judgment/Award to the parties. As the memo of appeal is not entertain able without the certified copy of the impugned judgment/Award I am of the view that the period which was needed for furnishing the copy has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation. 5. In the instant case the judgment/Award was passed on 10.7.96.1 have already stated above that the copy of the impugned judgment/Award was furnished to the present petitioner on 15.7.96. 5. In the instant case the judgment/Award was passed on 10.7.96.1 have already stated above that the copy of the impugned judgment/Award was furnished to the present petitioner on 15.7.96. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to get exclusion of this 5 days i.e. the limitation period being 90 days such an application for condonation has to be presented before the Court latest by 13.10.96. The present petition for condonation of delay was filed before this Court on 9.4.97 that is it was delayed by a period of 177 days. It is, therefore, necessary to see how this 177 days has been explained by the petitioner. 6. According to Mr. Ali. learned counsel for the petitioner the ground has been substantially set forth in paragraph 3 of the petition. For better appreciation of the contention of Mr. Ali, learned counsel for the petitioner I consider it necessary to quote the grounds that have been set forth under paragraph 3 of the petition. Paragraph 3 of the petition is accordingly extracted as under : "3. That after getting information about the award dated 10.7.96 through the concerned lawyer on 15.7.96, the Divisional Office asked the Investigator to confirm the appellant-petitioner regarding vehicular documents/particulars etc and also to collect information with regard to driver of the vehicle since the same had been driven without any approval of the owner of the vehicle and to that effect a publication was made in a local newspaper. Also the Divisional Office sought opinion from the lawyer. On receipt of the opinion of the lawyer, the local office asked the appointed lawyer to prepare an appeal. The concerned lawyer having prepared the same along with petitions of condonation and stay, .ultimately submitted before the Hon'ble Court on 9.4.97 after swearing affidavit by the authorised officer of the appellant-company." 7. In drawing my attention to this paragraph which was also read over by the learned counsel for the petitioner it is submitted that the grounds set forth under this paragraph 3 may be considered to be sufficient for granting the prayer for condonation. On the other hand, Mr. I. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the respondent No.l and Mr. In drawing my attention to this paragraph which was also read over by the learned counsel for the petitioner it is submitted that the grounds set forth under this paragraph 3 may be considered to be sufficient for granting the prayer for condonation. On the other hand, Mr. I. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the respondent No.l and Mr. P. Deb Roy, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 who have filed written objections against the application for the condonation have quite vehemently submitted that the above quoted paragraph clearly indicates how vague it is and as such this petition deserves no consideration. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that practically the petitioner has not assigned any ground whatsoever which is worthy for consideration. I find considerable force in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents. A bare perusal of the paragraph as quoted above will clearly indicate that the petitioner did not assign any valid reason for the aforesaid 177 days. It has been stated that when the petitioner came to knew about the Award on 15.7.96 the Divisional Office asked the Investigator to confirm the appellant-petitioner regarding the vehicular documents. It is necessary to mention here that this insurance company also contested the claim petition. Therefore; why again they felt it necessary to ascertain from the Investigator is not at all understandable to me as no cogent reason in this regard has been assigned. It has been stated that the vehicle was driven without the driver of the owner. How that ground can be taken by the petitioner is also not at all intelligible to me as the same has also not beep explained by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, quite strenuously argued that in an application for condonation the petitioner is not required to explain the day-to-day delay. Here again I cannot help making the observation that this Court never asked the petitioner to make any explanation for day-to-day delay. Therefore, such submission is considered redundant. However, Mr. Ali has referred to a decision rendered in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantanag & another vs. Mst Katiji & others reported in AIR 197 SC 1353. Here again I cannot help making the observation that this Court never asked the petitioner to make any explanation for day-to-day delay. Therefore, such submission is considered redundant. However, Mr. Ali has referred to a decision rendered in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantanag & another vs. Mst Katiji & others reported in AIR 197 SC 1353. A question for condonation of delay came before their Lordships in connection with the aforesaid case and that question was dealt with by their Lordship under paragraph 3 of the judgment. Under paragraph 3 of the judgment it was observed by their Lordships that 'every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. Here again, I feel it necessary to mention that this Court never asked the petitioner to explain the day-to-day delay. But this Court desired to know whether any reason whatever it may be has been assigned for this 177 days. It appears to me that the learned counsel for the petitioner could not understand the question and made some submissions which were not necessary. Consequently, this decision is also considered to be not relevant at all for the present purpose. The next decision referred to by Mr. Ali is a decision rendered in the case of State of Haryana vs. Chandramani & others, reported in AIR 1996 SC 1623 . This case relates to an application for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State Govt. In this case their Lordships made the following observation : "When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the buch ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression 'sufficient cause' should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather that the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to an characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to the requires adoption of pragmatic approach injustice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Govt at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapse, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual woul always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants." 9. From the above observation of the Supreme Court it is clear that when the State is an applicant for condonation of delay it deserves some liberal consideration so that substantial justice to the parties might be done. It has also been pointed out by their Lordships that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. Simultaneously, it has also been observed by their Lordships that the officer responsible for the lapse should be made personally responsible. The instant petition is not by Govt. 10. In this context Mr. Simultaneously, it has also been observed by their Lordships that the officer responsible for the lapse should be made personally responsible. The instant petition is not by Govt. 10. In this context Mr. Ali has also referred a decision of the Rajasthan High Court which was passed in the case Urban Improvement Trust vs. Poonam Chand, reported in AIR 1997 Rajasthan 134, Referring to this decision Mr. Ali has submitted that at least memo of appeal should be perused to see whether there is any merit in this appeal. In the aforesaid decision of the Rajasthan High Court learned Single Judge made the observation under paragraph 19 of his judgment that before rejecting the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act and dismissing appeals as barred by lapse of time, the Courts of law are required to put a glance as a condition precedent on the merits of the appeals and unless the appeals are found to be hopelessly devoid of merits ordinarily efforts should be made to decide the appeals on merits. On the basis of the aforesaid judgment Mr. Ali has argued that the memo of appeal should be read to examine if the appeal has got any merit or not. I have, therefore, taken the pains in going through the memo of appeal particularly the grounds as enumerated under letters (a), (b), (c) etc I find that there is practically no substantial ground which deserves consideration. On going through the grounds I find that the appellant-petitioner virtually lost sight of the fact that there is a specific provision in the Act according to which the defence of the insurance company is very much limited and circumscribed. There is a Full Court decision of this Court which is available in (1992) 2 GLR 391 (United India Insurance Co Ltd, Regional Office vs. Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Lakhimpur & others)(1992 (2) GLJ 296). Under paragraph 10 of the judgment in that case it was observed as under: "Under the common law an insurer has no right to be made a party to the action by the injured person against the insured. But such a right has been given to the insurer under section 96 (2) of the 1939 Act. It is a right created by statute and its content necessarily depends on the provisions of the statute. But such a right has been given to the insurer under section 96 (2) of the 1939 Act. It is a right created by statute and its content necessarily depends on the provisions of the statute. It is clear that the insurer can raise only those defences which are permitted under section 96 (2) (section 149 of the 1988 Act) unless the insurer has in the policy reserved the right to defend the action in the name of the insured, in which case all defences open to the insured are open to the insurer also." 11. As already stated some of those grounds mentioned in the memo of appeal are that the vehicle was driven by some unauthorised driver, that the Tribunal did not consider the evidence and peculiar nature of the case, that the Tribunal did not take into account the pleadings, that the condition of the policy was breached etc. The insurance company did not adduce any evidence. Moreover, I am of the opinion that if there is inordinate delay and this delay is not explained, atleast with some reason, there is no scope to examine the merit of the appeal. The decision in AIR 1997 Rajasthan 134 (supra) is not applicable to the present case as discussion made above will clearly indicate that no permissible ground has actually been set forth. If any condition of the insurance policy is breached then it is incumbent upon the insurance company to produce the insurance policy to show that some condition/conditions were violated. But that having not been done during trial there is no scope to advance such argument during hearing of a application for condonation. The grounds which have been assigned are so vague that it does not indicate why such period was needed for the purpose. Nothing has been mentioned in that regard. Why the Investigator was needed to be pointed is also not explained and whether the Investigator submitted any report has also not been stated.. 12. For all the reasons as stated above I find no merit in this petition for condonation of the delay and accordingly it is dismisssed with costs.