HET RAM v. STATE OF H. P. — 1997 DIGILAW 215 (HP)

JUDGMENT: Mjsriasvasaa, GJ. (Oral):- The lands, of the petitioners were acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act mi an award was passed on 14.8.1986. A supplementary award was passed on 18.2.1987. But at the time when the Supplementary award was passed the parties were not present. A notice normally would have to be issued under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) informing the parties that the award had been passed but such a notice was not issued. The petitioners came to know of the award on 10.4.1987 and sent a communication on 5.5.1987 to the second respondent, in which they said clearly that they wanted to file a Reference petition and therefore, required a copy of the supplementary award dated 18.2.1987. It was also mentioned in that letter that they had applied for the copy on 10.4.1987 but till then they had not been supplied with such a copy. Thereafter also, the petitioners did not get a copy of the award. They sent a communication on 9.5.1988 under Section 18 of the Act claiming enhancement of the compensation giving all the details on the basis of which they wanted such an enhancement. Along with that communication they had sent a covering letter, in which it had been stated that the payment of compensation was received by them earlier under protest and they wanted the matter to be referred to the District Judge for disposal in accordance with law under Section 18 of the Act. It was also stated by them that there were sufficient reasons for holding that the petition for reference was within time and in the alternative there were sufficient reasons to condone the delay in filing the said petition. 2. The said petition for reference was rejected by the second respondent by an order dated 1.7.1988. The second respondent held that the petitioners having come to know the award on 10.4.1987 but did not prefer the application within six months there from under Section 18(2) (b) of the Act and thus, the petition was barred by limitation. The second respondent also held that there was no application condonation of delay by the petitioners at consequently, the petition for Reference not sustainable. Aggrieved by the said order of the second respondent, the petitioners have come forward with the present writ petition. 3. The second respondent also held that there was no application condonation of delay by the petitioners at consequently, the petition for Reference not sustainable. Aggrieved by the said order of the second respondent, the petitioners have come forward with the present writ petition. 3. The first contention urged by learned counsel is that without a copy of the award for which an application had been made by the petitioners, they would not be in a position to know the details of the award and without such details they could not be expected to seek a Reference under Section 18 of the Act It is contended that a petitioner for copies having been filed and not complied with by the second respondent, the petition for Reference could not be said to be barred by limitation. It is also argued that the letter which accompanied the petition for reference was itself a petition for condonation of delay in seeking the Reference and the second respondent ought to have condoned the delay taking the facts and circumstances of the case into account 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners places reliance on a judgment of this Court in Dharam Dass & Ors. v. State of H.P. & anr., 1988(1) Sim L.C.. 1110. In that case, the petitioners had filed applications before the Land Acquisition Collector for condonation of delay in seeking a Reference under Section 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act Those applications were dismissed on the ground that sufficient cause was not made out The Bench of this Court held that the application for condonation of delay ought to have been ordered by the Land Acquisition Collector as he failed to supply the certified copy of the award in time, for which the petitioners had made already made applications. It was also held by the Bench that the Land Acquisition Collector failed to exercise his power to condone the delay and that on the facts and circumstances of the case it was impossible for the Court to hold that no sufficient cause was made out. 5. The said ruling will have no application in the present case as there was no application for condonation of delay by the petitioners before the Land Acquisition Collector. 5. The said ruling will have no application in the present case as there was no application for condonation of delay by the petitioners before the Land Acquisition Collector. Secondly, we do not find any provision in the Land Acquisition Act to enable the party to file an application for condonation of delay when there is a delay in seeking the Reference under Section 18(2) of the Act. In the absence of any specific provision to that effect, it is not possible for the Collector to condone the delay, even if there is an application by the concerned party for such condonation. Under Section 18(2) clause (b) of the proviso is very clear and specific in its terms. Under that proviso there arc two periods of limitations, one being six weeks from the date of the receipt of the notice under Section 12(2) and the other being six months from the date of the Collectors award, whichever period shall first expire. Hence, it cannot be contended that the Collector is empowered to condone the delay i seeking a Reference under Section 18(2) by any party. It is ell settled by now that Section 5 of the Limitation Act will not apply to the proceedings before an Authority, which is not a Court. Hence, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners to treats the letter accompanying the petition for Reference as an application for condonation of delay cannot accepted. 6. It is also not possible for us to accept the contention that unless a certified copy is furnished to the petitioners, they will not be in a position to seek a Reference under Section 18 of the Act. As already pointed out, two fixed points from which the limitation has to be counted have been specified under Section 18(2) of the Act. Hence, there is no necessity for applying for the certified copy of the award and no party can claim that he could seek a Reference only after the receipt of the certified copies of the award. 7. Further, the sub-Section contemplates an application for Reference within six weeks from the date of the receipt of the notice under Section 12(2) of the Act. The form of notice is found in paragraph 56 of the Financial Commissioners Standing Orders No.28. It is as follows. "Form of notice under Sections 12(2) and 31(1) of Act I of 1894. 7. Further, the sub-Section contemplates an application for Reference within six weeks from the date of the receipt of the notice under Section 12(2) of the Act. The form of notice is found in paragraph 56 of the Financial Commissioners Standing Orders No.28. It is as follows. "Form of notice under Sections 12(2) and 31(1) of Act I of 1894. Land Acquisition Object Gazette Case No, Notification Notice is hereby given that in the above case, in which you have been treated as a person interested, an award was made by me on the......... of-...........19under Section 11 of the Act 1 of 1894. The sum payable to you is Rs............ If you arc willing to accept it you should appear before me personally or by authorised agent on or before" Interest will not be payable in case of failure to appear." 8. It is evident there from that a notice under Section 12(2) docs not contain any particulars excepting the date of the award and the amount awarded. If the starting point of limitation under the first part of the clause (b) of the proviso of Section 18(2) of the Act is service of such notice, it is clear there from that the intention of the Legislature is not that the claimant should have full knowledge of the details of the award. According to the Legislature intention, if the parties have knowledge of the amount awarded and if they arc not satisfied therewith, the. should apply for Reference under Section 18(2) of the Act within six weeks from the service of notice under Section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the award as such, whichever period expires earlier. Hence, the contention that unless the parties arc made aware of all the details of the award, they cannot seek a Reference is not acceptable. 9. In this case, the petitioners have admitted that they became aware of the award on 10.4.1987. They have not chosen to state in the petition as to how and from what sources they came to be aware of die award. They have also not averred that they "did not know about the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector. 9. In this case, the petitioners have admitted that they became aware of the award on 10.4.1987. They have not chosen to state in the petition as to how and from what sources they came to be aware of die award. They have also not averred that they "did not know about the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector. In such circumstances, it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioners that unless the certified copy is furnished to the petitioners, they will not be in a position to seek a reference under Section 18(2) of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioners has drawn our attention to several judgments in support of his contention. In Special Deputy Collector. Land Acquisition (S.S.P.), Kurnool v. C. Sai Reddy & Ors., A.I.R. 1984 Andhra Pradesh, 24, a notice was issued under Section 12(2) of the Act, but it did not fulfill the requirement of the relevant rule. The Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that it would not be sufficient notice within the meaning of Section 12(2) of the Act and the period of limitation would not start running. 10. That judgment has no relevance in the present case as there was nfl notice at all under Section 12(2) of the Act in this case. 11. In Suraj Mal & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.. 1985 P.L.J. 2J2J there was no question of limitation. The Collector dismissed the application] for Reference on the ground that the amount of compensation was received without protest The Court held that the rejection of that application was erroneous The ruling has no relevance in the present case. 12. In Dharam Pal v. The Collector Land Acquisition Urban Development, Punjab & Anr., 1987 P.L.J. 263, a Single Judge of the Punjab and. Haryana High Court held that the Collector had no authority to decide whether an application for Reference was within time or not and that the Collector should refer the matter to the District Judge leaving the question open. With nil respect to the learned the question open. With all respect to the learned Judge, we arc unable to agree with the judgment. There is no provision in the Land Acquisition Act to enable the District Judge to decide whether an application for Reference was within time or not. With nil respect to the learned the question open. With all respect to the learned Judge, we arc unable to agree with the judgment. There is no provision in the Land Acquisition Act to enable the District Judge to decide whether an application for Reference was within time or not. As pointed out already, Section 8(2) is specific in its terms. It is for the Collector to make a Reference only when the application is within time as per the provisions of the said Section. If it is out of time, it is open to the Collector should reject the application for Reference and he has no alternative whatever under the provisions of the said Section. 13. In Ishabhi Umarbahi v. State of Gujarat & anr., AIR 1988 Gujarat 223, a Bench of Gujarat High Court held that the limitation under Section 18(2) has to be reckoned from the date of communication of the contents of the award and an application filed within the stipulated period after receipt of the contents of the award and rejection of the application as time barred is not justified. We arc unable to agree within the Division Bench of that Court. As pointed out already, the communication required under section 12(2) is not of the contents of the award but only of the factum of the passing of the award. 14. In Jit Singh v. Land Acquisition Collector, 1991(1) P.L.R. 519, the same learned Judge, who decided Dharam Pals case, who had become by then the Chief Justice of the Court, held that in an application for Reference under Section 18, the Collector had no jurisdiction to decide whether it was within time or not and he should refer the matter to the District Judge leaving the said question open. We have already expressed our dissent from such a opinion. 15. In Pali Ram & Ors. v. State of Haryana, 1994(2) P.L.R. 184, the another Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court expressed the same opinion by following the judgment in Dharam Pals case. We do not agree with the reasoning of the learned Judge. 16. Our attention has been drawn to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab & anr. v. Satinder Bir Singh, 1195(3) S.L.J. 2257. We do not agree with the reasoning of the learned Judge. 16. Our attention has been drawn to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab & anr. v. Satinder Bir Singh, 1195(3) S.L.J. 2257. The High Court had held in that case that the notice under Section 12(2) of the Act did not contain all the details of the award and, therefore, the claimant was not in a position to know the determination of the compensation for making an application under Section 18(2) of the Act. Consequently, the High Court help that there was no proper notice and the limitation prescribed under Section 18(2) had no application. Reversing that judgment of the High Court, the Supreme Court held that the limitation commenced from the date of the receipt of the notice under Section 12(2) of the Act or as envisaged under Section 18(2) and that it was not necessary for a notice under Section 12(2) to contain all the details of the award. The Supreme Court observed as follows "8. The question then is whether the notice under Section 12(2) is a valid notice From a conjoint reading of Sections 11 and 12, it is clear that notice is only an intimation of making of the award requiring the owner or person interested to receive compensation awarded under Section 11. On receipt of the notice, if the person interested receives compensation without protest, obviously no reference need be made. The determination of compensation becomes final and binds the parties. When he receives the compensation under protest as contemplated under Section 31 of the Act, the need to make the application for reference under Section 18(1) would arise. At that juncture it will be open to the person interested either to make an inspection of the award which was conclusive between him and the Collector by operation of sub - Section (1) of Section 12, or seek a certified copy of the award from the Collector and the contents. Thereon he could make necessary objection for the determination inter-alia, of compensation for the land. It is not necessary that the notice should contain all the details of the award including his consideration and its manner determination of the compensation as opined by the learned Judge of the High Court. Thereon he could make necessary objection for the determination inter-alia, of compensation for the land. It is not necessary that the notice should contain all the details of the award including his consideration and its manner determination of the compensation as opined by the learned Judge of the High Court. It is not incumbent that the person interested should immediately make the reference application on his receiving compensation under Section 31. In other words receipt of the amount and making the reference application are not simultaneous. The statutory operation of limitation mentioned by Section 18(2) does not depend on the ministerial act of communication of notice in any particular form when the Act or Rules has not prescribed any form. The limitation begins to operate from the moment the notice under Section 12(2) is received or as envisaged by Section 18(2). (9) The notice in the present case contained the amount awarded. The area acquired was not in dispute. Under these circumstances, the learned Judge was clearly in error in holding that since the notice did not contain all the details of the consideration and as to how the compensation has been determined, the notice was not a proper notice and therefore limitation did not being to run from the date of the receipt of the notice and thereby the rejection of the application was not legal." 17. This judgment of the Supreme Court is really against the contentions of the petitioner. Though Section 18(2) fixes the two points of commencement of the limitation as receipt of the notice under Section 12(2) and the Collectors award, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the later part of clause (b) of the proviso to Section 18(2) of the Act. In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer & anr., 1961 S.C. 1500, the Supreme Court held that in the case of the last part of clause (b), the relevant date will be the date on which the claimant had knowledge of the award. In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer & anr., 1961 S.C. 1500, the Supreme Court held that in the case of the last part of clause (b), the relevant date will be the date on which the claimant had knowledge of the award. The law was settled thus: "The knowledge of the property affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair - play and natural justice the expression "the date of the ward" used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively " 18. It is evident from the said passage that even if the knowledge is constructive though not actually, the period of limitation will start running That also shows that it is not necessary for a party to know the full details of the award before he seeks a Reference under Section 18(2) of the Act. However, so far as this case is concerned, the petitioners had sent a communication on 5.5.1987 to the Land Acquisition Collector, in which they had stated categorically that they wanted to file a Reference petition and required a certified copy of the supplementary award in respect of the village in question. That letter itself would amount to an application for reference under Section 18 of the Act. This position has been considered by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Venkatasami Naidu & Ors. v. State of Madras, AIR 1964 Madras 434. In that case the letter of the party read thus: "As you have not taken into account our objections and the record produced by us and as you have not included the value of the trees, the amount now determined by you is very low. We hereby make known to you that we are not in a position to accept that amount as compensation". 19. The Bench construed the said letter as an application for reference The reasoning of the Bench is found in the following passage: "Reading between the lines one can easily sec that the appellants did want proper compensation being awarded to them. One can reasonably draw the inference that they wanted the Tehsildar to take appropriate steps to secure that end as otherwise there will be no meaning for that letter at all. One can reasonably draw the inference that they wanted the Tehsildar to take appropriate steps to secure that end as otherwise there will be no meaning for that letter at all. In a recent case, W,A.No.l50 of 1963(Mad.) we had a similar situation. The statement, in a letter to the Tehsildar in that case was that the market value of the land was really higher than what has been estimated. We held that the implication of that letter was that the respondent did not accept the estimate and that he sought for a reference to Court. In the present case, the position is even clearer. The appellants have expressly stated that they are not accepting the compensation. We have no hesitation in holding that the implication of this letter is that they have asked for a reference under S. 18 of the Act." 20. We have followed recently this judgment in C.W.P. 1728/96 dated 27.2.97. The reasoning of the above cases will squarely apply in the present case also. Once the petitioners had made it clear that they wanted a reference under Section 18 of the Act to the Civil Court, which was preceded by an application for certified copy of the award for the purpose of ascertaining the full details of the award, it can be said that there is an application for reference under Section 18 by the petitioners on 5.5.1987. That letter dated j 5.5.1987 is well within the period of limitation under Section 18 of the Act. The petitioners became aware of the award only on 10.4.1987 and within a period of about a month there from, they had filed the application for reference. 21. Hence, the view taken by the Land Acquisition Collector that the application for reference is beyond the prescribed time is erroneous. 22. Learned Assistant Advocate General submits that the letter dated 5.5.1987 cannot be construed as a petition for reference as it docs not contain any detail as to the claim made by the petitioners According to him unless the amounts claimed by the petitioners arc set out. it is not possible to make a reference under Section 18. There is no difficulty in answering this contention. In the petition for Reference, which was actually made on 9.5.1988, the petitioners have set out the full details of their claim. They have also given the reasons for claiming enhanced compensation. it is not possible to make a reference under Section 18. There is no difficulty in answering this contention. In the petition for Reference, which was actually made on 9.5.1988, the petitioners have set out the full details of their claim. They have also given the reasons for claiming enhanced compensation. Taking the letter dated 5.5.1987 along with the petition dated 9.5.1988, there is no difficulty for the second respondent to make a reference under Section 18 of the Act. 23. In the result, the petition is allowed and the order dated 1.7.1988 passed by the second respondent is quashed. The second respondent is directed to make a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, as prayed for by the petitioners herein. There will be no order as to costs.