JUDGMENT S. N. Mallick, J.: The instant revisional application under s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code has been preferred by the defendant/petitioner against the order no. 77 dated 1.6.88 passed by the learned Munsif, Additional Court, Sealdah in Title Suit No. 138 of 1986. It appears from the impugned order that the learned Munsif thereby rejected the petition filed on behalf of the petitioner on the same date under s. 151 CPC praying for recalling the order dated 20.6.80 striking out the defence against delivery of possession and also his application dated 12.4.80 under s. 151 CPC wherein the defendant prayed for recalling the order passed by the said court on 2.4.80 whereby the learned Munsif directed him to deposit Rs. 2,000/- at a time. In the said application dated 12.4.80 the defendant/petitioner further prayed for treating his application filed on 15.11.76 under s. 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, referred to as the Act hereafter, as an application under s. 17(2A) and (B) permitting him to deposit the arrears by easy instalments. 2. Mr. Roychowdhury the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order has been passed by the learned Munsif illegally and with material irregularity resulting in failure of justice and causing irreparable injury to the petitioner for which it should be set aside by this Court. In order to appreciate the contention of Shri Roychowdhury it would be necessary to refer to the admitted facts on record as noted below:- 3. The instant Title Suit was filed by the landlord-plaintiff/opposite party on 25.10.76 for eviction of the petitioner on ground of default since June, 1975 in the 3rd Court of the Munsif at Sealdah where it was registered as T.S. No. 655 of 1976. On 15.11.76 the petitioner appeared and filed an application under s. 17(1) of the Act for permitting him to deposit rent for the month of October, 1976 at the rate of Rs. 275/- per month to the credit of the plaintiff-landlord. In paragraph 2 of the said application the petitioner denied the allegation of default and reserved his right to file the application under s. 17(2) of the Act "as receipts not granted against adjustment". On 27.7.77 the plaintiff/OP filed an application under s. 17(3) of the Act for striking out the defence against delivery of possession. In paragraph 2 of the said application the petitioner denied the allegation of default and reserved his right to file the application under s. 17(2) of the Act "as receipts not granted against adjustment". On 27.7.77 the plaintiff/OP filed an application under s. 17(3) of the Act for striking out the defence against delivery of possession. On 10.5.78 the petitioner filed written objection to the said application under s. 17(3) stating that his application dated 15.11.76 under s. 17(1) of the Act should be treated as an application under s. 17(2) of the Act. No formal prayer was, however, made in the said written objection except the prayer for rejecting the plaintiffs application under s. 17(3). By order no. 20 dated 24.5.79 the Trial Court on consent of both the parties recorded that the defendant was to deposit Rs. 550/- within 30.5.79 and a further sum of equal amount within 30.6.79 and also the current rent after which the petition under s. 17(3) will be heard. From order no. 26 dated 23.8.79 it appears that the said consent order was complied with by the petitioner. The application under s. 17(3) of the Act was fixed for hearing on 2.4.80. On the said date a prayer for adjournment on behalf of the defendant/petitioner was made and the defendant was directed to deposit Rs. 2,000/- in court within 15 (fifteen) days in default of which 17.4.80 was fixed for hearing the application under s. 17(3). On 12.4.80 the defendant/petitioner filed an application under s. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code for vacating the order dated 2.4.80 and for treating his application dated 15.11.76 as an application under s. 17(2A) & (B) of the Act and also for permitting him to deposit the arrears by easy instalments. By order no. 32 dated 17.4.80 the Trial Court directed that on the petitioner's depositing Rs. 1,000/- by 22.4.80 and the rest by 10.5.80 his application under s. 151 CPC will be put up. From the order no. 33 dated 22.4.80 it appears that the petitioner filed an application for time to deposit Rs. 1,000/- as per previous order of the court which was rejected and the plaintiffs application under s. 17(3) of the Act was fixed on 5.6.80 for hearing. From the order no. 33 dated 22.4.80 it appears that the petitioner filed an application for time to deposit Rs. 1,000/- as per previous order of the court which was rejected and the plaintiffs application under s. 17(3) of the Act was fixed on 5.6.80 for hearing. The plaintiffs application under s. 17(3) of the Act came up for hearing on 20.6.80 on which date the defendant/petitioner did not take any step and as such the application was heard ex parte and the defence against delivery of possession was struck out. It further appears from the record that on 22.7.80 the petitioner filed another application under s. 151 CPC for vacating order no. 36 dated 20.6.80 striking out the defence against delivery of possession and to re-hear the plaintiffs application under s. 17(3) of the Act. In the said application the petitioner prayed for Court's permission to deposit Rs. 2,000/- in court in terms of the earlier order no. 32 dated 17.4.80. The said application dated 22.7.80 was rejected by the court below on 28.11.80 by order no. 41. In the order no.41 dated 28.11.80 the Trial Court referred to its order no. 30 dated 2.4.80 and the order no. 32 dated 17.4.80 which were never complied with by the defendant/petitioner. Accordingly the Trial Court rejected the application dated 22.7.80 under its order dated 28.11.80 on the ground that s. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code had no application at that stage of the suit. A civil revision was moved before this High Court against the order dated 28.11.80. By order dated 4.10.85 passed in Civil Rule No. 354 of 1981 Satish Chandra the then Chief Justice dismissed the application under s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code filed by the petitioner and concurred with the finding of the learned Munsif made in his order dated 28.11.80. While discharging the rule His Lordship observed as follows:- "Having heard the learned Counsel I am not satisfied that the view taken by the learned Munsif suffers from any jurisdictional error or defect. If there be any application under some other provision of law that will be disposed of in accordance with law". 4. While discharging the rule His Lordship observed as follows:- "Having heard the learned Counsel I am not satisfied that the view taken by the learned Munsif suffers from any jurisdictional error or defect. If there be any application under some other provision of law that will be disposed of in accordance with law". 4. Thereafter the defendant/petitioner filed another application in the court below for an order on 23.7.86 to fix a date of hearing of the application under s. 17(2) and 17(2A) of the Act before the suit was taken up for peremptory hearing. On 1.6.88 another application was filed under s. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code by the defendant/petitioner to recall the Trial Court's order dated 20.6.80 whereby the Trial Court on allowing the plaintiffs prayer under s. 17(3) of the Act struck out the defence against delivery of possession. By the impugned order the learned Munsif rejected both the applications dated 12.4.80 and 1.6.88. 5. Mr. Roychowdhury has contended that the petitioner's application under s. 151 CPC was never considered by the Trial Court at any point of time before or after his defence against delivery of possession was struck out under s. 17(3) of the Act under the order dated 20.6.80. It has been further submitted by him that the same was disposed of by the Trial Court under the impugned order with reference to the High Court's order dated 4.10.85 as referred to above. According to Mr. Roychowdhury the Trial Court misconstrued the order of the High Court dated 4.10.85 and was under the wrong impression that there was no scope for re-opening the order dated 20.6.80 striking out the defence against delivery of possession. Mr. Roychowdhury has submitted that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court was invoked by the petitioner not in respect of the order of striking out the defence dated 20.6.80 but in respect of the order of the Trial Court dated 28.11.80. It has been further contended by Mr. Roychowdhury that the petitioner's application dated 12.4.80 was still pending and the Trial Court should have disposed it of before passing the order under s. 17(3) on 20.6.80. I have gone through the Lower Court Record including the petitions filed by the petitioner at different stages of the suit and the orders passed by the Trial Court on them. Roychowdhury that the petitioner's application dated 12.4.80 was still pending and the Trial Court should have disposed it of before passing the order under s. 17(3) on 20.6.80. I have gone through the Lower Court Record including the petitions filed by the petitioner at different stages of the suit and the orders passed by the Trial Court on them. It appears to me that from the very beginning the petitioner before the Trial Court has taken a circuitous and vexatious path with a purpose to put obstructions in the matter of passing appropriate orders by the Trial Court according to the provisions of law. In his application filed on 15.11.76 under s. 17(1) of the Act he did not raise any dispute so as to enable the Court to treat the said application as an application under Ss. 17(2) and (2A) of the Act or to enable him to approach the Court for treating the same as such an application. On the other hand, in paragraph 2 of the said application, as I have already noted he reserved his right to file an application under s. 17(2) of the Act later on. The petitioner was very much conscious of his right to file an application under s. 17(2) of the Act which for reasons not disclosed in the application he preferred to reserve it and the record shows he reserved this right and did not exercise it at any point of time. Such reservation of right as has been rightly contended by Mr. Bhattacharya, is not contemplated under any provisions of the Premises Tenancy Act. On the other hand, s. 17(2) of the Act makes it obligatory upon a tenant to file an application for determination of the rent payable within the prescribed time if there is any such dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant. On filing such applications in time the Trial Court is to proceed with the same under s. 17(2)(a)(b) and if necessary on further applications being made by the tenant the Trial Court may pass further orders under Ss. 17(2A) and (2B) of the Act. The application dated 15.11.76 under s. 17(1) of the Act does not raise any dispute as contemplated under s. 17(2) of the Act. There is a vague allegation denying default that rent receipts were not granted against adjustment. 17(2A) and (2B) of the Act. The application dated 15.11.76 under s. 17(1) of the Act does not raise any dispute as contemplated under s. 17(2) of the Act. There is a vague allegation denying default that rent receipts were not granted against adjustment. The Lower Court Record further shows that without filing any application under s. 17(2) of the Act the petitioner in his written objection dated 10.5.78 to the opposite party's application under s. 17(3) of the Act observed authoritatively that his application under s. 17(1) of the Act should be treated as an application under s. 17(2) of the Act. Such conduct on the part of a party to a suit giving instructions or directions upon the Court is not to be ignored lightly. Be that as it may, it would be worthwhile to note the number of applications filed by the petitioner before the Trial Court under s. 151 CPC. The first such application under s. 151 CPC filed by the petitioner is dated 12.4.80. Mr. Roychowdhury has submitted that this application was not disposed of by the Trial Court before passing the order under s. 17(3) of the Act on 20.6.80. The contents of this application and order passed by the Trial Court have already been noted in foregoing paragraph 3 (three) of this order. It may be recalled that by order no. 32 dated 17.4.80 the Trial Court directed that on the petitioner's depositing Rs. 1,000/- by 22.4.80 and the balance of Rs. 1,000/- by 10.5.80 as per order dated 2.4.80 the said application under s. 151 CPC will be put up. Presumably the Trial Court wanted the compliance of the order dated 2.4.80 as modified by the order dated 17.4.80 on the part of the petitioner as a condition precedent for hearing his application under s. 151 CPC dated 12.4.80. It appears from the record that neither the order dated 2.4.80 nor the order dated 17.4.80 modifying the earlier order was complied with by the petitioner at any point of time. In view of the circumstances it is difficult to agree with the contention of Mr. Roychowdhury that the Trial Court by not hearing out the s. 151 application dated 12.4.80 before passing the order under s. 17(3) of the Act acted illegally or at least with material irregularity. In view of the circumstances it is difficult to agree with the contention of Mr. Roychowdhury that the Trial Court by not hearing out the s. 151 application dated 12.4.80 before passing the order under s. 17(3) of the Act acted illegally or at least with material irregularity. In view of the above conduct of the petitioner who did not care to comply the orders of the Trial Court dated 2.4.80 and 17.4.80, compliance of which was a condition precedent to his hearing of the application under s. 151 CPC it would not be unreasonable to say that he forfeited his right of hearing relating to the said application. It would be also necessary to note that for non-compliance of the above orders by the petitioner the Trial Court fixed the opposite party's application under s. 17(3) of the Act for hearing on 20.6.80. On the said date the application was heard ex parte and the defence against delivery of possession was struck out. On 22.7.80 the petitioner again filed an application under s. 151 CPC for the second time for vacating the order no. 36 dated 20.6.80 striking out the defence against delivery of possession and to rehear the matter under s. 17(3) of the Act. He further prayed for Trial Court's permission to deposit Rs. 2,000/- in Court in terms of the Court's earlier order no. 32 dated 17.4.80. There was no mention of his first application under s. 151 CPC dated 12.4.80. Mr. Bhattacharya the learned Counsel for the opposite party has submitted that the petitioner did not mention his first application under s. 151 as he knew that he could not proceed with the earlier application for non-compliance of the Court's orders dated 2.4.80 and 17.4.80. Such inference, in my view would not be unreasonable or improper in view of the above conduct of the petitioner and the circumstances of the case. The second application under s. 151 CPC was rejected by the Trial Court by its order dated 28.11.80. The Trial Court as I have already noted in the above order recorded that its earlier order dated 2.4.80 and 17.4.80 were never complied with by the petitioner. As such the Trial Court while rejecting the second application under s. 151 CPC by its order dated 28.11.80 was of the view that s. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code had no application at that stage. As such the Trial Court while rejecting the second application under s. 151 CPC by its order dated 28.11.80 was of the view that s. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code had no application at that stage. I have already quoted the relevant part of the High Court's order dated 4.10.85 passed in revision preferred by the petitioner under s. 115 CPC against the order of the Trial Court dated 28.11.80. The order passed by the Trial Court on 28.11.80 was left undisturbed in revision by the High Court. 6. Mr. Roychowdhury has submitted that the order passed by the High Court in revision on 4.10.85 in respect of the Trial Court's order dated 28.11.80 has been misconstrued by the Trial Court in the impugned order. The Trial Court in the impugned order has noted that the defence against delivery of possession and was struck out under s. 17(3) by its order dated 20.6.80 and has observed that the defendant/petitioner moved the High Court in revision against it but the said order was confirmed by the High Court. This observation of the Trial Court is erroneous no doubt because the revision was preferred before this High Court against the order of the learned Munsif dated 28.11.80 whereby the Trial Court rejected the petitioner's second application under s. 151 CPC filed on 22.7.80. The contents of the said application under s. 151 CPC dated 22.7.80 have already been noted in paragraph 3. It may only be said here that in the said application the petitioner prayed for leave of the Court to deposit Rs. 2,000/- in terms of order no. 32 dated 17.4.80 and to re-hear the plaintiff's application under s. 17(3) of the Act after vacating the order no. 36 dated 20.6.80 striking out the defence against delivery of possession. It may be noted that there was no prayer in the second application under s. 151 to treat the application under s. 17(1) filed on 15.11.76 as an application under s. 17(2), (2A) and (2B) of the Act. It is worthwhile to note that no revision was prayed for against the order dated 20.6.80 striking out the defence against delivery of possession. It is worthwhile to note that no revision was prayed for against the order dated 20.6.80 striking out the defence against delivery of possession. In paragraph 1 of the said application there is a faint reference to the petitioner's earlier application under s. 151 CPC and the order of the Trial Court dated 17.4.80 whereby the Trial Court directed that the said application would be put up on compliance of the aforesaid order no. 32 dated 17.4.80. Be that as it may, the Trial Court rejected the second application under s. 151 CPC by its order dated 28.11.80. In the order dated 28.11.80 the Trial Court has referred to it, earlier order no. 30 dated 2.4.80 and no. 32 dated 17.4.80 and has found that the petitioner did not take any step to comply with the aforesaid orders and filing the application under s. 17(3) was allowed ex parte. In the context of the aforesaid circumstances the Trial Court rejected the second application under s. 151 CPC holding that s. 151 CPC would not be applied at that stage. The Trial Court further observed that the defendant/petitioner might seek relief under other specific provisions of law. Perhaps the Trial Court meant that the petitioner could move the superior court against the order no. 30 and no. 32 and against the order striking out the defence against delivery of possession. The observations of the High Court made in revision against the aforesaid order dated 28.11.80 passed by the Trial Court have already been quoted. The High Court directed that "if there be any application under some other provisions of law that will be disposed of in accordance with law". Such direction of the High Court perhaps prompted the petitioner to file an application before the Trial Court on 23.7.86 praying for order to fix a date for hearing the application under s. 17(2) and 17(2A) before the suit was taken up for hearing. It is interesting to note that no specific application under s. 17(2) and 17(2A) was pending in the court below filed by the defendant/petitioner at any point of time. It appears from paragraph 11 of his application that he referred to his initial application under s. 17(1) of the Act to be treated under s. 17(2) of the Act. It is interesting to note that no specific application under s. 17(2) and 17(2A) was pending in the court below filed by the defendant/petitioner at any point of time. It appears from paragraph 11 of his application that he referred to his initial application under s. 17(1) of the Act to be treated under s. 17(2) of the Act. At the same point of time it has also to be remembered that the petitioner's first application under s. 151 CPC dated 12.4.80 was not proceeded with by the petitioner in view of his non-compliance of the Trial Court's order dated 2.4.80 and 17.4.80 compliance of which was a condition precedent to the hearing of the said application. Mr. Roychowdhury has not submitted regarding the orders dated 2.4.80 and 17.4.80. These orders was binding upon the petitioner against which he preferred not to move the superior court in revision. Still then on the basis of the application dated 23.7.80 under s. 151 of the CPC the Trial Court considered the first application under s. 151 CPC dated 12.4.80. The Trial Court held that the application filed on 15.11.76 under s. 17(1) of the Act did not contain material particulars emphasised under s. 17(2) of the Act so as to be treated as an application under s. 17(2) of the Act. The Trial Court has considered the decision of this High Court reported in AIR 1972 Cal page 53 and has come to a finding that the said case law has no application to the petitioner's case has no dispute to be decided under s. 17(2) was raised in the application under s. 17(1) by the defendant. Relying on a decision of this High Court reported in 79 CWN page 112 (Jitendra Chandra Dey vs. Tarak Nath Mullick & Ors.) the Trial Court has found that there is not merit in the petitioner's application under s. 17(1) to be converted into a petition under s. 17(2) of the Act. Mr. Bhattacharya the learned Counsel has referred to the aforesaid Bench decision of this High Court reported in 79 CWN page 112. Mr. Bhattacharya the learned Counsel has referred to the aforesaid Bench decision of this High Court reported in 79 CWN page 112. This High Court following the earlier decisions of this High Court in G. T. Kamdar's case reported in 75 CWN page 372 and Soraj Kumar Kundu's case reported in ILR 1972(2) Cal 118 has held that an application inviting the court to treat a petition under s. 17(1) as one under s. 17(2) is misconceived and must be rejected. The said Bench decision on this point is binding upon this Single Bench and must be applied to the present case. In this position I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Roychowdhury that the Trial Court has acted illegally or with material irregularity in passing the impugned order whereby the Trial Court rejected the petitioner's application dated 2.4.80, 23.7.80 and the third application under s. 151 CPC filed on 1.6.88 in which the petitioner prayed for recalling the order of striking out the defence against delivery of possession passed on 20.6.80. The Trial Court, in my view has not committed any jurisdictional error and has not acted illegally or with material irregularity by passing the impugned order and I do not find any reason to interfere with the same. Mr. Roychowdhury has referred to a decision of this High Court reported in 74 CWN page 42 (Kirty Basu, Appellant vs. Peary Mohan Sarkar & Anr.) wherein it has been held if the Court does not consider a dispute under s. 17(2) of the Act and does not pass any order thereunder its order under s. 17(3) of the Act would be illegal and without jurisdiction. This reported case has no application to the instant one in view of the facts and circumstances already noted. Mr. Roychowdhury has also referred to a decision of this High Court reported in Cal. LT. 1991(2) HC 391 (N. Sha vs. Santosh Chatterjee). It has been held there as follows: "The ejectment decree passed by the Trial Court concerned without disposing of the defendant-tenant's application under s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to recall the order striking out the defendant-tenant's application has caused a great miscarriage of justice rendering the decree liable to be set aside and the suit remitted to the Trial Court concerned". The facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the reported case. Furthermore in the instant case it does not appear that any application was pending before the Trial Court filed by the present petitioner which should have been considered by it before striking out the defence against delivery of possession or before passing the impugned order. Mr. Bhattacharya has rightly submitted that the LCR does not disclose any application was pending before the Trial Court which deserved prior consideration before striking out the defence against delivery of possession. Accordingly I hold that the instant revisional application has no merit and it should be rejected with costs. The revisional application is dismissed on contest with costs assessed at 100 G.Ms to be paid by the petitioner to the OP within three weeks from this day. The LCR be sent down along with a copy of this order within two weeks after the ensuing Summer Vacation by a special messenger at the cost of the OP and such cost to be deposited by 10.6.97. The Trial Court is further directed to dispose of the suit which is pending since 1976 within 8 weeks from the date of communication of this order without granting any adjournment to any of the parties on any ground whatsoever beyond the above time limit. Verbal prayer for stay made on behalf of the petitioner is rejected. Appeal dismissed with cost.