M. F. SALDANHA, J, J. ( 1 ) THIS double murder case, which ended in an order of acquittal before the trial Court, involves some unusual aspects of the law as will be presently indicated by us. The incident in question took place on 19-9-199 1 at about 4 p. m. in RS. No. 136/3 of Kanasageri Village, when it is alleged that the accused were transiting through the property belonging to the deceased. Admittedly, the accused owned some adjoining agricultural lands, and as is common in the rural areas, they were in the habit of transiting through the field belonging to the deceased which was objected to, as a result of which, considerable amount of friction had taken place in the recent past. On the day in question two minor incidents had preceded the present one and it is alleged by the prosecution that the five accused, three of whom are men and the wives of two of them, all belonging to the same family, assaulted Hussainsab and Saidusab with axes and sticks, while the two women are supposed to have instigated the men folk and also participated to a limited extent in the assault by twisting the arms and legs of the victim, The assault was a merciless one and the two victims died on the spot. P. W. 2 Thallurappa who is the son of the deceased, claims to have been present when the incident took place. He was aged 11 years at that time and her an to his uncle P. W. 1 Fakirasab and informed him about the incident after which, Fakirasab and P. W. 2 proceeded to the police station at Lokapura and informed the authorities about the incident. The police, instead of registering the complaint, accompanied P. W. 1 back to the village and after ascertaining that such an incident had taken place, proceeded back to the police station and recorded the F. LR at 7. 20 p. m. on that evening. Apart from Thallurappa, the sister of the deceased who is P. W. 3, by name Thippavva, also claims to be an eye witness. The police commenced the investigation, placed A4 and AS under arrest on 21-9-199 1 and succeeded in apprehending Al to 3 on 26-9-199 1 and they also alleged that the accused were not available prior to that date. In the course of the investigation, it is contended that. The police commenced the investigation, placed A4 and AS under arrest on 21-9-199 1 and succeeded in apprehending Al to 3 on 26-9-199 1 and they also alleged that the accused were not available prior to that date. In the course of the investigation, it is contended that. two axes with blood, stains on them which on analysis were found to be human blood, were recovered at the instance of A2. On completion of the investigation, the five accused were put up on trial and the learned Sessions Judge. Bijapur at the conclusion of the trial held that the accused were entitled to an acquittal. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated the reasoning of the learned trial Judge proceeded on the footing that the complainant P. W. 1 depended heavily and entirely on the evidence of P. W. 2-Thallurappa. As far as p. W. 3-Thippavva is concerned, the learned trial Judge upheld the defence plea that even she was somewhere around that place when the incident occurred, that it was physically impossible for her to have seen the incident or the accused because, the Bandh between the fields was of a height of about 10, ft and that it was physically impossible for her to have viewed anything over this barrier. Also, the learned Judge took note of the fact that P. W. 3 Thippavva had admitted that she was in a sun-flower field at that time, where the plants were above chest high. The learned Judge concluded that the only evidence which the prosecution could rely on was perhaps that of P. W. 2 Thallurappa but that there was a serious limitation with regard to basing a conviction on this material because it would mean that the Court has convicted the accused on the strength of the uncorroborated evidence of a child witness alone. The accused were accordingly acquitted and the State of Karnataka has preferred this appeal assailing the correctness of that order. ( 3 ) THE learned S. P. P. contended that the order of the lower Court is reversible because the basic premise on which it is based is incorrect. The learned counsel submitted that as far as a child witness is concerned that the only reason why a Court is put on guard while dealing with that evidence is because of the possibility of the child being tutored. The learned counsel submitted that as far as a child witness is concerned that the only reason why a Court is put on guard while dealing with that evidence is because of the possibility of the child being tutored. He submitted that once the evidence has been duly scrutinised and its veracity put on test through cross examination, that if the evidence appears to be 100% reliable that it would be absolutely on par with that of a case involving a single eye witness and the age of the witness regardless that a conviction could safely be placed on this evidence. We need to mention here that the respondents learned counsel drew our attention to a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1994 Cri. L. J. 56 wherein the Supreme Court had occasion to sound a note of caution with regard to the evidence of a child witness who was found to have been heavily tutored. ( 4 ) AS far as this aspect of the law is concerned we need to lay down that a child witness is normally representative of an unspoiled mental make-up and that the chances of fabrication and false involvement on the part of a child would be relatively remote principally for this reason. We also take note of the fact that barring very strong bias or animus the possibility of a child being motivated to the extent of giving false evidence would be relatively low. As against this or conversely, it is equally true that a child is impressionable and that it can be influenced and therefore the possibility of tutoring it cannot be eliminated principally because a child would normally not have a mind of its own and could therefore be amenable to influences, particularly from close quarters. What is paramount in such situations is the age of the child because a child of tender years could possibly be amendable to strong indoctrination much more than a minor particularly between the ages of 10 to 15. We also need to record that a child witness is not immune from the rigour of cross-examination and that a child witness or a youth who has been tutored or who has given false evidence would in all likelihood be found out very quickly because the capacity to withstand searching cross-examination would be very much lower in such cases. We also need to record that a child witness is not immune from the rigour of cross-examination and that a child witness or a youth who has been tutored or who has given false evidence would in all likelihood be found out very quickly because the capacity to withstand searching cross-examination would be very much lower in such cases. It is in this background that we are inclined to uphold the very valid submission canvassed by the learned S. P. P. that the practice of indiscriminately disregarding the evidence of a child witness needs to be deprecated. Where the evidence has come through the test of fire as one may term it and if it has retained its character despite rigorous cross-examination that evidence would inspire total and complete confidence in the Court. The finding of the learned trial Judge therefore that merely because P. W. 2 is a child witness that the quality of the evidence would have to be relegated to a lower level and that it would therefore be inappropriate to base a conviction on that material, is not a sound proposition viewed at from the well-settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. ( 5 ) THE learned S. P. P. has taken us very carefully through the evidence of P. W. 2-Thallurappa whom we would prefer to describe as the main eye witness to the incident. Undoubtedly there has been some effort on the part of the defence to indicate that he was not present when the incident took place but a careful scrutiny of his evidence would indicate that there is no doubt about the fact that he has witnessed the incident in question. He is the son of the deceased and his presence at that place is quite natural apart from which he has given cogent reasons for why he was there and what he was doing at that spot. He was a youth and therefore did not intervene in the incident, which is understandable. His contention is that the accused Nos. 1 and 2 assaulted the deceased with axes and that accused No. 3 used a wooden club where as accused Nos. 4 and 5 instigated them and twisted the hands and legs of the deceased. He was a youth and therefore did not intervene in the incident, which is understandable. His contention is that the accused Nos. 1 and 2 assaulted the deceased with axes and that accused No. 3 used a wooden club where as accused Nos. 4 and 5 instigated them and twisted the hands and legs of the deceased. P. W. 2 did the most natural thing in so far as he ran for assistance to none other than his own uncle who was an employee of the Society. He conveyed to P. W. 1- Fakirasab the uncle that his father and his brother had been assaulted and killed and he there after accompanied P. W. 1 to the police station. His version is corroborated by P. W. 12 Ramappa who is the Secretary of the Society and who has deposed to the fact that P. W. 2 came there on that evening and that he conveyed the information regarding the incident. The learned defence counsel has attacked the evidence of P. W. 12 on the ground that even though he talks about P. W. 2 having come there and conveying the report of the incident that he does not mention the names of the accused. This in our considered view, is an unimportant aspect of the case because P. W. 12 is a total outsider and he was examined for the limited purpose of pointing out that P. W. 2 ran to the Society Office and conveyed the report of the incident whereupon, P. W. 1 was allowed to leave the office and go to the police station. P. W. 12 is not the investigating authority and under these circumstances it is too much to expect that he would go into the finer points of the whole issue when all that he was concerned about was the fact that since a serious incident had taken place. P. W. 1 wanted to leave the office and go to the police station. The learned S. P. P. has submitted that the evidence of P. W. 2 even though he was a boy of 14 when he gave evidence very clearly and cogently sets out the incident and that there are no infirmities of any seriousness in this deposition. P. W. 1 wanted to leave the office and go to the police station. The learned S. P. P. has submitted that the evidence of P. W. 2 even though he was a boy of 14 when he gave evidence very clearly and cogently sets out the incident and that there are no infirmities of any seriousness in this deposition. The learned defence counsel has pointed out that even though P. W. 2 accompanied his uncle to the police station that there is no record of his having either lodged a complaint or told the police anything even though he went there. This is criticised as being highly unnatural conduct but we fail to appreciate the significance of this head of attack because. P. W. 2 had already conveyed to his uncle P. W. 1 everything that he knew about the matter and the business at the police station was between his uncle and the police and it is therefore natural that P. W. 2 would have to remain silent at that point of time. The sum total of the situation is that even the trial Court could not point out any serious infirmities as far as the evidence of P. W. 2 is concerned and we need to endorse the view that this evidence is sufficiently clear and cogent that it describes the incident and that it implicates all the five accused. ( 6 ) AT this stage we need to deal with one serious head of criticism leveled by the respondents learned counsel wherein he vigorously attacks the evidence of P. W. 2 on the ground that the medical evidence conflicts with the version put forward. P. W. 2 is categorical about one fact namely that the incident took place just at the time when the deceased were having their meal. According to the learned counsel the medical evidence indicates the presence of semi-digested food, which would mean that the incident could not have taken place just after the deceased had finished their meal. Also the learned counsel submits that the most important aspect of the matter would be that the deceased could normally have been expected to consume their mid-day meal at around noon even if one makes some time allowance in which case. Also the learned counsel submits that the most important aspect of the matter would be that the deceased could normally have been expected to consume their mid-day meal at around noon even if one makes some time allowance in which case. P. W. 2ts evidence that the incident took place at about 4 p. m which would be several hours after the meal would be rendered false. The learned counsel also submitted that if the incident has taken place earlier that there is nothing to indicate that Thallurappa was present there and that this is the reason why the defence had vehemently contended before the trial Court that Thallurappa was not an eye witness. As far as this aspect of the matter is concerned what we need to record is that in the absence of specific questions being put with regard to the time frame that it is not possible to assume that the deceased would necessarily have eaten their afternoon meal at a particular point of time. In the absence of this factor being evidenced there are numerous possibilities and the mere presence of semidigested food when the post-mortem was conducted cannot seriously undermine the veracity of evidence that otherwise appears to be absolutely credible. If the defence desired to press home this point it was obliged to establish with a degree of certainty all the various ingredients thereof particularly the time factor. As we see it since there is nothing on record to indicate the point of time when the food was eaten as also the level of digestion etc. that it would be highly unsafe to undermine the evidence only on the basis of a series of possibilities and conjectures. This is not permissible under the well-defined rules of appreciation of evidence as are prevalent in criminal jurisprudence. ( 7 ) COMING to the evidence of P. W. 1 Fakirasab he is the complainant and the record indicates that the F. I. R. was timed at 7. This is not permissible under the well-defined rules of appreciation of evidence as are prevalent in criminal jurisprudence. ( 7 ) COMING to the evidence of P. W. 1 Fakirasab he is the complainant and the record indicates that the F. I. R. was timed at 7. 20 p. m. The learned S. P. P. has defended the position by seeking to explain that when P. W. 1 rushed to the police station and informed the police that a double murder has taken place in the village that the first duty of the police was to rush to the spot and bring the situation under control in order to prevent a serious law and order problem and he submits that having regard to the fact that the village was 10 kms, away that the time lag of three hours is fully justified. The C. P. I-P. W. 20 has stated that he first went to the village after the complaint was received by him and that he brought P. W. 1 back with him and thereafter recorded the F. I. R. Procedurally the Police officer was wrong in having done this because he has seriously damaged the prosecution case. There can be little dispute about the fact that he was informed about the commission of the offence and that too one of double murder and in these circumstances even if it appeared to him necessary that he should rush to the spot he was still legally obliged to have made a short entry regarding the brief outline of the complaint received by him and to have thereafter proceeded for the investigation. In not having done this he has jeopardised the prosecution case because the respondents learned counsel was quick to point out that the Police Officer proceeding to the village and taking some steps in the matter conclusively indicates that the investigation had commenced and an F. I. R. recorded after the investigation has commenced could only be treated as being on par with a statement under Section 162 Cr. P. C. The learned counsel relied on three decisions of the Supreme Court reported in A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 11582. A. I. R. 1981 S. C. 1230 and 1993 Cr. L. J. 3684, in support of the proposition that Ex. P1. P. C. The learned counsel relied on three decisions of the Supreme Court reported in A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 11582. A. I. R. 1981 S. C. 1230 and 1993 Cr. L. J. 3684, in support of the proposition that Ex. P1. namely the complaint, cannot be relied on by the Court as the F. I. R. The learned S. P. P. did violently attempt to defend the position by submitting that the Police Officer accompanying the complainant to the village did not constitute the commencement of investigation because he has not arrested anybody he has not even drawn up any Panchanama nor did he record anybodyts statement and that consequently, when the Officer came back to the Police Station with the witnesses that the investigation had not commenced. It would be hazardous to uphold this submission because undoubtedly the Police Officer had been informed of the commission of a double murder and the sole purpose of his proceeding to the village was in relation to the investigation of that complaint. After going there he has visited the scene of offence seen the dead bodies and even stationed a police guard there for the night and all of these clearly show that he has taken certain steps in his capacity as a Police Officer pursuant to the receipt of information concerning a double murder. In this background it becomes essential to uphold the submission canvassed by the respondents learned Advocate that Ex. p i would have only restrictive use and that in any event it cannot be treated as the F. I. R. ( 8 ) ALLIED to this is a further difficulty that has come up in so far as in the original complaint, accused No. 1 has been named as Siddappa and on the next day, a statement of P. W. 1 has been taken down whereby he has sought to correct the position and indicate that in actual fact, the name of Al was Maruthi. The learned S. P. P. brushed aside this aspect of the matter by contending that P. W. 1 was only relaying to the police the information gathered from P. W. 2 who was the eye witness and that therefore even if he had made a mistake about the real participant in the incident that this has been corrected at the earliest point of time and he was quick to point out that P. W. 2 has been consistent about the fact that it was the other brother Maruthi who was involved in the incident and not Siddappa. The respondents learned Advocate strongly contended that this circumstance is fatal to the prosecution in so far as it indicates that even though 3-1/2 hours had elapsed after the incident, that P. W. 1 was not certain with regard to the identity of the assailants and he therefore submitted that neither Siddappa nor Maruthi could be held liable the corollary being that in this state of uncertainty. Ex. PT would have to be totally written off and that the Court would have no means of ascertaining as to who were the persons named at the earliest point of time. On strict technicalities, the investigation having commenced Ex. P1 cannot be regarded as the F. T. R but it is not a total write-off in so far as that statement still has restrictive value as rightly pointed out by the learned S. P. P. since it can be used for purposes of confronting the witness with his previous statement in writing and proving contradictions. It is true that corrective action was taken on -the next morning, but in a case of this gravity where implication in the offence could result in a heavy sentence we are constrained to hold that in view of the aforesaid situation as far as Al is concerned that he would be entitled to the benefit of doubt. ( 9 ) AS regards the subsequent part of the argument advanced by the respondents learned counsel that the principles of falsis in uno, falsis in omnibus would hold good vis-a-vis the evidence of P. W. 1, we are not inclined to accept that position because as will be presently pointed out the evidence of P. W. 1 does not suffer from any serious infirmities and he has at the earliest point of time rectified the mistake. There is a very clear cut and fundamental difference between an honest mistake and fabrication. This is a case which falls with in the former category. ( 10 ) AS far as the evidence of P. W. 1 Fakirasab is concerned we need to record that the delay in the lodging of the F. I. R. is not something for which he can be held responsible. It is true that a grave error has been committed as far as the name of Al is concerned which originally appeared as Siddappa and was corrected on the very next day to read Maruthi P. W. l seeks to point out that this was an error and we would not attach much significance to it because, P. W. ls knowledge is only second hand in so far as he has complained on the basis of information relayed to him by P. W. 2 and there is even a possibility of a communication gap. In any event we have decided to go by the rule of caution and to give the benefit of this situation to Al Beyond this we see no ground on which his evidence can legitimately be discarded. On the contrary his leaving the office of the Society and proceeding to the police station along with P. W. 2 gives considerable support to the veracity of the evidence of P. W. 2 who states that immediately after the incident he rushed to P. W. 1 and conveyed the entire report to him. The evidence of P. W. 1 therefore would, in our considered view, not only assist the prosecution but would also provide a degree of support to the evidence of P. W. 2. ( 11 ) WE then go to the evidence of P. W. 3 - Thippavva who is the sister of the deceased. Apart from the usual criticism from the defence side that since she is related to the deceased like P. Ws. 1 and 2, that therefore, she would go out of her way to involve the accused we find it difficult to accept such a generalised attack in the absence of anything having been brought on record to indicate that she was otherwise hostile to the accused. 1 and 2, that therefore, she would go out of her way to involve the accused we find it difficult to accept such a generalised attack in the absence of anything having been brought on record to indicate that she was otherwise hostile to the accused. The learned trial Judge has, apart from the reasons indicated by us earlier, recorded the fact that she is a married lady who normally lives in another village and that therefore. there is no convincing reason why she should have been found at the spot and he has also rejected her evidence on the ground that her name does not appear in the f. I. R. ( 12 ) PAUSING here for a while, we need to point out that in the course of his arguments, the learned S. P. P. came down very strongly on the last of these reasons which are set out by the learned trial Judge and he pointed out that in case after case the trial Courts have been rejecting the evidence of a witness on the ground that the witness name does not appear in the F. I. R. He submitted, and with considerable justification, that the F. I. R. is a complaint to the law enforcement authority with regard to the commission of a crime and that it is not a comprehensive report on every thing that transpired at that time and more importantly, all those who have witnessed it: This last aspect of the master, submits the learned S. P. P. , is the function of the investigating authorities and if in the course of investigation, the police come to know that a particular person has knowledge of the commission of the offence they will certainly utilise that evidence in support of the prosecution. It may be that a reference to one or more witnesses is contained in the F. I. R. but there is no inflexible rule or convention that this must be so and conversely, it is certainly wrong to discard evidence of otherwise credible witnesses merely because for whatever reason, they were not named in the F. I. R. In fact, the F. I. R. is not the Alpha and Omega of the prosecution case and therefore it is not to be confused with being on par with a comprehensive encyclopedia of all that transpired. ( 13 ) AS far as the visibility aspect is concerned, we have heard both the counsel very carefully and have also perused the evidence of P. W. 3 particularly the generalised admission obtained from her in cross-examination to the effect that if one were in the adjoining field, the scene of offence would normally not be visible from that spot because of the Bandh in between. We note in this regard, that the evidence itself indicates that the Bandh is not of uniform height and varies from 4 ft. to about 10 ft. Secondly that the general height of the sun-flower plants does not necessarily mean that the line of visibility of the witness was obstructed. According to P. W. 2, she was standing under a tree from where the view of the incident would have been unhindered. Even assuming she was originally in the adjoining field unless the defence had succeeded in specifically pinpointing the exact spot in that field where she was standing one cannot come out with a generalised conclusion that it would be impossible for her to see the incident even if she were in that area. The fact of the matter is that she is a relative and a close one, that she was in fact found by the police on the next day when her statement was recorded and that her evidence substantially conforms to what she had originally stated. She has withstood the cross-examination quite admirably and in this background, we find it impossible to uphold the grounds on which her evidence was rejected by the learned Judge. ( 14 ) P. W. 3 has given evidence with regard to the incident which substantially conformed to and corroborated the evidence given by P. W. 2 and we do find that even as far as the injuries are concerned, that they can be co-related to the type of weapons and which the accused were using namely axes and a club and to the parts of the body on which according to the witnesses the blows were inflicted. It is these factors that give a higher credibility to the evidence of this witness and we do find that this material not only requires to be accepted but that it substantially furthers the prosecutions case. It is these factors that give a higher credibility to the evidence of this witness and we do find that this material not only requires to be accepted but that it substantially furthers the prosecutions case. ( 15 ) THE learned counsel who represented the respondents, drew our attention to a catena of decisions which have consistently held that the High Court should be very discriminating in the matter of reversing an order of acquittal in a criminal appeal, particularly since it is well-settled law that an order of acquittal at the end of a trial doubly reinforces the original presumption of innocence. In this background Mr. Kalyan Shetty submitted that the latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1997 S. C. C. (Cr1.) l95, has once again reiterated the position that the High Court should be slow to interfere in such situations also because of the age old maxim that there are two views possible on a record, and the one in favour of the accused must necessarily be accepted. He took us at considerable length through the judgment of the trial Court and he submitted that the conclusions are well-founded in so far as they are not run away inferences that the material referred to by the learned trial Judge is all from the record and not something that does not appear there and furthermore that, where the learned trial Judge has observed the principle of utmost caution that the conclusions are not only logical, but that they represent a well- considered decision which is certainly of the possible view even if another parallel may be permissible. We have had occasion to deal with this submission in the past and to lay down that a possible view does not mean any view that is taken but a view which is a judicially justifiable conclusion and which may not have been followed. It is therefore, necessary to re-examine the grounds on which that view has emerged and if these grounds are faulted, then it would not be permissible to hold that the conclusions or the view in question is a possible view. It is therefore, necessary to re-examine the grounds on which that view has emerged and if these grounds are faulted, then it would not be permissible to hold that the conclusions or the view in question is a possible view. It is in this background that we have re-examined the record of this case virtually thread-bare and we have also been doubly cautious since this is an appeal against acquittal in ensuring that there is total and complete justification for interference in so far as the earlier conclusion would result in a miscarriage or failure of justice. ( 16 ) WE have already held that as far as Al is concerned, that we propose to give him the benefit of doubt. As far as A4 and 5 are concerned, the role attributed to them is totally insignificant and even assuming one were to seriously accept the position that they were present when the incident took place it would still not be good enough to hold that they were participants in the formation of an unlawful assembly or for that matter, in the commission of criminal offences. To this extent therefore we uphold the submissions canvassed by the respondents learned Advocate that the acquittal order as far as accused Nos. 4 and 5 will have to be upheld. However, as far as accused Nos. 2 and 3 there is overwhelming evidence of their presence, participation and overtacts in the incident that resulted in the death of Hussainsab and Saidusab. These two accused would therefore, be liable to be convicted of the offences punishable under Section 302 nw 34 I. P. C. We are conscious of the fact that they were originally charged under Section 149 I. P. C. , but in the light of our conclusions, it cannot be held that there was an assembly of five or more persons and to this extent, the charge would stand watered down and the accused 2 and 3 would only be liable to be convicted under Section 302 nw 34 I. P. C. There are two subsidiary charges, namely the act of trespass as far as the field of the deceased is concerned and in so far as the object of entering the land was for purposes of committing a criminal offence, accused Nos. 2 and 3 would be liable under Section 447 nw 34 I. P. C. The evidence of P. W. 2 clearly indicates that he was intimidated by the accused who showed him axes and threatened to take his life and to this extent, accused Nos. 2 and 3 would also be liable for a conviction under Section 506 nw 34 I. P. C. ( 17 ) IN the result, the appeal partially succeeds. The order of acquittal in favour of accused Nos. 1, 4 and 5 stands confirmed. As far as Accused Nos. 2 and 3 are concerned, they stand convicted in the first instance of the offence punishable under Section 302 nw 34 I. P. C. and they are sentenced to R. I. for life. For the offences punishable under Section 447 nw 34 I. P. C. , A2 and 3 are sentenced to three monthst R. I. and for the offence punishable under Section 506 nw 34 I. P. C. , A2 and 3 are sentenced to R. I. for one year, substantive sentences to run concurrently. The acquittal of A2 and 3 in respect of the remaining charges stands confirmed. ( 18 ) THE appeal accordingly stands disposed off. The bail bonds of all the accused, if they are on bail to stand cancelled. Appeal allowed partly.