Judgment :- 1. Third Respondent in W.C. No. 18 of 1994, on the file of Deputy Commissioner of Labour-cum-Commissioner for Workmen Compensation, Madurai, is the appellant before this Court. 2. First Respondent in this Appeal filed a Claim Petition alleging that in the course of employment, he met with an accident in which his right hand had to be amputated. According to him, while he was working under the third respondent herein-Contractor, on account of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, he sustained the said injury. According to him, he was working in the Sugar Mills, Padamathur, Sivagangai. A road was being laid for the Sugar Mills from Padamathur to the site of the Sugar Mills. For the purpose of mixing metal and tar, a mixture plant was positioned at Padamathur at the site where the work was going on. At that time, the third respondent herein ordered the first respondent herein (claimant) to apply grease in the machine which was not properly guarded as per Rules provided in the Factories Act or any other labour legislation in India. When the driver was about to stop the machine to facilitate the greasing, the Contractor instructed him not to stop the machine as, according to him, it was not necessary to stop the machine while the grease was applied. While carrying out the instructions given by the Contractor, he met with the accident and his right-hand had to be cut-off. Therefore, he claimed damages. 3. Appellant herein filed a counter-statement stating that he was never an employer. On behalf of the Government of Tamil Nadu, tenders were invited for carrying out special repairs to bad stretches in Padamathur-Tiruppachetti Road. Second respondent submitted his tender for the above work, and, after negotiation, the same was accepted. An agreement was also properly executed with the appellant, and the site was handed over to second respondent, fixing four months time for completion of the contract. It is said that as per the terms of the contract, the tenderer has to make his own arrangement for tools and plant required for the work and they will be lent to contractor, if available with the Department and on the request of the tenderer. It is said that the claimant was never a workman, nor was he employed by third respondent-Department. The third respondent is only a Government Department, exercising Government functions. It is said that the claimant was never a workman, nor was he employed by third respondent-Department. The third respondent is only a Government Department, exercising Government functions. It is not liable for the injury caused to the claimant. 4. By the impugned order, the Authority held that the appellant herein is also liable for compensation. It found that the appellant is the principal employer, and it was for its purpose, the road was being maintained, even though the claimant was directly employed by the first respondent in the Claim Petition. Therefore, under Sec. 12 of the Workmens Compensation Act, it found that the appellant was also liable for the compensation. 5. In this Appeal, no substantial question of law has been raised, though under Sec. 30 of the Act, an Appeal lies only on a substantial question of law. 6. The question whether the claimant is an employee and whether the appellant is the principal employer are pure questions of fact based on evidence. 7. In a recent Bench decision of the Kerala High Court reported in 1995 (2) K.L.J. page 319 ( V. Raveendran v. B. Somavally and others ) which followed an earlier decision of that Court rendered by Krishna Iyer, J., as his Lordship then was, in 1972 KLJ 252 ( N.P. Lalan v. V.A. John ). It was held that against a finding on a pure question of fact, no appeal will he under Sec. 30 of the Workmens Compensation Act. In the Judgment reported in 1972 KLJ 252 (supra ), it was held thus:— “The Act relates to workers and the entire purpose of the statute is to see that the weaker Section of the community, namely, the working class, is not caught in the meshes of litigation which involves a protracted course of appeal. That is why the statute creates a special tribunal and provides only for a restricted appeal. The beningnant object of saving the worker from long and expensive litigation would be defeated if a loose interpretation were to be given to the proviso under Sec. 30 and all kinds of appeals, merely because there is some point which has the look of law, are admitted. A highly restrictive meaning has to be imported because of the very legislative purpose and the class of litigation covered, even apart from the drastic expression used in the proviso. A highly restrictive meaning has to be imported because of the very legislative purpose and the class of litigation covered, even apart from the drastic expression used in the proviso. In this context, Part IV of the Indian Constitution serves as a perspective while construing the Workmens Compensation Act. May be that pre-Constitution statutes were interpreted in a particular way by Courts on certain assumptions of the States functions at that time. To-day, it is absolutely plain that the Directive Principles of State Policy, though not enforceable by a Court, are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country, and must inform the judicial mind when interpreting statutes calculated to promote the welfare of the working class. In fact, Art. 42 enjoins upon the State to make provision for securing just and human conditions of work and Article 43 compel State to endeavour to secure by suitable legislation, to all workers conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life. Indeed, the spirit of Part IV of the Constitution must colour the semantic exercises of the judiciary when applying the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act. If that be the approach to be made, the argument that the proviso to Sec. 30 has been interpreted liberally in the pre-Constitution days is no significance. The same words with socio-economic developments in society, acquire a new emphasis in time with the changed conditions. It is clear therefore, that the dynamics of legal interpretations based on social changes which have taken place in the nations life and goals demand that the proviso to Sec. 30 should be so construed as to inhibit appeals a t the instance of employers even if there be some questions of law or gross errors of fact, unless very substantial legal issues arise.” Following the said decision, the Division Bench said: “The question as to whether or not the Workman was at the time of the accident employed by the employer and whether or not the accident resulting in injury took place during the course of employment are all questions of fact on which no appeal lies under Sec. 30 of the Act. It clearly restricts the right of appeal to substantial question of law. It clearly restricts the right of appeal to substantial question of law. Where on a particular point, there is evidence for and against, and a finding is recorded by the Commissioner, on taking a particular view of the evidence, it cannot be questioned however erroeous, as no question of law can be said to have arisen in such cases. Only in cases where the Commissioner has clearly misdirected himself on a question of law or a finding is recorded without any evidence whatsoever, or a perverse finding is reached which no reasonable man would reach, it can be said that a question of law has arisen, which the Court may consider it to be a substantial one’. (Emphasis). On the preliminary ground itself, the appeal has only to be dismissed”. 8. It is after taking evidence, the Commissioner has come to the conclusion that the appellant is the principal employer, which cannot be said as a perverse finding. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on a decision of the Kerala High Court reported in 1989-II-L.L.J. 114 (Travancore Devaswom Board v. Purushothaman) wherein their Lordships said that the Devaswom Board cannot be made liable under Sec. 12 of the Act, since it is a statutory body whose duty is to arrange for the conduct of the daily worship and ceremonies and of the festivals in every temple according to its usage, the beneficiaries being the general Hindu Public. It is not with any profit motive that the Board is functioning. Nor is it practicing a profession or calling. It is a statutory trustee constituted for the upkeep and management of the temples which are intended for the spiritual upliftment of the devotees. After so holding, their Lordships further went on to say that the Board is not doing any business so as to make it liable under the Act. 10. The said decision will have no application to the facts of this case. The Kerala High Court in that case held that the Devaswom is not doing a trade or business so as to make it liable. It is settled law that so far as the Government is concerned, its functions have now spread to various activities. In this case, the accident happened when the road belonging to the Government was being maintained. The Kerala High Court in that case held that the Devaswom is not doing a trade or business so as to make it liable. It is settled law that so far as the Government is concerned, its functions have now spread to various activities. In this case, the accident happened when the road belonging to the Government was being maintained. Even if it is not a trade, it cannot be doubted that it is a business, and under the present state, the same has an enlarged meaning. 11. In the result, I do not find any merit in the Appeal. The decision of the Authority is confirmed by dismissing the Appeal, however, without any order as to costs.