ASIT KUMAR DASGUPTA, C. M. M. , CALCUTTA v. STATE — 1997 DIGILAW 229 (CAL)

SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the Contempt Rule issued by learned single Judge of this Court. The appellant is the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate of Calcutta. Before issuing the Contempt Rule, the learned single Judge also issued a show cause notice. The circumstances under which the said notice to show cause before issuing contempt Rule was issued as appears from the said notice is set out hereinunder :"this is to record that sometime back in the last part of February this year between 16-2-1996 and 23-2-1996, Shri Asit Kumar Dasgupta, a member of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service, posted as Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta while talking to me over phone at my chamber in a most objectionable, intemperate, annoying and insulting language criticised the move of the High Court and the order of the present Chief Justice calling for copies of judgments delivered by him and few other members of the service for considering their eligibility for granting extension of service beyond 58 years. He asked me to see that copies of judgments were not called for and to tell the Chief Justice that he should not take the matter as in the domain of his father's zamindari inasmuch as many thieves in the Judicial service were allowed extension of their services by this Court on previous occasions without considering their judgments. " ( 2 ) IT further appears from the said order issuing notice that the learned Judge being taken aback to hear that a senior officer of the subordinate judiciary could talk to a sitting Judge of the High Court over phone in his chamber in such language challenging the authority of the High Court and abusing the Chief Justice. He informed the same to a senior Judge of this Court of the communication and the matter was duly reported in writing to the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice ultimately in his letter dated 17-4-1996 informed the learned Judge that he had referred, the matter to a committee consisting of Justice Samir Kumar Mookherjee, Justice U. C. Banerjee, Justice B. P. Banerjee, Justice N. K. Mitra and Justice A. K. Dutta and promised to communicate their report as and when required. The Chief Justice ultimately in his letter dated 17-4-1996 informed the learned Judge that he had referred, the matter to a committee consisting of Justice Samir Kumar Mookherjee, Justice U. C. Banerjee, Justice B. P. Banerjee, Justice N. K. Mitra and Justice A. K. Dutta and promised to communicate their report as and when required. ( 3 ) BUT according to the learned Judge although more than one and half months have passed since then nothing has been communicated to the learned Judge in this regard from the end of the Chief Justice. No positive action has been taken against the said officer departmentally or legally. In view of the above conduct of the said officer, the matter, in his opinion, should not be allowed to lie dormant, unattended, ignored and unpunished taking the dignity and authority of this Court. In his view, by making such remarks the aforesaid officer has scandalised and lowered the authority of this Court and is thus guilty of contempt committed in his hearing for which he should be proceeded against for criminal contempt of Court under Section 14 read with Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. But, at the time before issuing a Rule of Contempt, the said officer may be given a chance to explain his conduct before this Court. ( 4 ) PURSUANT to the said notice served upon the appellant, the appellant duly replied to the same. In the said reply, the appellant denied the allegations made against him. The learned Judge apparently being not satisfied with the said reply issued a Rule calling upon the appellant to show cause why he should not be committed to prison or otherwise penalised or dealt with for having wilfully committed contempt of Court under Section 14 of the said Act in the manner recorded in the first paragraph of his order dated 6-6-1996 treating the same as a description of the contempt he has committed. ( 5 ) MR. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharjee, learned Advocate for the appellant has submitted that the allegation made against the appellant, even if it is true, does not amount to criminal contempt under Section 2 (c) of the said Act. ( 5 ) MR. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharjee, learned Advocate for the appellant has submitted that the allegation made against the appellant, even if it is true, does not amount to criminal contempt under Section 2 (c) of the said Act. He has further submitted that under Section 14 of the said Act on the basis of which the Contempt Rule was issued by the learned single Judge, the acts of Contempt alleged, must have been committed in course of judicial proceedings. Private conversation between the alleged contemnor and the Judge not in course of Judicial proceeding, does not amount to an act of Contempt. ( 6 ) MR. Bhattacharjee has further submitted that on the basis of the acts alleged, the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to issue Rule of Contempt against the appellant under Section 14 of Contempt of Courts Act. He has further submitted that the Rule issued was in respect of a Criminal Contempt and the said learned Judge has no jurisdiction sitting singly, to issue Rule for Contempt. Since in respect of Criminal Contempt, the matter has to be dealt with by appropriate Division Bench as may be determined by the learned Chief Justice. ( 7 ) MR. Anindya Mitra, learned Additional Solicitor General, who was appointed as Amicus Curiae has submitted that it is not in dispute that there was a telephonic conversation between the learned single Judge and the appellant. Even assuming that the allegation against the appellant in respect of the words used by him is correct, that does not come within the purview of Criminal Contempt under Section 2 (C) of the Contempt of Courts Act. He has further submitted that the learned Judge has restricted the scope of contempt to the extent of scandalising and lowering the Court in the estimation of the public. Since there was a telephonic conversation between the appellant and the learned Judge, there was no scope for publication in respect of the words used by the appellant and as such there is no question of any scope for scandalising or putting or tending to reduce the position of the Court's dignity or judiciary in the estimation of the public. Since there was a telephonic conversation between the appellant and the learned Judge, there was no scope for publication in respect of the words used by the appellant and as such there is no question of any scope for scandalising or putting or tending to reduce the position of the Court's dignity or judiciary in the estimation of the public. ( 8 ) THE learned Additional Solicitor General has further submitted that the alleged criticism with regard to the procedure, calling for copies of judgment for the purpose of consideration of eligibility for grant of extension of service beyond 58 years really amounts to an expression of opinion of an individual and the communication of the same was restricted to the appellant and the learned Judge and cannot in any way affect the position of the judiciary in the estimation of the public. He has further submitted that an individual is entitled to express his honest opinion about the work of an institution including the system or procedure of work relating to judiciary but the same may not have the effect of scandalising or lowering the Court in the estimation of the public. ( 9 ) THE learned Additional Solicitor General however has further submitted that the portion of the words alleged to have been used by the alleged contemnor as recorded by the learned single Judge, viz. . . . "this is to record that sometime back in the last part of February this year between 16-2-1996 and 23-2-1996, Sri Asit Kumar Dasgupta, a member of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service, posted as Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta while talking to me over phone at my chamber in a most objectionable intemperate, annoying and insulting language criticised the move of the High Court and the order of the present Chief Justice calling for copies of Judgments delivered by him and few other members of the service for considering their eligibility for granting extension of service beyond 58 years. He asked me to see that copies of judgments were not called for and to tell the Chief Justice that he should not take the matter as in the domain of his father's Zamindari inasmuch as many thieves in the Judicial Service were allowed extension of their services by this High Court on previous occasions without considering their judgments. He asked me to see that copies of judgments were not called for and to tell the Chief Justice that he should not take the matter as in the domain of his father's Zamindari inasmuch as many thieves in the Judicial Service were allowed extension of their services by this High Court on previous occasions without considering their judgments. "may amount to scandalising or putting or tending to reduce the position of the Court or dignity of the judiciary provided the same has been disclosed to public. ( 10 ) IN the instant case, there is nothing on record to suggest that the said words have been communicated to anyone else other than the learned single Judge but also happens to be a part of the High Court. ( 11 ) THE learned Additional Solicitor General has further submitted that the learned single Judge has referred the matter to the learned Chief Justice who has constituted a Committee to deal with the same. ( 12 ) MR. Mitra has further submitted that the conversation referred to by the learned single Judge and the order issuing the rule does not tend to lower the authority of the Court and undermine public confidence. He has RELIED ON the Sunday Times case reported in (1974) AC 273. ( 13 ) IT was further been submitted by learned Additional Solicitor General that since in the instance case nothing has been disclosed to public, there is no question of scandalising or putting the administration of justice to ridicule and as such the issue of rule on the ground mentioned in the order does not appear to be justified. The learned Additional Solicitor General has also RELIED ON the judgment and decision in the case of Debi Prasad Sharma v. Emperor reported in AIR 1943 PC 202 wherein a Newspaper report untruely stated that Chief Justice of a High Court was writing to its subordinate Judges asking them to collect subscription for war fund. Privy Council held that the contempt proceeding was misconceived. The report did not involve any criticism of Chief Justice in his administrative capacity and there is no criticism of any Judicial act of the Chief Justice or any imputation on him for anything done or omitted to be done by him in administration of justice. Privy Council held that the contempt proceeding was misconceived. The report did not involve any criticism of Chief Justice in his administrative capacity and there is no criticism of any Judicial act of the Chief Justice or any imputation on him for anything done or omitted to be done by him in administration of justice. ( 14 ) THE Additional Solicitor General has further submitted that in fact, the words used by the alleged contemnor if true would really mean that he has criticised or attacked the system which amounts to interference with the administration of justice. In support of his contention he has RELIED ON the judgment and decision in the case of Rex v. Nayyar reported in AIR 1950 All 549 : (1950 (51) Cri LJ 1500 ). ( 15 ) THE learned Additional Solicitor General has also placed reliance upon the judgment and decision in the case of S. N. Chakraborty v. Bilamendu Mazumdar, reported in AIR 1972 Cal 352 wherein it was held that letters written to the District Magistrate by the Court Inspectors complaining a Magistrate, 1st Class, was rude and rough and bias against prosecution and vindictive. It was held that it was defamatory attack on the Judge and were not calculated to interfere with due course of justice and administration of law by the Court and there is no scope for contempt. ( 16 ) WE have considered the submissions made by Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharjee and also of the learned Additional Solicitor General. Two questions arise for determination in the instant case. The first question namely if the words or allegations alleged to has been made even if true constitute 'contempt' under Contempt of Courts Act 1971. The other question is what is the scope of Section 14 of the said Act and if the learned judge was justified in issuing the said rule under Section 14. To appreciate the aforesaid questions involved in the instant proceeding, it is necessary, to consider Section 2 (c) of the said Act. The other question is what is the scope of Section 14 of the said Act and if the learned judge was justified in issuing the said rule under Section 14. To appreciate the aforesaid questions involved in the instant proceeding, it is necessary, to consider Section 2 (c) of the said Act. It appears from the order issuing show cause notice dated 6-6-1996 and from the Rule issued on 9-7-1996 that the appellant was proceeded with under Section 14 of the said Act for committing Criminal Contempt on the basis of the words alleged to have been used by him against the Chief Justice of this Court and communicated to the learned single Judge on telephone. Criminal Contempt has been defined under Section 2 (c) of the said Act which provides as follows :-"2 (C) 'criminal Contempt' means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which; (I) scandalizes or tends to scandalise or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court; or (II) prejudices, or interfere or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (III) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of, justice in any other manner. " ( 17 ) IF we consider the said definition of Criminal contempt the first precondition appear to be the publication or doing of any other act, and secondly, such publication or doing of Act has resulted in any or all of the consequences specified in Section 2 (c) (i) (ii) (iii) viz :- (I) scandalizes or tends to scandalise or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any Court : or (II) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceedings : or (III) interferes, or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner. The publication may be by : (I) written words, or (II) spoken words, or (III) signs, or (IV) visible representations, or (V) otherwise. ( 18 ) THE legislature has made the scope of publication as wide as possible, although, it is difficult to comprehend what publication would come within the residuary class intended to be covered by (otherwise ). The publication may be by : (I) written words, or (II) spoken words, or (III) signs, or (IV) visible representations, or (V) otherwise. ( 18 ) THE legislature has made the scope of publication as wide as possible, although, it is difficult to comprehend what publication would come within the residuary class intended to be covered by (otherwise ). ( 19 ) IT appears that the spoken words alleged to have been used by the appellant and communicated to the learned Judge himself and not to any third party. ( 20 ) THE further question is if the words used amount to scandalisizing or therein anything tending to scandalize or lowering or tending to lower authority of this Court. It depends whether the words used amounts to contempt of scandalising on the basis of on to whom the words have been addressed. In this connection judgment and decision in the case of Puskuru Kishore Rao v. N. Janardhana Reddy, Chief Minister of A. P. reported in 1993 Crl LJ 115 (Anda Pra) may he taken note of. In the aforesaid decision it was held by the Andra Pradesh High Court that if the audience comprises persons whose confidence in the integrity of the judiciary is not likely to be shaken except on weighty material, then the prospects of committal will be remote. In the aforesaid case, the Chief Minister while inaugurating Training Institute for Judicial Officers observed that welfare measures suffered because Judges arbitrarily awarded higher compensation to landholders but the inauguration meeting was attended by only special invitees like Judges, Lawyers and Senior Officials, it was held that the speech did not amount to criminal contempt. ( 21 ) IN this connection the judgment and decision in the case of P. N. Duda v. Shiv Shankar, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1208 : (1988 Cri LJ 1745) may be taken note of. In the aforesaid decision the Supreme Court held that the speech made by the Law Minister did not hamper administration of justice. The Supreme Court further held that "administration of justice and Judges are open to public criticism and public scrutiny. Judges have their accountability to the society, their conscience and oath of their office, that is, to defend and uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear and favour. This the Judges must do in the right given to them to determine what is right. Judges have their accountability to the society, their conscience and oath of their office, that is, to defend and uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear and favour. This the Judges must do in the right given to them to determine what is right. Any criticism about the judicial system or the Judges which hampers the administration of justice which erodes the faith in the objective approach of Judge and brings administration of justice into ridicule must be prevented. The contempt of Court proceedings arise out of that attempt. Judgments can be criticised; and motives of the Judges need not be attributed, it brings the administration of justice into deep disrepute. Faith in the administration of justice is one of the pillars through which democratic institution functions and sustains. In the free market place of ideas criticism about the judicial system of Judges should be welcomed, so long as such criticism do not impair or hamper the administration of justice. This is how Courts should approach the powers vested in them as Judges to punish a person for an alleged contempt, be it by taking notice of the matter suo motu or at the behest of the litigant or a lawyer. Further, that intuition more subtle than major premise is the pride and the prejudice of a human instrument of a Judge through which objectively the Judge seeks to administer justice according to law. So, therefore, in a study of accountability if class composition of the people manning the institution is analysed it cannot be said that an expression or view or propagation of that view hampers the dignity of the Courts or impairs the administration of justice. Case law discussed. "the Supreme Court further noted that "in the speech made by the Law Minister before a meeting of the Bar Council of Hyderabad, the Law Minister examined the class composition of the Supreme Court. His view was that the class composition of any instrument indicates it predisposition, its prejudices. It was stated that the Supreme Court was composed of the element from the elite class. The Minister went on to say that because the Judges had their 'unconcealed sympathy for the haves' interpreted the expression compensation' in the manner they did, and that this the word compensation in Art. 31 was interpreted contrary to the spirit and the intendment of the Constitution. The Minister went on to say that because the Judges had their 'unconcealed sympathy for the haves' interpreted the expression compensation' in the manner they did, and that this the word compensation in Art. 31 was interpreted contrary to the spirit and the intendment of the Constitution. The Constitution therefore had to be amended by the 1st, 14th and 17th Amendments to remove this 'oligarchic' approach of the Supreme Court with little or no help. The inter-action of the decisions of amendment were viewed by the Minister in his speech. Then the speaker referred to Holmes Alexander in his column entitled 9 Men of Terror Squad' making a fyontal attack on the functions of the U. S. Supreme Court. There was a comparison after making the quotation 'one should ask the question how true Holmes Alexandar was in the Indian context'. According to the speaker twenty years of valuable time was lost in this confrontation presented by the judiciary in introducting and implementing basic agrarian reforms for removal of poverty what is the ultimate result. The nation did not exhibit the political will to implement the land reform laws. The removal of the Maharajas and Rajas and privy purses were criticised because of the view taken by Supreme Court which according to the speaker was contrary to the whole national upsurge. Then he made a reference to the Keshavananda Bharati's Golaknath's cases ( AIR 1973 SC 1461 and AIR 1967 SC 1643 ) and observed that a representative of the elitist culture of this country ably supported by industrialists and beneficiaries of independence get higher compensation by the intervention of the Supreme Court in Cooper's case ( AIR 1970 SC 564 ) which was a criticism of judgment in Cooper's case. " Considering the said speech the Supreme Court held that "there was no imminent danger of interference with the administration of justice, nor of bringing administration into disrepute. In that view it was held that the Minister was not guilty of contempt of Supreme Court. The speech of the Minister read in its proper perspective, did not bring the administration of justice into disrepute or impair administration of justice, though in some portions of the speech the language used could have been avoided by the Minister having the background of being a former Judge of the High Court. The speech of the Minister read in its proper perspective, did not bring the administration of justice into disrepute or impair administration of justice, though in some portions of the speech the language used could have been avoided by the Minister having the background of being a former Judge of the High Court. The Minister perhaps could have achieved his purpose by making his language mild but his facts deadly. " ( 22 ) IN the instant case also be submitted by the learned Additional Solicitor General the words used may be taken to be the criticism of the system in any view of the matter. The said words and/or allegations have not been published to any third person other than' the learned Judge himself. In this connection, judgment and decision in the case of State of Orissa v. M. S. Jaggi reported in 1989 Cri LJ 1598 (Orissa) may also be taken note of. In the aforesaid decision it was held that "allegation was made in a petition before the High Court that the Judge who was to hear the matter was related to the other side and as such the matter should be transferred to some other Judge. The Judge in the order made on this application recorded that the allegation was not correct and that the matter should be placed before the Chief Justice for taking appropriate action. Subsequently proceedings for contempt were launched. It was held that the allegation did not contain any aspersion of contumacy nor did the facts disclose any intention to malign the honesty of the Judge and as such did not amount to contempt of Court. " ( 23 ) WE may now refer to Section 14 of the said Act since the learned Judge initiated the proceeding and issued notice and rule on the basis of and referring to Section 14. " ( 23 ) WE may now refer to Section 14 of the said Act since the learned Judge initiated the proceeding and issued notice and rule on the basis of and referring to Section 14. "s. 14 (1) - When it is alleged, or appears to the Supreme Court or the High Court upon its own view, that a person has been guilty of contempt committed in its presence or hearing, the court may cause such person to be detained in custody, and, at any time before rising of the court, on the same day, or as early as possible, thereafter shall - (A) cause him to be informed in writing of the contempt with which he is charged; (B) afford him an opportunity to make his defence to the charge; (C) after taking such evidence as may be necessary or as may be offered by such person and after hearing him, proceed, either forthwith or after adjournment, to determine the matter of the charge; and (D) make such order for the punishment or discharge of such person as may be just. " ( 24 ) ON construing the said Section 14 of the said Act, it appears to us that the Section 14 empowers the High Court to protect the dignity of the High Court in course of Court proceedings. The facts in the instant case do not, in our view, justify the invocation of Section 14 of the Act. It was a telephonic conversation which cannot but be private conversation between the appellant and the learned Judge. In any view of the matter. Section 14 of the Act contemplates the situation where the words contempt have been used in presence or hearing of a learned Judge of the High Court while discharging his judicial function. ( 25 ) THE publication in the context of the Section means the person using the contemptuous act really intends to give publicity to the public. The publication must be such which tends to shake public confidence. In the instant case, there is no question of undermining public confidence, since it has been communicated only to the learned Judge and not to anybody else. The publication must be such which tends to shake public confidence. In the instant case, there is no question of undermining public confidence, since it has been communicated only to the learned Judge and not to anybody else. In the case of perspective Publication (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1971 SC 221 : 1971 Cri LJ 268 the Supreme Court held and observed that a distinction must be made between a mere libel or defamation of a Judge and what amounts to a contempt of the Court. It was further held that 'the test in each case would be whether the impugned publication is a mere defamatory attack on the Judge or whether it is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or the proper administration of law by the Court. It is only in the latter case that it will be punishable as contempt. Alternatively, the test will be whether the wrong is done to the Judge personally or it is done to the public. The publication of a disparaging statement will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge or to deter actual and prospective litigant from placing complete reliance upon the courts' administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. " ( 26 ) THE question before us is whether telephonic conversation between the alleged contemnor/appellant and the Learned Single Judge amount to scandalising the Court or undermining the authority of the Court. In our view, the conversation containing aspersion or contumacy will constitute Contempt of Court unless there is an imputation of some improper motives as would amount to scandalising the Court itself or to create distrust in the popular mind and impair the confidence in the people in Court. ( 27 ) IN this connection another decision of Supreme Court in the case of Gobind Ram v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1972 SC 989 : 1971 Cri LJ 620 may be taken note of. In the aforesaid decision transfer petition filed before the District Magistrate contained allegations that the complainant, an advocate was in intimate relations with the Magistrate and that the latter was receiving costly presents from him. In the aforesaid decision transfer petition filed before the District Magistrate contained allegations that the complainant, an advocate was in intimate relations with the Magistrate and that the latter was receiving costly presents from him. The High Court held the contemnor-advocate guilty of contempt. The contemnor took the matter to the Supreme Court where the rule was discharged and the following observations were made (para 9) -"it is difficult to comprehend that the mere statement that a Magistrate was in intimate relation with a party who happens to be an advocate and enjoys his hospitality or has friendly relations will constitute contempt of court unless there is an imputation of some improper motives as would amount to scandalizing the court itself and as would have a tendency to create distrust in the popular in the popular mind and impair the confidence of the people in courts. The allegation may or may not be defamation but it certainly cannot be contempt. " ( 28 ) IT appears from the show cause notice that the alleged telephonic conversation took place in the last part of February between 16-2-96 and 23-2-96. However the notice was issued on 6-6-96. Section 14 contemplate drawing up proceeding on the basis of alleged facts as early as possible when it appears, to the Court upon its own view that a person has been guilty of contempt committed in its presence or hearing, the Court may cause such person to be detained in custody, and at any time before the rising of the Court on the same day or early' as possible thereafter, shall - (I) cause him to be informed in writing of the contempt with which he is charged; (II) afford him an opportunity to make his defence to the charge; (III) after taking such evidence as may be necessary or as may be offered by such person and after hearing him proceed, either forthwith or after adjournment, to determine the matter of the charge; and (IV) make such order for the punishment or discharge of such person as may be just. ( 29 ) IT also implies that the show cause notice should have been issued on the same day or as early as possible thereafter. ( 29 ) IT also implies that the show cause notice should have been issued on the same day or as early as possible thereafter. In the instant case, neither of the conditions for issuance of notices under Section 14 has been satisfied, since the Act of Contempt neither occurred during course of hearing nor was the show cause notice issued in terms of Section 14, although the learned Judge recorded that the proceedings have been initiated under Section 14. In any event, a petition verified by an affidavit was affirmed on 9-7-96. In the said petition it has been mentioned that the appellant is a senior member of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service held a post of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate of Calcutta and he had never been charged with disrespect of Hon'ble High Court or the Hon'ble judges. He has also alleged in the petition that no such charge has ever been made against him even in respect of his dealings with the colleague so other members of the judicial service. It has also been alleged in paragraph 17 of the petition as follows :-A) "that on that particular date when the petitioner was holding his court, his orderly, Sri. Sitaram Maity, who had the occasion to serve under S. N. Mallick, J. when His Lordship was earlier holding the post of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, informed the petitioner that 'mallick Sahab' was calling the petitioner over the phone and the petitioner immediately went down to his Chamber and attended the phone. B) Mr. S. N. Mallick, J. told the petitioner that some miscreants picked up money from the pockets of His Lordship's security guard. The petitioner stated that it would be difficult to recover the money. His Lordship appeared to be annoyed and told the petitioner that when His Lordship was the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate such stolen money of several persons were recovered and asked the petitioner to see that the money is realised. The petitioner then requested His Lordship to ask the security guard to see the petitioner. C) Mr. S. N. Mallick, J. told the petitioner that a person known to His Lordship parked car in a 'no Parking' zone without knowing it to be so and the police had taken the number and started a case and the petitioner was requested to help the person. The petitioner again requested Mr. C) Mr. S. N. Mallick, J. told the petitioner that a person known to His Lordship parked car in a 'no Parking' zone without knowing it to be so and the police had taken the number and started a case and the petitioner was requested to help the person. The petitioner again requested Mr. S. N. Mallick, J. to ask the person to see the petitioner. ( 30 ) IT is not necessary for us to go into the corrections of the allegations made by the appellant in the aforesaid paragraph. ( 31 ) CONSIDERING the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view, the learned judge was not justified in initiating contempt proceeding and the Rule issued accordingly stands discharged. ( 32 ) WE record our appreciation of the very valuable assistance rendered by the learned Additional Solicitor General in this matter. ( 33 ) GUPTA, J. :- I have had the advantage of going this through a very well reasoned and elaborate judgment of my learned brother Shri S. K. Sen, J. with which I am in full agreement and I record my concurrence. However since I feel that the issue regarding the interpretation of Sections 2 (c) and 14 of the contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is very important, I venture to give some reasons of my own in support of the conclusion which his been drawn by Learned brother Shri S. K. Sen, J. ( 34 ) THE facts have been succinctly elaborated in the judgment of my learned brother. Sections 2 (c) and 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act have also been reproduced in his judgment. ( 35 ) IN the present case since admittedly the appellant is alleged to have had a telephonic conversation with the learned Single Judge, the question which arises for consideration is whether such telephonic conversation would amount to "publication" within the meaning of the said expression used in Section 2 (c) of the Act. ( 35 ) IN the present case since admittedly the appellant is alleged to have had a telephonic conversation with the learned Single Judge, the question which arises for consideration is whether such telephonic conversation would amount to "publication" within the meaning of the said expression used in Section 2 (c) of the Act. The legislature has clearly specified that a charge of criminal contempt under Section 2 (c) of the Act is made out only if any publication, whether by words or by signs or by visible representations, or by other means with respect to any matter, the doing of which scandalizes or tends to scandalize or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court or, prejudices or tends to prejudice the due course of any judicial proceedings, or interferes or tends to interfere with the administration of justice in any manner, is effected by the person charged with the doing of any such act. ( 36 ) IN the present case we are not concerned at all with any ingredient of contempt charge as such. Here our concern is only about the basic and elementary issue as to whether the allegation levelled against the appellant by the learned single Judge, even if deemed to be true, would amount to "publication" within themeaning of Section 2 (c) of the Act and thus amount to the committing of the Contempt of Court. ( 37 ) PUBLICATION as contemplated in Section 2 (c) of the Act, and as would thus be understood in the context in which it has come to be mentioned, with relation to the attributes of the acts constituting contempt, should in my opinion be given the meaning as is likely to be used in common parlance and in the ordinary course of things. Publication, as would thus be understood would come about if someone charged with contempt publishes the contemptuous words, that is to say publishes them in the sense that is widely accepted as publication in common law. He can be deemed to be guilty of contempt only if the offending words attributed to him are published by him, that is to say if he conveys the offending words to the public at large or even to a limited class of the people. Not only the intention to publish, but the actual act of publication is a necessary concomitant of the essence of publication. Not only the intention to publish, but the actual act of publication is a necessary concomitant of the essence of publication. Publication may be private or public, in the sense in which its uses may be attributable in relation to the contempt charge, as is specified in Section 2 (c) of the Act. Whether publicly, or privately, publication of the offending statement has to be made in such a manner so as not to restrict its communication to an individual alone, through a method or by adopting such means which would prevent or preclude any one else from being made aware of the same. The means of communication of the offending statement have to be such, so open that others, the members of the public or even a limited class of persons, have access to the offending statement. If they have the means to know that the offending statement has been made, the publication undoubtedly would come about and the act of publication may be complete. But if there is no publication, that is to say if the offending statement is neither meant for being circulated to the members of public nor are they aware of the same or in other words if the offending statement is meant exclusively to be conveyed to a single individual through a channel which is not available to anyone else, classically as in the present case through a telephone line, the person cannot be charged with committing contempt within the meaning of Section 2 (c) of the Act. Publication can be effected or brought about only if the offending statement is circulated for being read or being known by the public at large. The publication may also be affected or brought about by speaking the offending statement in such a manner as to convey the same to the members of the public, say through electronic media or evena normal public address system. Whether by speaking out, or by printing it, or even by writing it in any other manner, if the matter is meant for the consumption of the public at large, or if a situation has been created whereby the public at large has access to the matter, undoubtedly it may amount to publication. Whether by speaking out, or by printing it, or even by writing it in any other manner, if the matter is meant for the consumption of the public at large, or if a situation has been created whereby the public at large has access to the matter, undoubtedly it may amount to publication. But, if the offending statement is made to an individual in a situation, or under a circumstance whereby no one else, except the maker of the statement and its listner, has any opportunity or chance to hear what is being talked about, the conversation shall not amount to any publication at all. ( 38 ) VIEWED in the aforesaid background therefore I have no hesitation in holding that the alleged conversation between the appellant and the learned single Judge would not amount to publication within the Section 2 (c) of the Act and therefore the appellant cannot be held to have committed the contempt of the Court. ( 39 ) APART from the non-publication of the alleged conversation between the appellant and the learned single Judge, another defect from which the proceedings suffer is the invocation of the jurisdiction by the learned single Judge under Section 14 of the Act. Undoubtedly, the alleged conversation is alleged to have been spoken to by the appellant on telephone with the learned Single Judge. The expression "upon its own view" used in the Section 14 (1) of the Act clearly and unmistakably stipulates and suggests that a person has committed the contempt of Court and is thus guilty of such act, "in the view of the High Court or Supreme Court" as the case may be. The legislature has used three expressions in Section 14 (1) of the Act. These are "upon its own view", "contempt committed", and "in its presence or hearing". These three expressions whether read jointly, co-jointly or separately lead to only one conclusion and that is that the person charged has committed an act of omission or commission, amounting to contempt in the view of the Court itself, that is, upon its own view, that is, either in the court room where judicial proceedings are going on, thus seen by the Judge or, in the course of judicial proceedings at such place where the person charged with the commission of the act, is being seen by Judge of the Court. All these three expressions again take us to only one conclusion and that is that the act of omission or commission has been committed in the course of judicial proceedings or, when the judicial proceedings are on, and not otherwise. This is also born out from another important stipulation contained in Section 14 (1) to the Act. If the High Court finds that such contempt has been committed in its view, it may cause such person to be detained in custody and at any time before the rising of the Court, on the same day, or as early as possible thereafter cause him to be informed in writing of the contempt with which he is charged and inter alia afford him an opportunity to make his defence to the charge. What is of utmost importance to be noticed is that the person concerned can be detained in custody and at any time before the rising of the Court on the same day, has to be informed in writing of the contempt with which he is charged. Detaining a person and informing him of the contempt charge the same day before rising of the Court clearly means that the person has to be detained in the court room, as and when he is found to be committing the contempt of court. If a person therefore commits a criminal contempt of court not in the view of the court, not in the course of judicial proceedings, and not in the Court room itself, there is no question of his being detained then and there and being informed of the contempt charge before the rising of the court. The expression "may cause such person to be detained in custody" read along with the expression "at any time before rising of the court on the same day" clearly means that the person can be detained then and there, that is immediately on the contempt being noticed by the Court, in the Court itself. The expression "may cause such person to be detained in custody" read along with the expression "at any time before rising of the court on the same day" clearly means that the person can be detained then and there, that is immediately on the contempt being noticed by the Court, in the Court itself. ( 40 ) AS it is seen the alleged conversation between the appellant and the learned Single Judge, even if may be considered to amounting to contempt of court cannot be held to fall within the purview of Section 14 of the Act because undoubtedly this act attributed allegedly to the appellant of conversing with learned Single Judge on telephone was not committed "in the view of the Court", that is it was not committed in or near about a Court Room where a Judge could see it being committed nor was it committed in the course of judicial proceedings or when judicial proceedings were on in any court. This being the position therefore invoking jurisdiction under Section 14 of the Act was wholly unjustified, and patently erroneous. If at all, the appellant could have been proceeded against only under Section 15 of the Act. A detailed procedure has been prescribed in Sections 15, 17 and 18 of the Act, including the requirement of hearing of the contempt charge levelled under Section 15 of the Act by a Bench of High Court comprising of not less than two Judges. Section 17 provides for the issuance of the notice upon the person charged and the right to him of filing affidavit. In the present case before us since the proceedings have been initiated under Section 14 of the Act, we have no hesitation in declaring them as nullity in the eyes of law. Order accordingly.