JUDGMENT : P.K. Misra, J. - The petitioner along with three others were prosecuted under Sections 325/294/34, Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the "Code"). While acquitting two of the accused persons, the trial Court convicted accused Jugal Kishore Das under Section 325 of the Code and sentenced him to undergo R.I. for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,500/-, in default, to undergo R.I. for one month and convicted the present petitioner under Section 324 of the Code and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default, to undergo R.I. for two months. In Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 1994, while acquitting accused Jugal Kishore Das, the Sessions Judge has confirmed the order of conviction and sentence of the present petitioner. Hence, the Criminal Revision. 2. The Prosecution case is as follows: On 16.2.1990 at about 10 A.M., the informant (P.W.3) was taking tiffin in his house. At that time, the petitioner along with the acquitted accused persons came to his house and queried him regarding the measurement of land over which there was some prior dispute. The informant suggested that the accused persons may bring their own Amin for measurement. Immediately, the petitioner assaulted on the head of the informant with a Bhujali and the other accused persons also assaulted him, as a result of which the informant became senseless. On seeing this incident, the wife and father of the informant raised hue and cry and many other persons assembled there and removed the injured informant to the hospital for treatment. A written report was submitted at Kishan Nagar Police station and after investigation, charge sheet was submitted against all the accused persons under Sections 325/294/34 of the Code. 3. The plea of the accused persons was one of denial. 4. The prosecution examined seven witnesses including the informant as P.W.3 and an eye witness as P.W.5. Two witnesses were examined on behalf of the accused persons to prove that there was enmity between the parties and no incident had taken place as alleged. The trial Court believing the prosecution case in part convicted the petitioner and his brother Jugal Kishore Das under Sections 324/325, of the Code. Two witnesses were examined on behalf of the accused persons to prove that there was enmity between the parties and no incident had taken place as alleged. The trial Court believing the prosecution case in part convicted the petitioner and his brother Jugal Kishore Das under Sections 324/325, of the Code. The trial Court, however, did not accept the allegation regarding the commission of offence under Section 294 of the Code and also disbelieved the complicity of the other two accused persons and accordingly acquitted them of all the charges. The appellate Court found that there was serious discrepancy in the evidence of P.Ws.3 and 5 regarding the alleged assault by the co-accused Jugal Kishore Das and allowed his appeal. It, however, held that the evidence of P.W.3 regarding the assault by the present petitioner had been corroborated by P.W.5, the eye witness, and as such upheld the order of conviction and sentence in respect of the petitioner. 5. In this revision, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that the Investigating Officer having not been examined, the petitioner has been prejudiced, as various contradictions and omissions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses could not be proved. He has also contended that the three other accused persons having been acquitted on the basis of self-same evidence, the petitioner should not have been convicted. It is further submitted that the wife of the injured who was an eye witnesses having not been examined, adverse inference should have been drawn. It is further submitted that the appellate Court without carefully scanning the evidence in its proper perspective, has discarded the submission made on behalf of the present petitioner and series of illegalities and infirmities in the prosecution case have been overlooked necessitating a fresh look by the revisional Court. The learned counsel appearing for the State supporting the judgment of the appellate Court has contended that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of High Court, the concurrent finding regarding the guilt of the petitioner should not be interfered with. 6. Ordinarily, the High Court in exercise of criminal revisional jurisdiction does not enter into the question of appreciation of evidence and the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below are to be normally accepted. However, in the present case, there are certain salient features which have been ignored by the appellate Court necessitating a re-appraisal of the evidence. 7. Ordinarily, the High Court in exercise of criminal revisional jurisdiction does not enter into the question of appreciation of evidence and the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below are to be normally accepted. However, in the present case, there are certain salient features which have been ignored by the appellate Court necessitating a re-appraisal of the evidence. 7. The appellate Court has proceeded on the footing that P.W.5 was an eye witness and had corroborated the evidence of P.W.3, the injured, regarding the complicity of the present petitioner. Though P.W.5 claims that he has seen the occurrence, it is evident from the evidence of P.W.4 that the former was, indeed, a post-occurrence witness. P.W.4 has stated that on hearing the noise from the house of the informant, he went to the spot and found that the informant was lying on the ground. In cross-examination he has stated that he heard from the brother, father and mother of Anam (injured) that the accused persons assaulted Anam. He further stated:- "?.Suka Bhoi, Uttam Bhoi, Akrura Bhoi, Sura Pallei, Raghu Bhoi came to the spot with me 5 minutes after occurrence." From the aforesaid evidence of P.W.4, it is apparent that Raghu Bhoi (P.W.5) was a post-occurrence witness. The contention of the accused-appellants before the appellate Court that the prosecution had not examined the wife of the injured who had seen the occurrence, had been repelled by the appellate Court on the ground that other eye witnesses having been examined, there was no necessity for the prosecution to examine the wife of the injured. From the evidence of P.W.3, the injured, it is apparent that his wife was the only other eye witness, as evident from paragraph-7 of his deposition, where it was stated - "My wife was only present at the spot and my wife raised a hullah... and my father reached the spot hearing her shout." In fact, neither in the F.I.R. nor in his deposition, P.W.3 claims that the assault had been witnessed by any witness including P.W.5, other than his wife. In such background of the matter, the prosecution should have examined the wife of the injured, as the same would have corroborated the prosecution case. In such background of the matter, the prosecution should have examined the wife of the injured, as the same would have corroborated the prosecution case. It is true that the evidence of P.W.3 has received corroboration from the evidence of P.W.1, the doctor, who had initially treated P.W.3 However, the evidence on record which has not been properly scanned by the appellate Court reveals that, in fact, there was enmity between P.W.3 and the accused persons. Moreover, the self-same evidence of P.W.3 has not been accepted by the trial Court in respect of two accused persons and by the appellate Court in respect of the third accused person who have been acquitted of all charges. In fact, the other accused person Jugal Kishore Das was acquitted by the appellate Court of the more serious charge under Section 325 of the Code on the ground that the evidence of P.W.3 did not receive corroboration from the evidence of P.W.5 From the evidence of P.W.3 it is quite clear that there was enmity and political rivalry between P.W.3 and the petitioner. In the background of enmity between the parties and of the fact that the evidence of P.W.3 has not been accepted in respect of three other accused persons, it would have been better on the part of the prosecution to examine the other eye witness present, namely the wife of the injured. 8. Apart from the above aspects, non-examination of the Investigating Officer in the present case has the effect of adversely affecting the prosecution case. P.W.3 states that F.I.R. was scribed at the police station according to his statement, but he cannot say as to who scribed the F.I.R. The F.I.R. is purported to have been lodged at the police station on 16.2.1990 at 1.30 p.m. but it was placed before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, on 19.2.1990, i.e. almost after a gap of about three days. On the F.I.R. it has been endorsed as if the F.I.R. was despatched from the police station on 17.2.1990. Even assuming it to be so, there is no reason as to why it reached the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, on 19.2.1990. The Investigating Officer if examined, could have stated as to who had scribed the F.I.R. and as to how and when the F.I.R. was despatched and received by the Magistrate. Even assuming it to be so, there is no reason as to why it reached the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, on 19.2.1990. The Investigating Officer if examined, could have stated as to who had scribed the F.I.R. and as to how and when the F.I.R. was despatched and received by the Magistrate. Besides, certain contradictions and omissions in the evidence of P.W.3 could not be confronted to the Investigating Officer due to his non-examination. The appellate Court has observed in a facile manner that non-examination of the Investigating Officer did not cause any prejudice to the accused. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the Investigating Officer should have been examined and his non-examination has caused much prejudice to the accused and has adversely affected the prosecution case. Since the incident was of the year 1990 and the other three accused persons have been acquitted, I am not inclined to remit the matter for examination of the Investigating Officer at this distant point of time. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, the petitioner is entitled to benefit of reasonable doubt and is accordingly acquitted. 10. The Criminal Revision is allowed. Final Result : Allowed