JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, Una in Civil Appeal No. ill of 1987, dated 12-4-1990 By means of impugned judgment and decree, the lower appellate Court has held that Mangat Ram (hereinafter referred to as defendant No. 1’) is in unauthorised occupation of disputed khasra numbers and not as a tenant and the judgment and decree of the trial Court to that extent was sec aside and the appeal was partly accepted. Nathu Ram (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) and Avtar Chand (hereinafter referred to as defendant No. 2’) were held to be the owners of suit land but not in possession and the entries in the revenue record showing defendant No. 1 to be tenant at will under both of them i.e. plaintiff and defendant No. 2 are wrong and not binding upon them this judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court has been questioned in this appeal by the plaintiff. In order to properly appreciate the respective submissions made on behalf of the parties in this case/it is necessary to refer to a few facts, Plaintiff filed a suit for declaration and injunction and in the alternative for possession on the allegations that the land comprised in khasra No. 619 measuring 1 kanal 19 marlas and khasra No. 620 measuring 0-16 marlas situate in village Amb is owned and possessed by him as well as by defendant No. 2 Further case of the plaintiff was that defendant No. 1 is a clever person, who in connivance with the revenue Patwari an other revenue officials has got a wrong entry entered ia the records in bin favour showing him to be a non-occupancy tenant under the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 in Rabi 1976. n the basis of this wrong entry, he further got incorporated entry of mutation regarding conferment of propensity rights in favour of defendant No 1 which is wrong, illegal and without any basis as well as consent of the plaintiff and defendant No.2. n the basis of this wrong entry, he further got incorporated entry of mutation regarding conferment of propensity rights in favour of defendant No 1 which is wrong, illegal and without any basis as well as consent of the plaintiff and defendant No.2. It was further pleaded by the plaintiff that both he and defendant No 2 were the owners in actual possession of the suit land on the spot and on the basis of the wrong and illegal entries defendant No. 1 is threatening them to take forcible possession of suit laud The said defendant No. 1 was asked to desist from his unlawful acts, but of do avail. Hence the suit. The suit was contested and resisted by defendant No.1 who contested the same on the pleas of Court having no jurisdiction to try the suit, suit being not maintainable and being time-barred On merits, defendant No.1 claimed himself to be in cultivating possession of the suit land as tenant at will on payment of rent under the other parties and having become owner after the coming into force of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It was specifically denied by him that the entries in his favour are either wrong or illegal. 2. In the aforesaid background, the parties went to trial on the following issues :— 1. Whether the plaintiff and defendant No 2 are owners in possession of the suit land ? OPP, 2. Whether Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit ? OPD. 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form as alleged ? OPD, 4. Whether the suit is within time ? OPP 5. Whether the defendant No.1 had bee ia possession of the suit land as tenant-at-will and has now become owner thereof as alleged ? OPD 6. Relief Trial Court found issues No. 1 and 4 in the affirmative whereas issues No. 2, 3 and 5 were held to be in the negative and consequently the suit of the plaintiff was decreed In appeal preferred by defendant No.1 before the lower appellate Court the judgment passed by the trial Court was modified and the appeal was partly allowed as detailed hereinabove. It is in this background that the present appeal came to be filed by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court. 3. It is in this background that the present appeal came to be filed by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court. 3. In this case, from the materials on record one thing needs to be noticed at the very outset that the order of conferment of proprietary rights upon defendant No.1 in accordance with the provisions of the Act appears to have been Questioned by the plaintiff as well as defendant No. 2 and by means of judgment dated 26-11-1986, Collector, Amb vide Ext PB has set aside the order dated 9-12-1982 passed on mutation No. 3657 conferring propensity rights in respect of land comprised in Khasra No. 619 measuring 1-19 marlas and vide Ext. PC. order dated 26-11-1986 in the appeal filed by the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 in respect of Khasra No. 620 measuring 1-6 nutrias has set aside the order of Assistant Collector, IInd Grade dated 29-12-1986 and in both the cases the matter was remanded back to the Court below. In the light of Exts PB and PC which relate to land in suit passed by the competent authority under law, this Court has to examine the plea of defendant No. 1 raised regarding his tenancy over the suit land It may be appropriate to mention here that nothing to the contrary has been brought on record by defendant No. 1 to show as to how and in what circumstances the tenancy was created in his favour since Rabi 1976. So far title of the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 over the suit land is concerned, there is over whelming evidence both oral as well as documentary produced by the plaintiff Even from the case set up by defendant No. 1 to defeat the claim made i.e. the plaint, title of both i.e. plaintiff and defendant No. 2 is clearly established Needless to point out here that the moment defendant No. 1 claims tenancy over the suit land under the plaintiff as well as defendant No 2 that too on payment of rent, the ownership of both of them stands admitted. In addition to this, mutation No 3657 da ed 29-12-1982 was attested in respect of Khasra No. 619 measuring 1 kanal 19 marlas and mutation No 2658 dated 29-12-1982 was attested in respect of Khasra No. 620 measuring 16 marlas Both were admittedly attested in favour of defendant No. 1 conferring proprietary rights upon him which both were set aside vide Exts PB and PC, respectively. 4. In view of (he above said position, the question that remains to be determined is as to whether any tenancy was in fact, there or so created by the owners i.e. plaintiff and defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 or not ? In this behalf it may be appropriate to point out that tenancy is a bilateral agreement and payment of rent in any form whatsoever is a necessary ingredient of the relationship of landlord and tenant. In the instant case, there is ample evidence on record to show that the land in suit has been purchased by the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 Besides this they became owners of the suit land in the year 1973 and they were put in possession of Khasra No, 620 vide Rapat Roznamcha of the Patwari. In these circumstances, the plea of defendant No. 1 having become tenant under them does not appear to be correct at all. Even otherwise, no sane person would induct as a tenant after having purchased the land, more especially when it is a matter of common knowledge that under the provisions of the Act, tenants are becoming owners. In addition to this, there is no legal evidence which can be translated in support of the plea of defendant No. 1 to hold that the tenancy came into existence in his favour qua the suit land. 5. In the context of plea of tenancy, it may be necessary to refer to Ext. DW-2/A, Rapat Roznamcha recorded by the Patwari to the effect that he noted certain charges ia the revenue record in April, 1976. Thereafter on the basis of some notice- stated to have been issued by the Patwari calling objections for making correction of the entry in the column of cultivation in favour of defendant No. 1 so as to show him as tenant-at-will over Khasra No. 619, correction was made in favour of defendant No. 1 in Khasra Girdawari from Rabi, 1976 vide Ext. P-2. 6. P-2. 6. This entry made by the Patwari carries no weight in law as he had no authority to have ordered this correction in the revenue records. Need-less to point out here that correction of revenue entry could either be made with the consent of the parties or otherwise revenue officer was required to hold summary inquiry Admittedly Patwari is not a revenue officer. That being so, the correction made by the Patwari in favour of defendant No.1 is void and without jurisdiction. It casts no cloud on the title of the true owners. 7. Faced with the aforesaid circumstances, learned Counsel appearing for defendant No.1 vehemently urged that the suit of the plaintiff was not competent inasmuch as that he or for that matter defendant No. 2 both were not in possession of the suit land. As such the suit ought to have been filed for possession of the land in question it was further urged that there is nothing on record to grant the relief of possession as. There is no evidence in that behalf Similarly, it was also urged that there is no pleading on the basis of which the plaintiff can be given the relief of possession as also there being no issue on this point. It was also urged by the learned Counsel for defendant No. 1 that in case the appeal is allowed, in that event, the case be remanded back for disposal to the first appellate Court., So far the above noted pleas raised on behalf of defendant No.1 are concerned, for the reasons stated hereinafter, all those are liable to be rejected. 8. In the plaint, the plaintiff in the prayer clause has prayed for a n decree for possession of the suit land Further merely because there is no issue will not disentitle this Court for allowing the relief to the plaintiff. 9. In AIR 1986 Orissa 281, Managobinda and others v Brajabandhu Misra, a learned Single Judge while placing reliance on AIR 1966 SC 735, Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandra Maul, has held as under :— "9. The question raised here however is substantially different. Order 7. 9. In AIR 1986 Orissa 281, Managobinda and others v Brajabandhu Misra, a learned Single Judge while placing reliance on AIR 1966 SC 735, Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandra Maul, has held as under :— "9. The question raised here however is substantially different. Order 7. Rule 7, Civil Procedure Coda allows the plaintiff to claim relief either simply or in the alternative, and further vests power in the Court to "grant either general or other relief to the same extent as if it had been asked for where the Court thinks it just and proper and the same rule also applies to any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement The Court has thus inherent power to grant either general relief or other relief which appears to it to be legitimate and proper in any case even though such reliefs have not been specifically asked for. This power of the Court which even though may appear to be inconsistent with the principles urged by Mr. Mishra, namely, that the Court cannot make out a third case or that the parties should not be allowed to lead evidence which is not in accordance with their pleadings, yet on a close scrutiny there is no inconsistency. In AIR 1966 SC 735, Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandra Mauli it was held as follows :— "There can be no doubt that if a party asks for a relief on a clear and specific ground, and in the issues or at the trial, no other ground is covered either directly or by necessary implication, it would not be open to the said party attempt to sustain the same claim on a ground which is entirely new. * * * * * But in considering the application of this doctrine to the facts of the present case, it is necessary to bear in mind the other principle that considerations of form cannot override the legitimate considerations of substance. If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties But where the. substantial matters relating to the title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely, in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that a particular matter was not expressly taken in the pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case. What the Court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is : did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial, and did they lead evidence about it ? If it appears that the parties did not know that the matter was in issue at the trial and one of them had no opportunity to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedly would be a different matter. To allow one party to rely upon a matter in respect of which the other party did not lead evidence, would introduce considerations of prejudice, and in doing justice, to one party, the Court cannot do injustice to another.” 10. Thus the substance of the question is that when the question relates to the title of both the parties and evidence has been led about it and both the parties are aware of the same, the mere technicality that the issue was not expressed in the pleadings is of formal nature and should not be allowed to preclude the Court from granting the relief. The real question for consideration is to consider whether by such process one party is allowed to spring a surprise on the other patty Inasmuch as the other party had no notice and had no opportunity to lead evidence at the trial Such a case may arise where the plea raised by either of the parties is wholly inconsistent and can by no reasonings co-exist with the original plea taken.” 11. In AIR 1089 Karn 45, Smt. Neelawwa v. Smt Shivawwa, it was held that in a suit for title and for injunction restraining the defendant from alienating suit property, relief of partition and separate possession can be granted even in the absence of specific prayer for such relief It was observed that denial of separate possession would only lead to another suit. This seems to be based on the principle that multiplicity of proceedings should ordinarily be avoided as the same leads to delay in justice. 12. In view of the fact that the title of the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 regarding the suit land is not dispute, the tenancy of defendant No.1 has not been held to be there. As such even if the plea of defendant No.1 is accepted and if the case is to be remanded back, the best that can happen there is that after amendment of the plaint without leading further evidence as well as on the basis of the materials record, the result would be the same and a decree for possession would follow. In this view of the matter as well as after considering the provisions of Order 7, Rule 7 and Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court is certainly competent to grant the relief of possession in favour of the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 as prayed for in the suit since they are admitted owners of the suit land. Needless to reiterate here that the rules or procedures are hand made for advancing the cause of justice as well as for doing sub-standing justice between the parties and not for thwarting the same. Since defendant No.1 has been held to be a person in possession of the suit land without any right, as such he is held to be liable for payment of mesne profits in respect of the suit land with effect from the date of this judgment i.e 4-6-1997 till he delivers the possession of the suit land. Id taking this view, I am supported by the decisions reported in AIR 1966 SC 735, Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandra Maul (supra); AIR 1958 517, Rechepalli Atchamma v. Yerragunta Rami Reddi ; AIR 1967 SC 155. Gopalakrishna Pillai and others v Meenakshi Ayal and others and a Division Bench judgment of Delhi High Court reported in 1996 (2) RCR 197, Air India Limited v. Atma Ram Properties Private Limited. 13. Gopalakrishna Pillai and others v Meenakshi Ayal and others and a Division Bench judgment of Delhi High Court reported in 1996 (2) RCR 197, Air India Limited v. Atma Ram Properties Private Limited. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court is quashed and set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial Court is restored with the modification that the plaintiff and defendant No.1 are declared to be owners of the land comprised in Khewat No. 124, Khatauni No. 271. Khasra No. 619 measuring 1 kanal 19 marlas and land comprised in Khewat No. 536, Khatauni No. 82.5, Khasra No. 620 measuring 0-16 marlas, Kittas 2, as entered in jamabandi for the year 1976-77, situate in village Amb, Tehsil Am, District Una, H.P and a decree for possession is also passed in favour of plaintiff and defendant No. 2 with niece profits w.e.f. 4-6-1997 till the date of delivery of possession Mesne profits will be assessed by the trial Court and the plaintiff shall be liable for the payment of Court fee on such mesne profits. It is made clear that assessment of mesne profits will not come in the way of execution of decree so far it relates to possession of suit laud This appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms and Cross Objections 365 of 1990 are hereby rejected, Defendant No. 1 Will also pay the costs of this appeal qualified at Rs. 2,000. Appeal allowed.