This is an appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, against the Original Decree dated 30.12.87 passed by the Additional District Judge I, Manipur in Original Suit No.5/85/7/85. 2. The aforesaid original suit was filed by one Jamuna Prasad Jaiswal, plaintiff in the suit and respondent No. 1 in the present appeal, for a decree for possession of rooms described in Schedules D and E to the plaint by eviction of Saty anarayan Prasad Jaiswal and Shio Narayan Prasad Jaiswal, defendant Nos 1 and 2 in the suit and the appellants in the present appeal. The case as pleaded in the plaint is that Guru Dayal Ram Jaiswal was a Hindu governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law who died in the year 1934 leaving behind two sons Mukhlal Ram Jaiswal and Munilal Ram Jaiswal, the joint family of Guru Dayal Ram Jaiswal comprising of the aforesaid father and two sons owned several movable and immovable properties. After the death of Guru Dayal Ram Jaiswal, Mukhlal Ram Jaiswal became the Karta of the joint Hindu family consisting of himself, his brother Munilal Ram Jaiswal, his sons and his brother's sons. The only son of Munilal Ram Jaiswal was Baijnath Jaiswal who died as a bachelor in the year 1952 and the only daughter of Munilal Ram Jaiswal, Tara Devi got married and the widow of Munilal Ram Jaiswal, Janaki Devi expired in year 1981. Munilal Ram Jaiswal died in the year 1963 and on his death all his right, title and interest in all properties whether self-acquired or of the joint family property devolved on the surviving members of the said joint family and Mukhlal Ram Jaiswal became the Karta of the said joint Hindu family. Mukhlal Ram Jaiswal died on 24.3.76 leaving behind his fou'r sons Jamuna Prasad Jaiswal (plaintiff), Satyanarayan Prasad Jaiswal (defendant 1), Shio Narayan Prasad Jaiswal (defendant 2) and Ram Narayan Prasad Jaiswal who expired in the year 1980 and one daughter Rukmini Devi who got married in the year 1956, Ram Narayan Prasad Jaiswal had seven sons of whom Premohand Prasad (defendant 3) was the eldest and two daughters who were married. After the death of Mukhlal Ram Jaiswal, the family continued to be a joint Hindu family jointly owning and possessing the immovable properties mentioned in Schedule B to the plaint which were located and situated in different parts of the Manipur, Dimapur and Bihar. Practical difficulties, however arose in the management of the said properties by Jamuna Prasad Jaiswal as Karta of the said joint Hindu family and on 23.5.83 it was agreed to have a family settlement in respect of the properties mentioned in Schedule B to the plaint in order to preserve family peace and to keep the feeling of unity in the family. As per the said agreement, the plaintiff/respondent No. 1, Jamuna Prasad Jaiswal as Karta of his family consisting of himself, his sons and unmarried daughter was to have exclusive ownership and enjoyment of the properties given in Schedule B/l to the plaint; and Satya Narayan Prasad Jaiswal (appellant No. I/defendant No.l), Shio Narayan Prasad Jaiswal (appellant No.2/defendant No.2) and Prem Chand Prasad Jaiswal (proforma respondent/defendant No.3) acting on behalf of themselves and other members of their respective joint families agreed to relinquish all their right and title over the said properties allotted to Jamuna Prasad Jaiswal. Similarly, it was agreed that Jamuna Prasad Jaiswal on behalf of himself and other members of his family would relinquish all their right and title in the properties allotted to Satya Narayan Prasad Jaiswal, Shio Narayan Prasad Jaiswal and their families. The terms of the said family settlement of the properties were reduced to writing on 26.5.83 and the same was registered in the office of Sub Registrar, Manipur on 31.5.83. In terms of the said family settlement, Jamuna Prasad Jaiswal, Satya Narayan Prasad Jaiswal, Shio Narayan Prasad Jaiswal and Premchand Prasad Jaiswal got their names recorded in the revenue records in respect of their shares allotted to them. As per the said family settlement, the suit property described in Schedule C to the plaint which is also part of Schedule B/1 to the plaint fell into the share of Jamuna Prasad Jaiswai and his family members and they became the absolute owners of the said suit property. As per the said family settlement, the suit property described in Schedule C to the plaint which is also part of Schedule B/1 to the plaint fell into the share of Jamuna Prasad Jaiswai and his family members and they became the absolute owners of the said suit property. It was agreed verbally between the parties at the time of said family settlement that Satya Narayan Prasad Jaiswal, Shio Narayan Jaiswal and Prem Chand Prasad would vacate the suit property and shift to the properties allotted under the family settlement. Satya Narayan Prasad Jaiswal who along with his family members came to Imphal in the year 1982 for the purpose of settlement of family properties resided on the first floor by occupying two rooms of the building comprised in the suit property and also using another room on Western side of the building as kitchen. The said two rooms and kitchen are described in Schedule D to the plaint. Though Satya Narayan Prasad Jaiswal promised to vacate the said rooms described in Schedule D to the plaint, he did not vacate the said rooms, Shio Narayan Prasad Jaiswal also occupied a room on the first floor of the building comprised in the suit property described in Schedule E to the plaint and agreed to vacate the same but refused to do so. On these pleadings in the plaint, Jamuna Prasad Jaiswal has prayed for a decree for possession of the aforesaid rooms described in Schedule D and E to the plaint by eviction of Satya Narayan Prasad Jaiswal and Shio Narayan Prasad Jaiswal. 3. Defendants 1 and 2 contested the suit by filing two separate written statements raising the same pleas. Their case in the written statements is that after the death of Munilal Ram Jaiswal and his widow Janaki Devi, his daughter Tara Devi who is still alive has her right and interest in the joint family properties. Similarly, Rukmini Devi, daughter of late Mukhlal Ram Jaiswal has her right and interest in the coparcenary properties. But they are not parties to the family settlement which took place in May, 1983. The further case of the defendant Nos. Similarly, Rukmini Devi, daughter of late Mukhlal Ram Jaiswal has her right and interest in the coparcenary properties. But they are not parties to the family settlement which took place in May, 1983. The further case of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in the written statement is that prior to the family settlement of May, 1983 there has not been any partition amongst the parties to the suit nor any severance of the joint family, and hence Jamuna Prasad, SatyaNarayan Prasad, Shio Narayan Prasad and Prem Chand Prasad could not be treated as Kartas of their respective families and could not bind the other coparceners belonging to their respective families by executing family settlement deed dated 26.5.83. Defendant Nos 1 and 2 also took a plea in the written statements that the plaintiff was not the absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of the so called family settlement deed dated 26.5.83 and that the plaintiff does not have the exclusive right of use and enjoyment of the suit property. Defendant Nos 1 and 2 also pleaded that all the coparceners who had interest in the joint family properties were necessary parties to the suit, but were not impleaded as defendants. According to the case of the defendants 1 and 2, it was agreed between the plaintiff and the said defendants 1 and 2 that they would vacate the portion of the suit property occupied by them after a full and complete settlement and partition of coparcenary or joint family properties and there has not been full and complete settlement or partition of the joint family properties as yet, they were not liable to vacate the suit property. The said defendants 1 and 2 have denied in the written statement that there was ever any verbal agreement between the parties that defendants 1 and 2 would vacate the suit property as alleged in the plaint. The said defendants 1 and 2 have denied in the written statement that there was ever any verbal agreement between the parties that defendants 1 and 2 would vacate the suit property as alleged in the plaint. The said defendants 1 and 2 have further pleaded in their written statement that clause 6 of the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 mentioned that any dispute and difference between the parties as respect interpretation thereof or any matter relating thereto has to be referred to arbitration and since the dispute raised in the suit is in respect of interpretation of the said deed of family settlement and/or is a matter relating thereto, the suit does not lie without prior reference to arbitration. Defendant No.3 put in a separate written statement in which he supported the case of the plaintiff that it was verbally agreed between the parties that defendants 1 and 2 would vacate the suit property and shift to their respective properties allotted to them under the family settlement and stated that he is presently staying at Dimapur, Nagaland and he was never staying in the suit property and has made a prayer that the proceedings for eviction may be dropped as against him. 4. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, learned Additional District Judge framed 10 issues and recorded his findings thereon after the parties adduced oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective cases. Learned Additional District Judge, inter alia, held in the impugned judgment and decree that the plaintiff had cause of action for filing the suit, that the suit was not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and was not incompetent for want of prior reference to arbitration and that under the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83, exhibited as Ext A/2, the defendants 1 and 2 had relinquished their claims to the suit property and that plaintiff was entitled to recover the possession of the suit property from the said defendants 1 and 2 and accordingly decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. 5. Not all the findings recorded by the learned Additional District Judge in the impugned judgment and decree have been challenged at the hearing of the appeal by Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants. 5. Not all the findings recorded by the learned Additional District Judge in the impugned judgment and decree have been challenged at the hearing of the appeal by Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants. He however challenged some of the findings in the impugned judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge, Under Order 41, Rule 31, Civil Procedure Code, the appellate Court is required to give its decision with reasons on the points for determination in the appeal. Accordingly, on the various points raised by the counsel for the appellants at the time of hearing of the appeal, my decision and reasons for decisions are given hereinafter. 6. The first point raised by Mr. Nilamani Singh, learned counsel for the appellants, is that the family settlement dated 23.5.83 and the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 cannot be operative in law as all the coparceners who had interest in the coparcenary properties in respect of which the family settlement was made were not parties to the said family settlement. He argued that under section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the proviso and Explanation 1 thereto not only the male members but also the female members had interest in the Mitakshara coparcenary property and were entitled to their respective shares in the event of partition of the coparcenary properties. Accordingly, on the death of Munilal Ram Prasad Jaiswal in the year 1963 after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, his daughter Tara Devi had right and interest in the coparcenary and joint Hindu family properties. Similarly, Rukmini Devi, daughter of Mukhlal Ram Jaiswal who died in the year 1976 had right and interest in the coparcenary properties. The aforesaid Tara Devi and Rukmini Devi were not parties to family settlement dated 23.5.83 and the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 neither were they allotted any share under the said family settlement. Mr. Nilamani Singh cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao, (1985) 2 SCC 321 , in support of his submission that a female member of joint Hindu family is entitled to her share on a partition of the coparcenary property. 7. Mr. Mr. Nilamani Singh cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao, (1985) 2 SCC 321 , in support of his submission that a female member of joint Hindu family is entitled to her share on a partition of the coparcenary property. 7. Mr. Nilamani Singh also cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of VN Sarin vs. Ajit Kumar Poplai, AIR 1966 SC 432 , for the proposition that every coparcener has an antecedent title to the joint Hindu family property and this subsisting title of the coparcener to the totality of the property of the joint family is only transformed by a partition into separate titles of individual coparceners in respect of several items of properties allotted to them respectively. According to Mr. Nilamani, therefore Tara Devi and Rukmini Devi had subsisting title in the joint Hindu property of Guru Dayal Ram Jaiswal and since they had not been made parties to the family settlement dated 23.5.83 and the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 and had not been allotted any share under the said family settlement, they continued to have title in all the joint family properties including the suit property. Jamuna Prasad, the plaintiff, does not therefore have exclusive title or absolute ownership over the suit property on the basis of the aforesaid family settlement. Mr. Nilamani Singh further submitted relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of MMB Catholicos vs. MP Athansius, AIR 1954 SC 526 , that in a suit for ejectment, the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own title and this can be done by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus that is on him irrespective of whether the defendants has proved his case or not and a mere destruction of the defendant's title, in the absence of establishment of his own title carries the plaintiff nowhere. According to Mr. According to Mr. Nilamani Singh, the fact that defendants 1 and 2 have agreed under the family settlement dated 23.5.83 and the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 that the suit property will be part of the share of the plaintiff and that the said defendants 1 and 2 will have no right to the same does not carry the plaintiff anywhere because the plaintiff in the suit for ejectment against the defendants 1 and 2 will have to establish his own absolute ownership and right of exclusive possession to the suit property. He also cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ambika Prasad vs. Ram Ekbal Rai, AIR 1966 SC 605 , for the proposition that title cannot pass by mere admission and argued that even if the defendants 1 and 2 have in any way admitted some rights in favour of the plaintiff under the family settlement dated 23.5.83 and the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83, the plaintiff does not acquire exclusive title and ownership in respect of the suit property. 8. Mr. L. Nandakumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent No.l/plaintiff, on the otherhand, submitted that under clause 1 of the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 it is expressly stated that the properties of the joint family have been allotted to the parties in definite shares as fully described in Schedules B, C, D and E thereto for enjoyment of their respective shares in the properties "absolutely and exclusively to the entire exclusion of others". He further pointed out that so far as the suit properties were concerned, the same had been allotted under the said deed of family settlement to the shares of the plaintiff, and as per the said clause 1 of deed of family settlement, Ext A/2, the said share of the plaintiff was to be enjoyed by the plaintiff exclusively and absolutely to the entire exclusion of others. He cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Apoorva Shantilal Shah vs. Commissioner, Income Tax, Gujrat, AIR 1983 SC 409 , relied on by the learned Additional District Judge in the impugned judgment for the proposition that a partial partition of the joint family properties cannot be treated as invalid on the ground that there was no equal distribution amongst the co-sharers and that if any coparcener is aggrieved by such partial partition he can always challenge the said partial partition in any appropriate proceedings; but till such partial partition is held invalid by any competent Court the partial partition cannot be held to be invalid. 9. There can be no dispute over the proposition that each and every coparcener has title in coparcenary property so long as the coparcenary property has not been partitioned and, accordingly, there may be a lot of force in the submission of Mr. Nilamani Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellants that after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Rukmini Devi and Tara Devi had along with other coparceners of the joint Hindu family of late Guru Day al Ram Jaiswal title in the coparcenary properties and that their title could not be extingui­shed by the family settlement dated 23.5.83 and the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) to which they were not parties. But then in the present suit filed by the plaintiff Jamuna Prasad for a decree for possession of the suit property by evicting the defendants 1 and 2, the Court is only called upon to decide as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of the suit property from the defendants 1 and 2 and is not called upon to decide the question as to whether the plaintiff has exclusive possession and absolute ownership in respect of the suit property to the exclusion of the said Rukmini Devi and Tara Devi. In such a suit, as in the present one, the plaintiff is only required to prove that he has a better title than the defendants. To quote Salmond on Jurisprudence, Twelfth Edition : . In such a suit, as in the present one, the plaintiff is only required to prove that he has a better title than the defendants. To quote Salmond on Jurisprudence, Twelfth Edition : . "It is sometimes argued that the term 'ownership' is not strictly applicable to English law, because in an action concerning title to property the plaintiff need only prove that he has a better title than the defendant, not that he has the best of all possible titles. If, for example, A finds a chattel and is then dispossessed of it by B, all A need prove is that he has a better title than B. His ownership will be good against all the world except the true owner but is liable to be defeated if the latter claims the property..." It may be true as has been submitted by Mr. Nilamani Singh that by family settlement deed dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2), right, title and interest of Rukmini Devi and Tara Devi to the coparcenary properties in respect of which family settlement was made including the suit property, could not be extinguished and hence the plaintiff was not the absolute owner of the suit property with right of exclusive possession to the same. But under the said deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83, the title of defendants 1 and 2 in the suit property was extinguished and the plaintiff had a better title than the defendants 1 and 2 and was entitled to enjoyment and possession of the suit property to the exclusion of the. said defendants 1 and 2. 10. As a corollary of the first point, the second point that was raised by Mr. A. Nilamani Singh on behalf of the appellants in this appeal was that the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) was executed only by Jamuna Prasad (plaintiff), Satya Narayan Prasad (defendant 1), Shio Narayan Prasad (defendant 2) and Prem Chand Prasad (defendant 3) but no other coparceners who had right, title and interest in the coparcenary properties. Mr. A. Nilamani Singh on behalf of the appellants in this appeal was that the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) was executed only by Jamuna Prasad (plaintiff), Satya Narayan Prasad (defendant 1), Shio Narayan Prasad (defendant 2) and Prem Chand Prasad (defendant 3) but no other coparceners who had right, title and interest in the coparcenary properties. Mr. Nilamani Singh argued that since all the sons and daughters of Satya Narayan Prasad and Shio Narayan Prasad and all brothers and sisters of Prem Chand Prasad were also coparceners having right, title and interest in the coparcenary properties, they were required to execute the deed of family settlement and since the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) was not executed by them, it was not operative and binding on all the said coparceners. In this context Mr. Nilamani Singh stated that there was no severance and separation amongst the different branches of the joint Hindu family of Guru Dayal Ram Jaiswal and the properties of the said joint family prior to execution of the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83. Hence, all the coparceners of the said joint Hindu family of Guru Dayal Ram Jaiswal had interest in the coparcenary properties and were entitled to their respective shares on a partition of the coparcenary properties and hence the deed of the family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) which had not been executed by all the coparceners of the said joint Hindu family could not extinguish their right, title and interest in the coparcenary properties. Mr. L. Nandakumar Singh, learned counsel for the respon­dent/plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) was executed by the plaintiff and the defendants 1, 2 and 3 as Kartas or head of their respective joint Hindu families as would be evident from the said deed of family settlement itself and hence the interest of the coparce­ners belonging to the families of the plaintiff and the defendants 1, 2 and 3 was represented and taken care of by the said plaintiff and the defendants 1, 2 and 3. 11. In the case of Bhagawati Prasad vs. Rameshwari Kuer? 11. In the case of Bhagawati Prasad vs. Rameshwari Kuer? AIR 1952 SC 72 , the Supreme Court held : "...The general principle unboubtedly is that a Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved, but, as it is admitted here, that Imrit, one of the coparceners, did separate himself from the other members of the joint family and had has his share in the joint property partitioned off for him, there is no presumption that the rest of the coparceners continued to be joint. There is no presumption on the plaintiff's side too that because one member of the family separated himself, there has been separation with regard to all. It would be a question of fact to be determined in each case upon the evidence relating to the intention of-the parties whether there was a separation amongst the other coparceners or that they remained united. The burden would undoubtedly lie on the party who asserts the existence of a particular state of things on the basis of which he claims relief. These principles which have been laid down in several pronouncements of the Judicial Committee seem to us to be perfectly sound; vide ' Balakrishna vs. Ramakrishna, 58 Ind App 220 PC; Palaniammal vs. Muthu Venkatechala, 52 Ind App 83; Balabux Ladhuram vs. Rukhmabai, 30 Ind App 130." Thus, the Hindu family of Guru Dayal Ram Jaiswal has to be presumed to have remained joint unless it was proved that the intention of the parties was to separate themselves from the said joint family and as the plaintiff in the present suit seeks a decree for eviction against the defendants 1 and 2 from the suit property and for possession of the same by raising a plea that the Hindu family of Guru Dayal Ram Jaiswal was severed into separate branches of families of the plaintiff and the defendants 1, 2 and 3, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish this intention of the parties. In the case of Raghavamma vs. Chenochamma, AIR 1964 SC 136 , however, the Supreme Court after quoting the aforesaid judgment in the case of Bhagwati Prasad vs. Rameshwari Kuer (supra), has held that when evidence has been adduced on both sides, the burden of proof ceases to have any practical importance, and the Court will have to decide this question on the basis of evidence led by the parties. In the case of Smti Krishnabai Ganpatrai Deshmukh vs. Appasaheb, Tuljaramrao Nimbalkar, AIR 1979 SC 1880 , a question came up as the whether there was intention of the parties to sever their joint family status, and the Supreme Court held on the basis of preliminary recitals in a deed which was exhibited as Ext 39 in the said case as well as the surrounding circumstances and natural probabilities that Ram Chandra Rao had clearly intimated to his coparcener his intention to sever the joint family status and to hold and enjoy his share of the joint family property in severalty. In the instant case, the preliminary recitals of the deed of the family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) are to the following effect: "This MEMORANDUM of partial partition is made on this the 26th day of May, 1983 amongst : 1. Shri Jamuna Prasad Jaiswal, son of late Mukhlal Ram Jaiswal, Karta of his branch of the Hindu Joint Family consisting of himself, his wife and children of the First Part hereinafter called the First Party; 2. Shri Satyanarayan Prasad Jaiswal, son of Late Mukhlal Ram Jaiswal, Karta of his branch of the Hindu Joint Family consisting of himself, his wife and children of the Second Part. 3. Shri Shio Narayan Prasad Jaiswal, son of late Mukhlal Ram Jaiswal, Karta of his branch of the Hindu Joint Family consisting of himself, his wife and children of the Third Part, hereinafter called the Third Party. AND 4. Shri Premchand Prasad Jaiswal, son of late Ram Narayan Prasad Jaiswal, Karta of his branch of the Hindu Joint Family consisting of himself, his mother and children of the Fourth Part, hereinafter called the Fourth Party. Whereas the aforesaid parties are at present residing at Thangal Bazar, town Imphal in the State of Manipur. AND 4. Shri Premchand Prasad Jaiswal, son of late Ram Narayan Prasad Jaiswal, Karta of his branch of the Hindu Joint Family consisting of himself, his mother and children of the Fourth Part, hereinafter called the Fourth Party. Whereas the aforesaid parties are at present residing at Thangal Bazar, town Imphal in the State of Manipur. Whereas the said parties are the members of the Joint Hindu Family, governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, known by the name of 'Gurudayalram Mukhlal' (hereinafter referred to as the said Family) with its head quarters at Thangal Bazar, Imphal (Manipur) with the First Party hereto as Karta thereof; Whereas on the 23rd day of May, 1983, the parties named above as members of the said family in order to preserve the family peace and to keep the feelings of unity amongst them and further to provide adequate incentive to each member, orally partitioned and divided the properties described in the Schedule A in the manner mentioned in the Schedule B, C, D and E appended hereto; Whereas after effecting the said partial partition by Family Arrangement made on 23rd May, 1983 the possession of the properties described in the Schedule A and allotted to the parties hereto in the manner described in the Schedule B, C, D and E have been handed over to the allottees concerned by giving physical possession thereof and delivering documents as to title, etc, as far as practicable, for exclusive enjoyment of each such party as full and absolute owner thereof and their respective shares in the said properties have actually been enjoyed by the allottees concerned after such partition in the above manner; Whereas it has now been considered expedient by the parties hereto to confirm the terms and conditions in writing to serve as a record of the said oral partial partition." It is clear from the preliminary recitals in the aforesaid deed of family settle­ment/memorandum of partial partition dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) that there was intention on the part of the plaintiff, defendant Nos 1,2 and 3 to sever the joint family status of the family of Guru Dayal Ram Jaiswal with effect from 23.5.83 and that the properties described in Schedule A to the said deed of family settlement were to be allotted and enjoyed as per their respective shares as indicated in Schedules B, C, D and E to the said deed of family settlement separately by each of the families of the plaintiff, defendant Nos 1,2 and 3 and that the plaintiff, defendant Nos 1,2 and 3 executed the said deed of family settlement as the heads or Kartas of their respective families and represented the interest of all the members of their respective families. The interest of each of the coparceners who belonged to the respective families of the plaintiff, defendant 1, 2 and 3 was therefore taken care of and represented in the said deed of family settlement. The contention of Mr. Nilamani Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellants that the said deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) was not operative and binding on all the said coparceners not having been executed by all of them has therefore no force. 12. The third point raised by Mr.-Nilamani Singh on behalf of the appellants in this appeal is that the aforesaid deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) does not cover all the properties of the joint Hindu family of Guru Dayal Jaiswal and several properties of the said joint family have been left out. Mr. L. Nandakumar, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent No. 1, on the other hand, cited the judgment of Privy Council in the case of Appovier alias Seetaramier vs. Rama Subha Aiyan & others, 1866 Moore's Indian Appeal 75, in which the Privy Council has held that if the members of an undivided family agree among themselves with regard to particular property, that it shall thenceforth be the subject of ownership, in certain defined shares, then the character of undivided property and joint enjoyment is taken away from the subject matter so agreed to be dealt with. He also cited, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Apoorva Shanti Lai Shah vs. Commissioner, Income Tax, Gujarat (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the learned Additional District Judge for the proposition that a partial partition of the joint family property is valid. 13. From the very language of the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83, as well as from the evidence of DW 1, DW 2, DW 3 and DW 4, it is clear that the said deed is a partial partition and that some of the properties of joint Hindu family of Guru Dayal Ram Jaiswal have been left out from the purview of the said deed of the family settlement. But it is settled law as has been explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Kashinathsa Yamosa Kabadi vs. Narsingsa Bhaskarsa Kabadi, AIR 1961SC 1077, that is always open to the members of joint Hindu family to divide some properties of the family and to keep the remaining undivided. That apart, the learned Additional District Judge has recorded a finding in the impugned judgment and decree that the said aforesaid partial partition contained in the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) has been acted upon not only by the plaintiff but by the defendant Nos 1,2 and 3 themselves. In particular, the learned Additional District Judge has held : "... On the strength of the deed of partition Ext A/2 of which Ext A/5 is certified copy, the suit land was mutated in the name of the plaintiff vide certified copy of Jamabandi Ext A/6. Similarly, it transpires from the deed of trust Ext A/4 that the land under Patta No. 68 (old)/107 (new) of village No.8 Mantripukhri comprising CS Dag No.223 having an area of 24 acre has been recorded in the name of the defendant No.2, Shio Narayan Prasad Jaiswal as the same has been allotted as his share in partition deed Ext A/2 as mentioned in serial No.5 in Schedule A of the partition deed. Taking advantage of the partition deed, Ext A/2, the defendant No.2 Shio Narayan Prasad Jaiswal had transferred the land to Keshorimal Jain (DW 4) and his three brothers by executing a deed of trust Ext A/4. Jawaharlal Sahu (PW 2) also gives under about it. The defendant No.2 Shio Narayan Prasad Jaiswal (DW 1) also admits that the parties to the deed Ext A/2 including himself and the defendant No. 1 have been possessing the land situated at Telipatti in pursuance of the deed Ext A/2. He also states that the defendant No.l Satyanarayan Prasad Jaiswal is staying at Dumraon in Bihar which is a land allotted to the defendant No.2, Jawaharalal Sahu (PW 2) and Kalicharan Sahu (PW 3) give evidence about the parties possessing the land.situated at Telipatti. Jawaharlal Sahu (PW 2) also states about transfer of land at Mantripukhri by the defendant No.2. He also states that the defendant No.l Satyanarayan Prasad Jaiswal is staying at Dumraon in Bihar which is a land allotted to the defendant No.2, Jawaharalal Sahu (PW 2) and Kalicharan Sahu (PW 3) give evidence about the parties possessing the land.situated at Telipatti. Jawaharlal Sahu (PW 2) also states about transfer of land at Mantripukhri by the defendant No.2. If that is position, it is not permissible on the part of the contesting defendants to dissect the partition deed Ext A/2 for taking favourable parts of them and to discard the portions beneficial to the plaintiff and approbate and reprobate by saying at one time that the partial partition is valid and thereby obtained some advantage to which they could only be entitled to the footing that it is valid, and at another say that it is void on the ground of partial partition for the purpose of securing some advantage..." The aforesaid finding of the learned Additional District Judge have not been disputed by the appellants before me and I agree with the learned Additional District Judge that the defendants 1 and 2 having taken advantage of the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) and having mutated their part of the shares under the said deed of family settlement in the land revenue records and having enjoyed their part of shares in the properties under the said deed of family settlement cannot now take a plea that the said deed of family settlement is not operative and is invalid in so far as it relates to shares of the plaintiff in the properties under the said deed of family settlement. 14. The fourth point which was raised by Mr.Nilamani Singh on behalf of the appellants in this appeal was that the suit was liable to be dismissed as all the coparceners of the joint Hindu family of late Guru Dayal Ram Jaiswal have not been impleaded as party-defendants in the suit. Mr. L. Nandakumar, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent No.l, in reply referred to the provisions of Order 1, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which stated that no suit shall be defeated by reason of the mis-joinder or non-joinder of parties, and the Court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. He also cited the decision of Lahore High Court in the case of Bishambar Das & others vs. Kanshi Parshad & others, 1933IC Vol 141,45, in which it has been held that where a suit is for a division between two branches of a joint Hindu family, and not for partition of the properties between all the alleged coparceners inter se, the really necessary parties to the suit are the heads of each branch of the family and it is not obligatory on the plaintiffs to implead all the members of the two branches. He also cited the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Digambar Mahton vs. Dhanraj Mahton & others, 1922 IC Vol 67,156, wherein it has been held that in a partition suit under the Hindu Law, grandsons although proper parties are not necessary parties as their interests are fully represented by their father. He also relied on the judgment of Bombay High Court in the case of Bhikulal & others vs. Kisanlal & others AIR 1959 Bombay 260, in which it has been held that where partition is claimed as between branches of the family the heads of the^ branches alone need to be made parties. 15. Order 1, Rule 3 and Order 1, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure are quoted herein below: "3. Who may joined as defendants - All persons may be joined in one suit as defendants where — (a) any right to relief in respect of, or arising out of, the same. act or tranaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged* to exist against such persons, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative; and (b) if separate suits were brought against such persons, any common question of law or fact would arise. 9. act or tranaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged* to exist against such persons, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative; and (b) if separate suits were brought against such persons, any common question of law or fact would arise. 9. Misjoinder or non-joinder - No suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, and the Court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it: Provided that nothing in this rule shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party.'' A reading of the aforesaid two* provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure together would show that necessary party has to be impleaded as defendant and that a necessary party is one against whom a right to some relief is alleged to exist whether jointly, severally or in the alternative in respect of, or arising out of the same act or transaction, series of acts or transactions on which the act is based. The instant suit has been filed by the plaintiff for relief of eviction against the defendant Nos 1 and 2 and for a decree of possession in favour of the plaintiff. No relief whatsoever has been claimed against the other coparceners of the joint family of late Guru Dayal Ram Jaiswal. Mr. Nilamani Singh however stated that along with the defendants 1 and 2 their family members are also residing in the suit property in respect of which decree for eviction and possession is being claimed in the suit. Hence, no effective decree for eviction and possession can be passed by the Court unless all the family members of the defendants 1 and 2 are also impleaded in the suit. I am unable to accept this submission of Mr. Nilamani Singh. The transaction on the basis of which the plaintiff claims relief against defendants 1 and 2 is the family settlement or the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) under which the plaintiff claims to have been allotted the suit property for enjoyment to the exclusion of the defendants 1 and 2 and their families, the defendants 1 and 2 executing the said deed of family settlement, Ext A/2 as Kartas or heads of their respective families. In such a suit therefore the defendants 1 and 2 sufficiently repersented the interests of their respective family members; and their other family members who may be residing along with the defendants 1 and 2 in the suit property may be proper parties, but they are not necessary . parties. A decree passed by the Court for eviction in such a .suit will not only be binding on the defendant Nos 1 and 2 but on their respective family members and a decree for possession in favour of the plaintiff will also be effective and binding on defendants 1 and 2 and their respective family members. It is further clear from the aforesaid provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure that the instant suit shall not be defeated by reason of the non-joinder of coparceners other than defendant Nos 1,2 and 3 and the members of their respective families who have not been joined as defendants in the suit, but the decree passed in the present suit cannot and will not affect the rights and interests of the said coparceners not belonging to the families of defendant Nos 1,2 and 3. The fourth point raised on behalf of the appellants in this appeal that the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties therefore has no merit. 16. The fifth point raised by Mr. Nilamani Singh on behalf of the appellants in this appeal was that the defendants 1 and 2 took a specific plea in their respective written statements that under clause 6 of the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 it was stipulated that any dispute or difference between the parties as respects the interpretation thereof or any matter relating thereto has to be referred to arbitration and that the suit does not lie without prior reference to arbitration, but no finding as such was recorded by the learned Additional District Judge in the impugned judgment and decree. Mr. L. Nandakumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent 1/plaintiff, on the other hand contended that under section 32 of the Arbitration Act only a suit for a decision upon the existence, effect of validity of an arbitration agreement or award is barred; but so-far as the present suit is concerned it is not one in which the plaintiff has sought for a decree for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award. He further submitted that there was an arbitration proceeding by Panch after the aforesaid deed of the family settlement dated 26.5.83, but the said Arbitration was with regard to the properties at Telipatty in Imphal. Mr. Nandakumar stated that there was no arbitration proceeding in relatioin to the dispute relating to the suit property and that the present suit for possession of the suit property by the plaintiff was not barred by any provision of the Arbitration Act. 17. On a reading of the impugned judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge, I find that he has recorded a finding that the present suit is not covered under the said arbitration clause contained in clause 6 of the deed of family settlement dated 26.5,83 inasmuch as there was no dispute between the parties in the present suit relating to interpretation of the deed of family settlement. What learned Additional District Judge has lost a sight of is that clause 6 of the deed of the family settlement provided for reference to arbitration of not only the dispute or difference between the parties as the interpretation of the present contained in the deed of family settlement but also 'any matter relating thereto'. The expression 'any matter relating thereto' in the said arbitration clause will obviously cover matters other than those relating to interpretation of the presents contained in the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83. But then, even it is assumed that the present dispute between the parties in the suit is covered by the said arbitration clause, the mere fact that there was an arbitration agreement between the parties for resolution of dispute between them does not bar a suit by a party to the arbitration agreement relating to the dispute. It has been held by-the Supreme Court in the case of Orient Transport Co vs. M/s Jaya Bharat Credit & Investment Co Ltd, AIR 1987 SC 2289 , that if the intention of the Legislature were that all documents containing as arbitration clause-should come within the purview of sections 32 and 33, the Legislature would have said so in appropriate words and that sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, have a very limited application, namely, where the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement and not the contract containing the arbitration agreement is challenged. In the said decision, the Supreme Court further held that every person has a right to bring a suit which was of a civil nature and the Court had jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and this right has not been taken away by section 32 of the Arbitration Act. Thus assuming that clause 6 of the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) provided for arbitration of the dispute between the parties in the present suit, the civil Court still has the jurisdiction to try the suit which was of civil nature under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, however, the defendant Nos 1 and 2 being parties to the said arbitration agreement contained in clause 6 of the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 could before filing their written statement or taking any other steps in the suit proceedings apply to the Court to stay the proceedings; and if satisfied that there was no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in acccordance with the arbitration agreement and that the defendants 1 and 2 were and still remains, ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration, the Court could have made an order staying the suit proceedings. But no such application appears to have been filed by the defendants 1 and 2 under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for stay of the suit proceedings. Thus the point raised by the appellants that the suit was incompetent for want of prior reference of the dispute to arbitration has no merit. 18. The last point that was raised by Mr. Nilamani Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellants at the time of hearing of the appeal was that subsequent to the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83, there was an oral agreement between the plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2 that the defendants 1 and 2 would vacate the portion of the suit property under their occupation only after a full and complete partition of all the joint family properties. He further contended that since full and complete partition of the joint family properties has not yet taken place and some of the joint family properties have been left out from the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2), the defendant Nos 1 and 2 were not liable to be evicted from the suit property. Mr. Nilamani Singh pointed out that the learned Additional District Judge in his impugned judgment and decree took an erroneous view that no oral agreement between the parties relating to the terms of written deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 was admissible in' view of the bar against such oral evidence contained in section 92 of the Evidence Act. He cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gangabai vs. Chhabubai, (1982) 1SCC 4, in which it has been held that the bar imposed by section 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872 does not apply when the case of a party is that the transaction recorded in the document was never intended to be acted upon at all between the parties and that the document is a sham one. He also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajkumar Rajinder Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & others, (1990) 4 SCC 320 , for the proposition that where the language of a document is ambiguous and not clear, oral evidence revealing the true intention of the parties is admissible. He also cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Narandas Morardas Gajiwala vs. SPAM Papammal, AIR 1967 SC 333 , in support of his submission that under proviso (3) to section 92 of the Evidence Act the existing of any separate oral agreement constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved and contended on the basis of what has been decided in the aforesaid decision that by a .subsequent oral agreement the plaintiff and defendants 1, 2 and 3 agreed that the condition precedent for the performance of the obligation of the defendants 1 and 2 to vacate the suit property was that there would be a full and final settlement of all the joint family properties of late Guru Ram Dayal Jaiswal. He argued that since evidence will show that there has not been full and final settlement of the properties of the joint family, the defendants 1 and 2 were not obliged to vacate the suit property. 19. Mr. Nandakumar Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent 1/plaintiff, on the otherhand, supported the findings of the learned Additional District Judge in the impugned judgment on issue Nos 8 and 8 (a) that when a transaction has been reduced to writing being Ext A/2, no extrinsic evidence to vary or alter the terms of the deed Ext A/2 is admissible under section 92 of the Evidence Act, and relied on the decision of Patna High Court in the case of Bhola Nath vs. Santosh Prakash Arya, AIR 1975 Patna 336, in which it has been held that the parties cannot be permitted to modify the terms of the registered document by pleading oral arrangement. He also cited the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sumati Bala vs. NK Das, AIR 1975 Gauhati 43, to the effect that when a transaction has been reduced to the form of a document, either by consent or agreement of the parties or by requirement of law, the written instrument must be regarded as the appropriate and only evidence of the terms of their agreement and no other evidence of the transaction can be substituted as provided in section 91 of the Evidence Act. He further contended that the aforesaid decision of this Court in the case of Sumati Bala vs. NK Das (supra) would show that the exception to the rule contained in section 92 of the Evidence Act is that a party is not precluded from showing that the writing was not really the contract-between the parties, but was only a fictitious or colourable device to cloak something else. Mr. L. Nandakumar referred to the evidence of the plaintiff who was examined as PW 1 that the defendants were allowed to stay in the rooms comprised in the suit property on the clear understanding that they would vacate the same within a very short time and that there was no condition precedent attached to their said obligation to vacate the rooms in the suit property on which an oral agreement could be pleaded and proved under proviso (3) to section 92 of the Evidence Act. 20. 20. The law contained in sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act-and as explained by the Apex Court, Patna High Court and the Gauhati High Court in the aforesaid decisions cited by the learned counsel appearing for the parties is clear that when the terms of a transaction between the parties is reduced to writing in a document, the said document is that only evidence of the terms of the said transaction and no other evidence of the said transaction can be substituted for that so long as the writing exists and is within the power of the party and that when the terms of such transaction have been proved by producing document, no evidence of any oral agreement or settlement shall be admitted as between the parties to any such transaction or their representation in interests, for the purpose of contradicting varying, adding to, or substracting from its term. In the instant case, since the terms of partition of family settlement between the parties have been reduced in writing in the registered deed of family settlement dated 26.5.B3 and the said registered deed of family settlement has been proved and exhibited as Ext A/2, there is not question of any evidence in the nature of any oral agreement or statement in the present suit for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or substracting from the terms of the said deed of family settlement. It is further clear from the evidence adduced that it is not the case of defendants 1 and 2 that the transaction recorded in the said deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 is a sham one and that there was no partition between the parties contained in the said deed of family settlement dated 26.5.93 (Ext A/2). Hence, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gangabai vs. Chhabubai (supra) does not apply to the facts of the present case. Similarly, the language of the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) is very clear on the point that the plaintiff and his family members are entitled to own and enjoy the properties falling to their share including the suit property to the exclusion of defendants 1 and 2. Similarly, the language of the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) is very clear on the point that the plaintiff and his family members are entitled to own and enjoy the properties falling to their share including the suit property to the exclusion of defendants 1 and 2. Thus the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh vs. State of HP (supra) to the effect that oral evidence revealing the true intention of the parties is admissible under proviso (6) to section 92 of the Evidence Act where the language of the document is ambiguous and hot clear has no application to the present case. Under the terms of the said deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) therefore the defendants 1 and 2 have an obligation to vacate the suit property and more particularly the rooms comprised in the suit property under their occupation. 21. Defendants 1 and 2 however pleaded that by a separate oral agreement between the defendants 1 and 2 and the plaintiff the said obligation of the defendants 1 and 2 to vacate the rooms under their occupation comprised in the suit property was to be discharged only on a full and complete settlement of all the properties of the joint family. In the case of Narandas vs. Papammal (supra), the Supreme Court while interpreting proviso (3) to section 92 of the Evidence Act held, relying on the decision of Judicial Committee in the case of Rowland Adv vs. Administrator General of Burma, AIR 1938 PC 198, thus : "... it is necessary to distinguish a collateral agreement which alters the legal effect of the instrument from an agreement that the instrument should not be an effective instrument until some condition is fulfilled, or, to put it in another form, it is necessary to distinguish an agreement in defeasance of the contract from an agreement suspending the coming into force of the contract contained in the promissory note. It was therefore held by the Judicial Committee in that case that where the promissory note is, by its express terms, payable on demand, that is at once, the obligation under the note attaches immediately. It was therefore held by the Judicial Committee in that case that where the promissory note is, by its express terms, payable on demand, that is at once, the obligation under the note attaches immediately. A collateral oral agreement not to make demand until a certain specified condition is fulfilled has the intention and effect of suspending the coming into force of that obligation, which is the contract contained in the promissory note. Such an oral agreement constitutes a condition precedent to the attaching of the obligation and is within the terms of proviso 3 of section 92 of the Evidenct Act..." Thus, the plea taken by the defendants 1 and 2 that their obligation to vacate the rooms comprised in the suit property was by a separate oral agreement suspended till the full and final settlement of all the properties of the joint family has to be distinguished from a plea that the terms of the family settlement reduced to writing in the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) was altered, varied or modified in any manner by a separate oral agreement and proviso (3) to section 92 of the Evidence Act clearly provides that existence of any such separate oral agree­ment relating to suspension of the obligation under written contract may be proved. 22. Coming now to the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record, it appears that the plaintiff himself in para 9 of the plaint has stated that the defendant No. 1 promised that he would vacate the rooms described in Schedule D to the plaint "after the full settlement of the joint family properties." Defendant No. 1 in para 6 of his written statement has pleaded that it was agreed between the plaintiff and the defendant No.l that the defendant No.l would vacate his use aqd occupation of the portions of the suit land and of the premises thereon described in Schedule D to the plaint after a full and complete partition of all the coparcenary or joint family properties. Similarly, the defendant No.2 in para 6 of his written statement has pleaded it was agreed between the plaintiff and the defendant Nos 1 and 2 that defendants 1 and 2 would vacate their use and occupation of the portions of the suit land and of the premises thereon described in Schedule D and E to the plaint after a full and complete partition of all coparcenary or joint family properties. In his evidence, the plaintiff who was examined as PW 1, however, stated that the defendants were allowed to stay in the rooms in the suit building on the clear understanding that they would vacate the same within a very short time. This evidence of PW 1 who being the plaintiff was an interested witness is not corroborated by the evidence of either PW 2 orPW 3 who are the other two witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff. On the other hand, defendant No.2 who was examined as DW 1 has stated in his evidence that at the third meeting of the Pancha in which plaintiff, defendant No. 1 and defendant No.2 were present it was agreed between the three brothers, namely, the plaintiff, defendant No.l and defendant No.2 in presence of Pancha members that the defendant Nos 1 and 2 would continue to occupy the portions of the buildings falling to the share of the plaintiff till a complete and final partition of all the remaining ancerstral properties and the joint family properties of the parties. In the said evidence he has stated that in respect of paddy field at Mantipukhuri, Imphal, Railway Godowan at Dimapur, plot and building at Dimapur measuring 50' x 35', the plot and building at Biloti in Bihar and seven motor vehicles which were the part of the joint family properties and have not been partitioned among the parties. In the said evidence he has stated that in respect of paddy field at Mantipukhuri, Imphal, Railway Godowan at Dimapur, plot and building at Dimapur measuring 50' x 35', the plot and building at Biloti in Bihar and seven motor vehicles which were the part of the joint family properties and have not been partitioned among the parties. Again, the son of defendant No.l who has been examined as DW 2 has stated that at the last and third sitting of the Pancha held on 23.11.83 in which the plaintiff, defendant Nos 1 to 3 and he himself were present along with the Pancha members, it was verbally agreed between the plaintiff and defendant Nos 1 and 2 that till the joint family properties were completely partitioned among the coparceners, the defendant Nos 1 and 2 and their families would continue to use .and occupy the suit premises and this verbal agreement took place in the presence and hearing of the said members of the Pancha. The aforesaid DW 2 has also stated that the agricultural land at Mantipukhri, the Railway Godown at Dimapur and the assests and business of GM Transport Corporation have not been partitioned. It is further clear from the evidence on record that there was ah arbitration between the parties by a Pancha and two members of the Pancha were examined as DW 3 and DW 4. DW 3 has stated that at the third meeting of Pancha, Jamuna Prasad (plaintiff) took up oath in the name Almighty God and also of his ancestors that he would allow his younger brothers to continue to live in the premises where they were then living and would look after their requirements till the accounts were settled on the ensuing Ram Navami Day. DW 4 has similarly stated that the third sitting of the Pancha which was held at the Gaddi of Karta Singh, it was agreed by the parties that the defendant Nos 1 and 2 and their families would vacate the building at Thangal Bazar allocated as the share of the plaintiff after complete partition of the remaining properties of the parties including the gold ornaments and also after settlement of all the accounts of their joint family firms and undertakings. The said DW 4 has stated that they (Pancha) could not partition the movable properties of the parties and the settlement of their accounts. 23. The said DW 4 has stated that they (Pancha) could not partition the movable properties of the parties and the settlement of their accounts. 23. On the aforesaid pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record, I hold that an oral agreement was made between the plaintiff and the defendant Nos 1 and 2 at third sitting of the Pancha to the effect that defendant Nos 1 and 2 would discharge their obligation under the family settlement dated 23.5.82 and the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) to vacate the rooms comprised in the suit property on a full and complete partition or settlement of all the properties of the joint family of late Guru Dayal Ram Jaiswal. I further hold on the basis of evidence on record that the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2) does not cover all the properties of the joint family of late Guru Dayal Jaiswal and that in respect of some of the properties of late Guru Dayal Ram Jaiswal partition or settlement is yet to be made. Admittedly, the plaintiff was the Karta of the joint family of late Guru Dayal Ram Jaiswal prior to the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 and it was for the plaintiff as Karta of such joint family properties to have ensured a full and complete partition or settlement of all the properties of the joint family; and as soon as he (plaintiff) brings about such full and complete partition or settlement of all the properties of the joint family of late Guru Dayal Ram Jaiswal, he will be entitled to recover possession of the rooms comprised in the suit property which fell into the share of his family under the deed offamily settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2). 24. In the result, I vary the impugned judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge I and I order that the plaintiff will be entitled to recover possession of the rooms comprised in the suit property described in Schedules C, D and E of the decree of the learned Additional District Judge I, Imphal, Manipur, in Original Suit No.5/85/7/85 from defendant Nos 1 and 2 upon a full and complete partition or settlement of the remaining properties of the joint Hindu family of late Guru Dayal Ram Jaiswal which are not covered under the deed of family settlement dated 26.5.83 (Ext A/2). I further order that that plaintiff will be entitled to recover possession of the aforesaid rooms in the suit property from the said defendant Nos 1 and 2 by execution of this decree if he satisfies the executing Court that such a- full and complete partition or settlement of the remaining properties has taken place or that such a full and complete partition of the remaining properties has not been possible due to the non-cooperation of any party other than the plaintiff or due to reasons beyond his control. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, however, I leave the parties to bear their respective costs of this appeal. The appeal is partly allowed.