JUDGMENT S.N. Mallick, J. The instant revisional application under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred by the defendants/petitioners against Order No. 11 dated 28.8.95 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, 1st Court, Krishnanagar, Nadia in Money Suit No. 32 of 1995 rejecting their application under s. 21 read with s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and under s. 95(1) read with s. 134(d) of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 1983. 2. In the said application the defendants took the plea in their application that the above Money Suit filed by the plaintiff/opposite party, The Krishnanagar City Co-operative Bank Limited against them for a money decree of rupees 5,71,000/- along with a decree for compensation tentatively assessed at Rs. 100/- was not maintainable in law before a Civil Court for being barred under s. 95(1) and s. 134(d) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act"). 3. Admitted or undisputed facts on record are as follows : The defendant/petitioner No. 1 is an employee of the plaintiff Co-operative Bank. In fact, he is the Assistant Cashier of the opposite party now under suspension. The petitioner No. 2 is his wife being the defendant No. 2 in the Money Suit. It has been alleged that in course of his employment the petitioner No. 1 without the knowledge of the plaintiff Bank defalcated and misappropriated from 25.4.94 to 20.5.95 a sum of Rs. 5,65,000/- deposited with the Bank by different account holders. Admittedly, the petitioners have a joint S.B.A/C. with the plaintiff Bank, being No. 15407. It is the case of the plaintiff that the above defalcated sum was deposited by the petitioners in their above Savings Bank Account in part and the balance with other financing Bank. It is also stated in the plaint that the petitioner No. 1 defalcated a further sum of Rs. 6,000/- deposited by one of the account holders on 15.5.95 in his Savings A/C. No. 7362. Accordingly, the total defalcation detected by the plaintiff was of Rs. 5,71,000/- recovery of which was claimed in the above Money Suit. It is also stated in the plaint that the petitioner No. 1 defalcated a further sum of Rs. 6,000/- deposited by one of the account holders on 15.5.95 in his Savings A/C. No. 7362. Accordingly, the total defalcation detected by the plaintiff was of Rs. 5,71,000/- recovery of which was claimed in the above Money Suit. The petitioners before filing any written statement filed the application under s. 121 read with s. 9 of the C.P. Code and under s. 95(1) read with s. 134(d) of the Act for rejection or return of the plaint alleging that the above suit was barred under s. 95(1) and under s. 134(d) of the Act. 4. The learned Trial Judge rejected the said application by the impugned order and held as follows : "Having regard upon the facts and circumstances and legal aspect I am of opinion that the defendant/petitioner has been hopelessly failed to establish the suit bars or parricates the jurisdiction of this Court in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute under reference. So, I have no hesitation to decide that the plaintiff is a registered Co-operative Bank and the defendant No. 1 is an employee designated as Clerk under the bank and the dispute alleged in the plaint of the suit is not a dispute relating to the affairs of the Co-operative Society as has been defined in s. 95 clause 1 of the Act and the dispute under reference does not bar the jurisdiction of this Court as per the provision of s. 134(2) of the Co-operative Societies Act and that is why this court shall have every jurisdiction in regard to the subject-matter". 5. The learned Trial Judge while rejecting the application has further held that "there has been a clear prima facie case of fragment breach of rule and there is total violation of the procedure and a clear and cogent reason to express that the alleged activities of the defendant No. 1 is a serious breach of duty and thereby committed misappropriation of huge amount of the plaintiff bank". 6. Considering the circumstances of the case, the learned Trial Judge has held that in view of the spirit of law and the administration of justice, he is of the opinion that the dispute of subject-matter does not require to be referred to the Registrar under s. 95 of the Act. 7. Mr. 6. Considering the circumstances of the case, the learned Trial Judge has held that in view of the spirit of law and the administration of justice, he is of the opinion that the dispute of subject-matter does not require to be referred to the Registrar under s. 95 of the Act. 7. Mr. Das, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order is clearly against the provision of law in this regard as provided under the Act and as settled by our High Court in different reported cases. Mr. Das has drawn my attention to the definition of dispute as given in s. 2 of sub-s. (20) of the Act which runs as follows : "dispute" means any matter capable of being the subject of civil litigation and includes a claim in respect of any sum payable to or by a co-operative society". 8. He has also drawn my attention to the provisions of S. 95 of the Act which may be quoted below for proper appreciation of the law in the context of the facts of the present case. "Section 95. Dispute to be referred to Registrar.-(1) Any dispute concerning the business of a co-operative society capable of being the subject of civil litigation or any dispute relating to the affairs of a co-operative society (other than a dispute relating to the disciplinary action taken by a cooperative society against the paid employees of the co-operative society or the terms and conditions of service of the paid employees of the co-operative society) shall be referred in the prescribed manner to the Registrar, if the parties thereto are among the following :- (a) a co-operative society or its board or an officer (past or present), agent, employee or liquidator of a co-operative society; or (b) a member or a past member or a person claiming through a member or a past member or on behalf of a deceased member of a co-operative society or a financing bank of a co-operative society; or (c) a surety of a member or past member or deceased member of a co-operative society whether such surety is or is not a member of the co-operative society; or (d) any other co-operative society or any person including any financing bank having transaction with a co-operative society or any liquidator of a co-operative society. (2) Any dispute mentioned in sub-section (1) other than a dispute relating to recovery of money shall be referred to the Registrar within two months from the date on which the cause of action arises. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section or in any other law for the time being in force, the Registrar may admit any dispute after the expiry of the period of limitation provided in sub-section (2) if the applicant satisfies the Registrar that he had sufficient cause for not referring the dispute within such period of limitation, and the dispute so admitted shall not be barred by limitation. 9. Mr. Das has drawn my attention to the provision of S. 134 of the Act which bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of any dispute to be referred to the Registrar under s. 95. 10. Mr. Das has contended that the dispute between the parties to the suit is concerning the business of the plaintiff Co-operative Society capable of being the subject of civil litigation and it is also a civil dispute relating to the affairs of the plaintiff Co-operative Bank and, as such, it is required to be referred to the Registrar in the manner prescribed under the Act. It is alleged by the plaintiff Bank in the plaint that in course of business of the Bank the petitioner/defendant No. 1 while acting as the Assistant Cashier relating to the affairs of the Bank misappropriated the above money belonging to the Bank for which the suit had to be brought for recovery besides initiating a criminal prosecution. The point is whether such a matter can be treated as concerning the business of the Bank or whether act was committed by the petitioner No. 1 while managing the affairs of the Bank as its Assistant Cashier. 11. Mr. Das has referred to a Special Bench decision of this High Court reported in 1990(1) CHN page 404 (Anjan Choudhury vs. Anandaneer Co-operative Registered Housing Society & Ors.). 11. Mr. Das has referred to a Special Bench decision of this High Court reported in 1990(1) CHN page 404 (Anjan Choudhury vs. Anandaneer Co-operative Registered Housing Society & Ors.). In the above reported case it has been held as follows : "As we have already indicated, the "dispute", in order to come within the provisions of s. 86 of the Old Act and s. 95 of the New Act and thus to go out of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts under the provisions of s. 132 of the Old and s. 134 of the New Act, must be disputes, not just concerning or involving a Co-operative Society, but concerning the business or relating to the affairs of the Society, such business or affairs which the Society is authorised to be concerned with or be involved in order to carry out its objectives under the Act and as chartered by and in its Rules and By-laws. A loan granted by a Society which is only a Co-operative Housing Society and not a Co-operative Credit Society, or a tenancy granted in respect of a portion of its property by a Society which is a Co-operative Credit Society and not a Co-operative Housing Society, cannot thus give rise to a dispute concerning the business or relating to the affairs of the Society. But, as already stated, if the dispute concerns or relates to something which the Society is legally authorised to and required by its Rules and Bye-laws to undertake, it would squarely come within the provisions of s. 95 of the New Act, corresponding to s. 86 of the Old Act and cannot be entertained by the Civil Court if the parties to the dispute are as specified in those sections. And once those conditions are satisfied, the dispute must be referred to the Registrar and cannot be taken cognizance of by the Civil Courts, however, complicated the questions of law the dispute may involve. If that be, and we think that to be, the law made by our legislature and that law does not suffer from any Constitutional infirmity, then it is simply useless to express any anxiety, as manifested in the Order of Reference as to whether the Registrar, not being expected to be "properly well equipped as a Civil Court", would be able to decide the dispute effectively. Even if a legislative measure appears to be unwise, we must leave it at that, for neither we can review legislative wisdom nor should we be presumptuous to think that wisdom is our sole monopoly. Justice Holms once said to Justice Stones that if the Legislature enacts a measure and "I cannot find anything in the Constitution expressly forbidding them to do, I say, whether I like it or not, Goddamit, let them do it." 12. In the aforesaid reported case it was held that the dispute in that case directly concerned the business and related to the affairs of the Society which was patently a Co-operative Society. In the instant case, the plaintiff is a Co-operative Bank engaged in banking activities which admittedly consists inter alia of giving loans and inviting deposits from the members. The alleged defalcation was made by the petitioner No. 1 in respect of the Bank's money which was undisputedly concerning the business and relating to the affairs of the Bank. 13. Mr. Das has also referred to an earlier decision of this High Court reported in 91 CWN page 1112 (Konnagar Samabaya Bank Ltd. vs. Nilmoni Banerjee) which supports his contention that the dispute raised in the suit is to be referred to the Registrar under s. 95 of the Act. 14. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff Bank has supported the impugned order by contending that under s. 95(2) of the Act the disputes relating to money are not to be referred to the Registrar under s. 95(1) of the Act. But the provisions of s.95 of the Act taking as a whole does not support such contention. Sub-section (1) of s. 95 provides which disputes are to be referred to the Registrar. Sub-section (2) provides the time limit for referring such dispute to the Registrar and sub-s.(3) empowers the Registrar to admit a claim beyond the period of limitation as contemplated in sub-s.(2). It would absolutely be wrong to say that as per the provisions of s. 95(2) disputes relating to money claim are to be referred to the Registrar. Section 95(1) is quite clear on the disputes to be referred to the Registrar as has been found in the Special Bench decision of our High Court (supra). It would absolutely be wrong to say that as per the provisions of s. 95(2) disputes relating to money claim are to be referred to the Registrar. Section 95(1) is quite clear on the disputes to be referred to the Registrar as has been found in the Special Bench decision of our High Court (supra). The law is clearly settled in the aforesaid decision that any dispute which directly concerns the business and relates to the affairs of the plaintiff Co-operative Society is to be referred to the Registrar and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the same. 15. Mr. Mukherjee has, however, submitted that the above Special Bench decision is in his favour. In support of his contention he has relied on the finding of the Court that in order to be a dispute as contemplated under s. 95(1) of the Act it must be a dispute not just concerning or involving a Co-operative Society, which the Society is authorised to be concerned with or be involved in order to carry out its objectives under the Act and as chartered by and in its Rules and By-laws. Undisputedly, the plaintiff/opposite party is engaged in bank transaction and the defendant/petitioner No. 1 is its employee working as an Assistant Cashier. So, the alleged defalcation made by the petitioner No. 1 must be concerning the business of the Bank and relating to its affairs. The aforesaid Special Bench decision, in my opinion, does not help Mr. Mukherjee in any manner. 16. Mr. Mukherjee has referred to a Bench decision of this High Court reported in 1991(2) CHN page 190 (Bankura Wholesale Consumers' Cooperative Society Ltd. vs. West Bengal Essential Commodities Supply Corporation Ltd. & Anr.). It is not followed how this decision helps Mr. Mukherjee to contend that the dispute raised in the plaint is not a dispute under s. 95(1) of the Act and, as such, is not required to be referred to the Registrar. In the case relied upon by Mr. Mukherjee the dispute was between a Co-operative Society and the West Bengal Essential Commodities Supply Corporation Ltd. and another, relating to a money claim. In that case the Co-operative Society concerned along with another filed a money claim against the Corporation for an award for specific sum of money. In the case relied upon by Mr. Mukherjee the dispute was between a Co-operative Society and the West Bengal Essential Commodities Supply Corporation Ltd. and another, relating to a money claim. In that case the Co-operative Society concerned along with another filed a money claim against the Corporation for an award for specific sum of money. The Assistant Registrar refused to entertain the said dispute in view of an arbitration clause in the agreement. The Appellate Tribunal concurred with the finding of the Registrar but this High Court in the above reported case held that it was a dispute under s. 95 of the Act and, as such, it has to be referred to the Registrar in the prescribed manner and the Registrar has legal obligation to decide the dispute under the provisions of the Act. So, this decision also does not help Mr. Mukherjee in any way. 17. Mr. Mukherjee has also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1969 SC page 1320 (Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. M/s. Dalichand Jugraj Jain and Ors.). It was a case arising out of Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act of 1961. The provisions of which are similar to the present Act applicable to West Bengal. 18. The Supreme Court in the above case has held as follows : "It is clear that the word "business" in this context does not mean affairs of a society because election of office bearers, conduct of general meetings and management of a society would be treated as affairs of a society. In this sub-section the word business has been used in a narrower sense and it means the actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the society which the society is authorised to enter into under the Act and the Rules and its Bye-laws. 19. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court held that the business of house letting could not be treated as the business of the Co-operative Society in view of the Rules and By-laws governing it. Supreme Court has made it clear that ordinarily, if a society owns buildings which it does not require for its own purpose it cannot be said that letting out of those parts is a part of the business of the society. Supreme Court has made it clear that ordinarily, if a society owns buildings which it does not require for its own purpose it cannot be said that letting out of those parts is a part of the business of the society. But, the Supreme Court has also said, it may be that it is the business of a society to construct and buy houses and let them out to its members. In that case according to the Supreme Court letting out property may be part of its business. But in the case before the Supreme Court the Society was a Co-operative Bank and the Supreme Court held that ordinarily a Co-operative Bank cannot be said to be engaged in business when it lets out properties owned by it. The main test is whether the dispute to be referred to the Registrar concerned the business of the Cooperative Society capable of being subject of civil litigation or it relates to the affairs of the Co-operative Society. In the instant case by applying the above legal tests to the materials on record it must be held that the present dispute raised by the plaintiff and the defendants concerns the business of the plaintiff Co-operative Bank and it relates to its affairs. 20. Under the circumstances, I must hold that in view of the provisions of law and the decisions of our High Court and the Supreme Court as discussed above, the impugned order cannot be allowed to stand. The reasonings given by the learned Assistant District Judge that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit are perverse and against the law. By passing the impugned order the learned Assistant District Judge has acted illegally or at least with material irregularity so as to occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the petitioner. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff/'opposite party's Money Suit. By passing the impugned order, the learned Assistant District Judge has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, the learned Assistant District Judge should have rejected the plaint under Or. 7 Rule 11(d) of the Act. 21. Accordingly, the revisional application succeeds and it is allowed. By passing the impugned order, the learned Assistant District Judge has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, the learned Assistant District Judge should have rejected the plaint under Or. 7 Rule 11(d) of the Act. 21. Accordingly, the revisional application succeeds and it is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the application filed by the petitioners before the Trial Court under s. 21 read with s. 9 of the C.P. Code and under s. 95(1) read with s. 134(d) is allowed. The plaint of the Money Suit, being No. 32 of 1995 of the 1st Court of the learned Assistant District Judge, Krishnanagar, Nadia is rejected. 22. No order as to costs. Affidavit-in-reply filed in Court be kept with the record. Revision allowed; and plaint rejected.