JUDGMENT A. K. MATHUR, C.J. - Petitioner by this petition has prayed that Notification F. No. A-3-32-90-ST-V(89), dated September 20, 1990 (annexure P1) may be declared as ultra vires of the power of the State Government so as to amend entry No. 6 of Schedule I appended to the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 (for short "the Act"). 2. Brief facts giving rise to this petition are that the petitioner, M/s. Ruchi Fabrics Ltd., is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 with its registered office at 32-33-34, Sector D-2, Industrial Area, Sanwar Road, Indore. The petitioner carries on the business of manufacture and sale of woven fabrics of cotton yarn which are not subjected to any process. All varieties of cloth were tax-free under entry 6, Schedule I of the Act. Entry 6 reads as under : "6. All varieties of cloth manufactured in mills or on powerlooms or handlooms including processed cloth." This entry was substituted by notification dated September 20, 1990 which reads as under : "6 (i) Cotton fabrics covered under heading numbers 52.05, 52.06, 52.07, 52.08, 52.09, 52.10, 52.11, 52.12, 58.01, 58.02, 58.03, 58.04, 58.05, 59.01, 59.03, 59.05, 59.06 and 60.01 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986). (ii) Manmade fabrics covered under heading numbers 54.08, 54.09, 54.10, 54.11, 54.12, 55.07, 55.08, 55.09, 55.10, 55.11, 55.12, 58.01, 58.02, 58.03, 58.04, 58.05, 59.01, 59.02, 59.03, 58.05, 59.06 and 60.01 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986). (iii) Woven fabrics of wool covered under heading numbers 51.06, 51.07, 58.01, 58.02, 58.03 and 58.05 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986)." By virtue of substitution of this entry, certain categories of cloth which were included in the more comprehensive former entry have been excluded. Therefore, the petitioner has challenged this notification on the ground that this is beyond the power under sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Act. Learned counsel submitted that section 10 only permits the inclusion of certain entries and does not give the power to the State Government to amend the Schedule by excluding some of the entries. 3. In order to appreciate the contention of learned counsel, reference may be made to section 10 of the Act which reads as under : "10. Tax-free goods. 3. In order to appreciate the contention of learned counsel, reference may be made to section 10 of the Act which reads as under : "10. Tax-free goods. - (1) No tax shall be payable on the sales or purchases of goods specified in the second column of Schedule I subject to the conditions and exceptions, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the third column thereof. (2) The State Government may, in respect of any goods, by notification, amend Schedule I so as to include therein any goods not already specified or may relax or omit any of the conditions and exceptions set out in the corresponding entry in the third column thereof." Section 10 lays down that no tax shall be payable on the sales or purchases of the goods specified in the second column of Schedule I subject to the conditions and exceptions, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the third column thereof. Sub-section (2) lays down that the State Government may, in respect of any goods, by notification, amend Schedule I so as to include therein any goods not already specified or may relax or omit any of the conditions and exceptions set out in the corresponding entry in the third column thereof. Learned counsel submitted that by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 10, the State Government, by notification, can only include, but cannot exclude any entry. We don't agree with the contention of the learned counsel. When the State Government has been given a power to amend the Schedule, that power includes inclusion and exclusion. 4. Learned counsel wanted us to read sub-section (2) to the limited extent only that the State Government has power to include new items in the entries in Schedule I and does not have a power to exclude. We regret this kind of construction is not possible. Section 21 of the M.P. General Clauses Act, 1957 clearly says that power of amendment includes power of exclusion and inclusion both. Section 21 of the M.P. General Clauses Act reads as under : "21. Power to make to include power to add, amend, vary or rescind orders, etc. We regret this kind of construction is not possible. Section 21 of the M.P. General Clauses Act, 1957 clearly says that power of amendment includes power of exclusion and inclusion both. Section 21 of the M.P. General Clauses Act reads as under : "21. Power to make to include power to add, amend, vary or rescind orders, etc. - Where, by any Madhya Pradesh Act, a power to issue notification, orders, rules or by-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanctions and conditions, if any, to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or by-laws, so issued." This section clearly says that where by any M.P. Act, power has been given to issue notifications, orders, rules or by-laws, then that power includes a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanctions and conditions, if any, to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or by-laws so issued. Therefore, when the State Government has been given a power to include certain entries in Schedule I, then such power will include in it the power to exclude certain items also. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel is not correct. 5. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Lahu Udyog Karmchari Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. State of M.P. (1974) MPLJ 887. In this case, the question was regarding interpretation of section 71 of the M.P. Town Improvement Trust Act, 1961 and in that context, their Lordships observed as under : "Though there is no specific provision in the M.P. Town Improvement Trust Act as in section 48, Land Acquisition Act, to release any land included in the scheme since the State Government could issue a notification under section 71 of Town Improvement Trust Act including certain land in a particular scheme, it has by operation of section 21 of the M.P. General Clauses Act also power to issue notification releasing portion of the land from the scheme." 6. The learned counsel then invited our attention to the case of State of Bihar v. D. N. Ganguly AIR 1958 SC 1018 . The learned counsel then invited our attention to the case of State of Bihar v. D. N. Ganguly AIR 1958 SC 1018 . It was a case under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 under section 10(1) and in that context, their Lordships observed that the Act does not expressly confer any power on the appropriate Government to cancel or supersede a reference made under section 10(1) of the Act. It was also observed that such power cannot be claimed by implication on the strength of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The rule of construction enunciated by section 21 of the General Clauses Act in so far as it refers to the power of rescinding or cancelling the original order cannot be invoked in respect of the provisions of section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore in this case which reference was made and it was sought to be revoked. In that context, their Lordships observed that section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be invoked. But that is not the case here. 7. The learned counsel also invited our attention to the case of Gopi Chand v. Delhi Administration AIR 1959 SC 609 . In this case, their Lordships observed that section 21 of the General Clauses Act embodies a rule of construction, the nature and extent of the application of which must inevitably be governed by the relevant provisions of the statute which confers the power to issue the notification. The power to cancel the notification can be easily conceded to the competent authority and so also the power to modify or vary it be likewise conceded; but the said power must inevitably be exercised within the limits prescribed by the provisions conferring the said power. 8. In the present case, under sub-section (2) of section 10 of the Act power has been given to the State Government to amend the Schedule, that also includes the power to exclude the items in the Schedule. Simply because a Schedule has been issued at one time, that does not mean that the State Government becomes functus officio. In fact, sub-section (2) of section 10 facilitates and enables the State Government to amend the Schedule from time to time and that means that it can include and exclude the items mentioned in the Schedule. 9. Simply because a Schedule has been issued at one time, that does not mean that the State Government becomes functus officio. In fact, sub-section (2) of section 10 facilitates and enables the State Government to amend the Schedule from time to time and that means that it can include and exclude the items mentioned in the Schedule. 9. Lastly learned counsel invited our attention to the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Sales Tax Officer, Navgaon v. Timber & Fuel Corporation [1973] 31 STC 585 that Government has no power under section 12 of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act to levy tax either prospectively or retrospectively. The power of the Government was merely to exempt one or more dealers from paying tax. That power cannot be used directly or indirectly to retrospectively levy tax on someone else. These observations have hardly any relevance in the present case. We have already observed that section 10(2) of the Act confers power on the State Government to amend the Schedule and that power includes the power to include or exclude any entry. Therefore, we do not find any illegality in the notification. 10. There is no merit in this petition. Accordingly it is dismissed. Petition dismissed.