Judgment :- 1. The petitioner prays for the issue of Writ of certiorari to call for the records in G.O.Ms. No. 2523 dated 8.9.86 on the file of the Government of Tamilnadu (Home AC.I) Department and also the records relating to K.Dis. 4779/85/A7 dated 5.5.86 of the Sub Collector and Accommodation Controller, Coimbatore and to quash the same. 2. The petitioner is the owner of premises bearing door No. 10/27, Doddarayan Koil Street, Coimbatore, which is under the tenancy of the Government on a monthly rent of Rs. 120/-. The tenancy is for residential purpose and the tenancy is according to the English calendar month. The Government has allotted the premises to the 3rd respondent, Inspector of Police. The petitioner filed an application under Sec. 12(1)(b) of the Tamilnadu Act 18 of 1960 before the 1st respondent for an order directing the allottee to deliver possession of the building to the landlord on the ground that the writ petitioner/landlady bona fide requires the same for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction. Though the averment was made that the 3rd respondent has since been transferred and on that ground the request was made for release of the property, the same has not been pressed. According to the petitioner, she has applied for demolition and reconstruction, that necessary planning permission has been obtained, that building construction plan has been obtained, that the Commissioner, Coimbatore Corporation has renewed the licence from time to time, that the building is more than 60 years old and in a dilapidated condition, that the building is necessary for demolition and reconstruction to develop the business run in partnership, that the building is a country-tiled one and the rafters are made of coconut trees, that the existing structure is a source of danger to the occupants thereon and that she is entitled to an order directing the allottee to deliver possession. The 1st respondent passed an order on 5.5.86 rejecting the application. 3. As against the orders of the 1st respondent, an appeal was preferred before the 2nd respondent, who had concurred with the orders of the 1st respondent and dismissed the appeal by G.O.Ms. No. 2523 (Home AC.I) Department dated 8.9.86. Being aggrieved by the rejection by the 1st respondent, as confirmed by the 2nd respondent, this writ petition has been filed on 3.2.86. 4. No. 2523 (Home AC.I) Department dated 8.9.86. Being aggrieved by the rejection by the 1st respondent, as confirmed by the 2nd respondent, this writ petition has been filed on 3.2.86. 4. On behalf of the respondents, the 1st respondent has filed a counter. The Writ petition was taken up for hearing on 7.2.97 as well as on 10.2.97. Detailed arguments were advanced by Mr. N.V. Nagasubramaniam appearing for Mr. Venkatasamy, Advocate, as well as Mr. M. Govindarajan, Government Advocate appearing for respondents 1 and 2. The other respondents did not appear, though they have already been served in the main writ petition. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the proceedings of the 1st respondent, as confirmed by the 2nd respondent are vitiated by illegalities, suffer with error apparent on the face of the record and they are liable to be quashed. It is further contended that the respondents have misconstrued the scope and purport of Sec. 12(1)(b) and this misconception had resulted in miscarriage of justice. The learned counsel further contended that Sec. 12(1)(b) is identical in all respects to Sec. 14(1)(b) and that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the latest pronouncement reported in AIR 1997 SC 47 = 1997-1-L.W. 218 Vijay Singh etc. v. Vijayalakshmi Ammal applies even in respect of application filed under Sec. 12(1)(b) of the Act. Applying the law laid down by the Apex Court, it is contended by the learned counsel that the entire orders of the respondents are vitiated as they have not decided the application in the manner required and as provided for in Sec. 12(1)(b) of the Act. It was also contended that a report has been called for from the PWD Engineer, whose inspection has not been disclosed to the petitioner and whose report was also not disclosed, which is in violation of natural justice. 6. Sec. 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 provides for recovery of possession by landlord for demolition and reconstruction against tenants. Sec. 14(1)(b) of the Act reads thus: 14(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, but subject to the provisions of Secs. 6. Sec. 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 provides for recovery of possession by landlord for demolition and reconstruction against tenants. Sec. 14(1)(b) of the Act reads thus: 14(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, but subject to the provisions of Secs. 12 and 13, on an application made by a landlord, the Controller shall, if he is satisfied- (b) that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished, pass an order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building to the landlord before a specified date.” This provision is applicable to private tenancies in respect of which the Government is not deemed to be a tenant. In respect of premises of which the Government is deemed to be a tenant, Sec. 12(1) (b) is the provision, where the recovery of possession by landlord for demolition and reconstruction is provided for Sec. 12(1)(b) of the Act reads thus: “12. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act. on an application made by a landlord of a building in respect of which the Government shall be deemed to be the tenant, the authorised officer shall, if he is satisfied- .. (b) that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished, pass an order directing the allottee to deliver possession of the building to the landlord before a specified date.” 7. On a comparison of said two provisions, I do not find any difference at all. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in respect of Sec. 14(1)(b) will also squarely apply to Sec. 12(1)(b) as well and that there cannot be a different interpretation or different legal position in respect of Sec. 12(1)(b). It is essential to set out the law laid down by the Apex Court with respect to Sec. 14(1)(b). The Full Bench decision of the Apex Court in Vijay Singh ., v. Vijayalakshmi Ammal reported in 1996 (II) CTC 586= 1997-1-L.W. 218 had been rightly relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is essential to set out the law laid down by the Apex Court with respect to Sec. 14(1)(b). The Full Bench decision of the Apex Court in Vijay Singh ., v. Vijayalakshmi Ammal reported in 1996 (II) CTC 586= 1997-1-L.W. 218 had been rightly relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The Full Bench had occasion to consider the earlier pronouncement of the Apex Court in Metalware & Co. , v. Bansilal Sharma & Co. , ( 1979(3) SCC 398 = (1979) 92 L.W. 38 S.N, P. ORR & Sons (P) Ltd. , v. Associated Publishers (Madras) Limited ( 1991 (1) SCC 301 ) = 1991-2-L.W. 547, and the decisions of the High Court in R.P. David v. N. Daniel (1976 (1) MLJ 110), Mehboob Basha . v. M. Manga Devi ( 1965 (2) MLJ 209 ), K.J. Sivaligam . v. S. Guruswamy ( 1983 (2) MLJ 85 = 96 L.W. 114) and K. Ramachandra Rao . v. Krishnaswami Iyengar ( 1976(1) MLJ 267 = 89 L.W. 127). 8. After consideration of entire case law, the Apex Court had held thus: “On reading Sec. 14(1)(b) along with Sec. 16, it can be said that for eviction of a tenant on the ground of demolition of the building for erecting a new building, the building need not be dilapidated or dangerous for human habitation. If that was the requirement there is no occasion to put a condition to demolish within a specified time, and to erect a new building on the same site. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 16 contemplates that permission had been granted by the Rent Controller under Sec. 14 (1)(b) for demolition of the building, but if such demolition is not carried out in terms of the order and undertaking, then Rent Controller can order the landlord to put the tenant in possession of the building on the original terms and conditions. If the building is dangerous and dilapidated requiring immediate demolition for ‘safety’, then there is no question of “Rent Controller” directing landlord to put the tenant in possession of such building on the original terms and conditions, on account of the failure of t he landlord to commence the demolition within the period prescribed. If the building is dangerous and dilapidated requiring immediate demolition for ‘safety’, then there is no question of “Rent Controller” directing landlord to put the tenant in possession of such building on the original terms and conditions, on account of the failure of t he landlord to commence the demolition within the period prescribed. Similarly, there was no occasion to link the demolition of such building with erection of new building and then to give the landlord freedom from the restrictive provisions of the Act for a period of five years from the date on which the construction of such new building is completed and notified to the local authorities concerned. In this background, it has to be held that neither of the extreme position taken by the respondent or the appellants can be accepted. Permission under Sec. 14(1)(b) cannot be granted by the Rent Controller on mere asking of the landlord that he proposes to immediately demolish the building in question to erect a new building. At the same time it is difficulty to accept the stand of the appellants that the building must be dilapidated and dangerous, unfit for human habitation. For granting permission under Sec. 14(1)(b), the Rent Controller is expected to consider all relevant materials for recording a finding whether the requirement of the landlord for demolition of the building and erection of a new building on the same site is bona fide or not. For recording a finding that requirement for demolition was bona fide , the Rent Controller has to take into account: (1) bona fide intention of the landlord far from the sole object only to get rid of the tenants; (2) the age and condition of the building; (3) the financial position of the landlord to demolish and erect a new building according to the statutory requirements of the Act. These are some of the illustrative factors which has to be taken into consideration before an order is passed under Sec. 14(1)(b). No Court can fix any limit in respect of the age and condition of the building. That factor has to be taken into consideration along with other facts and then a conclusion one way or the other has to be arrived at by the Rent Controller”. 9. No Court can fix any limit in respect of the age and condition of the building. That factor has to be taken into consideration along with other facts and then a conclusion one way or the other has to be arrived at by the Rent Controller”. 9. In my considered view, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in respect of Sec. 14(1)(b) will also squarely apply to the buildings with respect to which the Government is deemed to be a tenant under Sec. 12(1)(b) of the Act. All applications filed under Sec. 12(1)(b) of the Act have to be decided by the 1st respondent in terms of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, though they arise out of proceedings under section 14(1)(b). The provisions are in pari materia and there is no difference at all. Taking into consideration the provisions of the Act, it is essential for the 1st respondent, who is the authority under Sec. 12(1)(b) of the Act to take into consideration (1) bonafide intention of the landlord far from the sole object only to get rid of the tenants; (2) the age and condition of the building; (3) the financial position of the landlord to demolish and erect a new building according to the statutory requirements of the Act and these are some of the illustrative factors which have to be taken into consideration before an order is passed under Sec. 12(1)(b) of the Act. In the light of the said decision of the Supreme Court, the legality of the order passed by the 1st respondent, as confirmed by the second respondent is to be considered. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the 1st respondent had merely assumed that the building is in sound condition, which conclusion is solely based on the report of the Executive Engineer, PWD, Coimbatore. The 1st respondent had not applied the tests and had not even applied its mind to the requirement of the landlady and her entitlement for demolition and reconstruction of the premises under Sec. 12(1)(b). The reason that the landlady had not given an undertaking, in my view is of little consequence, as such undertaking could be given at a later point either pending the proceedings or pending the appeal. In this respect the 1st respondent had not drawn the attention of the writ petitioner about the requirement. The reason that the landlady had not given an undertaking, in my view is of little consequence, as such undertaking could be given at a later point either pending the proceedings or pending the appeal. In this respect the 1st respondent had not drawn the attention of the writ petitioner about the requirement. Further no particular Form has been provided for in this respect. However at the appellate stage, the petitioner has given an undertaking which is sufficient for all purposes and this will satisfy the statutory requirement. The 1st respondent has assumed that the building is not ripe for demolition and that it is in good condition. This conclusion has been arrived at based on the report submitted by the Executive Engineer, PWD, Coimbatore. The direction issued by the first respondent is not disclosed to the petitioner, nor the petitioner could be present at the time of inspection nor the report of the Engineer has been indicated or disclosed to the petitioner. This material has been collected behind the back of the petitioner and had been put against the petitioner. The report of the PWD Engineer has also not been placed before the Court. 11. The Appellate Authority also had taken into consideration the report of the Executive Engineer while rejecting the appeal as the main reason. The respondents have proceeded as if the building is sound and it is fit for occupation while forgetting the fact that it is a tiled building more than sixty years of age. The 1st respondent proceeded as if there is no rule which provides for inspection in the presence of the landlord it is elementary principle that the inspection by the P.W.D. Engineer to find out the structural soundness of the building by the Executive Engineer, P.W.D., concerned should have been conducted in the presence of the landlord. This in my view is not the correct legal position. Obviously, such a view is in violation of principles of Audi Alteram Partem. The material which is sought to be used against the petitioner should be collected in the presence of the petitioner or with notice to the petitioner or at least disclosed to the petitioner/landlady. 12. The further objection is that the proposed construction is required to be used by the landladys nephews son, who was at that time studying in Medical College in Andra Pradesh. 12. The further objection is that the proposed construction is required to be used by the landladys nephews son, who was at that time studying in Medical College in Andra Pradesh. In my view this is not relevant nor it has any bearing with respect to claim under Sec. 12(1)(b). The purpose for which the proposed construction may be used is not a relevant consideration, much less significantly. The proposed new construction will not definitely fall within the purview of the Act in view of the statutory exemption. 13. In terms of Sec. 13(1) where the landlord fails to demolish any material portion of the building or fails to commence demolition within a period of one month in accordance with the undertaking given under clause (b) of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 12, the authorised officer in this case, the 1st respondent, may re-allot the building to another person after issue of notice as prescribed under Sec. 13 of the Act. Thus, there is sufficient safeguard which provision is also identical to Sec. 16 of the Act. 14. On a consideration of the entire order passed by the 1st respondent, as confirmed by the 2nd respondent this Court is of the view that the respondents 1 and 2 have not decided the application for demolition and re-construction filed by the writ petitioner in the manner required by law and in terms of the statutory provisions of the Act and have committed serious illegality in rejecting the application. Absolutely, there has been no advertence or consideration of the relevant factors which require to be decided in respect of this application filed under Sec. 12(1)(b) of the Act by the respondents. The respondents have not taken into consideration the age of the building, the nature of the construction, location of the construction, extent of return which the petitioner gets from the property as on date by way of rent, the capacity of the writ petitioner to demolish and reconstruct as well the bona fides of the writ petitioner. Those aspects are definitely material and relevant and there has been no application of mind by the respondents with respect to these aspects and consequently this Court has no other alternative except to quash the impugned proceedings and issue further directions. Those aspects are definitely material and relevant and there has been no application of mind by the respondents with respect to these aspects and consequently this Court has no other alternative except to quash the impugned proceedings and issue further directions. In the circumstances, this Court allows the writ petition, quashing the impugned order passed by the 1st respondent, as confirmed by the 2nd respondent and remand the matter to the 1st respondent for de novo proceedings. 15. It is needless to state that the 1st respondent shall issue necessary notice and it is open to the writ petitioner to make further representations or place such materials as may be required to substantiate her claim, according the law laid down by the Supreme Court reported in Vijay Singh v. Vijayalakshmi Ammal (AIR 1997 SC 47). The 1st respondent shall also provide sufficient opportunity of hearing before passing orders. Besides that, also if necessary, inspect the premises in person or at the instance of the writ petitioner to direct an expert to inspect the premises and submit his report. 16. The matter has been pending from 1984 onwards. The property is located in the heart of the Coimbatore city. In the interests of justice, it is essential that the application of the writ petitioner should be taken up and disposed of without further delay. The 1st respondent is directed to conclude the de novo proceedings and pass orders within a period of six months from today. 17. The writ petition is allowed. No costs.