JUDGMENT R.L. KHURANA, J.—This regular second appeal by the defendant has been directed against the judgment and decree dated 30-7-1988 of the learned District Judge, Nahan, reversing the judgment and decree dated 13-5-1987 of the learned Sub-Judge 1st Class, Paonta Sahib. 2. The subject matter of dispute between the parties is the land measuring 31 bighas 11 biswas comprising of Khasra Nos. 442 and 829 of village Bhagani, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, specifically described in the plaint and jamabandi for the year 1979-80 and hereinafter referred to as the Sand in dispute. 3. Briefly stated, the facts of the present case are these. The land in dispute was previously under the tenancy of Bhima, the father of the parties. After his death, the parties succeeded to such tenancy rights in equal shares. The defendant, being the elder brother of the plaintiff was acting as Karta of the joint family and managing the land in dispute as well as other household affairs. The plaintiff was assigned the job of working as a labourer in order to augment the income of the family. The defendant being a clever person by playing fraud and by suppressing the true facts obtained proprietary rights qua the land in dispute to the exclusion of the plaintiff. Consequently, the revenue entries came to be changed in favour of defendant showing him to be the owner and in possession of the land in dispute. The plaintiff, who was working in Uttar Pradesh, came to know about the acquisition of proprietary rights by the defendant and the revenue entries only on his return in September 1984 when he was not permitted to enter the land and the family house. The plaintiff, accordingly, filed a suit for declaration of his title and joint possession of the land in dispute to the extent of 1/2 share. 4. The defendant resisted the suit. It was admitted that earlier Bhima, father of the parties was the tenant qua the land in dispute and that after his death such tenancy rights devolved upon the parties in equal shares. It was pleaded that sometime in the year 1965-66, the plaintiff abandoned his tenancy rights as a result of which the defendant became the sole tenant of the land in dispute and the proprietary rights in respect thereof were conferred on him to the exclusion of the plaintiff. It was pleaded that sometime in the year 1965-66, the plaintiff abandoned his tenancy rights as a result of which the defendant became the sole tenant of the land in dispute and the proprietary rights in respect thereof were conferred on him to the exclusion of the plaintiff. The compensation for the proprietary rights was also deposited by him. In the alternative, the defendant has set up the case that he has become the owner qua the shares of the plaintiff by virtue of his continuous adverse possession. Legal objections as to limitation and estoppel were further raised. 5. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned trial Court: - 1. Whether the plaintiff abandoned his tenancy right and the defendant became tenant exclusively on the suit land as alleged, if so as to what effect ?O. P. D. 2. If issue No. 1 is not proved, whether the defendant has become owner of the suit land by adverse possession from the date of grant of patta ? O.P.D. 2B. Whether the defendant was a Karta and trustee of the plaintiff and his property including the suit land ? O.P.D. 3. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct from filing the present suit ? O.P.D. 4. Whether the suit is not within time ? O.P.D, 5. Relief. The learned trial court answered issues No. 1, 3 and 4 in the affirmative and issue No. 2A in the negative. Issue No. 2 pursuant to the findings on issue No. 1 was held to have become redundant. Resultantly, the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed by the learned trial court vide judgment and decree dated 13-5-1987. On an appeal having been carried before the learned District Judge, by the plaintiff, the findings of the learned trial court were set aside on all the issues. The plea of the defendant with regard to adverse possession was also negatived. Consequently, after setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial court, the plaintiff was held to be the joint owner of the land in dispute to the extent of half share. A decree for joint possession was, therefore, passed in his favour on 30-7-1988. 6. The plea of the defendant with regard to adverse possession was also negatived. Consequently, after setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial court, the plaintiff was held to be the joint owner of the land in dispute to the extent of half share. A decree for joint possession was, therefore, passed in his favour on 30-7-1988. 6. Feeling aggrieved by and being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree dated 30-7-1988 of the learned District Judge, the defendant has come up before this court by way of present regular second appeal, inter alia, on the grounds that the learned first appellate court has not appreciated the documentary as well as oral evidence in its right perspective. The abandonment of the tenancy rights on the part of the plaintiff stood proved. Alternatively, it has also been established that the defendant is coming in adverse possession qua the share of the plaintiff since 1966 and the suit on the face of it is barred by time. 7. Admittedly, Bhima, the father of the parties was the tenant qua the land in dispute and on his death parties succeeded to the tenancy rights in equal shares. Ex. P-1, Misel Haqiyat for the year 1960-61 records the parties in possession of the land in dispute in equal shares under the owners. It is also not denied that the land in dispute came to be vested in the state under Section 27 of the HP. Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953. Consequently, in Ex. P-2, jamabandi for the year 1964-65, the State of HP. is recorded as owner of the land in dispute while the parties are shown as in possession thereof in equal shares as non-occupancy tenants. 8. It is sell settled that a tenancy can be terminated either by way of ejectment of the tenant in accordance with law or by relinquishment or abandonment by the tenant. Even a wrongful dispossession of a tenant will not determine the tenancy unless his right to possess the tenancy has come to an end under some provision of law. 9. The case put forward by the defendant is that sometime in the year 1965-66, the plaintiff, while moving to Uttar Pradesh with a view of settling there, had abandoned his tenancy rights qua the land in dispute as a result of which the defendant became sole tenant. 9. The case put forward by the defendant is that sometime in the year 1965-66, the plaintiff, while moving to Uttar Pradesh with a view of settling there, had abandoned his tenancy rights qua the land in dispute as a result of which the defendant became sole tenant. The relevant pleadings in this regard are contained in para 2 of the reply on merits of the written statement of the defendant, in the following terms: - "That para No. 2 of the plaint is admitted to the extent that previously the father of the plaintiff and defendant was tenant over the suit land and after his death the plaintiff and defendant became tenants of the suit land. But in 1965-66 the plaintiff abandoned his right of tenancy and defendant became the tenant of the whole of the suit land and the owner without any objection accepted the rent of the suit land from the defendant meaning thereby the owner has accepted the defendant as tenant over the whole of the suit land. And on 29-10-1966 the defendant was granted proprietary rights of the suit land and he became the absolute owner of the same. He did deposit the compensation of the suit land also." Again in para 3 it has been pleaded that the plaintiff left the house of Bhagani in 1965-66 after abandoning his right of tenancy of the suit land in favour of the defendant and settled in Uttar Pradesh. In the present case no cogent evidence, oral or documentary, has come on the record to to prove abandonment of the tenancy rights on the part of the plaintiff. 10. The apex Court in M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1979 SC 621 has held that waiver means abandonment of a right and it may be either express or implied from the conduct, but its basic requirement is that it must be an intentional act with knowledge. 10. The apex Court in M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1979 SC 621 has held that waiver means abandonment of a right and it may be either express or implied from the conduct, but its basic requirement is that it must be an intentional act with knowledge. There is no waiver unless the person who is said to have waived his rights is fully informed as to his right and with full knowledge of such right, he intentionally abandons it The High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Kundan (deceased) represented by his L.R.S. and another v. Hah Ram, 1988 SLJ 337 following the ratio laid down by the apex court, has held that abandonment must be an intentional act with knowledge. Mere non-participation in the profits does not amount to abandonment. It was further held that it must be specifically pleaded that the person, who is said to have abandoned his right, had full knowledge with respect to his right and he intentionally had abandoned his share. 11. In the present case, what to talk of evidence, there are no pleadings that the plaintiff had full knowledge of his rights in the land in dispute and that he had intentionally abandoned his such rights. Therefore, the learned first appellate court has rightly held that there has been no abandonment on the part of the plaintiff. The alternative case of the defendant that he has acquired title qua the share of the plaintiff also does not stand proved. The defendant, while appearing as DW I has categorically admitted that he never denied the right of the plaintiff in the land in dispute till 1984. The present suit was filed on 4-11-1984, that is, immediately after the denial of the rights of the plaintiff by the defendant. The findings of the learned first appellate court are correct and does not warrant any interference. Since, the plaintiff continued to be a tenant to the extent of half share in the land in dispute, he was entitled to acquisition of proprietary rights in respect thereof. The conferment of proprietary rights on the defendant qua the whole of the land in dispute vide certificate dated 29-10-1966, to the exclusion of the plaintiff, therefore, on the face of it, is bad. 12. The conferment of proprietary rights on the defendant qua the whole of the land in dispute vide certificate dated 29-10-1966, to the exclusion of the plaintiff, therefore, on the face of it, is bad. 12. The learned counsel for the defendant has contended that in the face of the order of the Compensation Officer granting proprietary rights in favour of the defendant, before any relief can be granted to the plaintiff, it is necessary for the plaintiff to get rid of an order made by the Compensation Officer and that though the plaintiff has not expressly asked for the setting aside of such an order, the declaratory decree asked for has to be deemed to be the one to set aside the order of the Compensation Officer. The suit, therefore, would be governed by Article 100, Limitation Act, 1963. The suit having been filed after the expiry of the prescribed period of one year, is hopelessly barred by time, in support of his contention, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the ratio laid down by a Division Bench of this court in State v. Sadh Ram, (1973) HP 235. Following the ratio of the Division Bench in the above referred t case, a learned single Judge in Moti v. Ajudh Raj and another, 1991 Shim. LC. 114 on similar facts and in similar circumstances, has held that the declaratory decree prayed for in the suit had the effect of setting aside the order passed by the Compensation Officer and since Article 100, Limitation Act, 1963, prescribed one year period for filing a suit for setting aside the order passed by an officer of the Government from the date of passing of such order, the suit filed beyond the period of one such order, the suit filed beyond the period of one year would be barred by time. 13. The decision of the learned single Judge in Motis case (supra) was assailed before the apex Court by way of an appeal in Ajudh Raj and others v. Moti, Air 1991 SC 1600. The apex Court distinguished the ratio laid down by the Division Bench and single Judge of this Court. It was held : - "The principle for deciding the question of limitation in a suit filed after an adverse order under a Special Act is well settled. The apex Court distinguished the ratio laid down by the Division Bench and single Judge of this Court. It was held : - "The principle for deciding the question of limitation in a suit filed after an adverse order under a Special Act is well settled. If the order impugned in the suit is such that it has to be set aside before any relief can be granted to the plaintiff the provisions of Article 100 will be attracted and if no particular Article of the Limitation Act is applicable the suit must be governed by the residuary Article 113, prescribing a period of three years. Therefore, in a suit for title to an immovable property which has been the subject matter of a proceeding under a Special Act if an adverse order comes in the way of the success of the plaintiff, he must get it cleared before proceeding further. On the other hand if the order has been passed without jurisdiction, the same can be ignored as nullity, that is, non-existent in the eye of law and it is not necessary to set it aside; and such a suit will be covered by Article 65." 14. In the present case, admittedly the plaintiff was neither a party to nor any notice was issued to him in the proceedings before the Compensation Officer under the provisions of Section 27(4) of the HP. big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953. It appears that the proprietary rights in respect of the land in dispute were conferred on the defendant on the basis of jamabandi for the year 1964-65, copy of which is Ex. P. 2. Admittedly, in such jamabandi the name of the plaintiff is recorded as in possession of the land in dispute alongwith the defendant. Therefore, on the face of it, the proprietary rights could not have been conferred on the defendant alone to the exclusion of the plaintiff. Such an order as such has been passed without jurisdiction inasmuch as the necessary conditions for the exercise of power under section 27(4) of the HP. Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953 were absent. Since the Compensation Officer lacked jurisdiction, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to ask for the setting aside of the order before seeking declaration of his title and joint possession of the land in dispute. Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953 were absent. Since the Compensation Officer lacked jurisdiction, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to ask for the setting aside of the order before seeking declaration of his title and joint possession of the land in dispute. Following the ratio laid down by the apex court in Ajudh Raj and others case (supra), the present suit cannot be held to be barred by time. Resultantly, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs, quantified at Rs. 1500/. Appeal dismissed.