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1997 DIGILAW 221 (KER)

John v. State of Kerala

1997-06-13

P.A.MOHAMMAD

body1997
Judgment :- P.A. Moharred, J. The petitioner was working as Headmaster at St. Mary's High School, Mankulam, Idukki which is an aided school under the Corporate Educational Agency, Diocese of Kothamangalam. His case is that he was appointed as Headmaster with effect from 15.5.1990. Ext. P2 is the proceedings of the first respondent, the District Educational Officer, Kattappana provisionally approving the appointment of the petitioner as Headmaster. Subsequently, the petitioner forwarded an application to the office of the first respondent for fixation of pay in the scale applicable to Headmaster with effect from 15.5.1990. However, by Ext. P4 the said application was returned observing that the petitioner was not eligible for H.M.' s scale on 15.5.1990 as per existing rules on the ground that his service as H. S. A. had commenced only from 1.6.1977. Being aggrieved by Ext. P4, the petitioner filed Ext. P5 representation before the Director of Public Instruction, Trivandrum. 2. This writ petition has been filed praying to declare that R.3 of Chapter XXVI of the K.E.R. as violative of Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. There is a further prayer for a direction to the respondents to sanction Headmaster's scale of pay to the petitioner with effect from 15.5.1990. 3. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the third respondent-State. The main opposition to the claim of the petitioner appears to be that he has not completed 16 years of service prescribed under R.3 Chap. XXVI in as much as his service as High School Assistant commenced only from 1.6.1977. It is further contended that the said rule is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and not liable to be struck down. 4. R.3 of Chap. XXVI is thus: "The Headmaster of an Aided complete Secondary school/ training School shall be given the Departmental Headmaster's scale of pay only if he has put in a minimum of 16 years of continuous service as graduate teacher in schools recognised by the Department. 4. R.3 of Chap. XXVI is thus: "The Headmaster of an Aided complete Secondary school/ training School shall be given the Departmental Headmaster's scale of pay only if he has put in a minimum of 16 years of continuous service as graduate teacher in schools recognised by the Department. Those Headmasters with a minimum continuous qualifying service of 12 years as graduate teachers shall be given such allowance as may be fixed by Government: Provided that the Headmaster appointed on a regular basis prior to the coming into force of these Rules shall be allowed to continue in their existing scale of pay." Under this rule the Headmaster shall be given the Headmaster's scale of pay only if he has put in a minimum of 16 years continuous service as graduate teacher. However under R.44A of Chapter XIVA the minimum service qualification for appointment as Headmaster is twelve years of continuous graduate service. R.44A is thus: "44A. (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-r.(1) of R.44, the minimum service qualification for appointment as Headmaster, in Aided Complete High schools/training Schools shall be twelve years of continuous graduate service with a pass in the test in the Kerala Education Act and the Kerala Education Rules and pass in Account Test (Lower) conducted by Kerala Public Service Commission. Provided that Headmasters of High and Training Schools, who were actually holding the said post on the eleventh day of June, 1974 shall stand exempted from passing the Account Test (Lower)." After highlighting the difference between these two rules the counsel for the petitioner submits that the duties being discharged by all the Headmasters of the Higher Secondary School are same and there is no rational behind classifying Headmasters into two categories namely, those who have completed 16 years of continuous service as graduate teacher and those who have not completed 16 years of continuous service, but having 12 years continuous qualifying service to their credit. On the basis of this differentiation the counsel further points out that the salient principle of 'equal pay for equal work' enunciated in Art.39(d) of the Constitution has been violated in this case. 5. It is pointed out that when the service qualification for appointment as Headmaster is 12 years as provided in R.44A of Chap. On the basis of this differentiation the counsel further points out that the salient principle of 'equal pay for equal work' enunciated in Art.39(d) of the Constitution has been violated in this case. 5. It is pointed out that when the service qualification for appointment as Headmaster is 12 years as provided in R.44A of Chap. XIV A, a different formula cannot be adopted while fixing the scale of pay of Headmasters as provided under R.3 of Chap. XXVI. In other words, the fixation of 16 years service qualification cannot be insisted for allowing Headmasters scale of pay. Of course, it can be seen that there are two different categories of Headmasters, first category being the Headmasters having 16 years continuous service as graduate teacher and other being the Headmaster having 12 years continuous service as graduate teacher. Both these categories ci Headmasters are performing the same functions and duties in the school. Because this situation, is it possible to argue that there is violation of principle of 'equal pay for equal work'? However it is apt to examine whether the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is an absolute principle which can be applied in all circumstances. In this context, I am being reminded of what Chinnappa Reddy, J. said in Randhir Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1982 SC 879 at 881): In the principle of equal pay for equal work" is not expressly declared by our- Constitution to be the fundamental right. But it certainly is a constitutional goal. Art.39(d) of the Constitution proclaims x equal pay for equal work for both men and women' as a Directive Principle of State Policy. * Equal pay for equal work for both men and women' mean! But it certainly is a constitutional goal. Art.39(d) of the Constitution proclaims x equal pay for equal work for both men and women' as a Directive Principle of State Policy. * Equal pay for equal work for both men and women' mean! Equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes." As far as the enforcement of this principle learned judge further said "Construing Arts.14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Art.39(d), we are that the principle for Equal pay for Equal work' is deducible from those Articles and applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer." In State of M.P. v. Pramod Bhartiya (AIR 1993 SC 286) the Apex Court in unequivocal terms declared: "Equal pay for equal work, it is self-evident, is implicit in the doctrine of equality enshrined in Art.14, it flows from it. Because clause (d) of Art.39 spoke of "equal pay for equal work for both men and women" it does not cease to be a part of Art.14. To say that the said : been stated as a directive principle of State Policy is not enforceable in a Court, of a sophistry. Parts IV and 111of the Constitution are not supposed to be exclusionary of each other., r. They are complementary to each other. The rule is as much a part of Art.14 as itis of clause (1) of Art.16. Equality of opportunity guaranteed by Art.16(1) necessarily means and involves equal pay for equal work. It means equally that it is neither a mechanical rule nor does It mean geometrical equality. The concept of reasonable classification and all other rules evolved with respect to Arts.14 and 16(1) come into play wherever complaint of infraction of this rule falls for consideration". 6. The following observation contained in Randhir Singh's case (AIR 1982 SC 879) supra is relevant for solving the dispute in the present case. "It is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a service," with varying qualifications for entry in to a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade. "It is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a service," with varying qualifications for entry in to a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade. The higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the In clarification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay." 10 In this context, what the Supreme Court said in State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia (AIR 1989 SC 19) is also appropriate: "Art.14 permits reasonable classification founded on different basis. It is now well established that the classification can be based on some qualities or characteristic of persons grouped together and not in others who are left out. Those qualities or characteristics must, of course, have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience could be the proper basis for classification to promote efficiency in administration. He or she learns also by experience as much as by other means. It cannot be denied that inequality of work "performed by persons of longer experience is superior than the work of newcomers". cannot be denied that the persons claiming 'equal pay for equal work' should jjual'fication, merit and experience. Of course, there are two categories of is in this case. The promotion "to a higher post does not ipso facto obtain equal pay. The grant of promotion is different from fixation of pay scale. provided in R.44A of Chapt. XIV A is qualifications for promotion to the post of Headmasters whereas R.3 of Chap. XXVI prescribes the conditions to be fulfilled for awarding the Headmaster's scale of pay. The minimum service qualification required for promotion to the post of Headmaster is 12 years continuous graduate service. When that service qualification is available, then the teacher shall be promoted as Headmaster. Thereafter, arises the question of fixation of scale. If the Headmaster has sixteen years continuous service as graduate teacher, he will be given Headmasters' scale of pay. That means at the time of promotion he is not eligible to get the, Headmasters' scale of pay because he has put in only 12 years continuous service as ""';er. Even assuming the work done by two categories of Headmasters is 01 Ui. That means at the time of promotion he is not eligible to get the, Headmasters' scale of pay because he has put in only 12 years continuous service as ""';er. Even assuming the work done by two categories of Headmasters is 01 Ui. e -Me nature, experience based on length of service reasonably sustain the classification. The basis of the classification is intelligible and meaningful. My conclusion, therefore, is that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' as discussed and analysed hereinabove, has no application in the facts of the present case. 7. The validity of the Rule challenged herein was examined by a Division Bench of this Court in O.P. No. 2753/81 and consequently held thus: "We would like to add that on promotion of the petitioners as Headmasters they continued to receive the pay on the post attached to graduate teachers and they were given an allowance fixed under R 8 of, Chap. XXVI of the Rules. It is only on their getting the requisite experience of 16 years that they would be entitled to befitted in the higher scale of pay given to departmental headmasters. We have therefore, no hesitation in taking the view that the impugned rule is not discriminatory and is not violative of Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution of India". Again a learned Single Judge of this Court while dealing with an identical question observed in the judgment of O.P. No. 8530 of 1984 thus: "Once it is accepted that a primary school teacher who has not put in fifteen years service as such is qualified, eligible and also entitled to be considered subject to seniority in the district, for promotion to the post of Headmaster, one fails to see how such period of service as teacher has any relevance in determining the pay scale to be admissible to him after promotion as Headmaster. Classification between Headmasters who have put in fifteen years service in the lower cadre is not geared in any manner to the object of the scheme. It does not appear to have any nexus to the object of the scheme. I therefore, find that the classification made runs counter to equality clause of the Constitution and the principle of equal pay for equal work enshrined in the clause". It does not appear to have any nexus to the object of the scheme. I therefore, find that the classification made runs counter to equality clause of the Constitution and the principle of equal pay for equal work enshrined in the clause". This judgment was set aside by a Division Bench in W. A. No. 965 of 1987 and while doing so it observed: "Though the Headmaster with a lesser teaching experience and Headmaster with longer teaching experience discharge the same functions as Headmaster on his promotion to that cadre, there is difference in the quality of service between the two classes of Headmasters. The experience makes a person more efficient and competent. That is also a reason why higher emoluments are paid depending upon the number of years a person puts in a particular service. It cannot therefore, be said that the length of service is not a relevant criteria in the matter of fixing different emoluments." The above observation is perfectly in consonance with the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the decisions discussed hereinbefore. The question does not requires any further examination or elucidation in view of what is said above. The Original Petition is accordingly dismissed.