JUDGMENT P.K. Palli, J. (Oral) :- This appeal has been filed by the appellant defendants. Suit, for possession filed by respondent No. 1 /plaintiff seeking a decree for possession in respect of the land in question, was decreed by Am learned trial Court and the first appeal filed by the present appellants/defendants stands dismissed. Parties, herein - after, in the judgment would be referred to as plaintiff and defendants 2. The sole question for consideration before this court is whether the rights on non-occupancy tenants would come to an end on purchase of the la under their tenancy or not. 3. The undisputed facts, as emerged out from the reading of the impugned judgment and record, are that one Thutha was the owner of the land in question and on his death his widow Bholan succeeded as limited owner. The plaintiff is daughter of Bholan. The defendants were .ion-occupancy tenants under the above said Bholan. Bholan vide a registered sale deed Ext. PW-5/A sold the land in question in favour of the defendants in Samat 1996 Vikrami. One Lalman filed a declaratory suit laying challenge to the sale deed as reversioner and vide judgment and decree dated September, 7, 1949, the suit was decreed and it was held that the sale shall have no effect whatsoever on the reversionary rights of the plaintiff in that suit. The decree was confirmed in firs: appeal as well as in second appeal. As a sequence of the sale, defendant No. 1 to 9 were recorded as owners in possession. Bholan died on September 13, 1972. 4. The present plaintiff, Bohri, claiming her self to be the daughter of Bholan, filed the suit out of which this appeal has arisen, as sole legal heir of her mother and also based her claim on the basis o: the decree and judgment passed earlier in the reversionary suit. 5. The suit was contested by defendants No. 1 to 9 asserting themselves to be non-occupancy tenants and a plea had been raised that the sale made by Bholan in their favour, even if set aside would earn" no effect on their fights of tenancy. It may be stated here that apart of the land stood acquired by the State and possession has also been taken over. The impugned decree for possession has been passed in respect of the remaining land. 6. It may be stated here that apart of the land stood acquired by the State and possession has also been taken over. The impugned decree for possession has been passed in respect of the remaining land. 6. The learned trial Court held that Bholan was a limited owner on the death of her husband and the defendants, who were non - occupancy tenants and paying GALLA stopped paying the same after the sale in their favour. 7. It was further held that on account of the sale by Bholan in favour of defendants No. 1 to 9 they lost the non-occupancy tenancy rights on account of doctrine of merger as envisaged by Section 1 l(d) of Transfer of Property Act. The tenancy, thus, stood determined. The suit was, consequently, ordered to be decreed on account of the above said findings. The judgment and decree stands affirmed by the learned first apellate Court. 8. Mr. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the defendants contends that if the sale in favour of the defendants was to be held valid, it would be only in that situation that the doctrine of merger would apply and in no other situation. Mr. Sharma is further at pains to contend that, admittedly, the defendants, were the non-occupancy tenants under Bholan and it was never intended that their tenancy rights shall stand extinguished on account of the purchase of the land by them. 9. It is next pointed out that the plea of merger was not taken in the plaint in the plaintiff has led any evidence on the point and, therefore, the impugned judgments are liable to be set aside. Mr. Sharma has taken me through the contents of the plaint also to substantiate his contention. In further support of his arguments, reliance has been placed on A.I.R. (38) 1951 S.C. 186 (Badri Narain Jha & Ors. v. Rameshwar Dayal Singh & Ors.). A.I.R. 1954 Nagpur 328 (Balapradsad Asram Charkha & Ors. v. Asmabi), 1995(2) S.C.C. 501 (Parmar Kanaksinh Bhagwansinh v. Makwana Shanabhai Bhikhabhai & Ors.) and A.I.R. 1975 Kerala 18 (Krishnan Madhavan v. Narayanan Jayadevan & Ors.) 10. Mr. Kuthiala, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff, in reply, has adopted the same line of reasonings, as has been given by the learned Courts below in the impugned judgments. Mr. v. Asmabi), 1995(2) S.C.C. 501 (Parmar Kanaksinh Bhagwansinh v. Makwana Shanabhai Bhikhabhai & Ors.) and A.I.R. 1975 Kerala 18 (Krishnan Madhavan v. Narayanan Jayadevan & Ors.) 10. Mr. Kuthiala, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff, in reply, has adopted the same line of reasonings, as has been given by the learned Courts below in the impugned judgments. Mr. Kuthiala further contends that immediately on the purchase of the land under their tenancy by the defendants their status as tenants came to an end and they became owners in possession of the toil land. It is further submitted by him that a person cannot be a tenant as well as the owner/ landlord at the same time. The status of these two persons could not co-exist as the same is inconsistent. Reliance has also been placed on A.I.R. 11953 Travancore 584 (Velu v. Lekshmi & Ors.), A.I.R. 1961 Kerala 292 Ummathu v. Ali alias Beva Haji) and S.L.J. 1972 (2) H.P. 301 (Badri Lal & Ors. v. Jai Kishan & Ors.). 11. Having given my thoughful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and after carefully scrutiny of the impugned judgment are record find that there is no merit in this appeal. 12. As per provisions contained in Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, a lease of immoveable property determines- in case the interest of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right. There is, thus, no force in the contention raised by the learned counsel and in my considered opinion, the non-occupancy tenancy rights of the defendants came extinct or to say inferior, as these rights merged into superior rights of ownership on the basis of the sale deed. Reference in this respect can usefully be made to a judgment of Division Bench of this court reported in S.L.J. (2) H.P. 301 (supra). 13. Their Lordships were dealing with Section 14 of-the Hindu Section Act, 1956. In that case a Hindu widow being a limited owner conferred occupancy rights before the Act came into force. The suit was filed by the reversioners to get the Patta creating occupancy rights declared ineffective. The said suit was decreed before the coming into force of the Act. Their Lordships were dealing with Section 14 of-the Hindu Section Act, 1956. In that case a Hindu widow being a limited owner conferred occupancy rights before the Act came into force. The suit was filed by the reversioners to get the Patta creating occupancy rights declared ineffective. The said suit was decreed before the coming into force of the Act. In this situation, it was held that the creation of the rights- of tenancy was in the nature of permanent rights, inasmuch as an occupancy tenant could not be evicted from the land at the sweet will of the landlord. If the widow had become absolute owner of the property that would not mean that on the enlargement of her rights of ownership, the tenants, whose tenancy has been dared void and ineffective either the life time of the widow could get benefit of the rights which a statute had conferred upon the widow It was further held that the rights of tenants continued only no. long as the widow pas alive and not beyond that. While dealing with the scope of Transfer of (Property Act Section 101, it was held that there was a surrender of the rights of non-occupancy tenancy and the moment occupancy tenancy was created there was complete merger of the inferior rights in the superior rights, and once the superior rights are terminated the defendants cannot now claim toe rights of n on-occupancy tenants. 14. The arguments raised by Mr. Sharma, thus, cannot be appreciated in view of this judgment. 15. Coming next to the second submission that no plea of merger was taken by the plaintiff in the plaint. I am not prepared to accept it as there is issue No. 10 on the point and it reads like this, "10, In case issue No. 3 is proved in the- affirmative, whether the non-occupancy rights of the defendants stand extinguished by the doctrine of merger". Again the plea of revival of the non-occupancy tenancy rights was raised by the defendants in their written statement in paras 2 and 4 and in corresponding paras of the replication the plaintiff raised the plea of doctrine of merger. In the situation, it is not open for Mr. Sharma to contend that there was no plea nor there was any evidence on behalf of the plaintiff to subtantiate the same. 16. In the situation, it is not open for Mr. Sharma to contend that there was no plea nor there was any evidence on behalf of the plaintiff to subtantiate the same. 16. Once the issue on the point has been framed and parties are alive to the controversy in question and have addressed arguments in both the learned Courts below, the argument cannot be permitted to be raised in second appeal that the plea was not raised. This was sole question that was debated upon and in this view of the matter the argument is rejected. 17. By no stretch of imagination it can be held that in the event of the sale being set aside there would be an automatic revival of the non-occupancy tenancy rights in favour of the defendants. No circumstance or any piece of evidence has been brought to my notice on the basis of which it could be said that the parties ever intended that in the event of the purchase of the land by the defendants or in the event of the sale made by Bholan being set aside, the same would revive the rights of the defendants, which they held in the land in question prior to the purchase as non-occupancy tenants. 18. The sale made by Bholan was valid only till her life time and in the event of her death it was to revert back to her reversioner. The judgment and decree passed in the declaratory suit by the reversioner calls for no other interpretation. The plaintiff is the sole heir after the death of her mother Bholan, as per mandatory provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956. 19. Lastly, Mr. Sharma contends that he has no quarrel with the declaration in favour of the plaintiff that she has become owner of the suit property, but the rights of the defendants as non-occupancy tenants cannot be given go-bye. I am afraid that this position, as projected by Mr. Sharma, cannot be accepted 20. The case law cited by the learned counsel has been looked into. These are the cases relation to mortgagees and not even remotedly applicable to resolve the present controversy. The judgment of the Apex Court (1995) 2 S.C.C. 501 (supra) on the question of merger rather helps the plaintiff in stead of the defendants. Sharma, cannot be accepted 20. The case law cited by the learned counsel has been looked into. These are the cases relation to mortgagees and not even remotedly applicable to resolve the present controversy. The judgment of the Apex Court (1995) 2 S.C.C. 501 (supra) on the question of merger rather helps the plaintiff in stead of the defendants. That was a case of the property which was already on lease and the landlord created a mortgage security in favour of the lessee by executing a mortgage by conditional sale for the amount borrowed by him from lessee/ mortgagee. It was in that situation, it was held that the leasehold rights of the lessee would not merge in the mortgage security. There was no implied surrender of possession of the property by the lessee and, therefore, in the event of the decree for redemption of the property, the lessee could still claim right to continue in possession of the property as tenant. 21. No other point has been raised or claimed. 22. Both the learned Courts below have carefully dealt with the points raised before them and the impugned judgments are absolutely just and proper and do not call for any interference in second appeal before this court. 23. In view of what has been said above, there is no merit in the appeal, which is, consequently, ordered to be dismissed with no order as to costs.