JUDGMENT In the instant writ application the petitioner No. 1 Mahadevi Birla Girls’ Higher Secondary School and Five (5) Trustees of Birla Vidya Bihar Trust have challenged the action of the State respondents in withdrawing the 80 per cent tax exemption and permit control exemption which was enjoyed by the said school by the notification dated 17th July, 1989 issued by the Joint Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Transport Department, as also the rejection of the representations made by the petitioners school for exemption from such tax, by an order issued by the Principle Secretary of the Department of Transport and Communication and communicated to the petitioner school by the Joint Secretary of the said Department by his letter dated 14th September, 1994. 2. The petitioners have prayed for issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to withdraw the said order dated 14th September, 1994 as also the aforesaid notification dated 7th July, 1989 as related to Education Institution Buses enjoying tax concession under Bengal Act (i) 1932. Prayer has also been made for declaration that the earlier tax concession granted to the Education Institution Buses cannot be taken away, altered or abrogated under the Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1979 and alternatively for a declaration that provision of Section 21 of the aforesaid 1979 Act precludes retroactivity of earlier tax concession and or remission and the aforesaid notification dated 7th July, 1989 is bad, illegal, void and outside the scope of the aforesaid 1979 Act. 3. Prayer for issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus has also been made for declaration that the Educational Institution Buses cannot be treated at par with “buses of company” and Educational Institution Buses cannot be taxed under Group-B of Schedule (i) under the State Act of 1989 and Section 21 of the aforesaid 1979 Act in absence of any guiding principle is ultra vires the Constitution. 4. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that the said school being the petitioner No.1 is one of the creations of Birla Vidya Bihar Trust created under a Registered Deed of Trust dated 31st October, 1957 and the petitioners school which is a Higher Secondary School is under the Administration Management and Control of the said trust which is duly affiliated with the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi the petitioner school owns and holds Educational Institution Buses. By a Government order dated 29th April, 1977 all the schools situating in the State of West Bengal, affiliated to the Central Board of Secondary Education were treated at par with Educational Institution recognised by the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education in the matter of granting 80 per cent tax exemption under the notification dated 26th March, 1968 and also in the matter of exemption for permit Control under Section 42(3) (g) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Accordingly the petitioners school admittedly obtained such tax exemption. The West Bengal Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1979 came into operation with effect from 26th April, 1979. Even before the same came in to operation the Secretary Regional Transport Authority, Calcutta, by a letter dated 11th October, 1978 communicated to the petitioner school that it has been decided by the Government that when any transport vehicle owned by any Educational Institution within the meaning of Section 42 (3) (g) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is used for carrying students from their residence to their institutions and back on realising of monthly conveyance charges from the students, such use should be deemed to be a use not solely for the purpose of that Educational Institution within the meaning of Section 42(3) (g) of the said Act and therefore the vehicle shall be covered by permit under Section 42(1) of the Act. The said school therefore was asked to intimate the said authorities whether monthly conveyance charges are realised from the students for carrying them from the residence to the institutions and back. After coming into operation of West Bengal Tax Act, 1979. The said school therefore was asked to intimate the said authorities whether monthly conveyance charges are realised from the students for carrying them from the residence to the institutions and back. After coming into operation of West Bengal Tax Act, 1979. Department of Transport, Government of West Bengal issued a notification dated 7th July, 1989 providing, inter alia, that only the Motor Vehicles of the class as described in the said notification shall be totally exempted from payment of the tax under the said Act of 1979 and all Motor Vehicles which were hitherto being exempted from payment of tax, but are not covered under the present notification shall be required to pay tax with effect from 1st of April, 1989. By another order dated 16th November, 1989 the Joint Secretary Department of Transport communicated that the earlier tax exemption benefits granted to different Educational Institutions, stands cancelled under the aforesaid notification dated 17th July, 1989 any Educational Institution seeking tax exemption has to apply for consideration of the Government and in absence of specific order in respect of a particular institution, no tax exemption shall be granted. Under the said order only exception was made in case of Educational Institution run wholly under the State Government or directly by the State Government Education Department. 5. The petitioner, challenged the aforesaid notification before the Original Side of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution being Matter No. 2500 of 1990 which was finally disposed of by a judgment and order dated 18th May, 1994, so far as the impugned notification dated 7th July, 1989 was given retrospective effect making it operative from 1st of April, 1989 the same was struck down declaring, inter alia, that such notification will have prospective effect. The order dated 18th of September, 1988, issued by the Secretary, R.T.A., Calcutta, was also quashed as it was held in view of sub section 3(h) of Section 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1988 the school bus of the petitioner used for the purpose of carrying students to the school and back are exempted from permit control irrespective of the question whether any conveyance charges are realised by, the school from the students. 1988 the school bus of the petitioner used for the purpose of carrying students to the school and back are exempted from permit control irrespective of the question whether any conveyance charges are realised by, the school from the students. By the said judgment and order the petitioners were given liberty to apply to the appropriate authority for tax exemption both under the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1979 and the West Bengal Additional Tax and one time tax on Motor Vehicles Act, 1989 with further direction upon the respondent that if such application was made the appropriate authority shall consider and dispose of the same in accordance with law by passing a speaking order. Thereafter a representation was made by the petitioners praying for such exemption and they were also personally heard and thereafter by the impugned order dated 14th September, 1994, such representation for tax exemption has been rejected. 6. The petitioners have challenged Section 21 of the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1979 on the ground that there is no guiding principles underlying the said section to guide the delegated authority as to what should be the criteria for granting or not granting exemption in the matter of payment of tax. The impugned order rejecting the representation of the petitioner where it has been held by the Principal Secretary that necessity for not obtaining permit for education institution basis is not related with taxation of the vehicle has been assailed on the ground that both form part of the scheme of 1979 as well as the 1989 Act wherefrom it will be clear that the taxation on vehicle is linked with the legal necessity for obtaining permit. 7. It has also been contended that under Section 66(3) of the present Act (Section 42(3) of the old Act), there is a specific and different class of exempted Vehicles including Educational Institution Buses and it being legislative class within itself under the Central Act of 1988 Educational Institution Buses belonging to the same class and category cannot be declassed and removed from the said category and cannot be treated separately and to treat the same in West Bengal Act separately is violative of the equality class of the constitution. It has also been contended that aforesaid notification dated 7th July, 1989, is violative of Articles 14 and 265 of the Constitution as there is no nexus between the scheme and the object of the 1979 Act and the provision of Section 21. It is the further contention of the petitioner that the provision of Section 21 of the said Act do not empower the executive to council the existing exemption. It is the further contention of the petitioner that Educational Institution Buses cannot be treated at par with buses of company and even if students are carried in such bus for traveling to school and coming back to their residence such bus remain Education Institution bus and therefore cannot be subject to tax and the impugned notification is therefore ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. It has also been contended following the Supreme Court decisions in case of (1) Unnikrishnan reported in 1993 (1) SCC page 645 (Paragraphs 30 and 34) and in the case of (2) Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab reported in 1994(3) SCC page 569 that the expression life means all that on earth which makes life liveable and therefore the impugned order which really amounts to attempt to tax Education is violative under Article 21 of the Constitution 8. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner although in support of the contention raised in the petition challenging constitutionality and legality of the impugned notification dated 7th July, 1989 of Section 21 of the West Bengal Tax Act. 1979 and the impugned order rejecting the representation of the petitioner, has advanced a lengthy argument relying on a large number of decisions, (the list of which appears from the written notes of submissions tiled by the writ petitioners), in view of the specific objection raised by the respondents that the self-same point has already been decided by the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Gitesh Ranjan Bhattacharjee in Matter No.2500 of 1990 it is no longer open to the petitioner to raise such points in the present petition because of the principles of res judicata and the principles analogous thereto and other points not having been urged by the petitioner in the previous writ petition although be had the opportunity to do so, such points cannot be gone into the present writ petition under the principle of constructive res judicata and the provision of order two rule two, of the Code of Civil Procedure which will be applicable to the writ application because of the rules framed by this High Court, it is necessary to examine what were the issue involved in the previous writ application and what was the decision rendered in the previous case and whether the aforesaid principles of res judicata and principles under order two, rule two of the aforesaid Code of Civil Procedure will be applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. The judgment rendered in the previous writ petition being Matter No. 2500 of 1990 has now been reported in (3) AIR 1994 Calcutta 245 Birla Vidya Vihar Trust v. State of West Bengal. 9. After going through the aforesaid decision rendered by G.R. Bhattacharjee, J., in the case of Birla Vidya Vihar Trust v. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1994 Calcutta page 245, it appears to this Court that the Learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents has rightly contended that legality and constitutionality of the 7th July, 1989 notification as also several contentions raised in the present petition are no longer open as in the aforesaid decision of Birla Vidya Vihar Trust (supra) such points were raised by the petitioner and have already been decided against the petitioners. 10. It appears from the aforesaid judgment and a copy of the previous writ petition that the said Trust in the aforesaid writ petition, inter alia. 10. It appears from the aforesaid judgment and a copy of the previous writ petition that the said Trust in the aforesaid writ petition, inter alia. prayed for a declaration that Section 2(1)(b), of the West Bengal Additional Tax and, One Time Tax of Motor Vehicles Act of 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Additional Tax Act) is ultra vires the Constitution so far as it includes the bus or Omni-Bus registered and owned by any trust or any Educational Institution or any organisation within the meaning of “bus of a company” and that the imposition of Additional Tax is not applicable to the buses of the petitioner' school. The present writ petitioner school was also one of the writ petitioners in the aforesaid case and it was prayed for granting Inter alia of the aforesaid July 1989 notification. 11. The letter dated 18th September, 1978 issued by the Secretary Regional Transport Authority, Calcutta being Annexure-‘D’ in the present writ petition was Annexure-‘D’ to the aforesaid earlier writ petition and such action of the Regional Transport Authority to treat such school bus of the petitioners school to as a contract carriage requiring the same to obtain a permit under Section 42(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939 was also under challenge in the previous writ petition. 12. It appears from the said judgment that the challenge in the said writ petition of the action of the respondents to require the school bus by which the students are taken from their residence to school and back on realising of charges to obtain a permit under Section 42(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1930 treating the same as contract carriage was upheld by His Lordship on the reasoning that under Section 42(3) of the present Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 the exemption from permit control comes as a matter of course if the requisite conditions are fulfill and such exemption is not a matter of discretion of the Government and therefore once it found that the Educational Institution is recogaised by the Government and the transport vehicles of the school is used solely for the purpose of the school the exemption is automatic and it is immaterial that conveyance charges are realised from the students for transporting them to school and back to their residence 13. But at the same time the other challenges in the said writ petitioners in the aforesaid case as to the constitutionality and legality of the said notification dated July 1989 and the various provision of the said Additional Tax Act and the West Bengal Tax Act, 1979 were rejected. 14. In Paragraph 4 of the aforesaid judgment it was specifically held by His Lordship that Section 21 of West Bengal Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1979 read with Section 72 and Section 15 of the Bengal General Class Act, 1899, leaves no scope for any doubt that the State Government has the power to amend, vary or rescind any earlier notification granting any exemption from payment of tax and may also issue fresh notification on exemption and therefore the Government notification dated 7th July. 1989 issued under, Section 21 of the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1979 has the effect of superseding the earlier notification dated 26th March, 1968, whereby 80 per cent tax exemption granted in favour of Educational Institution in respect of their buses including that of the petitioners school solely for the purpose of such institution. The reason why the aforesaid July 1989 notification supersedes the earlier notification granting such 80 per cent exemption from tax has also been discussed in details by His Lordship in the said paragraph. In the Paragraph 5 of the said judgment His Lordship rejected the contention of the writ petitioner that before withdrawing such exemption the petitioners school should have been given opportunity of hearing and that being of legitimate expectation will apply. The further contention of the petitioner in the said case that discrimination has been made by the State by withdrawing such exemption in respect of the Educational Institutions, but retaining the same in respect of Educational Institution run by and under the control of Government was also rejected in Paragraph 6 of the said judgment. The further contention of the petitioner in the said case that discrimination has been made by the State by withdrawing such exemption in respect of the Educational Institutions, but retaining the same in respect of Educational Institution run by and under the control of Government was also rejected in Paragraph 6 of the said judgment. The challenge of the petitioner of Section 21 of the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1979 on the ground that the same gives unguided and uncanalised power to the Government in the matter of exercise of its discretion for granting exemption was also rejected by His Lordship in Paragraph 7 of the judgment bolding, Inter alia, that since the aforesaid section authorises the State;; Government to grant such exemption if it thinks fit in the public interest, the public interest itself is a guiding factor in the matter and therefore it cannot be said that there any unguided power was vested with the State Government. 15. In Paragraph 8 of the judgment the contention of the petitioners that the bus of an Educational Institution having been included in the definition of a bus of a Company under Section 2(1) (b) of the Additional Tax Act, such classification is highly discriminatory and arbitrary and bad in law was also rejected by His Lordship holding, inter alia, that there is no scope for holding the definition the bus of a Company as given in Section 2(1) (b) of the Additional Tax Act is offensively discriminatory or is bad in law. It was also held by His Lordship in Paragraph 9 of the said judgment that the school bus of the petitioner school come under the definition of Omni-Bus and therefore they do not come under the definition of motor car and consequentially the school bus of the petitioners school cannot come under the category described in A(2) of the Schedule (I) to the Additional Tax Act of 1989. His Lordship however in Paragraph 10 of the said judgment struck down only the retrospectivity of the aforesaid notification dated 7th July, 1989 which was sought to be given effect to from 1st of April, 1981, but at the same time holding, inter alto, that the said notification will be given effect prospectively. 16. His Lordship however in Paragraph 10 of the said judgment struck down only the retrospectivity of the aforesaid notification dated 7th July, 1989 which was sought to be given effect to from 1st of April, 1981, but at the same time holding, inter alto, that the said notification will be given effect prospectively. 16. By the aforesaid judgment and order liberty was given to the petitioners to apply before the appropriate authority to pray for exemption from tax both under the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1979 as also the Additional Tax, 1989 with the direction if such application was made the appropriate authority shall consider and dispose of the same in accordance with law by passing a speaking order after giving opportunity of bearing to the petitioner. 17. It will thus appears from the aforesaid judgment that most of the points which have been raised in the present writ petition including the legality and validity of Section 21 of the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Tax Act. 1979 and the aforesaid notification dated 7th July, 1989 have already been decided in the said earlier proceeding between the parties against the petitioners holding the same to be legal and valid. It has therefore rightly been submitted by the respondents that it is no longer open to the petitioners to agitate such points once again in the present writ petition as the same will be barred by the principle of res judicata or principles analogous thereto. 18. The submission of Mr. P.K. Dutta, the Ld. Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the aforesaid earlier judgment of Gitesh Ranjan Bhattacharjee, J. is not a finality in the matter of adjudication of the issues involved as there was no clear finding of His Lordship in the said judgment as to whether Section 23(2) of the Act of 1979 can be whittled down by Section 22 and/or 25 of the Bengal General Classes Act of 1899, the Act of 1932 and the Act of 1979 being a subsequent legislation and whether a special Act can be overridden by an earlier General Act is misconceived and not tenable at all. Similarly the contention of the petitioner that. Similarly the contention of the petitioner that. constitutionality of Section 21 of the Act of 1979 in the context of the impugned notification dated 7th July, 1989 having been challenged on various grounds in the present petition the principles of res judicata will not be applicable and in view of the fresh adjudication dated. 14th September, 1994 by the Principal Secretary read with a Constitutional point taken on the various grounds in the present writ petition, it is open to the Court to review the order dated 14th September, 1994 and while doing the same this Court will not be precluded from examining the constitutional validity of the impugned notification and for examining the scope of Section 21 of the Act of 1979 vis-a-vis Section 23 (2) (a) of the said Act is equally misconceived and untenable If such argument of the petitioner is to be accepted, there will be no finality of any litigation. If allegedly the abovementioned points were urged in the previous writ proceeding, but not decided by His Lordship and the Court held against the petitioner on other points, such undecided points will be decided to have been impliedly overruled by the Court. The petitioner not having preferred any appeal against the said judgment and order cannot agitate such points in the present petition 19. When in the previous writ petition the petitioner challenged the legality and the validity of Section 21 of the said Act as also the aforesaid notification dated 7th July, 1989, it was very much open to the petitioner to challenge also the constitutionality of the same. But admittedly the petitioner not having challenged the constitutionality of such Section 21 of the said Act and the said notification will be precluded from raising such points in the present writ petition and the principle of constructive res judicata will be very much applicable in the present case. 20. In the case of (4) Smt. Molina Ghosh v. State of West Bengal reported in 1988(2) CLJ page 220 a Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court held that a ground not urged or which could have been urged but not urged in earlier writ proceedings will not be available in a subsequent writ petition under the principles of res judicata or constructive res judicaa or principles of res judicata or constructive res judicata or principles analogous thereto. The Division Bench relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in the case of (5) Debilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, Batlam & Ors. reported in AIR 1965 SC 1150 , where the Supreme Court held that though the Courts dealing with the question of the infringement of fundamental rights must consistently endeavour to sustain the said rights and should strike down their unconstitunal invasion, it would not be right to ignore the principles of res judicata altogether in dealing with writ petitions filed by citizens alleging the contravention of their fundamental rights, inasmuch as considerations of public policy cannot be ignored in such cases. The same view was taken earlier in the case of (6) Azizus Suvan v. Union of India reported in AIR 1966 Calcutta 570 where has been held, inter alia, that the principles of res judicata will apply to the application under Articles 32 and 2226 of the Constitution and mere addition of a party or a new ground which might and ought to have been raised but not raised in the earlier petition will not exclude the operation of the principles of res judicata. Some view was taken in the case of (7) Chief Manager & Disciplinary Authority, Allahabad Bank v. S.K. Chakraborty reported in 95 Calcutta Weekly Notes page 366 (para 7). 21. It has been sought to be contended by Mr. Dutta the Id. Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner that in view of the fact in the present writ petition the very constitutionality of the aforesaid provision of the Act is under challenge, the aforesaid provisions of constructive res judicata will not apply. 22. The aforesaid contention of the petitioner however is not tenable in view of the aforesaid decision of the Calcutta Law Journal in the case of Molina Ghosh v. State of West Bengal reported in 1988(2) CLJ page 20 and Chief Manager and Disciplinary Authority, Allahabad Bank v. S.K. Chakraborty reported in 95 CWN 366 wherein it has been held, Inter alia, that even fundamental rights must also be considered and controlled in the light of public policy as involved in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 23. 23. The challenge of the petitioner in the present writ application against the inclusion of buses of Educational Institution in the definition of buses of company under the Additional tax Act is also not open any further to the petitioner in view of the further fact that in the case of (8) Sarat Chandra Sarma and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. reported in 1996(1) CLJ 166 , wherein the vires of the aforesaid Additional Tax Act was under challenge, a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court upheld the vires of the Act and Inter alia, rejected the challenge of the definition of “buses of company” and dismissed the writ petition. 24. It has however rightly been contended by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that in view of the decision of a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in the case of (9) State of West Bengal v. Hariprasad Singh reported in 93 CWN 1158, notwithstanding Rule 53 of the rules framed by this Hon'ble Court regarding application tinder Article 226, in view of the explanation to the provision 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the provision of the Code relating to suit will not apply to the writ proceedings and consequently the provision under Order 2 Rule 2 will not apply. It appears that subsequently a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in the case of (10) State of West Bengal v. Nripendranath reported in 1991 (2) CLJ 403 although has expressed serious doubt about the correctness of the aforesaid decision of the earlier Division Bench in the case of State of West Bengal v. Hariprasad Singh (supra) being a bench of Co-ordinate jurisdiction kept the said point open. 25 But even if the provision of Order 2 Rule 2 is not applicable, the same really does not help the petitioner in the Instant case Inasmuch as even then the principles of constructive res judicata or principles analogous thereto will very much apply to the writ proceedings as it has been held consistently by the Supreme Court and High Court, including other High Courts. 26. In fact the decision which has been cited by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner of the Supreme Court in the case of (11) Sarat Chandra Muley v. State of Maharastra and Ors. 26. In fact the decision which has been cited by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner of the Supreme Court in the case of (11) Sarat Chandra Muley v. State of Maharastra and Ors. reported in Judgment Today 1995 (7) SC 317 which is a pest 1976 amendment of Code of Civil Procedure it has been held that the points which were available to the petitioner on the first writ proceeding but were not raised, will not available to him to a subsequent writ proceeding and he is precluded from raising. such controversy once again. The decision relied upon by the petitioner of the Supreme Court in the case of (12) Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India reported in AIR 1990 SC page 334 also does not held the petitioner. In the said case the Supreme Court held that a decision on an abstract question of law unrelated to facts which gives rise to a right cannot operate as res judicata nor also a decision on the question of jurisdiction will be res judicata in a subsequent suit of proceedings. But in the selfsame decision it was also held that if a question of law is related to the fact in issue, an erroneous decision on such a question of law may operate as res judicata between the parties in the subsequent suit or proceeding, if the cause of action is same 27. In the instant case the decisions in the previous writ proceedings were not on abstract question of law at all, but on question of law related to the facts in issue between the parties which are sought to be re-opened by the petitioner in the present writ petition. Although the same is sought to be done in the gurb of a separate cause of action, the challenge in the present writ petition is not merely confined to the order of the principal secretary simplicitor, but the challenge is also very much against the self-same notification dated 7th July, 1989 withdrawing the exemption from taxes which was allegedly in the previous writ petition is the same as the previous petition. 28. 28. I am also unable to accept the submission of the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner that the respondents not having pleaded the bar of res judicata in their affidavit-in opposition it will be deemed that the objection on such ground has been waived by the respondents, whether there is a waiver or not is a question of fact to be decided under the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case in my view there has been no waiver of such plea of res judicata by the respondents. The respondents very much raised such question of res judicata and constructive res judicata at the time of hearing right from the beginning as also as preliminary point and made elaborate submission on such points relying on a number of decisions. The writ petitioner at that stage did not object to the same by raising the plea of waiver but such plea has been raised only in the written notes of argument. 29. Interestingly the petitioner who are raising such point of technicality to avoid the principles of res judicata. themselves however are not so particular in their own writ petition, inasmuch as they have not pleaded at all In the writ petition their challenge as to the legality, validity and constitutionality of the notification dated 7th July, 1989 and various provisions of the said Acts. Such challenge have been made in the grounds under Paragraph 20 of the petition which however are submissions of the petitioners and not at all their pleadings. 30. As pointed out hereinbefore the Courts have consistently held even if the principles of res judicata may not be applicable strictly to the writ proceeding the principles analogous thereto will certainly apply as a matter of public policy so that there is a finality in the litigation and the same is true even in a case when the fundamental or any other constitutional right is affected. In this connection the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (13) AIR 1961 SC 1457 , Daryao v. State of U.P.; (14) AIR 1986 SC 391 , Forward Construction v. Probhat Mondal ; (15) AIR 1990 SC 1607 , Direct Recruit v. State of Maharastra; AIR 1990 SC 334 , Supreme Court Employee, v. Union of India; (16) AIR 1990 SC 414, C.R. Venugopal v. N.W. Charitie and (17) AIR 1993 SC 781, Junior Telecom Officers v. Union of India may be referred to. 31. Applying such principles I am not Inclined to go into such questions of law in the instant case which the petitioner although could have raised in the earlier proceeding but did not choose to raise. 32. As to the question which have already been decided by His Lordship in the previous proceedings even if it could be said that the defence of principles of res judicata would not be available to the respondent. they not having pleased the same in their affidavit-in-opposition, such issues decided by His Lordship being question of law is certainly binding upon this Court being a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction and I do not find any reason to differ with such finding of His Lordship. I fully agree with His Lordship the very provision made in Section 21 for giving exemption in public interest itself if a sufficient guideline and cannot at all be said that the power of the State Government in the aforesaid provision is uncanalised. As it has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of (18) Express Hotel v. State of Gujrat reported in 1909 (3) SCC 677 (Paragraphs 35 to 37) that even if the statute confers the power on an authority without expressly providing guideline, the same may be inherent or inbuilt in the provision itself so as to save it from the vice of arbitrariness and unreasonableness and vesting the power of a Higher Authority like Government itself is circumstances against arbitrariness. I also fully agree with HIS Lordship that the power to supersede earlier notification by the new notification was patently there with the State Government and that apart Section 22 of the Bengal General Clauses Act also is attracted in the case, which provides that where by any act a power to issue order, rules, bye laws or notifications is conferred that power includes the power exercisable in the like manner and subject to like sanction and condition if any, to add to, amend vary or rescind any order. rules, bye laws or notifications etc. and because of the notification dated 7th July, 1989 the earlier notification granting 80 per cent tax exemption in favour of school buses stood superseded and withdrawn and that no opportunity of hearing was necessary to be given to the petitioner because of withdrawal of such exemption. I also fully agree with reasoning of His Lordship in rejecting the challenge of the petitioner as to the definition of “buses of company” and alleged discrimination in excluding a class of Vehicles from the purview of such taxation. 33. The submission of the learned Counsel of the petitioners that the issues which were involved in the previous writ petition were not finally decided by G.R. Bhattacharjee, J, which will be evident for the fact that His Lordship granted liberty to the petitioners to apply for exemption before the appropriate authority and hence the issues involves not having been finally settled the principles of res judicata will not apply, is wholly misconceived. A perusal of the judgment delivered by His Lordship in the previous case leave no manner of doubt the issues which are involved in the said petition including the challenge of the aforesaid notification on various grounds were finally decided by His Lordship. The fact that the petitioners were given liberty to apply for exemption before the appropriate authority does not change the position that the issues which were involved in the previous petition9 were finally decided as to the legality and validity of the said notification. Such decision notwithstanding under the provision of the Act itself it was open to the petitioner to apply for exemption and it is because of the aforesaid reason such liberty was granted to the petitioner. Such decision notwithstanding under the provision of the Act itself it was open to the petitioner to apply for exemption and it is because of the aforesaid reason such liberty was granted to the petitioner. But while deciding such question of exemption on the application of the petitioner it was not certainly open to the appropriate authority to go into the question of legality and validity of the said notifications and the other provisions of the Act after such judicial pronouncement in respect thereof. But on the said application it was for the appropriate authority to decide in exercise of its discretion whether such exception should be granted to the petitioners within the framework of the existing provision of law. 34. In the aforesaid judgment His Lordship also never indicated that the appropriate authority while considering the application of the petitioners for exemption for payment of tax will be entitled to go into the question of legality and validity of the impugned notification and other provisions of the Act. 35. In such view of the matter in the present writ application it is only open to the petitioners to challenge the correctness of the order passed by the appropriate authority rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for exemption for payment of tax. 36 After going through the impugned order passed by the Principal Secretary department of transport rejecting the application of the petitioners for exemption I am of the view that no interference is called for with the said order passed by the Principal Secretary. 37. It cannot be said' that the Principal Secretary by passing the impugned order and exercising the discretion in the matter of granting of exemption, has acted arbitrarily or illegally. It appears from the impugned order that he has rejected the prayer for exemption by passing a speaking order and the reason given for rejection of the prayer appears to this Court quite tenable. It has rightly been held by the said Principal Secretary that the law relating to the require me of obtaining a permit and the law relating to tax on Motor Vehicles are different legislations based on totally different consideration inasmuch as permit is for the purpose of controlling of transport Vehicles whereas tax is an imposition made for public purposes without reference to any specific benefit to be conferred on the tax payer. 38. 38. It is now well-settled that tax is a compulsory extraction of money from the citizen and there is no equity in taxation, and the State has got the power to impose tax on any subject for the purpose of raising revenue. It has been rightly contended by the learned Advocate General relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (19) Federation of Hotel and Restaurant Association of India v. Union of India reported In 1989(3) SCC 634 (Paragraph 46) that the legislatures have a wide discretion in selection of persons subject matters, events etc. for taxation and it does not have to tax everything in order to be able to tax something. 39. It has also been rightly held by the Principal Secretary the fact that the school buses of the petitioners enjoyed 80 per cent tax concession under the previous Government notification dated 26th March, 1968 does not entitle the petitioners to enjoy such exemption from taxation for all time to come and all previous notifications granting such exemption now having been superseded by the present notification dated 7th July, 1989 which has been held to be valid taking effect prospectively, the petitioners are liable to pay such tax for the school buses. I also do not find any error or illegality in the impugned order of the said Principal Secretary in refusing to exercise such discretion in granting exemption on the reason that when the concerned schools are realising fees from the students for taking them to school from their home and back and exemption has not been granted by the State Government even to the ambulance and mobile dispensary owned by the Municipality, Local Bodies etc. when service of ambulance is not rendered free of cost, there is no reason why the petitioner would be granted such exemption. when service of ambulance is not rendered free of cost, there is no reason why the petitioner would be granted such exemption. The State having the power to tax such vehicles of the petitioners under the aforesaid Acts and by the 7th July, 1989 notification the State Government now having decided as a matter of a policy not to grant any exemption, Inter alia, to the school buses as fees are realised from the students, In supersession of the earlier notification and it being a fiscal policy of the State to tax the school buses for the purpose of augmentation of revenue, the impugned order of Principal Secretary rejecting the prayer for grant of exemption for the school buses of the petitioner cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal. As held by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of (20) Bombay Conductors and Electricals Ltd. v. Government of India reported in 1986(23) ELT page 87, while imposition of tax is the prerogative of the legislature, administration of tax laws is the responsibility of the executive and since the legislature being unable to amend tax laws urgently delegates such power to the executive and therefore granting of exemption from payment of tax on withdrawal of the same is a legislative action. It is also not be overlooked, the State is obliged neither to grant exemption from payment of tax nor to perpetuate an exemption once granted, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of (21) B.A. Jayram v. Union of India reported in AIR 1983 SC page 1005 (Paragraph 10). The petitioners are therefore liable to pay tax under the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1969 as also under the said Additional Tax Act for all their school buses with effect from the date of the said 9th July, 1989 notification by which the 80 per cent exemption enjoyed by the petitioners for their school buses was withdrawn and which has been held in the previous writ proceeding to be taking prospective effect. 40. The writ application therefore fails and the same is hereby dismissed with costs assessed at 100 G.M. All interim orders stand vacated. 41. 40. The writ application therefore fails and the same is hereby dismissed with costs assessed at 100 G.M. All interim orders stand vacated. 41. It may be recorded herein that on July 9, 1996, the school buses of the petitioners which were seized for non-payment of such taxes were directed to be released by a conditional interim order, which is quoted hereunder :– “Let the main writ application come up for hearing at the top of the list irrespective of the part heard matters on 25.7.96. Affidavit-in-Opposition to the writ application be filed by 17.7.96. Reply, if any, thereto be filed by 24.7.96. In the meantime, there will be an interim order to the effect that if the petitioners furnish a Bank Guarantee to the tune of Rs.75,000/- without prejudice to the right and contentions of the parties the respondents shall forthwith release the vehicles bearing police registration Nos. WBY 5907 and WBY 5692, which have been seized. Pending hearing of this application, the petitioner school shall be permitted to run the school buses, if owned by the school concerned for which the respondents shall not take any coercive measures against the petitioner school for plying the said vehicles without payment of additional taxes or any other taxes. It is made clear that before release of the aforesaid two seized vehicles on furnishing of Bank Guarantee the petitioner school will be at liberty to ply the other buses owned by the school for carrying students as indicated above. But such Bank Guarantee as aforesaid must be furnished by 16th July, 1996. It is further made clear that during pendency of the writ application the petitioner school shall remain restrained from transferring, encumbering or alienating in any manner whatsoever the school buses, which the petitioner school will be running for the students as mentioned in the writ petition. It is made clear that in the event the writ application fails and it is held by this Court that the petitioner school is liable to pay such taxes in respect of the vehicles in question such amounts of taxes, which might be due in respect of the said vehicles, shall have to be deposited by the petitioners within a month from the date of decision of the Court. All parties will act on a xeroxed signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking” 42. All parties will act on a xeroxed signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking” 42. Now that the writ petition has failed and It has been held by this Court the petitioners are liable to pay such taxes and Additional Taxes for their school buses, the petitioner must deposit the amount of such taxes due in respect of their school buses within a month from date in terms of the said interim order. Under such circumstances it is directed that the respondent shall forthwith encash the Bank Guarantee which was furnished by the petitioners under the order of the Court and the petitioners shall deposit the balance amount of such taxes due in respect of all the school buses of the petitioners within a month from date. In default the respondents will be entitled to take all steps in accordance with law for realisation of such taxes with penalty and interest including seizure and sale of such buses. All parties to act on the signed copy of the operative portion of the judgment.