Judgment P. K. Sarkar, J. 1. This Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 22-9-1990 passed in m. T. A. No.6/45 of 1981/87 by the 2nd additional District Judge, Begusarai. 2. The appellants were defendants in the original title suit, which was filed by the plaintiff-respondents for declaration of their title and recovery of possession over the suit land described in the Schedule of the plaint. 3. The matter was heard by the learned Munsif, First Court, Begusarai, who dismissed the suit, as according to him, the plaintiff failed to prove that they have any subsisting title over the suit land. The plaintiffs thereafter filed an appeal bearing TA. No.6/45 of 1981/87 before the District Judge, begusarai, which was heard by the 2nd additional District Judge, Begusarai, and the said Court in the impugned judgment dated 22-9-1990 has found the plaintiffs claim true and reversed the judgment of the trial court and also directed the defendants to deliver possession to the plaintiffs within two months from the date of the decree, failing which the plaintiffs will be entitled to take possession through the process of Court. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order this Second Appeal has been filed. 4. This Second Appeal was admitted on the limited question of law as to whether even though, there was no issue pressed before the trial court in regard to the acquisition of title of the plaintiffs by an adverse possession, the court of appeal below was correct in holding that the plaintiffs acquired title to the land in question by an adverse possession. Thus this Second Appeal is limited to the aforesaid extent. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that from both the judgments of the trial court and also the lower appellate court it will appear that no specific issue of the fact whether the plaintiffs acquired title by adverse possession, has been framed. It is further submitted that the plaintiffs also did not make any specific plea of acquiring title by adverse possession in the plaint. Thus this finding of the learned appellate court and also basing his order mainly on the aforesaid fact (adverse possession) is illegal and deserves to be set aside. 6. It is further submitted that the plaintiffs also did not make any specific plea of acquiring title by adverse possession in the plaint. Thus this finding of the learned appellate court and also basing his order mainly on the aforesaid fact (adverse possession) is illegal and deserves to be set aside. 6. In order to appreciate the points in issue the brief facts of the cases of the respective parties can be stated below: the plaintiffs contended that the suit land was originally belonged to and as in possession of Biro Mian and the same was recorded in his name in the survey Khatiyan. Shaikh Auwal, son of biro Mian came in possession of the suit land after death of his father. There was arrears of rent against him for the land in suit and, therefore, the landlord, namely, Babu Jogesh Prasad and others filed rent suit against him and obtained decree against him. Thereafter the landlord got the land sold in Execution case No.812 of 1920 and purchased the two plots, himself on 24-4-1921 and got delivery of possession. Later on Shri jugeshwar Prasad settled the aforesaid two plots in favour of the plaintiffs through the registered deed dated 19-1-1938 and from that date the plaintiffs are coming in possession over the suit land. 7. At the time of vesting of zamindari the names of the plaintiffs were given in the jamabandi return by the landlord and, accordingly, Register-II was prepared in the name of the plaintiffs and they are paying rent. It is further submitted that the plaintiffs have constructed one well for irrigational purposes and also planted several trees and constructed boundary wall. 8. Further case of the plaintiffs is that in the year 1957 one Jangali Sahu started laying claim over this land and a proceeding under Sec.144 of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (here in after to be called as "the Code")was started. That case was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs on 3-1-1957 and two plots were amalgamated on the spot for cultivation. The plaintiffs have also partitioned the suit land and the plaintiff No.1 got half from north and plaintiff No.2 got the other half from south, though there was no partition by metes and bounds. It is further stated that the defendants got executed one Kebala of this land from a fictitious person. The said Kebala was thus forged and fabricated. The plaintiffs have also partitioned the suit land and the plaintiff No.1 got half from north and plaintiff No.2 got the other half from south, though there was no partition by metes and bounds. It is further stated that the defendants got executed one Kebala of this land from a fictitious person. The said Kebala was thus forged and fabricated. A proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code was started, which was later on converted into a proceeding under section 145 of the Code, in which the plaintiffs could not take steps to make pairvi, and on 31-10-1972 the aforesaid proceeding was decided in favour of the defendants and thus from this very date the defendants dispossessed the plaintiffs from the land in question. 9. The defendants case is that jugesh Prasad was never landlord of the suit land nor he got the land in question in auction sale nor he took delivery of possession. The land remained in possession of the raiyat. It is further stated that Sk. Tahir Hussain and Sk. Sikandar hussain sons of the Khatiyani Raiyat had sold the suit land to Sk. Aiyub through registered deed of sale dated 18-5-1907 and the purchaser came in possession. Sk. Aiyub sold the said land to the defendants through two Kebalas dated 16-9-1969 and the defendants came in possession over the same since then. It is also stated that the defendants planted the trees etc. which were destroyed. The plaintiffs never planted any tree nor came in possession and the proceeding under Sec.145 of the code was rightly decided in their favour. The defendants never dispossessed the plaintiffs and are themselves in continuous possession. 10. From the trial court judgment it will appear that the story of continuous possession of the defendants and other facts were accepted and the suit was dismissed. The judgment of the lower appellate court, on the other hand, shows that the learned appellate court has believed the story of possession of the plaintiffs and dispossession of the defendants up to the proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code and observed that the defendants have purchased nothing, but a bag of wind and litigation and being emboldend by the decision in the proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code they recently dispossessed the plaintiffs from the suit land. The lower appellate court also observed that even if it is presumed for a moment that the plaintiffs by that deed of settlement had acquired a defective title in the suit land, but they remained in possession for more than several 12 years from the date of execution of the deed of settlement till the date of dispossession openly, peacefully and continuously without any interruption and to the knowledge of all, including the defendants and their vendors and that they acquired a title to that land by adverse possession. 11. Now the point for consideration, therefore, is whether this finding of the learned lower appellate court can be upheld in view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants that no such issue has been framed nor there is any thing in the pleading to that extent. 12. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents submitted that from the plaintiffs case as mentioned in the trial court judgment it will appear that the plaintiffs have claimed that they are coming in possession of the suit land for several 12 years and hence they have acquired right by adverse possession also. She further submits that specific issue has also been framed in the trial court to the effect as to whether the title, possession and dispossession, as alleged by the plaintiffs are correct. 13. The learned counsel submits that it is true that specifically the words "adverse possession" have not been mentioned, but the words "title, possession and dispossession" will automatically include the fact of adverse possession also. The lower appellate court has considered the basic submissions of the parties and came to a conclusion on the fact of possession and title and alternatively observed that they have gained title by adverse possession also. Hence it cannot be said that the fact of adverse possession was not mentioned in the pleadings of the parties and is totally an alien element. 14. Mr. Bose, learned counsel for the appellants has placed a decision reported in the case of Chakuri Mallah and others V/s. Bhabhuti Mallah and others (B. B. C. J.1981 page 406) and submitted that in that case a Bench of this Court has observed that if any specific case of adverse possession is pleaded and if the trial Court has not given any finding there on, the lower appellate court is wrong in its finding to that effect. , 15. Smt. Seema Ali Khan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that the aforesaid case law is not applicable in this case in view of the fact that the fact of the present case and that of the aforesaid case are not similar. That case was a case of partition under the Hindu law between the members of the joint family property. Thus it will be presumed that the parties are in joint possession and unless there is specific plea based on the pleading to show that any of the parties was in exclusive possession of the properties to the knowledge of all the parties. The plea of adverse possession was not accepted in absence of specific pleadings in the plaint. In the instant case, the claim of the possession to the knowledge of the other party for several years has been claimed and thus this case is clearly distinguishable from the case cited above and cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case. 16. The learned counsel for the appellants also placed reliance on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of M/s. Sadi Ram Ganga Prasad v. Union of India (A. I. R.1982 Allahabad246 ). Where in it has held that there was no issue framed in the trial court regarding condition of the goods at the time of their booking and, therefore, the appellate court was not proper in dismissing the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had despatched the goods in good condition. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents submits that this fact of that case is also different from that of the present case and hence totally distinguishable from the aforesaid case. 17. In view of the facts and the circumstances mentioned above, I find that the plea of adverse possession is fully covered by Issue No.4 framed on the point of title, possession and dispossession. Since it is mentioned in the pleadings that the plaintiffs also acquired title by adverse possession, which is apparent from paragraph 5 of the judgment of the lower appellate court, and only because the trial court and/or the lower appellate court did not use the words "adverse possession" specifically, it can be held that no such plea was taken and hence in absence of such pleading the claim of the plaintiffs-respondents should be given a total go by. 18. 18. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, mentioned above, I do not find that there is any legal infirmity in the impugned judgment of the learned lower appellate court for which an interference is called for. 19. In the result the impugned judgment dated the 2nd September, 1990 passed by the lower appellate court is upheld and this Second Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal Dismissed.