S. VENKATARAMAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition is filed by the landlord against the rejection of his petition for eviction under Section 21 (1) (a), (f) and (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. As in this revision petition, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has mainly relied on the grounds under Section 21 (1) (a) and (h), it is not necessary to refer to the pleadings with regard to the ground under Section 21 (1) (f) of the Act. ( 2 ) THE petitioner's case is that the respondent who is a tenant liable to pay rent of Rs. 475/- per month had failed to pay the rents due from August 1987 to the end of August 1988 and that he failed to pay that amount inspite of service of notice, dated 10-6-1988. According to the petitioner, the respondent was liable to be evicted on that ground under Section 21 (1) (a ). He further pleaded that he had decided to earn some income to augment his meagre salary and rentals by starting a business in condiments with the assistance of his sisters, in the petition premises and that as such he bona fide and reasonably requires the petition premises. ( 3 ) THE respondent-tenant did not dispute the rate of rent. He also did not specifically deny the fact that he had not paid the rent from August 1987. His case was that during July and august 1987 the roof of the premises stated leaking, that with the consent of the petitioner he effected the repairs to the premises spending Rs. 5,900/- that he intimated the amount spent to the petitioner and requested him to adjust it towards the rents payable by him and that he started adjusting the amount spent by him towards rent payable from August 1987 onwards. According to him, the petitioner himself was still due to him Rs. 1,625/ -. He further alleged that the petitioner demanded higher rate of rent at Rs. 750/- per month and because he did not agree to raise the rent, the petitioner has come forward with a plea of requirement of starting a condiments business. He also pleaded that hardship may be caused to him in case he is evicted. 1,625/ -. He further alleged that the petitioner demanded higher rate of rent at Rs. 750/- per month and because he did not agree to raise the rent, the petitioner has come forward with a plea of requirement of starting a condiments business. He also pleaded that hardship may be caused to him in case he is evicted. ( 4 ) THE lower Court on the evidence on record did not accept the plea of the respondent that he effected repairs with the consent of the petitioner or that any amount allegedly spent by him towards repairs was adjustable towards the rent. Further the lower Court relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in modern Hotel, Gudur v K. Radhakrishnaiah and Others, held that as admittedly the petitioner was having an advance of rs. 7,500/- with bun and as the arrears of rent due as on the date of issue of notice was lesser than that amount, the petitioner cannot contend that the respondent is a willful defaulter and seek eviction under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. It did not accept the petitioner's case under Section 21 (1) (h) mainly for tike reasons that the petitioner had come forward with inconsistent version with regard to his sister who was supposed to assist him in carrying on the business. It referred to the circumstance that in the notice, the petitioner had stated that he would take, the assistance of his unmarried sister while in the evidence he sought to make out that his married sister would aenist him. It further pointed out that the petitioner had not established his bona fide need as admittedly another premises which could have been used for the same purpose had fallen vacant and the petitioner had given that premises to one satyanarayana Rao. On these findings, the learned Small causes Judge has rejected the landlords petition. It further pointed out that the petitioner had not established his bona fide need as admittedly another premises which could have been used for the same purpose had fallen vacant and the petitioner had given that premises to one satyanarayana Rao. On these findings, the learned Small causes Judge has rejected the landlords petition. ( 5 ) SRI Papi Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner, as sailed the finding of the lower Court with regard to the ground under section 21 (1) (a) pointing out that the evidence clearly shows that the building in question was constructed in the year 1981 and that as such Part in of the Act was not applicable when the premises were let out to the respondent and that the payment of advance was lawful and the lower Court could not have taken that advance into account to hold, that the respondent was not a defaulter. He relied on the decision of this Court in Chunilal parusram (deceased) by L. Rs. v Bombay Miscellaneous Private limited, in this connection. ( 6 ) ANOTHER contention urged by Sri Papi Reddy is that even if the advance paid by the respondent became refundable, unless tile tenant called upon the landlord to adjust that amount towards the arrears of rent, there is no duty cast on the landlord to make such adjustment and that in a petition for eviction, the tenant cannot put forth the circumstance that certain advance was with the landlord to avoid eviction under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, he haying not exercised the option and asked the landlord to activist the advance towards the rent. In this connection he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in nand Lal Agarawal v Ganesh Prasad Sah and Others, as well as the decision of this Court in Manjunatha Shetty v S. Susheela thimmegowda. The decision in Manjunatha Shetty's case, supra, is entirely based on the decision of the Supreme Court in nand Lal's case, supra. In this connection he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in nand Lal Agarawal v Ganesh Prasad Sah and Others, as well as the decision of this Court in Manjunatha Shetty v S. Susheela thimmegowda. The decision in Manjunatha Shetty's case, supra, is entirely based on the decision of the Supreme Court in nand Lal's case, supra. ( 7 ) WITH regard to the ground under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act, Sri Papi Reddy pointed out that the discrepancy with regard to the question as to which sister was to help the petitioner in running the business was not a material discrepancy; that it is only by a mistake in the notice it had been mentioned that the unmarried sister would assist the petitioner and that the evidence shows that the unmarried sisters of the petitioner are mentally retarded and the petitioner could never have intended to mention that he would take the assistance of such sisters. With regard to the petitioner giving the other premises which became vacant to Satyanarayana Rao, he submitted that, that was a residential portion and the petitioner had mortgaged it to satyanarayana Rao as he was short of funds and that circumstance should not have weighed against the petitioner's claim. ( 8 ) SRI S. K. V. Chalapathy, learned Counsel for the respondent sought to support the findings of the lower Court and apart from the decision in Modern Hotel's case, supra, referred to by the lower Court, he relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in m/s. Sarwan Kumar Onkar Nath v Subhas Kumar Agarwalla and the decision in K. Narasimha Rao v T. M. Nasimuddin ahmed, and contended that these decisions clearly laid down that even without the tenant seeking adjustment of the advance available with the landlord and which is refundable as per the terms of the statute, it is the duty of the landlord to adjust it towards the rent due and the landlord cannot seek eviction under Section 21 (1) (a ). He further submitted that the Supreme court has interpreted the provisions which are in pari materia with the provisions of Section 18 (2) (b) of the Karnataka Rent coptrol Act and has clearly held the even the advance amount collected by the landlord is covered by the provisions and that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court the law laid down in chunilal Parasram's case, supra, cannot be followed. With regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in Nand Lai's case, supra, he submitted that as the judgment in Sarwan Kumar's case, supra, is rendered by a three Judge Bench and as even the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court including the latest one have followed the principle laid down in Sarwan Kumar's case, supra, this Court has to follow the same legal proposition. With regard to the ground under Section 21 (1) (h) he supported the findings of the lower Court on the evidence available on record. ( 9 ) IT is not disputed that the building in question was constructed in about 1981 and in view of Section 2 (2) proviso, parts II and III were not applicable to that building for a period of 5 years. As the lease was granted to the respondent before 1986, the collection of advance amount of Rs. 7,400/- cannot be said to be illegal. But the question is whether after the relevant part became applicable to the premises, the landlord became liable to refund that amount. ( 10 ) SECTION 18 (2) (b) which is the relevant provision reads as hereunder. " (B) save as provided in clause (a) any sum or consideration paid in excess of the agreed rent whether before or after the commencement of this part in consideration of grant, continuance or renewal of the tenancy of the building, after such commencement shall be refunded or returned by the landlord or other person to the person by whom it was paid or at the option of such person otherwise adjusted by the landlord or other person. ? ( 11 ) THERE is no dispute about the fact that no fair rent is fixed for this building. ? ( 11 ) THERE is no dispute about the fact that no fair rent is fixed for this building. As such clause (b) of Section 18 (2) is applicable to this building and the clause clearly stipulates that any sum or consideration paid in excess of the agreed rent even before the commencement of the Part shall be refunded or returned by the landlord or at his option adjusted by the landlord after such commencement. As such though the advance paid by the respondent while taking the premises on lease was not illegal, once Part III became applicable to the premises in 1986, the petitioner became statutorily liable to refund that amount or to adjust the same at the option of the tenant. ( 12 ) IN Chunilal Parasram's case, supra, this Court while interpreting the expression "in excess of the agreed rent" appearing in Section 18 of the Act has held that it would apply only to the amount which has been received by the landlord 'as rent' but in excess of the agreed rent and that it would not apply to a case where the landlord has received something not as rent but as advance or premium. But the Supreme Court while dealing with analogous provision in Bihar Buildings (Lease, rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 in Sarwan Kumar's case, supra, and in Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and eviction) Control Act, 1960 in Modern Hotel's case, supra, has held that provision is applicable even to the advance amount paid by the tenant In K. Narasimha Rao's case, supra, the supreme Court was considering Section 7 (2) of the Tamil Nadu buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, which is also similar to the provision in the Karnataka Act. That was also a case where the tenant had paid a sum of Rs. 3,000/- as advance. In these cases, the Supreme Court has held that even the amount collected as advance by the landlord will have to be refunded by the landlord by virtue of the statutory provision which is the same as the one in Section 18 (2) (b ). In view of these later Supreme Court decisions, I find it not possible to follow the decision in Chunilal Parasram's case, supra. In view of these later Supreme Court decisions, I find it not possible to follow the decision in Chunilal Parasram's case, supra. ( 13 ) THE next point to be considered is whether even in a case where the landlord is liable to refund the amount collected by him in excess of the agreed rent, whether the tenant should specifically seek for adjustment of that amount towards arrears of rent when a notice is issued to him demanding arrears of rent to avoid eviction. ( 14 ) IN Nand Lal's case, supra, the Supreme Court has no doubt held as hereunder:"without the tenant calling upon the landlord to adjust the excess payments towards the arrears of rent, he cannot seek such a right in the suit filed by the landlord by way of defence in the suit for eviction. " ( 15 ) IN Sarwan Kumar's case, supra, the Supreme Court while dealing with Bihar Act and Part III, has observed that it was open to respondent-landlord to appropriate the sum towards the arrears of rent even without any option being exercised as regards such adjustment by the appellant. This decision has been explained in Nand Lai's case, supra and it has been clarified that the judgment does not lay down any general principle that in whatever circumstances, the excess payment had been made and whatever be the period of default, the landlord was bound to adjust the excess payment towards the arrears of rent and that, that judgment was confined to the facts of that case. ( 16 ) HOWEVER, the judgment in K. Narasimha Rao's case, supra, the Supreme Court has specifically raised the following question for determination:"the question, therefore, is whether the said excess amount paid by the tenant to the landlord being available with the landlord the tenant can be held to have committed willful default in payment of rent even though he had not expressly asked the landlord to adjust that amount towards the arrears of rent. "the Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of the Act which as already pointed out is identical to Section 18 (2) (b) of the Karnataka Act. The Supreme Court while following the earlier decision in Modern Hotel's, case, supra, which was under the Andhra Pradesh Act has distinguished the decision in Nand lal's case, supra, and other cases under the Bihar Act as hereunder:"12. The Supreme Court while following the earlier decision in Modern Hotel's, case, supra, which was under the Andhra Pradesh Act has distinguished the decision in Nand lal's case, supra, and other cases under the Bihar Act as hereunder:"12. For the purpose of this case, it is sufficient for us to say that there are provisions in the Bihar Act, which clearly make it illegal to claim or receive any payment in excess of the amount in addition to the rent or any sum exceeding one month's rent in advance and there is a clear declaration that any excess amount received would not be lawful. There is no provision in the Bihar Act corresponding to that in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 7 in the Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh Act, which creates a legal obligation in the landlord to refund the excess amount to the tenant creating a corresponding right in the tenant to recover that amount from the landlord. The absence of such a provision in the Bihar Act making the excess amount refundable and imposing an obligation on the landlord to make that refund immediately or to adjust it, is the distinguishing feature in the Bihar Act. However, on the clear provision of the Tamil Nadu Act which applies in the present case, there is no ambiguity. Further reference to the decisions under the Bihar Act is, therefore/not necessary. " ( 17 ) THE Supreme Court has held that when a sum of rs. 2,850/- was lying with the landlord as excess amount of advance paid by the tenant that alone was sufficient to negative the landlord's claim of ejectment and that the landlord was bound to immediately refund that excess amount even before the arrears accrued and he not having made the refund was bound to adjust it towards the rent due from the tenant and that the tenant could certainly not be held to be a wilful defaulter in the payment of rent. ( 18 ) IN view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court, it has to be held that under the provision of the Karnataka Act also if the landlord is having any amount with him which is refundable under the provisions of Section 18 (2) he is bound to adjust that amount towards the arrears, if any and the tenant cannot be held to be a defaulter merely because he has not specifically asked the landlord to adjust that amount towards arrears. Consequently, the finding of the lower Court that the respondent is not a defaulter and not liable for eviction under Section 21 (lxa) cannot be interfered with. ( 19 ) COMING to the ground under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act, without giving undue importance to the discrepancy referred to by the lower Court, one circumstance is sufficient to negative the petitioner's claim. It is undisputed that the premises in the first floor was vacated by one Sampath Kumar after filing of the petition and the petitioner has allowed one Satyanarayana Rao to occupy the same, According to the respondent, the petitioner has let out that portion to Satyanarayana Rao. However the petitioner alleged that he had actually mortgaged that portion for Rs. 40,000/ -. He admitted that there was no registered mortgage deed and further stated that there was only an agreement. Even that agreement was not produced before the court. . It is Under these circumstances, the lower Court declined to accept the petitioner's version that he has mortgaged that portion to Satyanarayana Rao. With regard to the contention put forth by Sri Papi Reddy that was only a residential portion and could not have been used for commencement of the business in condiments, it is sufficient to refer to the admission made by p. W. 1 himself. P. W. 1 has clearly admitted that though the portion given to Satyanarayana Rao was convenient for starting the business, he gave it to Satyanarayana Rao as he was short of funds. As such there could be no doubt that the proposed business could have been started in that portion, if genuinely petitioner needed accommodation to start the business. Infact, the evidence of P. W. 2 with whose Assistance the petitioner wants to start the business, has stated that she was doing this condiment business even earlier in the house itself. As such there could be no doubt that the proposed business could have been started in that portion, if genuinely petitioner needed accommodation to start the business. Infact, the evidence of P. W. 2 with whose Assistance the petitioner wants to start the business, has stated that she was doing this condiment business even earlier in the house itself. It shows that for doing this business even residential accommodation is sufficient. In view of the conduct of the petitioner in giving the portion which became vacant, either on rent or taking some advance, to another person, the lower Court has rightly held that the petitioner's claim is not bona fide. In the circumstances, i do not find any good ground to interfere with the impugned 'order. ( 20 ) FOR the above reasons, this revision petition is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .