This is the defendants' second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure from the judgment and order dated 7.10.96 passed by the learned District Judge at Shillong in TCA No.l (H) 96, setting aside the judgment and order dated 11.4.96 passed by the learned Munsiff at Shillong in Title Suit No. 10 (H)88. The facts of the case in a short compass are as follows : 1. The plaintiff/respondent here filed a suit being Title Suit No.lO(H) 88 before the learned Munsiff at Shillong as against the defendants for permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, associates, representatives and others from proceeding any further with the proceedings initiated, under C. No. V-44/l/Adj/86 dated 8.12.86, by and under the signature of the Collector, Customs and Central Excise, Shillong, appellant herein, and for any other relief or reliefs which the plaintiff/respondent is in law and equity entitled to. 2. According to the plaintiff, it is a registered company, registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (Act 1 of 1956) having its registered office at Bawri Mansion, Dhankheti, Shillong, Meghalaya, and factory at Byrnihat within the State of Meghalaya and it has been dealing in the manufacture of plywoods and it is the only industrial concern of like nature within the State of Meghalaya and is also engaged in dealing with the manufactured products throughout India and are manufacturing the same under the related Central Excise Licence since its inception in the year 1973. 3. To the utter astonishment and surprise of the plaintiff/respondent, on 25.2.8 5, the central excise authorities alongwith a pose of their officers and armed constables, made a sudden raid in the headquarter office and factory office of the plaintiff's company simultaneously without any valid search warrant and took away almost all the documents, account books and registers, thus violating all the statutory rules and procedure. 4. The defendants/appellants had illegally searched the premises of the head office of the plaintiff/company as well as their factory premises and seized all the documents of the plaintiff/company just to harass them unnecessarily for reasons best known to them. 4. The defendants/appellants had illegally searched the premises of the head office of the plaintiff/company as well as their factory premises and seized all the documents of the plaintiff/company just to harass them unnecessarily for reasons best known to them. Thereafter, the plaintiff/respondent company has been served with a show cause notice bearing No.C.No.V-44/l/Adj/86 dated 8.12.86 under section 11A of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 read with Rule 233A of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and directed the plaintiff/respondent herein to show cause as to why central excise duties should not be realised and penalty should not be imposed and the land, building, machineries, materials etc should not be confiscated under the relevant provisions of the Central Excise Act. 5. It is also the case of the plaintiff/respondent, that the said show cause notice and the proceedings initiated thereunder are wholly illegal, invalid and/or in excess of jurisdiction. Moreover, the defendants/appellants herein did not allow the plaintiff/company to inspect all the documents in original and they refused to furnish the copies of those documents seized by them and as such, the plaintiff respondent herein could not submit their effective show cause statement. In compliance with the said show cause notice but under a related letter of the defendants being No.C.No.V-44/Adj/86/Pt. 1/169048 dated 29.7.88, the plaintiff was informed that they have been allowed to inspect the documents during the period from 27.7.88 to 29.7.88 during office hours and, that the said letter issued by the defendants had been served to the plaintiff only on 29.7.88 itself. Despite the existence of such letter, the representatives of the plaintiff had not been allowed to inspect the documents. 6. Thereafter, the defendants under their aforesaid letter dated 29.7.88, informed the plaintiff company that, if they failed to submit their reply to the show cause notice within 29.8.88 positively, the case would be decided ex-parte in terms of defendants letter No.33664-67 (a) dated 22.7.88 without making any further correspondence with the plaintiff company. 7. The plaintiff went on to state, that the appellant/Collector, Customs and Central Excise, Shillong, has unjustly and with malafides already made up his mind and has prejudged the alleged proceedings before giving adequate opportunity to the plaintiff company to inspect the original documents and, as such, the entire action of the respondents is wholly incompetent, unconstitutional, malafide and unjust. 7. The plaintiff went on to state, that the appellant/Collector, Customs and Central Excise, Shillong, has unjustly and with malafides already made up his mind and has prejudged the alleged proceedings before giving adequate opportunity to the plaintiff company to inspect the original documents and, as such, the entire action of the respondents is wholly incompetent, unconstitutional, malafide and unjust. The plaintiff also sought for a temporary injunction restraining the respondents from proceeding further with the said proceedings. 8. The suit was contested by the defendants/appellant by filing written statement and contending inter alia that, on intelligence information to the effect that the plaintiff company, the respondent herein are systematically evading central excise taxes leviable on goods by manipulating the prescribed Central Excise Gate Passes by cunning devices and in gross violation of Rules 9 (1), 52A,173C, 173F, 173G and 221 of the Central Excise Rules of 1944 and they are supplying plywoods to various parts all over India. The preventive branch of the Central Excise Department made raid in relevant places all over India including the office of the respondent and seized those relevant documents. The seizures revealed, that the respondents plaintiff evaded central excise taxes to the tune of Rs.64,00,000/-- (Rs. sixty four lakhs) and accordingly, the competent authority drew up proceedings under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 and the Rules made thereunder against the plaintiff company and issued the aforesaid notice dated 8.12.86, requiring the respondents to show cause within 30 days as to why appropriate action should not be taken against them for violation of Central Excise Rules, which is a complete code providing not only procedure and penalties but also redresses by way of appeal, etc. 9. 9. The plaintiff company took time for enabling them to submit their show cause statement from time to time and, that the same was granted by the defendants concerned on many occasions and finally, a specific date had been fixed on 2 0.8.8 8 for their show cause statement and they had been given ample opportunity for inspection of documents even obtaining Photostat copies of the same, etc on 27,28 and 29th July, 1988 vide letter dated 22.7.88 issued to them under Registered A/D Post, but the respondent/plaintiff instead of showing their show cause, filed the present suit on 20.8.88 and sought for a decree for permanent injunction restraining the appellant/defendants from proceeding any further with the proceedings initiated under the aforesaid show cause notice dated 8.12.86. 10. The trial Court initially heard the case and passed an order on 5.12.89 dismissing the Misc Case relating to the ad-interim injunction and also disposing the main suit, allowing the respondent/plaintiff to inspect the documents in the office of the appellant and to show cause within 30 days. Being dissatisfied with the said order dated 5.12.8 9, the respondent/plaintiff filed an appeal in the Court of the learned District Judge, Shillong, vide Misc Civil Appeal No. 1 (H) 90. The said appeal was duly heard and the same was disposed of on 18.9.92, thus remanding the suit/case back to the learned trial Court for recording the evidence of the witnesses produced in the said Misc Case No. 11 (H) 88. The learned trial Court took evidence in the said Misc Case No. 11 (H) 8 8 and fixed for hearing on the preliminary issues relating to the maintainability of the'suit and jurisdiction of the civil Court by the consent of the parties vide order dated 30.8.94 and, the learned trial Court heard the matter on several dates including 4.9.95 and 30.11.95 and passed the judgment and order dated 11.4.96, dismissing the suit and also vacating the ad-interim injunction granted in the Misc Case No. 11 (H) 88. 11. Against the said judgment and order dated 11.4.96 passed by the learned trial Court, the respondent/plaintiff preferred an appeal in the Court of the learned District Judge at Shillong in TCA No. 1(H) 96 which was, also duly heard and the same was disposed of on 7.10.96. 11. Against the said judgment and order dated 11.4.96 passed by the learned trial Court, the respondent/plaintiff preferred an appeal in the Court of the learned District Judge at Shillong in TCA No. 1(H) 96 which was, also duly heard and the same was disposed of on 7.10.96. The first appellate Court set aside the judgment and order dated 11.4.96 passed by the learned trial Court and remanded the case to the trial Court for giving a judgment after complying the previous order dated 18.9.92 passed by the learned District Judge. 12. The main contention of Shri H. Ahmed, learned counsel for the appellant, is that the learned first appellate Court failed to appreciate the findings of the learned trial Court to the effect that the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 is a complete code providing specific forum for review, appeal and revision against any unfavourable order to any parties and the alleged cause of action in the suit of the respondents herein is clearly barred not only by the Act itself, but also by provision of section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. 13. The impugned judgment and order dated 7.10.96 passed by the first appellate Court is not tenable in the eye of law inasmuch as the first appellate Court erred in law in setting aside the judgment and order dated 11.4. 96 of the learned trial Court. Moreover, the learned appellate Court ought to have considered that a lawful proceeding initiated under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 cannot be injuncted upon and the defendants cannot be restrained from proceeding with the said proceedings under the said show cause notice dated 8.12.86. 14. At the hearing, Shri VK Bhatra, learned counsel for the respondent, contended that the learned first appellate Court, rightly passed the impugned judgment and order dated 7.10.96 inasmuch as the learned trial Court erred in law in holding that the suit is barred by section 40 (2) of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. It is also contended by Shri Bhatra, that the matter of jurisdiction had been fairly conceded before the learned first appellate Court by both the parties and also before the trial Court as is evident from the order dated 5.12.89. It is also contended by Shri Bhatra, that the matter of jurisdiction had been fairly conceded before the learned first appellate Court by both the parties and also before the trial Court as is evident from the order dated 5.12.89. And, moreover, the learned trial Court had misappreciated the provisions of law laid down under section 40 (2) of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, Shri Bhatra contended. 15. Supporting the case of the respondent/plaintiff, Shri Bhatra had relied upon many decisions of the Apex Court as well as of different High Courts reported in AIR 1970 SC 997 , AIR 1975 Patna 162, AIR 1972 AP 266 , AIR 1961 SC 1457 , AIR 1956 SC 346 , AIR 1972 SC 1612 , (1988) 1 GLR 103 (1988(1) GLJ153), (1994) 2 GLR 366 (1994 (2) GLJ151) and 1987 (27) ELT 414 (Bom) 16. At the time of admission of this second appeal this Court had formulated the following substantial questions of law namely : (i) Whether the finding of the first appellate Court directing the trial Court to record the evidence of the parties in respect of the issue and remanding the case, is tenable in law; (ii) Whether the suit is not maintainable for not issuing statutory notice under 1 section 80 CPC and section 40 (2) of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. 17. As liberty was granted by this Court on 11.12.96, Shri H. Ahmed, learned counsel for the appellant contended, that the suit of the respondent/plaintiff is also barred by section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Now, this Court is to examine as to whether the impugned judgment and order of the first appellate Court suffers from infirmity or illegality or whether, the first appellate Court had acted illegally or with material irregularity while passing the impugned judgment and order dated 7.10.96 or not. 18. For better appreciation in the matter, the provisions of law laid down under section 40 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, is reproduced as hereunder: "40. Protection of action taken under the Act. (1) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Central Govt. or any officer of the Central Govt. or a State Govt. for anything, which is done, or intended to be done,, in good faith, in pursuance of this Act or any Rule made thereunder. Protection of action taken under the Act. (1) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Central Govt. or any officer of the Central Govt. or a State Govt. for anything, which is done, or intended to be done,, in good faith, in pursuance of this Act or any Rule made thereunder. (2) No proceeding, other than a suit, shall be commenced against the Central Govt. or any officer of the Central Govt. or a State Govt. for anything done or purported to have been done in pursuance of this Act or any Rule made thereunder, without giving the Central Govt. or such officer a month's previous notice in writing of the intended proceeding and of the cause thereof or after the expiration of three months from the accrual of such case." 19. Mere and bare reading of this section makes it clear that there is a radical change in the new provision from the provision as it stood before the 19.5.73 inasmuch as the proceeding by way of suit, has been taken out of the purview of section 40 (2) of the Act. This section 40 of the Act applies to suits for damages and compensation in respect of acts under the Act. The authorities, including the Govt. are protected and indemnified in respect of bonafide acts done or purporting to have been done under powers conferred by the statute. It is true that, if the levy of the tax is outside the scope of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, and the Rules made thereunder, the civil Court's jurisdiction is not ousted by anything in the section of the Central Excise and Salt Act. But, where eleborate provisions are made in the statute/Act for alternative and adequate remedies, including the provisions or recording evidence and for determining the facts, civil Courts jurisdiction is barred, However, there is absence of adequate remedy under the statute or, where the provisions of the statute are not elaborate, civil Courts are not barred from entertaining a suit notwithstanding the fact that there is an express exclusion therein. 20. It is also established that section 40 of the Act applies to suits for damages and compensation in respect of the Act. This section merely indicates immunity or protection against the claims of damages against the Govt. 20. It is also established that section 40 of the Act applies to suits for damages and compensation in respect of the Act. This section merely indicates immunity or protection against the claims of damages against the Govt. itself from any of its officers for acts done in good faith under the Act and, section 40 (2) is applicable only to legal proceedings 'other than a suit'. The present suit of the respondent/plaintiff is not a suit for damages and compensation in respect of the acts of the defendants/appellants under the Act. This is a suit for permanent injunction, restraining the defendants/appellants, their agents, associates, representatives and others from proceeding any further with the proceedings initiated under the aforesaid show cause notice dated 8.12.86, issued under section 11A of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 read with Rule 233 A of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 made under the said Act. In my considered view, elaborate provisions are made in the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 for alternative and adequate remedies in the form of appeal, as, contemplated under chapter VIA of the Act and as such, civil Courts jurisdictioin is barred in the instant case. 21. Section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, provides that an injunction cannot be granted when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding except i>i case of breach of trust. The admission of the parties with regard to the jurisdiction of civil Court cannot override the statutory provisions of law. 22. Considering the existing facts and circumstances of the case, I, hereby invoke the inherent powers of the Court as contemplated under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also pass the following order : The suit of the plaintiff/respondent is also barred by section 41 of the Specific Relief Act of 1963 in view 6f the existing facts and circumstances of the case. I am also of the view that the decisions and the rulings cited by Shri VK Bhatra, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, do not help or support the case of the respondent/plaintiff. I am also of the view that the decisions and the rulings cited by Shri VK Bhatra, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, do not help or support the case of the respondent/plaintiff. For the reasons and discussions made above, the learned first appellat Court lost sight of the order dated 30.8.94 passed by the learned Munsiff in TS No. 10(H) of 1988/Misc Case No. 11(H) of 1988 while passing the impugned judgment and order inasmuch as both the parties agreed and consented in taking up the issues relating to the maintainability of the suit and jurisdiction! of the civil Court. For the reasons and discussions made above, the appellant could make out a case to justify the interference of the impugned judgment and order dated 7.10.96 passed by the first appellate Court in TCA No.l(H) 96 as the learned first appellate Court had acted illegally and with material irregularity while passing the same. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order dated 7.10.96 passed by the learned District Judge in TCA No. 1 (H) 96 is set aside, thus affirming the judgment and order of the learned trial Court with a little modification to the extent that the suit I of the respondent/plaintiff is also barred by section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Interim orders, if any, passed by the first appellate Court as well as the trial Court are merged with this judgment and order. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own cost.