JUDGMENT : Pradipta Ray, J. - The petitioners as plaintiffs instituted O. S. No. 217 of 1986 in the Court of Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Balasore for declaration of their right, title and possession over the disputed land measuring Ac. 0.92 decimals comprising a tank, its embankment and vacant land with trees thereon and for permanent injunction restraining the opp. parties 1 to 7 from interfering with their possession over the disputed land. The petitioners also filed an application being Misc. Case No. 143 of 1986 for temporary injunction. The learned trial Judge by order dated October 14, 1987 granted temporary injunction restraining the opp. parties 1 to 7 from interfering with the petitioners' possession over the disputed land until further orders. The suit, however, came to be dismissed for default on July, 27, 1990. On an application filed under Order 9, Rule 9, C.P.C. the suit was restored to file on December 13, 1991. The petitioners thereafter filed an application before the learned trial Judge seeking police help to implement the order of injunction dated October 14, 1987 but the same was rejected on March 26, 1993. On April 22, 1996 another application was filed by the petitioners before the learned trial Judge praying for an order directing the Officer-in-charge of Soro police station to render police help at the time of catching fish from the disputed tank. The learned trial Judge by order dated May 4, 1996 allowed the said application by directing the Officer-in-charge of Soro police station to ensure compliance of the injunction order dated October 14, 1987 and to render necessary police help to the petitioners at the time of catching and, removing fish from the tank. 2. The opp. parties 1 to 7, being aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated May 4, 1996 filed Civil Revision No. 21 of 1996 before the learned District Judge, Balasore. By the impugned order dated August 31, 1996 (Annexure-2) the learned District Judge allowed the revision holding inter alia, that although the suit was restored by order dated December 13, 1991 the order of injunction passed earlier to the dismissal of the suit did not automatically revive and as such the question of its implementation through police help did not arise. The correctness, legality and propriety of the aforesaid order of the learned District Judge is assailed in this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The correctness, legality and propriety of the aforesaid order of the learned District Judge is assailed in this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 3. Despite service of notice, opp. parties 1 to 7 have not entered appearance. 4. Shri S. Mishra-2, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the learned District Judge committed an error of law in holding that the order of interim injunction does not automatically revive with the restoration of the suit. He has further submitted that the learned District Judge erred in holding such view because he failed to appreciate the distinction between the provisions relating to the order of attachment before judgment under Order 38, Rule 5, C.P.C. and an interim order made under Order 39, C.P.C. The learned counsel has informed us that there is no decision of this Court on the point and has also filed a memo to that effect. 5. There can be no dispute that interlocutory orders get dissolved with the dismissal of the suit even if it was dismissed for default. But the question that arises for decision in this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is : With the restoration of the suit dismissed for default, does an interlocutory order of injunction automatically resuscitate? 6. This very question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of Patna High Court in Bankim Chandra and Others Vs. Chandi Prasad. Khaleel Ahmad J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench drew distinction between two cases, namely, a case in which order of attachment before judgment was passed but the suit was dismissed for default and then restored to file and another case in which interlocutory orders like stay or injunction were passed and the suit was restored after it was dismissed for default. In the former case in view of express provisions of Order 38, Rule 9, C.P.C. which states that where an order is made for attachment before judgment, the Court shall order the attachment to be withdrawn when the defendant furnishes the security required together with security for the costs of the attachment, or when the suit is dismissed, it was held that the order of attachment before judgment loses all its force once the suit is dismissed and it does not automatically revive with restoration of suit. This rule cannot apply to a case wherein an interlocutory order like stay or injunction was granted but the suit was dismissed for default and then restored to file. It was observed by the Bench as follows : "Orders like one for stay are nothing but ancillary orders and they are all meant to aid and supplement the ultimate decision arrived at in the main suit or appeal. Therefore, once a suit or appeal dismissed for default is restored by the order of the Court, all ancillary orders passed in the suit or appeal before its dismissal also revive and operate since that date with all their legal implications unless there is any other factor on the record or in the order passed to show to the contrary." The ratio of the aforesaid case of the Division Bench was followed in Ranjit Singh Vs. Dr. Sarda Ranjan Prasad Sinha. The same opinion was expressed by Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Nandipati Rami Reddi and Others Vs. Nandipati Padma Reddy and Others. In Paragraph 7 of the judgment the Bench observed as follows : "Clause (1) of Rule 9, of Order 9 C.P.C. empowers the Court, once it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for non-appearance of the appellant, is set aside the dismissal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit. That means if the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing at the time of hearing, it can revive the suit after setting aside the dismissal order. Once the dismissal order is set aside, the parties would be placed in the position in which they were when the suit was dismissed for default. The suit will proceed after restoration as if there was no order of dismissal. Clause (1) of Rule 9 clearly means this. Therefore, it follows that the interlocutory orders, which had been passed before the order of dismissal, would also be revived along with the suit when the order of dismissal has been set aside and the suit has been restored. The Bench was conscious of the position of a case in which during the period of interregnum, i.e. after the dismissal of the suit and before it is restored to file the defendant enters upon the suit land. The Bench was conscious of the position of a case in which during the period of interregnum, i.e. after the dismissal of the suit and before it is restored to file the defendant enters upon the suit land. In paragraph 9 of the judgment the Court observed as follows : "In regard to the illustrations given by Sri Bapi Raju the position stands differently. Then the suit stood dismissed and before restoration if the defendant has made some alienations, the alienations would not ipso facto become invalid and unenforceable on the restoration of the suit. The plaintiff will have to take other appropriate proceedings to avoid that alienation. That is because when the alienation was made it was in accordance with law and not contrary to any order of the Court. Further, the rights of strangers or third parties are brought into play during that time and simple restoration of the suit would not ipso facto affect the validity of the alienation. Likewise, when there was an injunction before the dismissal of the suit, if the defendant enters upon possession of the suit land after the dismissal of the suit for default, no proceedings for contempt of Court can be taken against him after the restoration of the suit. That is also because the defendant entered upon possession of the land after the suit was dismissed and when the injunction order was not dismissed and when the injunction order was not actually in force though it was revived later with the restoration. But these instances or illustrations cannot affect the general rule that when the suit is restored the interlocutory orders and their operation during the period of interregnum are revived." 7. In the impugned judgment the learned District Judge noted the views expressed in the aforesaid decisions of Patna High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court, but he preferred to follow the decisions reported in Gangappa Vs. Boregowda and Others Abdul Hamid Vs. Karim Bux and Others, and Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow Vs. Ved Prakash, without appreciating the ratio of those decisions presumably because the decisions in Gangappa's case and Abdul Hamid's case are Full Bench decisions. 8. In Gangappa Vs. Boregowda and Others Abdul Hamid Vs. Karim Bux and Others, and Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow Vs. Ved Prakash, without appreciating the ratio of those decisions presumably because the decisions in Gangappa's case and Abdul Hamid's case are Full Bench decisions. 8. In Gangappa Vs. Boregowda and Others, High Court was not considering the effect of restoration of a suit which was dismissed for default, on an interim order passed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C., In the said case the question for determination was : Whether the attachment before judgment which ceased to be in force with the dismissal of the suit will revive when the decree dismissing the suit is subsequently reserved and a decree in plaintiff's favour is passed by the same Court or by a Superior Court and if revived whether the revival will be in force from the date on which the attachment before judgment is effected as provided for in the Code." We have already pointed out, the difference between an order of attachment before judgment and an interlocutory/interim order passed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. No doubt, in paragraph 10 of the judgment the Full Bench made certain observations about the interlocutory orders in general, but the said observations were in the nature of an obiter and did not lay down any proposition of law. 9. There is also a difference between the effect of restoration of a suit which was dismissed for default and that of reversal of a final decree of dismissal of suit by a superior Court. Interlocutory orders passed by the trial Court come to an end with the disposal of the suit and in appeal fresh interim orders are required to be passed. In such cases, the interim orders passed in the suit cannot revive. But when a suit which has been dismissed for default is restored to file the suit itself revives along with all ancillary orders subsisting on the date of dismissal. Ratio of the decision in Gangappa's case does not apply to the present case. 10. In Abdul Hamid Vs. Karim Bux and Others, the question involved was whether on the dismissal of a suit for default an order of attachment before judgment automatically lapsed and whether fresh order of attachment was necessary on the restoration of the suit. Ratio of the decision in Gangappa's case does not apply to the present case. 10. In Abdul Hamid Vs. Karim Bux and Others, the question involved was whether on the dismissal of a suit for default an order of attachment before judgment automatically lapsed and whether fresh order of attachment was necessary on the restoration of the suit. The decision in Abdul Hamid's case was confined to a case of attachment before judgment and the views expressed therein cannot be extended to a case like the present one. 11. In the decision reported in Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow Vs. Ved Prakash, Court was considering the effect of restoration of a suit dismissed for default on an interim order of injunction passed under Order 39, Rule 1, C.P.C. but it entirely relied upon the aforesaid two Full Bench decisions without appreciating the difference between an order of attachment before judgment and other kinds of interlocutory orders. We have already distinguished the aforesaid two Full Bench decisions and are unable to accept the view expressed in Ved Prakash's case. 12. Difference between the effect of restoration of a suit upon an interim order passed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of C.P.C. and that on an interim order of attachment before judgment has now been expressly recognised in the CPC after the amendment of 1976. By 1976 Amendment, Rule 11-A has been inserted in Order 38 of C.P.C., Rule 11A (2) of Order 38 expressly provides : "An attachment made before judgment in a suit is dismissed for default shall not become revived merely by reason of the fact that the order for the dismissal of the suit for default has been set aside and the suit has been restored." Absence of any such provision in respect of other kinds of interim orders indicates that the legislature does not intend to forbid revival of other interlocutory or interim orders with the restoration of a suit dismissed for default. 13. For the reasons aforesaid we arc in respectful agreement with the views expressed in the judgments of the Patna High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in Bankim Chandra and Others Vs. Chandi Prasad, : AIR 1978 A.P. 30 respectively. 13. For the reasons aforesaid we arc in respectful agreement with the views expressed in the judgments of the Patna High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in Bankim Chandra and Others Vs. Chandi Prasad, : AIR 1978 A.P. 30 respectively. In our view, with restoration of a suit dismissed for default all interim orders automatically revive unless (1) nature of the particular order does not permit automatic revival or its automatic revisal leads to serious complications or unworkable situations : (ii) developments during the interregnum between the date of dismissal for default and the date of restoration alter the situation in a manner making revival of a particular interim order redundant or extremely difficult or bring into play rights of innocent strangers or third parties and (iii) there is legal prohibition against such automatic revival. 14. In the circumstances, we allow this application. The impugned order passed by the District Judge is set aside. The revision application is remitted back to the Court below for fresh consideration in the light of this decision. Learned District Judge is directed to dispose of the revision application within a period of two months from the dale of communication of this order. R.K. Patra, J. 15. I agree. Final Result : Allowed