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1997 DIGILAW 235 (GAU)

Anil Paul v. State of Tripura

1997-11-12

J.N.SARMA, N.C.JAIN

body1997
J. N Sarma, J.- This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 21.9.87 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala in Sessions Trial No.94 (WT/A) of 1986 whereby one Anil Pal (the present appellant) has been convicted and sentenced under section 302 IPC to suffer imprisonment for life and he has been further convicted and sentenced under section 201IPC to suffer RI for 5 1/4 years with a direction that both the sentences shall run concurrently. During the pendency of this appeal, the accused has been granted bail and as such he is now on bail. Three others were acquitted. 2. A charge sheet was filed by OC. Sidhai Police Station ^for prosecution of the accused persons namety, Shri Amulya Chandra Paul. Shri Anil Paul (present appellant) and Smti Sumitra Paul and Smti Sabita Paul under section 302/2017 193/109 IPC. 3. One Jyoti Rani Paul, wife of the present appellant died on 31.7.83 and her dead body was found to be hanging from the beam of the house of the husband. Jyoti Rani Paul was married to the accused Shri Anil Paul about 10 years back before the incident and they had three children of this wedlock. The first son died after few months of the birth and thereafter two other sons were born, at the time of death of Jyoti Rani Paul, the second son was aged about 5 years and his name is Milton Paul. 4. Jyoti Rani Paul died on 31.7.83 and an information was lodged before the Officer-in-charge, Sidhai Police Station by the husband, Shri Anil Paul ie, Ext. 10 wherein it was stated that his wife committed suicide at about 10 AM fastening a napkin in his house. It is further stated that dead body was seen by them and they do not know the cause of death. There is a further sentence in this Ext. in different ink which states “we have no doubt with regard to this” and a prayer was made that inquiry be made regarding this. This was received at the Police Station at 13.45 PM and was registered as Sidhai PS UD Case No.3 (J) 83 under section 174 CrPC. Thereafter, the case was investigated by one Tapan Majumdar. AS I, to the PS. ASI visited the spot, prepared the inquest report, brought down the dead body and sent it for post mortem. This was received at the Police Station at 13.45 PM and was registered as Sidhai PS UD Case No.3 (J) 83 under section 174 CrPC. Thereafter, the case was investigated by one Tapan Majumdar. AS I, to the PS. ASI visited the spot, prepared the inquest report, brought down the dead body and sent it for post mortem. The ASI seized the blood-stained wearing of the deceased along with other articles. 5. One Dr. Rupchand Debnath, M/0 Incharge Mohanpur PHC conducted the examination on the dead body on 1.8.83 and forwarded the report to the Police Station. The Post Mortem Report categorically opined that it was not a case of death b}' hanging but it was homicidal death due to throttling or by manual strangulation. Accordingly, the police prima facie believed that Shri Anil Paul was responsible for the murder of his wife and he later hanged her body to transpire the evidence of murder. 6. Accordingly, an FIR was lodged which is Ext.P16 on 2.8.83 at about 10 AM. The ezahar being Sidhai PS Case No.2(8)/83 under section 302/201 was registered and the OC himself took up the investigation. In course of investigation, the OC visited the place of occurrence, prepared the hand sketch map and recorded the statement of witnesses.1 He failed to arrest Shri Anil Paul as it is stated that he was absconding. Shri Anil Paul ultimately surrendered at the Police Station on 18.8.83. During the investigation it appeared to the Officer-in-charge that other accused persons namely, Shri Anil Paul, the present appellant, parents and sister were also involved in commission of the offence. So, they also were arrested. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed. Thereafter, the matter was taken up for trial by the learned Sessions Judge. The learned Sessions Judge by order dated 9.2.87 framed the charges under section 302/201 IPC. The charges were explained to them in Bengali and the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The charges framed by the learned Sessions Judge on 9.2.87 are quoted below inasmuch as some arguments have been made by the learned counsel for the appellant that no charge was framed under section 201 IPC. The charge against the appellant reads as follows : “Firstly - That you on the 31st day of July. 1983 at about 10.00 AM and Harinakhola PS Sidhai. The charge against the appellant reads as follows : “Firstly - That you on the 31st day of July. 1983 at about 10.00 AM and Harinakhola PS Sidhai. Dist West Tripura did commit murder by intentionally causing the death of Jyotirani Paul and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 302 IPC and within my cognizance. Secondly - That you on the same date, time and place knowing or having reason to believe that certain offence, to wit causing death of Jyotirani Paul, punishable with death or imprisonment for life under section 302 IPC has been committed knowingly gave false information to the 1O and others, to wit that the victim committed suicide by hanging, with the intention of screening yourself from legal punishment, and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 201 IPC and within my cognizance. And I hereby direct that you be tried on the said charges by this Court.” 7. The charges were also framed against the remaining accused persons also for having abetted the commission of offence of murder and for giving false information to the Investigating Officer and others for screening themselves from punishment. Those charges were also read over and explained in Bengali to the accused and the accused persons pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 8. The prosecution examined 26 witnesses in all and exhibited documents marked as Ext. PI to PI8. The prosecution also made some material exhibits being marked as Ext. MO1 to MO 14. 9. The accused persons lead no evidence in support of the defence. However, the defence as it transpires from the trend of cross examination as well as from the statement they gave at the time of examination under section 313 CrPC is a total denial of the prosecution case. It was also pleaded that the brother of the deceased in collusion with Ex MLA, Radha Raman Debnath started this false case against the accused persons. ' 10. We have heard Shri AK Bhowmick, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant and Shri S. Das, learned Public Prosecutor for the State. 11. Before we proceed further let us see who are the witnesses in this case. PW 1 is Shri Abani Datta. he is a neighbour and his house is situated to the North East of the house of the accused at some distance. PW 2 is one Nityaranjan Deb. 11. Before we proceed further let us see who are the witnesses in this case. PW 1 is Shri Abani Datta. he is a neighbour and his house is situated to the North East of the house of the accused at some distance. PW 2 is one Nityaranjan Deb. He is also a neighbour and he has not stated anything to support the prosecution case save and except stating that he saw the wife of Anil Paul hanging from the beam of the house. PW 3 is Shri Anil Chandra Paul, the brother of the deceased. Jyoti Rani Paul. PW 4 is one Munindra Ghosh who is a neighbour. PW 5 is another brother of the deceased Smti Jyotirani. PW 6 is one Laxi Rani Das who was declared hostile and on the date of deposition her age was recorded as 13 years, so on the date of incident she will be aged about 9 years. She stated before the police that “as I entered into the hut of Milton's mother 1 found Milton's father tying up Milton's mother to hang her up”. She also stated before the police earlier that she informed of this incident to her parents. But in the Court she denied all the statements. PW 7 is Hardhan Rudra Paul. He is a neighbour and resident of same village. PW 8 is Shri Miltpn Paul. On the date of recording evidence his age was about 9 years, so on the date of incident he will be aged about 5 years. He is the son of deceased Jyotirani Paul and accused, Anil Paul. On the date of incident he was the student of Baluyari School. Acording to the prosecution he is an eye witness and he has stated in evidence regarding culpability of accused Shri Anil Paul. PW 9 is Shri Kiran Chandra Das. He is also a resident of same village and he also was declared hostile. This Kiran Chandra Das is the father of PW 6 Laxi Rani who stated that she reported the matter to him before the police. PW 1,0 is Shri Keshab Debnath who is a photographer. He took the 8 numbers of photos being Ext. P series of the dead body before it was sent to the Post Mortem. This Kiran Chandra Das is the father of PW 6 Laxi Rani who stated that she reported the matter to him before the police. PW 1,0 is Shri Keshab Debnath who is a photographer. He took the 8 numbers of photos being Ext. P series of the dead body before it was sent to the Post Mortem. The negatives of these photos are not available as it has been stated that the negatives have been destroyed during a cyclonic storm when many articles of his shop were damaged. These photographs bear the seal of his studio but there is no signature of the photographer. PW 11 is Shri Hirendra Chandra Das. He is also a neighbour who stated that there was some quarrel between Jyotirani and other accused persons and some time he intervened. PW 12 and 13 do not require any mention. PW 14 is Shri Lari Chaiii Biswas who is the scribe of the information which was lodged by accused Anil Paul at the earliest point of time before the Police Station. PW 15 is one Shri Dilip Ghosh. He passed the information of death of Jyotirani to her brothers, PW 16 is Shri Bhabatosh Roy who met Anil Paul on way to Police Station to lodge the information. PW 17 is Dr. Rupchand Debnath who conducted the post mortem examination. PW 18 is one Shri Chidhananda Bardhan who is an employee of Agartala Municipality and he deposed that Anil the accused was absent in office from 31.7.83 to 18.8.83 without any application for leave. PW 19 is Shri Tapan Majumdar. AS1 of Police who first visited the site and made the inquest report and sent the dead body for post mortem. PW 20 is Shri Amar Kishore Dutta, SI of Police who got the requisition from OC to arrest the accused person. His evidence is absolutely irrelevant. PW 21 is Shri Radha Raman Debnath. the MLA who is an witness in the inquest report as well as in the seizure list. PW 22 is one Pradip Das Gupta. He is the witness regarding seizure and inquest report. He also accompanied the brother of the deceased to the spot in a three wheeler. PW 23 is another witness of the seizure list. PW 24 is Shri Arun Chandra Das. the Constable who took the dead body to the morgue of the hospital for post mortem. He is the witness regarding seizure and inquest report. He also accompanied the brother of the deceased to the spot in a three wheeler. PW 23 is another witness of the seizure list. PW 24 is Shri Arun Chandra Das. the Constable who took the dead body to the morgue of the hospital for post mortem. PW 25 is AS1. who deposed regarding the lodging of report by Shri Anil Paul, the accused, on 31.7.83. PW 26 is Sujit Gupta, the 10. 12. The questions which arises for determination in this case are as follows : (i) Whether the death of Jyotirani was by hanging or whether she was murdered? (ii) Whether the accused caused the murder of Jyotirani? (iii) Whether the accused”tried to cause disappearance of evidence? 13. The learned counsel for the appellant urged the following points : (i) It is a case of suicide by hanging and the accused is in no way responsible for it. (ii) There is no evidence as against the accused to establish the charge of murder and/or the charge under section 201 of IPC. (iii) That the medical evidence does not inspire confidence and no reliance can be placed on the deposition of PW 8. Milton Paul as he is a child witness and there was contradictions in the statement before the Court and before the police under section 161 CrPC. (iv) Even if it is held that there are no contradictions in spite of it. it must be held that there was omission and later on an attempt to improve and add was made and such improvement and additions cannot be taken into consideration to convict a person. 14. Shri S. Das, learned Public Prosecutor joined in issue with all these submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant. 15. The first submission of learned Advocate for the appellant is that there is no charge under section 201 oflPC. Section201 of IPC is causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender. This section is divided into two clauses, one causing the disappearance of evidence of an offence, two giving of false information, hi both the cases, the following ingredients are essential to constitute the offences under this section : (i) An offence must have been committed; (ii) The accused must have known or have reason to believe that an offence was committed. (iii) The accused must have intended to screen the offender from legal punishment. 16. In the instant case from FIR it will be seen that it was specifically stated therein that after murder, subsequently the dead body was suspended to disappeared the evidence of commission of murder and he also lodged an information to the police which is Ext. P4. So. if there was a murder this information given will be a false information and he was specifically charged with having been committed the murder. He was charged knowingly giving the false information to the Investi­gating Officer with the intention of screening himself from the legal punishment. So. the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that there was no proper charge under section 201IPC and there was ho material with regard to that cannot be accepted. Whether the charges have been brought home or not that will be discussed later on. 17. Next let us take up the point urged by Shri Bhowmik. learned Advocate for the appellant that it is a case of suicide by hanging, and if it is found that it is a case of suicide by hanging, the whole substratum of prosecution shall fall through. 18. In order to decide that point let us first have a look at the inquest report. The inquest report says that the distance of the bamboo beam from the floor is about 5 Yz cubit, meaning thereby that it is about 99 inches. It is stated by PW 1 Shri Abani Dutta that the height of Anil's wife was about 5 feet. PW 3 also corroborates it saying that the height of the deceased was about 5 feet. It is in evidence that there was no cot or chowki in the room. Anil and his wife used to sleep on the floor. There was only a wooden box measuring about 1 Yz feet x 1 foot ic, Ext MO 1. PW 3 stated that it was not possible on the part of the deceased to touch that bamboo beam even by standing on the box. It was suggested to witness that the bamboo box was not out of reach of the deceased but the witness denied it. PW 3 stated that it was not possible on the part of the deceased to touch that bamboo beam even by standing on the box. It was suggested to witness that the bamboo box was not out of reach of the deceased but the witness denied it. PW 4 also stated that the height of the bamboo beam where from the dead body was hanging was at a height of 5 Yz cbt to 5 4 cbt from the floor of the house. He also stated that the deceased was short height and the bamboo beam was beyond the reach of the deceased. He further stated that even on standing on the box kept in the room the deceased could not have touched the bamboo beam. Ex LMO 1 is the box. This PW 4 further stated that sole of the feet of the deceased was about 2 cubits from the floor of the hut. 19. PW 19 Tapan Majumdar. ASI stated that he measured the height of the beam from the dead body where from the dead body was hanging, this height was about 5 Yz cubit from the floor of the hut. the roof of the hut was at the height of 2 Yz cubits from the beam. The wooden box was to the North of the dead body at a distance of 2 Vs. cubits. On seeing the condition of the suspended dead body, he suspected that it was not a case of suicidal hanging. 20. PW 26 Shri Sujit Gupta, Investigating Officer deposed that the beam wherefrom the dead body was hanging was at the height of 5 Yz cubits from the floor. The beam was beyond the reach of the deceased and there nothing was found in the hut wherefrom the deceased might catch the beam. A suggestion was given to this witness that he got something which can be planted catching the beam, mat suggestion was denied. 21. The accused in examination of section 313 CrPC while answering to question No.28, admitted that there was no cot or choky in the room. In answer to question No.29 that the beam was beyond the reach of the deceased, he stated that the said beam was within her reach. 22. 21. The accused in examination of section 313 CrPC while answering to question No.28, admitted that there was no cot or choky in the room. In answer to question No.29 that the beam was beyond the reach of the deceased, he stated that the said beam was within her reach. 22. Considering all these evidences it can be safely concluded that the beam from where the deceased was hanging was beyond the reach of the deceased and there was nothing by standing on which she can reach the beam for the propose of hanging. So it must be a case where the deceased was hanged in the beam by some one else. 23. The next question is regarding the story of suicide i.e. medical evidence which is PW 17 who deposed as follows : (a) There was continuous ligature mark on the neck and laceration on the side of the neck (b) The ligature had two knots, one of these two knots was tied and it was in front side of the neck and the other knot was/ 2 1/a feet over the neck (c) The face of the deceased was swollen. 24. He also mentioned the other injuries and other circumstances and categorically opined that the injuries found cannot be caused by suicidal hanging except half pretruted tongue. He also denied that he submitted a false report under the pressure of Radhamohan Debnath. Ex MLA. Doctor inter alia found the following internal and external injuries : (a) A continuous ligature mark on the neck and laceration on the side of the neck. (b) The eyes were in haemorrhagic condition i.e. the eyes were reddish and laceration was found on the left side of the left cornia. (c) The tongue was half pretruted. (d) Bloody froth omitted from mouth. (e) The face of the deceased was swollen and cyannsed. (f) The eyes were open and prominent. (g) Ecchymoses from neck to chest, (h) Ecchymoses in plourae. (i) Larynx and trachoea were found swollen. (j) Tardiou's spots were found on both the lungs, (k) Ecchymoses was found on pericardium. (l) Heart was congested, (m) Both the carotid artaries were found reptured. 25. On the basis of these injuries, the Doctor opined that the death of the person was homicidal due to throttling or by manual strangulation. (i) Larynx and trachoea were found swollen. (j) Tardiou's spots were found on both the lungs, (k) Ecchymoses was found on pericardium. (l) Heart was congested, (m) Both the carotid artaries were found reptured. 25. On the basis of these injuries, the Doctor opined that the death of the person was homicidal due to throttling or by manual strangulation. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that these injuries, signs and symptoms which were found by the Doctor on the deceased would suggest that it was not a case of strangulation or throttling but it is a case of suicide. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the appellant refers us to Modi's Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology Twenty-first Edition. In Chapter IX Modi pointed that death resulting from asphyxia are by hanging, suffocation. He points out that hanging is a form of death produced by suspending the body with a ligature mark round the neck to constricting the force being the weight of the body or a part of the body weight. He draws our attention to the post mortem appearance mentioned by Modi. These are external and internal, he relies on the following portion : “External Appearance are those due to the ligature on the neck and those peculiar to the mode of death. In both hanging and strangulation, the ligature should be photographed in situ, and then removed by cutting, without tying the knot, (or in case of running noose, bandaging or stitching it at the point of ils exit). Its cut ends should be properly stitched and tied with a long thread to keep it properly for demonstration in the Court and to enable reconstruction. After measuring the length of the ligature and circumstances of the neck, it should be handed over duly sealed to police. 1. Ligature Mark - This depends on the nature and position of the ligature used, and the time of suspension of the body after death. If the ligature be soft, and the body, be cut down immediately after death, there may be no mark. Again, the intervention of a thick and long beard or clothes on the neck may lead to the formation of a slight mark only. 26. In this particular case, the learned Advocate for the appellant submits that the ligature was removed by the sweeper as deposed by the Doctor PW 17. Again, the intervention of a thick and long beard or clothes on the neck may lead to the formation of a slight mark only. 26. In this particular case, the learned Advocate for the appellant submits that the ligature was removed by the sweeper as deposed by the Doctor PW 17. He says that the ligature was removed by the sweeper in his presence and he submits that it was not handed over duly sealed to the police, the accused is entitled to the benefits of this lapse on the part of the investigating agency. There may be some force in the argument of the learned Advocate for the appellant but the broad approach which we must make is that whether for this lapse on the part of the investigating agency, the accused is entitled to that benefit and whether there are other evidence to rule out the possibility of death by hanging. Learned Advocate for the appellant draws our attention to the medico legal question likely to arise in the case of hanging and that part of Modi's book is quoted below : “Whether death was caused by hanging - In India, it is a common practice to kill a victim, and then to suspend the body from a tree or a rafter to avert suspicion. It is. therefore, necessary to find out if hanging was the cause of death in a suspended body. The presence of a ligature mark alone is not diagnostic of death from hanging, inasmuch, being a purely cadaveric phenomenon, it may be produced if a body has been suspended after death. Often a body is suspended after murder to simulate suicidal hanging. In such cases a close examination of the direction of the friction marks on the fibers of the rope at the point of suspension may indicate whether the body was pulled up by some one else or dropped down by its weight.” 27. The learned Advocate for the appellant submits that there was no examination of the direction of the friction marks on the fibres of the rope at the point of supension to indicate whether the body was pulled up by someone else or dropped down by its weight but the learned Advocate for the appellant failed to consider in the instant case that it was not a rope which was used but was napkin (Gamocha) or towel. So, it was not possible to find out the friction marks on the fibres of the rope and this does not lead to anywhere. Modi points out strangulation and throttling at page 195 and that is quoted below : “Definition- Strangulation is a violent form of death, which results from constricting the neck by means of a ligature or by any other means without suspending the body. It is called throttling, when constriction is produced by the pressure of the fingures and palms upon the throat. Strangulation may also be brought about by compressing the throat with a food, knee bend of elbow, or some other solid substance.” 28. So, we will have to find out on the evidence whether it is throttling or strangulation. Learned Advocate for the appellant also draws our attention to the Tabular Form given by Modi to point out the differences between hanging and strangulation and on the basis of this chart he submits that the instant case is a case of hanging and not strangulation. He further draws our attention that in the case of hanging there will be saliva, dribbling out of the mouth down on the chin and chest but in the case of strangulation there will be saliva but no such dribbling. 29. Let us see the evidence regarding the presence of saliva. The Doctor PW 17 deposed that there was no mark of saliva. So. this submission has no force. 30. Let us see the next difference. In case of hanging the neck will be XX. stretched and elongated in fresh bodies but in the case of strangulation the neck is not elongated. The Doctor PW 17 in this case did not find neck to be elongated. Modi further points out that in case of hanging bleeding from the nose, mouth and ears are very rare but bleeding from nose mouth and ears may be found in case of strangulation. Regarding existence of blood in nose and mouth let us have a look at the evidence. The inquest report shows that blood was coming out from the tongue. 31. PW 3 stated that he saw blood oozing through mouth of the dead body. He also show blood coming out through one of the eyes. 32. Regarding existence of blood in nose and mouth let us have a look at the evidence. The inquest report shows that blood was coming out from the tongue. 31. PW 3 stated that he saw blood oozing through mouth of the dead body. He also show blood coming out through one of the eyes. 32. PW 4 stated that he saw froth of the blood from nostril of the deceased, later on he said he did not remember whether blood was on the nostril or mouth. PW 17. the Doctor inter alia stated as follows : “Blood came out through mouth due to pressure on the throat. Blood emitted both from the nostril and mouth.” 33. PW 19 also stated the same thing. PW 21 also stated that there was bleeding through mouth of the lady. So this also shows that the present case is not a case of hanging but of strangulation. 34. The next submission which the learned Advocate for the appellant made is with regard to the ligature mark and on this contention he submits that ligature mark on the body will show that it is a case of hanging. In order to appreciate this contention, again let us go back to the evidence and find out whether this contention is borne by the evidence on record. We should bear in mind that there were two knots, one knot was round the neck by a napkin, and that napkin was tied to a bedsheet and-that bedsheet was tied up with the beam of the hut. 35. PW 3 states that the position of the knot shows that it was not a case of hanging. He stated that the neck of the deceased was tied up by means of a napkin and that napkin was again tied up with a piece of cloth and that piece of cloth was tied upto the bamboo beam. The Doctor deposed that the ligature mark was not complete, it was less circular. He further deposed that the ligature mark round the neck was not tight and the suggestion which was given to him that ligature mark round the neck was tight was denied. So, this ligature also shows that it is not a case of hanging but of strangulation. He further deposed that the ligature mark round the neck was not tight and the suggestion which was given to him that ligature mark round the neck was tight was denied. So, this ligature also shows that it is not a case of hanging but of strangulation. The learned counsel for the appellant also takes us to the other part of the tabular form but it is not necessary to refer to them inasmuch as there is oral evidence beyond reasonable doubt coupled with the evidence of the Doctor to show that the present case is not a case of death by hanging but a case of strangulation or throttling. The other circumstantial evidence to aile out the case of hanging is blood mark in different clothes which is not possible in the case of hanging. The bedsheet which was seized and used as one of the ligature and the napkin used as another ligature and the blouse of the deceased and the pillow cover, mat made of cane and katha (Ext. MO 5) all have blood mark. The trial Court on examination of these marks/exhibits found that these were stained with blood. The witness to the seizure list as well as others also deposed that these articles bore blood marks. The further deposition of the Doctor that the injuries which he found cannot be caused by hanging also rule out the case of hanging but forwarded by the defence side. 36. An argument has been made that it has not been established that these blood marks are the bloods of the deceased and in support of it. the learned counsel for the appellant relies on AIR 1987 SC 1507 (Kansa Behera vs. State of Orissa). The facts of that case was that one person was killed and the accused was convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence. One of the circumstances established against the appellant is that dhoti and shirt .were recovered from the possession of the appellant when he was arrested on 15:12.68 and these articles were found to be stained with human blood. The facts of that case was that one person was killed and the accused was convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence. One of the circumstances established against the appellant is that dhoti and shirt .were recovered from the possession of the appellant when he was arrested on 15:12.68 and these articles were found to be stained with human blood. The Supreme Court in paragraph 11 on the facts of this case, laid down the law follows : “As regards the recovery of a shirt or a dintu with blood-stains which according to the serologist reports were stained with human blood but there is no evidence in the report of the serologist about the group with blood and therefore it could not positively be connected with the deceased. In the evidence of the Investigating Officer or in the report it is not clearly mentioned as to that were the dimensions of the stains of blood. Few small blood-stains on the clothes of a person may even be of his own blood especially if it is a villager putting on these clothes and living ^iii villages. The evidence about the blood group is one conclusive to connect the blood-stains with the deceased/That evidence is absent and in this view of the matter, in our opinion, even this is not a circumstance on the basis of which any inference could be drawn.” 37. In appreciating evidence we should bear in mind that the probative of value of proof, circumstances must be considered with regard to the ordinary human conduct and on a pragmatic and realistic approach, In the definition of proof as given under section 3 of the Evidence Act. no distinction is made between the circumstances and other evidence. In either case, the Court has to consider the whole matter before it and proceed with prudence before coming upon the probabilities. Suspicion cannot take place of legal proof. The conviction cannot be sustained even if the prosecution story considered as a whole may be true until it is found that it must be true, from one may be true4Qe.mustbM£ti»e is inevitable a long distance to travel and whole of the distance must be covered by the legal. reliable and an unimpeachable evidence (see Sarwan vs. AIR 1957 SC •637). reliable and an unimpeachable evidence (see Sarwan vs. AIR 1957 SC •637). But at the same time we must bear in mind that circumstantial evidence is such which coupled with evidence of various facts are so associated with the fact in issue, if taken together they form a chain of circumstance leading to an inference or presumption of the existence of the main fact. The circumstantial evidence must be complete and incapable explanation of any other hypothesis than that fact sought to be brought home. 38. In this particular case, it is the story of prosecution that there was a bed on the floor of the house and there was a bed sheet, pillow cover and katha and the deceased was lying on the bed and at that time the accused throttled or strangulated her. and as a result of throttling and/or strangulation bloods must have been there in those materials including in the blouse of the deceased. 39. In the case of Kansa Behera, 1987 SC (supra) there were blood stains in the dhoti and shirt but there was no mention regarding the dimensions of stains of blood. There was the possibility that few small blood stains on the clothes of a person may even be his own blood. That is not the case in hand. There was sufficient amount of blood even on the different materials and it was not suggested in cross examination that it is not the blood of the deceased So. we hold that medical evidence coupled with other evidence establishes it beyond reasonable doubt that the present case is not a suicidical hanging but it is a case of murder or is homicidal and it is further found that after causing death of deceased her dead body was put in a state of suspension by tying it on the beam by Ext. MO 4 and Ext.MO 6 and thereafter an information was lodged by the accused before the Police Station. 40. Now crucial point to be decided is whether the present appellant is responsible for causing the death of the deceased and he is further responsible for lodging a false information with regard to the cause of death before the Police Station. 41. Let us take up the first question whether the present appellant is responsible for causing the death of the deceased. 41. Let us take up the first question whether the present appellant is responsible for causing the death of the deceased. The prosecution story is that the relationship between the husband and wife was strained. Two things are highlighted in this connection, one that the appellant herein demanded an amount of Rs.8.000/- to 10.()()()/- from the brother of the deceased and that money not being paid, the accused became annoyed and angry with his wife. This part of the story cannot be accepted inasmuch as there is no reliable evidence in support of it. Secondly, it is the case of prosecution that the accused had some illicit connection with some other girls and two girls were brought to the place of the deceased and they lived there for some time together and that also spoiled the relationship between the husband and the wife and the wife was beaten by the accused. Anil Paul as well as by other persons. Regarding this let us have a look at the evidence. 42. PW 1 before the police stated that on many occasions he went to the house of Anil on hearing the cries of Anil's wife and gave objection to the inmates of the house for assaulting the wife. Of course, before the Court he denied the statement and he was confronted with the statement under section 145. Evidence Act and that was marked as Ext. PI. That also was affirmed by the Investigating Officer. 43. PW 3 also stated that when his sister was assaulted, he requested to the neighbour to prevent it. He also stated that Anil had some illicit connection with a girl in Chandimura and he further deposed that accused Anil had some illicit connection with the sister of Sankar Das. He also deposed that a girl from Kailashar was brought to Anil's house, ft was further stated that Anil used to take the girl to town (girl brought from Kailashar). He also deposed that his sister was not given food properly by Anil. 44. PW 4 a neighbour deposed that about a year preceding the date of occurence. he heard the cry of Anil's wife. He also deposed that about two months prior to the date of occurrence accused Anil brought two girls of the age group of 15 and 16 years from Kailashar. 44. PW 4 a neighbour deposed that about a year preceding the date of occurence. he heard the cry of Anil's wife. He also deposed that about two months prior to the date of occurrence accused Anil brought two girls of the age group of 15 and 16 years from Kailashar. These two girls staved in the house of Anil for about two months and after two days after their departure, the occurrence took place. It was suggested to him that he did not state before the 10 that Anil Paul brought two girls from Kailashar and they stayed in their house for about two months. As a matter of fact, such statement was not found under section 161. 45. PW 5 the other brother also deposed regarding ill treatment to Anil's wife and about the illicit connection of Anil with the girls. It was further stated by him that accused Anil again started torturing his wife after the arrival of these girls and his gesture with the girls were indecent. 46. PW 7 another resident of the village also stated that Anil's wife made some complaints to him about the ill treatment of Anil Paul to his wife. He also told that the deceased told him that she was not getting proper food and treatment and she was suffering from fever. 47. PW 9 also stated that about a month before the date of occurrence a young lady came to the house of accused person. Before the police he stated regarding torture but that was denied by him. He also stated before the police that mixing of Anil with the girl did not appear decent to him. Of course, he denied this statement before the Court. 48. PW 11 is a physician. He deposed that accused Anil's mother and his wife used to have altercation of words and on some occasion he used to intervene. 49. PW 7 a neighbour deposed that in the morning of the date of occurrence wife of accused Anil called his as he went to their house and asked him to inform her brother to send some quantity of Chira and few mangoes for her. She also told her that she was suffering from fever and she is not getting taste in the ordinary meals. 50. So. She also told her that she was suffering from fever and she is not getting taste in the ordinary meals. 50. So. all these evidences establish beyond reasonable doubt that the relationship between the Anil and his wife was not good. Anil's wife did not get proper food and treatment at his own house and on the date of death of the deceased, she was suffering from fever and was weak. 51. The only eye witness regarding the occurrence is PW 8. Milton Paul, the son of the deceased. He is a child witness and his deposition is short one and it is quoted below in its entirety for the proper appreciation of the case in hand. “(To understand as to whether he is capable of making the difference between truth and falsehood I put some questions to him and he gave the correct reply) Anil Paul is my father Accused Anil Paul in the dock has been identified as his father. My grandfather and my grandmother are also present in the accused dock. My mother is not alive. I cannot say how many years back died. After the death of my mother I have been living in the house of my maternal uncle. In accents interrupted by sobs the witness says my mother was lying on the bed. At that time my father strangulated my mother by her throat. My mother could not say anything. At that time I was in the hut. My father gave me threat. When my father pressed on the throat of my mother by his thumb and figures 1 entered into the hut. Then my father gave me a threat. So, 1 came out. When my father came out of the hut I again entered into the hut and I found my mother in a state of hanging. On seeing this I went to Haradhan Bhai and informed him of this. On getting the information from me HardhanBhai came. I addressed Hardhan as Haradhan Bhai. This Haradhan Bhai gave evidence today. Cross-examination : On the date of occurrence my maternal uncle took me to his house. After that day I did not come back to the house of my father. 1 narrated the occurrence to Darogababu. On getting the information from me HardhanBhai came. I addressed Hardhan as Haradhan Bhai. This Haradhan Bhai gave evidence today. Cross-examination : On the date of occurrence my maternal uncle took me to his house. After that day I did not come back to the house of my father. 1 narrated the occurrence to Darogababu. I cannot remember after how many days of the occurrence 1 made statement to 10.1 narrated the occurrence to Darogababu when I was in the house of my father at Harina Khala. I stated to the IO that when I entered into the hut I found my father strangulating my mother on her throat. (Attention drawn but such statement is not found in his 161 statement). It is not a fact that on being tutored by my maternal uncle I have given false evidence. I was a student of Baluyari School at the time when my mother died. I cannot remember if I stated to IO that on seeing the condition of my mother in a state of hanging. I went to Haradhan Bhai and informed him of this (attention drawn to his 161 statement but such statement is not found missing).” 52. It may be mentioned herein that on the date of deposition, the witness was aged about 9 years. 53. With regard to this witness the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant are as follows : (i) That he is a child witness and no conviction can be based on the deposition of such a child witness without corroboration. (ii) That there was contradiction and as such this witness is not reliable. (iii) That he is a tutored witness inasmuch as he is living with his maternal uncle on and from the date of occurrence. (iv) That even if it is not held to be contradiction, this is improvement/ embellishment and additions and as such it does not inspire confidence. 54. Regarding the first argument of the learned Advocate for the appellant that no conviction can be based on the deposition of the child witness. Regarding child witness, the learned counsel for the appellant places reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court. 55. Before we go to the decisions, let us have a look regarding competency of a child witness to testify. Section H8 of the Evidence Act provides who may testify. Regarding child witness, the learned counsel for the appellant places reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court. 55. Before we go to the decisions, let us have a look regarding competency of a child witness to testify. Section H8 of the Evidence Act provides who may testify. Under section 118 all persons are competent to testify, unless the Court considers that by reason of tender years, extreme old age. disease or infirmity, they are inacapable of understanding the questions put to them and of giving rational answers. All grounds of incompetency have been swept away by this section, under which competency of witnesses is the rule and their incompetency is the exception. As to infancy, it is not so much the age as the capacity to understand which is the determining factor. No precise age limit can be given, as persons of the same age differ in mental growth and their ability to understand the question and give rational answers. The sole test is whether the witness has sufficient intelligence to depose or whether he can appreciate the duty of speaking the truth. 56. In the instant case as will be seen, the learned Sessions Judge allowing the witness Jo depose has satisfied himself on this count and the learned Sessions Judge has observed that he is capable of making the difference between the truth and falsehood and he put some questions to him and he gave the correct reply. So. this witness i.e. child witness, was competent to testify. 57. In order to give conviction it is not the law that there should be corroboration of a child's unsworn evidence in the form of sworn evidence from an independent witness. Other facts and circumstances may be taken into consideration to find out whether this evidence is correct and truthful. 58. Now let us take up the decisions cited by learned Advocate for the appellant: (i) AIR 1971 SC 1064 (Bharvad Bhikha Valu & others vs. State of Gujarat). That was a case where evidence of the child witness (aged about 14 years old) came up for consideration. The Supreme Court pointed out that the High Court adopted the correct approach in finding that though there were no infirmities of Khengar's evidence as it stood but in view of the fact that he was a young boy it would be prudent to seek corroboration of Khengar's evidence. The Supreme Court pointed out that the High Court adopted the correct approach in finding that though there were no infirmities of Khengar's evidence as it stood but in view of the fact that he was a young boy it would be prudent to seek corroboration of Khengar's evidence. The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed this appeal. (ii) Next case relied on is AIR 1981 SC 1122 (Suresh vs. State of UP). In this case in paragraphs 6 and 11 the Supreme Court pointed out inter alia as follows : “(a) We must confess that if the case were to rest solely on Sunil's uncorroborated testimony, we might have found it difficult to sustain the appellant's conviction. But there are unimpeachable and the most eloquent matters on the record which lend and unfailing assurance that Sunil is a witness of truth, not a witness of imagination as most children of that age generally are. (b) Coupled with these considerations is the fact that the basic evidence in the case is of a child of five who answered many vital questions with a nod of the head, one way or the other. A witness who, by reason of his immature understanding, was not administered oath and who was privileged, by reason of his years, not to make his answers in an intelligible and coherent manner is unsafe to be trusted wholesale. We cannot also overlook, what Shri LN Gupta highlighted, that Sunil's statement was recorded about 20 days later. There is valid reason for the delay, namely, his state of mind (he was a witness to the murder of his mother and an infant brother) and the state of his body (he was gagged as a result of which his clavicle was fractured). Children in the first place, mix up what they see with what they like to imagine to have seen and besides, a little tutoring is inevitable in their case in order to lend coherence and consistency to their disjoined thoughts which tend to stray. The extreme sentence cannot seek its main support from evidence of this kind which, even if true, is not safe enough to act upon for pulling out a life.” 59. The primary distinguishing fact in the case cited is that the child witness answered many vital question with a nod of the head, one way or the other. The extreme sentence cannot seek its main support from evidence of this kind which, even if true, is not safe enough to act upon for pulling out a life.” 59. The primary distinguishing fact in the case cited is that the child witness answered many vital question with a nod of the head, one way or the other. That is not the position in the case in hand. This child witness, in the case in hand, on the date of incident was school going boy. He understood the question and gave straight forward answers to them and even he started sobing during deposition. This witness is also absolutely bold and straight forward. Attention was drawn to his earlier statement made before the police and certain things which were not there were sought to be utilised as contradictions. That unfortunately is not the law. What is contradiction and how the statement under section 161 is to be utilised, that matter is no longer res integra in view of the decision of the Apex Court in AIR 1959 SC 1012 (Tahsildar Singh & another vs. State of UP). 60. Before we go to deal with this case, let us have a look at AIR 1973 SC 1409 (Ranbir & others vs. State of Punjab) wherein the Supreme Court pointed out that maxim 'falstis in uno falsus in omnibus' is not a sound rule to be applied in India. The Supreme Court further pointed out that the question of delay in examining a witness during investigation is material only if it is indicative and suggestive of some unfair practice by the investigating agency/officer for the purpose of introducing a got-up witness to falsely support the prosecution case. It is essential that the Investigating Officer should be asked specifically about the delay and the reasons therefor. Evidence of a witness does not become untrustworthy merely because he was examined after delay by the Investigating Officer. 61. In this particular case an argument was advanced that the statement of the child witness was recorded after sometime. But as pointed out by the Supreme Court, no question on this point was put to the Investigating Officer to explain regarding delay. Further, there was no unreasonable delay in recording the statement of this-witness. On both these grounds, the objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant shall stand rejected. 62. But as pointed out by the Supreme Court, no question on this point was put to the Investigating Officer to explain regarding delay. Further, there was no unreasonable delay in recording the statement of this-witness. On both these grounds, the objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant shall stand rejected. 62. In AIR 1993 SC 2275 (Baby Kandayanathil vs. State of Kerala), the Apex Court pointed out that when the presence of a child at the place of occurrence is not denied and when the evidence is recorded after putting them preliminary question and satisfying that they were answering it intelligently and fearlessly and when the child witness gives all the details of the occurrence and withstand the test of cross examination their evidence is acceptable. 63. The Supreme Court in AIR 1973 SC 2622 (Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade & another vs. State of Maharashtra) in paragraph 6 has struck a note of caution regarding the approach to be adopted in a criminal trial, that is quoted below : “Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a necessary social perspective in criminal cases which suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the contemporary context of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has a public accoutability. The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs from the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace even1 hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilt}' men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will then break down and lose credibility with the community. The evil of acquitting a guilt}' person light-heartedly as a learned author has sapiently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just one guilt}7 person has gone unpunished. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will then break down and lose credibility with the community. The evil of acquitting a guilt}' person light-heartedly as a learned author has sapiently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just one guilt}7 person has gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against indicated 'persons' and more severe punishment of those who are found guilty. Thus too frequently acquittals of the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that “a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent....” In short our jurispnidential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocent.” 64. Next case relied on by the learned Advocate for the appellant is AIR 1994 SC 454 (Chhagan Dame vs. State of Gujarat). That was a case where the accused was alleged to have caused death of his wife by stabbing because of some illicit relationship of the accused No. 1 with accused No.2. In that case the Supreme Court on consideration of the materials on record came to the finding that the child witness was tutored and was under the influence of police and was made to adhere the statement made earlier to the police and it was further found that the witness was under the influence of the police and the possibility of tutoring cannot be excluded. The same is not the case here. There is not a suggestion even in the instant case that the child was under the influence of the police and tutoring was also not established. All the cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant do not help him. 65. The same is not the case here. There is not a suggestion even in the instant case that the child was under the influence of the police and tutoring was also not established. All the cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant do not help him. 65. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, regarding appreciation of the evidence of child witness, relies on the following decisions : (i) AIR 1987 SC 1328 (Dalbir Singh & others vs. State of Punjab) wherein in paragraph 15 it is pointed out by the Apex Court that no hard and fast rule can be laid down about the appreciation of evidence. It is after all a question of fact and each case has to be decided on the facts as they stand in the particular case. 66. Next, let us take up the question of contradiction as urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. He submits that the statement made by the PW 8 before the Court regarding the death of deceased by strangulation and hanging was not made before the police under section 161 and as such it is contradiction. This submission of learned counsel cannot be accepted in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in AIR 1959 SC 1012 (supra) wherein the majority of the Apex Court pointed out what is contradictions and what is the scope of section 162 of the CrPC. In paragraph 19, 20 and 25. the Supreme Court pointed out what is contradiction: “19. 'Contradict' according to the Oxford Dictionary means to affirm to the contrary. Section 145 of the Evidence Act indicates the manner in which contradiction is brought out. The cross examining counsel shall put the part or parts of the statement which affirms the contrary to what is stated in evidence. This indicates that there is something in writing which can be set against another statement made in evidence. If the statement before the police officer in the sense we have indicated and the statement in the evidence before the Court are so inconsistent or irreconcilable with each other that both of them cannot co-exist, it may be said that one contradicts the other. 20. It is broadly contended that a statement includes all omissions which are material and are such as witness is expected to say in the normal course. 20. It is broadly contended that a statement includes all omissions which are material and are such as witness is expected to say in the normal course. This contention ignores the intention of the legislature expressed in section 162 of the Code and the nature of the non-evidentiary value of such a statement, except for the limited purpose of contradiction. Unrecorded statement is completely excluded. But recorded one is used for a specified purpose. The record of a statement, however perfunctory, is assumed to give a sufficient guarantee to the correctness of the statement made, but if words not recorded are brought in by some fiction, the object of the section would be defeated. By that process, if a part of a statement is recorded, what was not stated could go in on the sly in the name of contradiction, whereas if the entire statement was not recorded, it would be excluded. By doing so, we would be circumventing the section by ignoring the only safeguard imposed by the legislature, viz. that the statement should have been recorded. 25. It is not necessary to multiply cases. The two conflicting views may be briefly stated thus : (i) omissions, unless by necessary implication be deemed to be part of the statement, cannot be used to contradict the statement made in the witness-box; and (ii) they must be in regard to important features of the incident which are expected to-be included in the statement made before the police. The first proposition not only carries out the intention of the legislature but is also in accord with the plain meaning of the words used in the section. The second proposition not only stretches the meaning of the word 'statement' to a breaking point, but also introduces an uncertain element, namely, ascertainment of what a particular witness would have stated in the circumstances of a particular case and what the police officer should have recorded. When the section says that the statement is to be used to contradict the subsequent version in the witness box, the proposition brings in, by construction, what he would have stated to the police within the meaning of the word' statement'. Such a construction is not permissible.” 67. The same is the case in AIR 1963 Assam 151 (State vs. Md. Such a construction is not permissible.” 67. The same is the case in AIR 1963 Assam 151 (State vs. Md. Misir Ali & others) where the Division Bench of this Court in paragraph 15, 16 and 17 law has been laid down as follows : “15. Before we conclude this judgment it is necessary to point out that an unfortunate practice still continues in the subordinate Courts of placing much importance on mere omissions from the statements made by prosecution witnesses to the police during investigation. Strictly according to law an omission cannot be-regarded or proved as a contradiction, firstly because there is no diction in the case of an omission, because an omission implies absence of diction, and secondly because section 162. Criminal Procedure Code permits the limited use of a statement made to the police, and what is permitted to be used is a portion of that statement which is found to be contradictor}' to the evidence given in the Court. Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code thus only permits the statement made to the police officers to be used for that limited purpose, and not the statements not made during the police investigation. Again, an omission cannot be proved as a contradiction, because section 145 of the Evidence Act which is the section dealing with the procedure to prove a contradiction, deals with statements in writing, and requires the portion of the writing which is sought to be used for contradiction to be brought to the notice of the witness and the witness being questioned about it. For that reason again, an omission in a previous statement cannot be used for the purpose of contradiction under section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. Hence, what is not found in a police statement under section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be used under that seciion. nor can the same be proved under section 145 of the Evidence Act. 16. We should not, however, be understood as stating that in no case could a serious and glaring omission from a police statement be relied on. It may not be relied on as a contradiction as such, but it may be relied on as a relevant circumstance. nor can the same be proved under section 145 of the Evidence Act. 16. We should not, however, be understood as stating that in no case could a serious and glaring omission from a police statement be relied on. It may not be relied on as a contradiction as such, but it may be relied on as a relevant circumstance. To give an example, if a witness stated on oath before the Court trying a murder charge, that A, B and C attacked and caused the death of the deceased, and before the police he only stated that A and B did the murderous assault, that circumstance may be brought out not as a contradiction under section 145 of the Evidence Act but as something having an effect somewhat similar to a contradiction, in that a different case, as it were, is put forward by the witness for the prosecution, disclosing perhaps an attempt to improve or develop the prosecution case, which thus may have the effect of casting a doubt on the prosecution case as put forward before the Court, and also on the veracity of the witness, at least to the extent of his implicating C. 17. We also regret to note that the procedure to be followed in the case of proving the contradictions appearing in the statements made by prosecution witnesses to the police during investigation, is not being followed by subordinate Courts, as well as by the counsel appearing in criminal cases. We had occasion to point out the correct procedure more than once and it would be worth while restating it. If it is intended by an accused to contradict the evidence given by a prosecution witness at the trial, with a statement made by him before the police during the investigation, the correct thing to do is to draw the attention of the witness to that part of the contradictory statement, which he made before the police, and question him whether he did in fact make that statement. If the witness admits having made the particular statement to the police, that admission will go into evidence and will be recorded as part of the evidence of the witness and can be relied on by the accused as establishing the contradiction. If the witness admits having made the particular statement to the police, that admission will go into evidence and will be recorded as part of the evidence of the witness and can be relied on by the accused as establishing the contradiction. If, on the other hand, the witness denies having made such a statement before the police, the particular portion of the statement recorded under section 162 Criminal Procedure Code should be provisionally marked for identification, and when the Investigating Officer who had actually recorded the statement in question, comes into the witness box, he should be questioned as to whether that particular statement had been made to him during the investigation, by the particular witness, and obviously after refreshing his memory from the Police Case Diary the Investigating Officer would make his answer in the affirmative. The answer of the Investigating Officer would prove the statement which is then exhibited in the case and will go into evidence, and may. therefore, be relied on by the accused as a contradiction. This is the only correct procedure to be followed, which would be in conformity with section 145 of the Evidence Act.” 68. To the same effect is a decision in AIR 1962 Allahabad 582 (State of UP vs. Joti Prasad) wherein paragraph 19 the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court pointed out as follows : “The evidence of Radhey Lai was disbelieved also on the ground that he did not state under section 161, CrPC that he had seen the Niamavali with Raja Ram. Radhey Lai stated that if the Investigating Officer had not asked him he may not have stated that he had seen Niamavali with Raja Ram. We see no adequate ground to disbelieve Radhey Lai A statement under section 161 CrPC is generally brief and the Investigating Officer not having a complete picture of the occurrence asks a witness only what he considers necessary at that stage. An omission of such a nature is not a contradiction under section 162 CrPC. It was held in Tahsildar Singh vs.. State of UP, AIR 1959 SC 1012 , that the contradiction under section 162, should be between what a witness asserted in the witness box and what he stated before the police officer and not between what he said he had not stated before the police officer and what he actually stated before him. State of UP, AIR 1959 SC 1012 , that the contradiction under section 162, should be between what a witness asserted in the witness box and what he stated before the police officer and not between what he said he had not stated before the police officer and what he actually stated before him. It was further held that the doctrine of recital by necessary implication, the concept of the negative or positive aspect of the same recital and the principle of inherent repugnancy may in one sense rest on omission but by construction the said omission must be deemed to be part of the statement in writing. Such omissions are not really omissions strictly so called and the statement must be deemed to contain them by implication.” 69. The submissions of the learned Advocate for the appellant that these are contradictions cannot be accepted. At best they may be omissions and imporvement and what will be the impact of such omissions and improvement, that decided in a number of cases by the Apex Court. In AIR 1959 SC 1012 (supra) the Supreme Court pointed out that omissions cannot be used for contradictions unless they can be deemed to be by necessary implication to be part of the statement. Further, the statement of the witness to the police is not substantive evidence and the effect of contradictions is to find out whether it makes its evidence before the Court unreliable. 70. In AIR 1987 SC 923 (Eqbal Baig vs. State of Andhra Pradesh) the Supreme Court pointed out that failure of a witness to name a person earlier will not if so-facto wipe out the evidence in Court. 71. In AIR 1983 SC 126 (Maqsooden & others vs. State of UP)the Supreme Court pointed out that improvements made by witnesses and variations in their earlier and latter statements not by itself sufficient to hold their testimony to be infirm. 72. In 1990 (Supp) SCC 275 (Smti Dharamwati vs. Jaibir & another) the Supreme Court pointed out that where the trial Court places reliance on a child witness (in that case 8 years old daughter of the deceased) having watched her demeanour concluding that she could not be a tutored witness, the High Court should not have rejected her testimony merely on the ground that she was a child witness and could be easily tutored. In the case in hand also it was the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that PW 8 though was a child witness is in a position to understand that thing and it was further accepted by the learned Sessions Judge that there were no tutoring. 73. In AIR 1988 SC 1998 (State of UP vs. Anil Singh) in paragraph 15, the Supreme Court relying on the earlier Privy Council decision in AIR 1919 PC 157 pointed out as follows : “It is also out experience that invariably the witnesses add embroidery to prosecution story, perhaps for the fear of being disbelieved. But that is no ground to throw the case overboard, if true, in the main. If there is a ring of truth in the main, the case should not be rejected. It is the duty of the Court to call out the nuggets of truth from the evidence unless there is reason to believe that the inconsistence of falsehood are so glaring as utterly to destroy confidence in the witnesses. It is necessary to remember that a Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. One is as important as the other. Both are public duties which the Judge has to perform.” 74. So, we find that the evidence of PW 8 has ring of truth and this evidence cannot be discarded on the grounds as urged the learned counsel for the appellant. In this particular case, a large number of witnesses have been declared hostile. Section 154 of the Evidence Act provides for hostile witness and it further provides that the evidence of hostile witness cannot be washed off altogether. The Court may after reading and considering the evidence as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of other evidence on the record, that part of his statement which is creditworthy. There is no legal bar to have a conviction upon his testimony if corroborated by other reliable evidence. It is in that light that we must examine the evidence of PW 6 the other child witness. There is no legal bar to have a conviction upon his testimony if corroborated by other reliable evidence. It is in that light that we must examine the evidence of PW 6 the other child witness. Her statement is that on the date of occurrence, she came to the house of accused and found the wife of accused Anil Paul in the state of hanging and saw Anil tying the body. In addition to this there are certain circumstances in this case which also must be taken into consideration. 75. The law is that when the inference of guilt of an accused person is to be drawn from circumstantial evidence only, those circumstances must in the first place be cogently established. Further, those circumstances should be of a definite tendency tending towards guilt of the accused and in their totality, must unerringly lead to the conclusion that within all human probability, the offence was committed by the accused and none else. In the instant case the accused seen together in the last with the deceased and when the police suspected murder, he absconded. Regarding the accused being last seen together with the deceased, there are ample evidences on record. The admitted position is also this that the accused could not be arrested by the police for about 16 to 17 days as he was absconding. Regarding his absconding, PW 26 stated that he tried to trace out the accused but did not find him and he engaged some source for collecting the information of the accused. On his way to Police Station he went to the village in search of the accused, the accused was not available there. On 3.8.83, the police raided the house of the accused, Anil Paul but could not trace out him. On 5.8.83 a Radio message was sent to arrest the accused. Anil Paul so that he may be traced out. Thereafter, for all these days attempts were made but he was not found. Only on 18.8.83 at about 7.45 PM the accused, Anil Paul surrendered before the police. This also was put to the witness in question No.65 and 66 and he made a mechanical statement that it is false but there is no explanation as to why he was absent from his house on and from 31.7.83 to 18.8.83. Only on 18.8.83 at about 7.45 PM the accused, Anil Paul surrendered before the police. This also was put to the witness in question No.65 and 66 and he made a mechanical statement that it is false but there is no explanation as to why he was absent from his house on and from 31.7.83 to 18.8.83. The accused, Anil Paul left the house just after the dead body was brought down and thereafter he was not available till 18.8.83 and no explanation is forthcoming with regard to the absence of accused, Anil Paul for this period though it was specifically put to him in his examination under section 313 CrPC. The other circumstances is strained relationship between the appellant and the deceased and there is the evidence that he (Anil Paul) used to torture the deceased, Jyoti Rani Paul. This aspect of the matter has already been discussed. 76. The explanation given by the accused that he went to Thana (police station) to lodge a report as urged by the other members of his family is also not borne out by the evidence on record as the other accused persons categorically stated in their statement under section 313 CrPC that they were not present in the house. So, he on his own went to the police station to inform and he, accused, even did not make any endeavour to save the life of his wife, that is against the norms of human behaviour inasmuch as if some near and dear one is found to be hanging, the first attempt will be to raise hue and cry and make an attempt to save the life of the person by bringing the hanging person down but even that was not done in the instant case. So, taking into consideration the evidence on record as well as circumstantial evidence as indicated above, we come to the conclusion that it is the accused who killed the deceased, Jyotirani by strangulation or throttling. Accordingly, we hold him guilty under section 302 IPC. 77, The next question is that whether the accused is guilty under section 201 of the IPC. Accordingly, we hold him guilty under section 302 IPC. 77, The next question is that whether the accused is guilty under section 201 of the IPC. We have already held that the accused caused murder of Jyotirani and thereafter in order to cause disappearance of the evidence of murder and/or to screen himself, he lodged a false ezahar Ext P10 and as such he, accused Anil Paul, is also guilty under section 201 IPC. 78. Before we part with the record, it will be proper to mention another argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The question of benefit of doubt can arise where two possibility, one of commission and other innocence is reasonably possible. The reasonable doubt should be a real and substantial one and well founded actual doubt arising out of the evidence existing after consideration of all the evidence. That is not the position in the instant case. Accordingly, this submission of learned counsel for the appellant shall also stand rejected. 79. Accordingly, there is no merit in this criminal appeal and the same is dismissed. The bail bond of Anil Paul shall stand cancelled and the accused shall be immediately rearrested and put in jail to undergo the sentence.