ORDER S.K. Dubey, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for queshment of the order dated 13.12.1996 (Annexure P-1) passed in C.R. No. 134/92 by District Judge, Raipur affirming the order dated 23.7.1992 passed in Execution Case No. 60/78 passed by the IIIrd Civil Judge, Class I, Raipur, for issuance of warrant of delivery of vacant possession of the shop, in dispute, to the respondent No. 1. 2. Facts giving rise to this petition are thus : The petitioner is a landlord who instituted a civil suit No. 80 A/78 for eviction of the tenant the respondent No. 1 from shop No. 6/122, in area 7' x 20', situate at G.E. Road, Raipur on the averment under section 12(1)(h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act'), that the accommodation is required bona fide for the purpose of re-holding and such re-building cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated. During the pendency of the suit the parties entered into a compromise and a decree (Annexure P-3) dated 27th July. 1981 was passed on the following terms agreed upon between the parties: 3. The respondent No. 1 in terms of the compromise handed over the vacant possession of the shop for its re-building. The petitioner alter demolition of the shop reconstructed the shop not of the same area, but of 30 x 10 an area different than the one mentioned in the compromise decree. When the respondent No. 1 was not delivered the possession of the shop the respondent No. 1 on 19.10.1985 filed an application under Order 21 rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure for executing the decree, seeking the assistance of the Court for the deli very of the property specified in the decree. The petitioner filed objections dated 23.4.1986 (Annexure P-5) and contended that the respondent No. 1 cannot be put in possession of the reconstructed shop of the area 30' x 10' which is an area different than mentioned in compromise decree. The petitioner filed objections dated 23.4.1986 (Annexure P-5) and contended that the respondent No. 1 cannot be put in possession of the reconstructed shop of the area 30' x 10' which is an area different than mentioned in compromise decree. In terms of compromise decree the respondent No. 1 is entitled to possession of shop only after the consent of the petitioner, that the compromise decree is a conditional one and respondent No. 1 has not complied with the conditions incorporated in the compromise decree; that the respondent No. 1 can instituted proceedings in accordance with the provisions of Act, and that the decree is inexcusable. 4. The executing Court rejected the objections holding that in terms of the compromise decree the tenant has not violated any condition in particular condition No. 5 nor there is any allegation to that effect. The conduct of the petitioner is not clean, he avoided the delivery of possession for about seven years of the property specified in the compromise decree. The respondent No. 1 has opted his right of taking possession and or of re-entry in terms of the compromise decree and not under the provisions of the Act. the compromise decree is not barred by any statutory provisions therefore, the respondent No. 1 is entitled to get the decree executed. Hence the executing Court directed the petitioner to deliver the possession of the shop of the area in terms of the compromise decree of the map annexed with the execution application. 5. Aggrieved of this order the petitioner preferred a revision which was also dismissed by the revisional Court holding that the decree was not under section 12(1)(h) of the Act giving a direction under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 18 of the Act, therefore, the question invoking a right of re-entry by an application under section 18(3) does not arise as the parties while entering into a compromise settled their rights an liabilities on the terms agreed upon on which the compromise decree was passed which is a contract in itself, therefore, the terms of contract incorporated in the decree were enforceable. If the petitioner has constructed a bigger shop in size deliberately, by that the right of the respondent No. 1 is not lost for gelling the possession of the shop as specified in the compromise decree. 6. If the petitioner has constructed a bigger shop in size deliberately, by that the right of the respondent No. 1 is not lost for gelling the possession of the shop as specified in the compromise decree. 6. Shri N.S. Kale, learned Senior Counsel, submitted that the suit was for enactment on the ground under section 12(1)(h) of the Act. Where the suit is decreed by judgment of the Court or by compromise decree the provision of section 18 would apply, therefore, the application for re-entry conferred by section 18 read with rule 4 of M.P. Accommodation Control Rules, 1966 (for shot 'Rules') ought to have been made within the prescribed period of limitation of six months from the dale on which the cause of action for re-entry arose. The application also requires to state ground on which such possession is claimed. Therefore, even if the application is made under Order 21 rule 11 the application ought to have been construed under section 18(3) read with rule 4 of the Rules as this is a matter of substance which bears on the question of right of re-entry and not as a matter of right. If such decree is allowed to be executed by execution and not by an application under section 18(3) read with rule 4, the execution of the decree can be within the period of 12 years and in such circumstances the landlord will have to keep the shop vacant till the expiry of 12 years, which is not permissible. It is further submitted that right of re-entry under section 18(3) is by way of concession to a tenant on the fulfillment of the condition laid down in section 18 which has to be construed strictly. The Courts below rejected the preliminary objection as to maintainability of the execution application and directed the issuance of warrant of delivery of possession. After rejection the petitioner was entitled to raise other objections in support of the excitability of the decree. Therefore, even if this is considered to be a compromise decree passed on agreement of the parties for the purposes of granting relief in terms of section 74 of the Contract Act and section 18(3) of the Act the Court would have directed payment of compensation instead of directing delivery of possession. Therefore, even if this is considered to be a compromise decree passed on agreement of the parties for the purposes of granting relief in terms of section 74 of the Contract Act and section 18(3) of the Act the Court would have directed payment of compensation instead of directing delivery of possession. Counsel placed reliance on Ramnath and anothers v. M/s. Ramnath Chitar Mal A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 104 and Ghanshyam Hazarimal and another v. Nathmal Laxminarayan 1975 M.P.L.J. 509. 7. Shri Alok Aradhe, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 submitted that the compromise decree was complete in itself and was executable. The petitioner deliberately made a construction in such a manner so as to defeat the decree. The respondent No. 1 is a doctor who was running a clinic in the tenanted shop, who has been kept out of suit shop for the past 11 years. As the compromise decree is in the nature of contract and retains its character as a contract the Court rightly rejected the objection. Reading the terms of the compromise it is clear that it is not a decree under section 12(1)(h) simpliciter therefore, the provisions under section 18 of the Act do not apply. It was further submitted that rule 4 is not applicable as it applies to an application which is to be made before the Rent Controlling Authority and not to the Civil Court. The objection to the maintainability of the execution proceedings was raised for the first time before the revisional Court whereby it was contended that the respondent No. 1 ought to have made an application under section 18(3) read with rule 4. Therefore, if the order is considered to be one under section 18(3) then the revision was not maintainable and the petitioner ought to have filed an appeal in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Bhagwan Singh Ramcharan v. Mst. Kallo Maula Shah and others 1977 M.P.L.J. 583. The executing Court has to execute the decree as it stands. The decree has to be read in whole and not in part. Even if the application is to be considered under section 18(3) then it was the petitioner who was to demonstrate the breach committed by respondent No. 1. Kallo Maula Shah and others 1977 M.P.L.J. 583. The executing Court has to execute the decree as it stands. The decree has to be read in whole and not in part. Even if the application is to be considered under section 18(3) then it was the petitioner who was to demonstrate the breach committed by respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1 had opted for delivery of possession and not for compensation, therefore, the petitioner ought to have delivered the possession in terms of section 18(2). That having not been done the Court rightly issued warrant of possession for placing the respondent No. 1 in possession. Learned counsel also resorted to the provisions of sections 144 and 151 and submitted that the relief of recovery of possession on the principle of restitution was permissible in the circumstances of the case. As the two remedies were available, that is, by making an application under Order 21. Rule 11 and another under section 18 (3) and that the respondent No. 1 had elected one, it cannot be said that the Court illegally exercised the jurisdiction. Counsel cited The Bihar State Co-operative Marketing Union Ltd. v. Uma Shankar Sharan and another A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1222, Vasant Kumar Radhakishan Vora v. The Hoard of Trustees of the Port of Bombay A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 14, S.N. Banerjee & another v. Kuchwan Lime and Sotne Co. Ltd. A.I.R. 1941 P.C. 128, Babaji Charan Sahu & another v. Laxmipriya Dehi and others 1982 NOC 177. 8. It is well sealed that in a suit for ejectment of tenant on any of the grounds enumerated in section 12(1) of the Act a compromise decree is passed on the agreed terms and the compromise is lawful, as in any other suit, so in an eviction suit such a consent decree retains its character and all the elements of a contract being founded on an agreement or contract between the parties and, therefore subject to the incident of a contract. Such decree can be executed. The parties to such decree can be granted relief in accordance with the agreed terms in the decree, in the absence of fraud, accident or surprise, equity will not relieve against a breach of terms which are superadded by the order of the Court. See: Roshanlal v. Madanlal A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2130, Nai Baba v. Ramnarayan A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 22. 9. See: Roshanlal v. Madanlal A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2130, Nai Baba v. Ramnarayan A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 22. 9. It is also well settled legal position that an executing Court cannot enlarge or vary the terms of the decree. The Court has to execute the decree as it stands in accordance with the procedure laid down under order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The executing Court cannot travel beyond the decree or order under execution. No exception can be taken to that general principle, but the Court has right to construe a decree in the high of the applicable provisions of law. See the decision of Supreme Court in C.F. Angadi v. V.S. Harannayya A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 239 and Rameshwar Dass Gupta v. State of U.P. 1997 (1) MPWN 163. 10. In the case in hand in a suit for eviction based on the ground under section 12(1)(h) of the Act the parties settled their rights on the terms agreed upon between them. It is not the case of the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 has violated any of the terms agreed upon incorporated in the compromise decree. On the other hand, the respondent No. 1 having complied with the terms of the consent decree after re-construction of the shop was not delivered possession in accordance with term 6 incorporated in the decree. The petitioner even has not placed any material to demonstrate that after the re-construction he noticed the respondent No. 1 of completion of reconstruction and offered the respondent No. 1 to deliver possession and/or that the respondent No. 1 failed to take steps within a period of six months after its reconstruction to take possession through Court. The petitioner mala fidely with a view to detest the decree made the reconstruction of a larger area and then did not offer the respondent No. 1 to occupy the accommodation so rebuilt or even the arc in proportion which was occupied by the tenant before its reconstruction after setting the rent in accordance with clause 3 of the terms agreed upon. On the other hand, the petitioner dragged on proceedings for long time, therefore, the executing Court was right in giving assistance to the respondent No. 1 to place him in possession by issuing warrant for the delivery of the property specified in the decree. 11. On the other hand, the petitioner dragged on proceedings for long time, therefore, the executing Court was right in giving assistance to the respondent No. 1 to place him in possession by issuing warrant for the delivery of the property specified in the decree. 11. Even if the compromise decree is not considered to be based on contract but under section 12(1)(h) of the Act, and the application under Order 21 rule 11 is substantially to be considered under section 18(3) of the Act, in that case too, as the respondent No. 1 had elected his right to get possession of the shop after rebuilding which was to be given by the landlord to the tenant within a reasonable time and for that six months' period was fixed after reconstruction by consent between the parties. The petitioner failed to deliver the possession within the specified time, therefore, respondent No. 1 filed the application to put him into possession of the specified property. Therefore, from he circumstances as the respondent No. I has not been found to have committed any breach of the terms as to disentitle him his right of re-entry, the respondent No. 1 was entitled to be put back in occupation of the shop under section 18(3) of the Act. 12. It would be useful to have a glance on section 12(1)(h) section 18 and rule 4 which read thus: S. 12. Restriction on eviction of tenants. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: xx xxx xxx (h) that, the accommodation is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of building or re-building or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations and that such building or alterations cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated. 18. Recovery of possession for repairs and re-building and re-entry. 18. Recovery of possession for repairs and re-building and re-entry. (1) In making any order on the grounds specified in clause (g) or clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 12, the Court shall ascertain from the tenant whether he elects to be placed in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof from which he in to be evicted; and if the tenant so elects, shall record the fact of the election in the order and specify therein the date on or before which he shall deliver possession so as to enable the landlord to commence the work of repairs or building or rebuilding, as the case may be. (2) If the tenant delivers possession on or before the date specified in the order, the landlord shall, on completion of the work of repairs or building or re-building place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof, as the case may be, within one month of the completion of such work. (3) If, after the tenant has delivered possession on or before the date specified in the order, the landlord fails to commence the work of repairs or building or re-building within one month of the specified date or fails to complete the work in a reasonable time or having completed the work, fails to place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation in accordance with sub-section (2) the Court may on an application made in it in this behalf by the tenant within such time as may be prescribed, order the landlord to place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof or to pay to the tenant such compensation as the Court thinks fit. R. Application for re-entry. An application by a tenant under sub-section (2) of section 17 or under sub-section (3) of section 18 for putting him in possession of the accommodation or part thereof shall be made within six months from the date on which the cause of action for re-entry arises and shall state the grounds on which such possession is claimed. An application by a tenant under sub-section (2) of section 17 or under sub-section (3) of section 18 for putting him in possession of the accommodation or part thereof shall be made within six months from the date on which the cause of action for re-entry arises and shall state the grounds on which such possession is claimed. A bare look to section 12(1)(h) of section 18 would show that in a case where an order of eviction is passed on the ground of section 12(1)(h) that the accommodation is to be newly built or re-built, the Court passing the decree is casted with a duty to ascertain from the tenant whether he elects to be place in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof from which he is evicted, and if he exercises his very valuable right the Court has to record the fact of election in the order and specify therein the date on or before he shall deliver possession as so to enable the landlord to commence the work of repairs or building or re-building, as the case may be. When the tenant fulfils the condition precedent of delivery of possession on or before the specified date in the decree, the tenant gets the right of re-entry after its re-building. At this stage it is the obligation of the landlord to place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation after reconstruction. If the landlord fails to deliver the possession or backs out from the agreed term under compromise or tries to detest the decree so as to debar the tenant of his right of re-entry, the Court has power to place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation as reconstructed. See the decisions of this Court in Shri Ram v. Vijay Kumar 1982 MPRCJ (54) Radhakishan v. Bhagwandas and 1988 MPRCJ 123, Vitthal Rao v. Gangaram 1989 MPRCJ 211. 13. The present case is of reconstruction and not of work of repairs or construction having not been commenced at all, therefore, when the respondent No. I was not placed back in the reconstructed shop specified in the decree, the respondent No. 1 approached the Court for putting him back in occupation of the area as specified in the decree or occupied by the respondent No. 1 prior to decree. The Court was under a duty to pass an order of or-entry under section 18(3) of the Act and to ensure that the petitioner having obtained a decree under section 12(1)(h) does not violate any condition of the statute. It is the duty of the Court to ensure that no unscrupulous landlord can play fraud upon the Court and obtain a decree under Section 12(1)(h) only to violate subsequently the statutory condition thereof. If that is allowed to happen then not object of the Act would be frustrated, paving way for rent-racking. See the decision in Radhakishan's case and Vitthal Rao's case (supra). 14. The contention that a shop larger in the area was reconstructed, therefore, the decree could not have been executed has also no merit. The respondent No. 1 was entitled to occupy new shop reasonably corresponding and comparable to the tenement in respect of which the decree was passed. The landlord was bound to provide the corresponding area of the shop. See the decision of the Supreme Court in K. Shrinivas Rao v. K.R. Narsimhaiah and another 1989 MPRCJ 121 and this Court's decision in Radhakishan's case (supra). 15. The contention that application ought to have been made under section 18(3) of the Act by the respondent No. 1 for putting him in possession of the accommodation or part thereof within six months from the date on which the cause of action for re-entry arose. The rule does not say that if the application is not made within six months from the date on which cause of action arose, such an application shall not be entertained or shall be dismissed as barred by time. Further, in the absence of a penal consequence in the provision, Court has to see that benefits conferred by beneficial legislation are not defeated by subtle devices and in given circumstances of the case the Court has power to condone delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act by virtue of section 29 of the said Act, for mat I place reliance on the decision of this Court in case of Laxmandas v. Virendra Kumar (2). In the circumstances, the question does not arise as the petitioner has not placed any material about the date of completion of re-construction and his offer to respondent No. 1 to occupy the accommodation. In the circumstances, the question does not arise as the petitioner has not placed any material about the date of completion of re-construction and his offer to respondent No. 1 to occupy the accommodation. Besides, the question was not raised before the executing Court, hence, cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time for invoking extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction. 16. As to award of compensation in lieu of restoration of possession the respondent No. 1 has elected to be placed in occupation in terms of the agreed terms. The agreement does not contain any stipulation by way of penalty in case of breach of the agreement. The terms are recorded in the decree. Even now the respondent No. 1 prays for being placed in possession hence question of compensation does not arise. See: Vitthal Rao's case (supra). 17. The decisions ralied by the counsel for the peititoner arc distinguishable on facts and arc of no help to the petitioner. 18. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the view that the Courts below ware right in rejecting the objection to execution of the decree and directing delivery of possession of the reconstructed shop of the comparable area of the original shop. The order not being manifestly illegal of without jurisdiction cannot be interfered under Article 227 of the Constitution. See Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and others `A.I.R. 1984 SC 38. Besides, this Court in discretionary extra jurisdiction will not help the petitioner to allow injustice to be perpetuated by committing breach of lawful terms incorporated in the compromise decree or violation of section 18 of the Act. 19. In view of above it is not necessary for me to deal with other submissions made by Shri Aradhe, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. 20. However, this order will not come in the way of the petitioner to raise such other objections which may be available under law to the petitioner in the matter of execution of the decree. 21. In the result, the petition has no merit and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 750/-, if pre-certified. Petition dismissed