TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition for a writ of certiorari, the petitioner calls in question the validity of a notice issued by the 2nd respondent karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board calling upon the petitioner to clear arrears amounting to Rs. 17,82,290. 20 on account of water supplied to it by the Board or else face disconnection of the supply with effect from 16th of september, 1987. A mandamus directing the Board to continue the supply of water to the petitioner in accordance with the terms and conditions of an agreement executed between the petitioner-Company and the State is also prayed for. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is a public limited Company who has set up an industrial unit for the manufacture of Caustic Soda in the uttara Kannada District of the State of Karnataka. By an agreement executed between the State Government and the company on the 5th of July, 1971, the Government appear to have agreed to the supply of water to the said Unit on the terms and conditions set out therein. The agreement inter alia stipulated that the Government shall invoice the Company for the water actually supplied to it at the rate of Rs. 177/- per million litres. The rate was inclusive of all impositions including those by way of taxes, duties, fees, surcharge, levies, tolls etc. The agreement was to continue for a period of 20 years and could be extended at the option of the Company for a further period of 5 years. During the currency of the agreement Karnataka Urban water Supply and Drainage Board Act, 1973 was promulgated with effect from 15th of October, 1973. The Act envisaged the creation and incorporation of a Board for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Sections 16 and 17 of the Act identify the functions of the Board and inter alia provide that the Board may either at the instance of the Government or a local authority or even suo motu investigate the nature and the type of Schemes that can be implemented in the area of any local authority for the provision of drinking water and drainage facilities. Execution of schemes, operation and maintenance of drinking water supply and drainage undertakings, levy and collection of water rates, fees, rentals etc. Execution of schemes, operation and maintenance of drinking water supply and drainage undertakings, levy and collection of water rates, fees, rentals etc. , providing technical assistance or giving advice to local authorities in regard to execution and maintenance of urban water supply and drainage works are among others some of the functions, which the Board has to discharge. A reference in further detail to the provisions of the act shall be made a little later. Suffice it to say that with the incorporation of the Board, supply of water to the petitioner-Company was taken over by the Board from the State government, and has been making the supply ever since. In due course, the Board appears to have raised a demand for payment of water charges from the petitioner. The petitioner did not react favourably to this demand and insisted that in the light of the agreement between the State Government and itself, the Board was not entitled to claim charges at a rate higher than what was stipulated by the said agreement. While maintaining that stand the petitioner offered to raise the rate marginally, recognising the fact that the supply of water at the rates originally stipulated in the agreement had become unremunerative. By its letter dated 4th of July, 1986, the petitioner offered to enhance the rate from Rs. 177/- to Rs. 354/- per million litre effective from 1-7-1986. The Board did not however consider this to be acceptable and demanded water rate at Rs. 979 per million litre with effect from 1-1-1987. It also refuted the claim made by the petitioner that the agreement executed between the petitioner and the State was binding upon it or that the Board could not unilaterally revise the water rates. While the parties thus stuck to their respective stands, the Board issued a notice dated 19th of August, 1987 calling upon the petitioner to pay for the water supplied to it at the rate of Rs. 979/- per million litre from 1-1-1987 and Rs. 1,170/- per million litre from 1-4-1987, failing which it threatened to discontinue the supply with effect from 16th of September, 1987. Aggrieved, the petitioner has come up with the present writ petition assailing the validity of the notice and seeking a mandamus for continuing the supply as already indicated earlier. ( 3 ) ( 4 ) MR. 1,170/- per million litre from 1-4-1987, failing which it threatened to discontinue the supply with effect from 16th of September, 1987. Aggrieved, the petitioner has come up with the present writ petition assailing the validity of the notice and seeking a mandamus for continuing the supply as already indicated earlier. ( 3 ) ( 4 ) MR. Ramaswamy Iyengar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, argued that the 2nd respondent-Board was acting as an agent of the 1st respondent-State and was therefore bound by the terms and conditions stipulated in the agreement in question. He contended that the agreement in question constituted a promise which the State or its Agent could not go back on and which could be enforced against the agent as much as the principal on the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Alternatively, he urged that the rates claimed by the Board from time to time and so also their fixation was arbitrary disentitling the Board to enforce the same against the petitioner. ( 5 ) MR. Subbanna, learned Counsel for the Board, on the other hand argued that the Board was a statutory authority created under the provisions of an Act passed by the State Legislature and charged with the duty of discharging the functions assigned to it. He submitted that the Board was not a party to any agreement with the petitioner-Company nor could it be said that the Board was acting as an Agent of the State Government while discharging its functions. He contended that Section 71 of the act saves only such of the contractual obligations as flowed from contracts executed by or on behalf of any local authority relating to operation or maintenance of a water supply or drainage undertaking notified by the Government. The contract between the State Government and the petitioner was not, urged the learned Counsel, saved or recognised by the said provision so as to be enforceable against the Board. Relying upon Section 56 (2) of the Act, Mr. Subbanna contended that the provisions of the act had overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any custom, usage or contract or decree or order of a Court or other authority. Relying upon Section 56 (2) of the Act, Mr. Subbanna contended that the provisions of the act had overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any custom, usage or contract or decree or order of a Court or other authority. He submitted that any contract executed between the State Government and the petitioner forbidding any enhancement in the water rate for a period of 25 years would come in conflict with the statutory power vested in the Board to settle such rates and the terms for the supplies made, under the provisions of the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder and would therefore fall foul of Section 56 (2 ). He lastly urged that the supply at the rate of Rs. 177 per million litre had become impossible without heavy losses to the Board keeping in view the fact that the Board was incurring as on 1-4-1987 an expense of rs. 1,170/- per million litre on a "no profit no loss basis". Relying upon the material produced by him, he argued that an account of the petitioner paying at a much lesser rate, the Board had already incurred a loss running into crores of Rupees, thereby making it highly inequitable and unfair to enforce the stipulations contained in the agreement. ( 6 ) SECTION 71 of the Act inter alia provides that with effect from the date of vesting of water supply and sewerage undertakings of any local authority in the Board, any appointment, notification, order, tax, rates, rentals, fees and other charges, scheme, rule, bye-law form notice etc. , made or issued under the Karnataka Municipalities Act or any other law in so far as it relates to the water supply or sewerage undertakings shall continue in force and be deemed to have been made under the provisions of this Act until it is superseded or modified by any appointment, notification, tax, rates, rentals etc. , made, issued, imposed or granted under this Act. Section 71 (1) (b) relates to obligations and liabilities incurred and contracts entered into with or for the local authorities in regard to operation and maintenance of water supply and drainage undertakings and is for our purposes relevant. , made, issued, imposed or granted under this Act. Section 71 (1) (b) relates to obligations and liabilities incurred and contracts entered into with or for the local authorities in regard to operation and maintenance of water supply and drainage undertakings and is for our purposes relevant. The provision reads thus:"all obligations and liabilities incurred, all contracts entered into, all matters and things engaged to be done by, with, or for the local authority in so far as it related to the operation and maintenance of such of the water supply or drainage undertakings as may be notified by the government shall be deemed to have been incurred, entered into or engaged to be done by, with, or for the board". ( 7 ) A plain reading of the above shows that only such obligations, liabilities and contracts in regard to operation and maintenance of such water supply and drainage undertakings as may be notified by the Government alone are deemed to have been incurred, entered into or engaged to be done by, with or for the Board. Stated conversely, obligations, liabilities and contracts entered into or incurred by the State Government do not qualify for the benefit of the deeming provision extracted above, as the expression local authority used in Section 71 (1) (b) does not include the Government. This is apparent from the definition of the said expression given by Section 1 (15), which defines 'local authority' thus:"local authority" means a municipal corporation, a municipal council, a sanitary board or a notified area committee constituted or continued under any law for the tune being in force". ( 8 ) IT follows that the Act does not transfer an existing obligation or liability whether arising from a contract or otherwise in relation to operation and maintenance of water supply or drainage undertaking except in so far as the said obligation arises qua a local authority. An obligation like the one arising in the instant case against the State Government has not been transferred to or taken over by the Board so as to be capable of being enforced against it. ( 9 ) MR. Iyengar however placed reliance upon Section 28-A of the Act to argue that the Board could operate or maintain only such schemes as were transferred to it by the State Government from a local authority. ( 9 ) MR. Iyengar however placed reliance upon Section 28-A of the Act to argue that the Board could operate or maintain only such schemes as were transferred to it by the State Government from a local authority. He urged that since the power to transfer was restricted to such undertakings as were earlier vesting in a local authority, transfer of other undertakings, that were being managed and operated by the State Government through its own departments like the Public Works Department was beyond the scope of the Act. Any such transfer, argued the learned Counsel, was tantamount to creating an Agency in favour of the Board de hors the provisions of the Act. Maintenance and operation of the undertakings so transferred would, according to the learned counsel, amount to the Board managing them for and on behalf of the State Government in its capacity as an Agent. The argument is no doubt attractive and was attractively presented by Mr. lyengar but the same does not prove to be equally sound on a closer scrutiny. It is true that in terms of Section 28-A of the Act, the Government may by order direct the Board to investigate, prepare and execute any scheme in any local area and may even transfer to the Board the water supply and drainage undertaking from the local authority. It is also true that the scheme or undertaking so transferred would primarily involve maintenance of drinking water and sewerage facilities in any of the local area of any such local authority, but that does not mean that the Board cannot supply water for purposes other than domestic for the benefit of persons other than the residents of any such local area. Section 28-B of the Act provides that the executive Engineer of the Board may on an application by the owner or occupier of any building, arrange, in accordance with such Regulations as may be prescribed, to supply water thereto for domestic consumption and use. 'domestic purpose' does not include supply for any trade, manufacture or business or for purposes of irrigation, construction, fountains, public parks et. 'domestic purpose' does not include supply for any trade, manufacture or business or for purposes of irrigation, construction, fountains, public parks et. , sub-section (2) of Section 28-B however empowers the Board to supply water for any purpose other than the domestic purpose and reads thus:"the Board, may supply water for any purpose other than a domestic purpose on such terms and conditions and in such manner as may be prescribed by regulations". ( 10 ) IT is therefore obvious that supply of water for domestic purposes is not the be all and end all of the functions of the board created under the Act. Reliance by Mr. Iyengar upon the provisions of Section 28-A and the preamble of the Act to show that the same envisaged only regulation and development of drinking water and drainage facilities would in the light of the specific provision contained in Section 28-B (2) be of no assistance. The language employed in the provision extracted above being unambiguous it is not possible to hold that the board is in terms of the provisions of the Act, entitled only to undertake schemes for the supply of water for domestic purposes, so that any supply made beyond the said purpose could be deemed to be outside the purview of the Act and thereby introduce an element of Agency between the State government on the one hand and the Board on the other. This position is made further clear by sub-section (3) of Section 28-B which empowers the Board to supply water to the Government or to any local authority also on such terms as to the charges and as to the period as may be prescribed by the Regulations. In the light of these provisions, I have no difficulty in rejecting the sub-mission made by Mr. lyengar that supply of water by the board to the petitioner-Company being altogether a non-domestic purpose was beyond the scope of its functions and hence should be deemed to have been made on behalf of the state Government in discharge of the later's contractual obligations. lyengar that supply of water by the board to the petitioner-Company being altogether a non-domestic purpose was beyond the scope of its functions and hence should be deemed to have been made on behalf of the state Government in discharge of the later's contractual obligations. ( 11 ) EVEN assuming that the contract executed between the State Government and the petitioner was a contract, which could be deemed to be a contract entered into between the Board on the one hand and the petitioner on the other, yet the question is whether such a contract could survive the rigors of Section 56 (2) of the Act, which runs thus:"save as otherwise provided in this Act the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any custom, usage or contract or decree or order of a Court or other authority". ( 12 ) IT is apparent from a bare reading of the above that the provisions of the Act would take effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any contract, decree or order of the Court. The power to fix rates for supply of water whether the same be for domestic or other purposes is clearly available to the Board under Sections 17 (5) and 28-B (2) and (3) of the Act. While Section 17 (5) relates to levy and collection of water rates fees, rentals and other charges in respect of the undertakings that the Government may specify, Section 28-B (2) and (3) empower the Board to prescribe the terms and conditions, subject to which it makes the supply for non-domestic purposes. The power to prescribe the terms including the rates and fees etc. , is not subject to any contract to the contrary. This implies that the power to prescribe the rate, terms and conditions can be exercised by the Board at its will, so that any contract that may affect such a power shall have to give way to the provisions of the Act having regard to the overriding provisions of Section 56 (2 ). The contract set up by the petitioner is certainly one which purports to negate the power otherwise vested in the board to fix rates and charges for the supplies made by it, and shall therefore stand abrogated by the overriding provisions of section 56 (2), supra. The contract set up by the petitioner is certainly one which purports to negate the power otherwise vested in the board to fix rates and charges for the supplies made by it, and shall therefore stand abrogated by the overriding provisions of section 56 (2), supra. Coming then to the question whether the petitioner can invoke the doctrine of promissory or equitable estoppel, it is to be noted that the claim made by the petitioner is founded on a concluded contract. Non-supply or the insufficient supply in violation of the terms and conditions contained in the said contract would at best tantamount to the respondent-state committing a breach of its contractual obligations. Any such breach may in turn give rise to a claim for payment of compensation by way of damages suffered by the petitioner as a consequence thereof for it cannot be said that adequate monetary compensation to the petitioner would not provide an appropriate redress for the petitioner's grievance. This is so particularly in view of the fact that the petitioner has not accused the 1st respondent-State of acting arbitrarily or unfairly in having discontinued the supply as stipulated by the agreement. No foundation has been laid in the writ petition for the petitioner to contend that the suspension of the supply of water by the State in the circumstances attendant upon the case amounts to the State acting arbitrary and contrary to Article 14. There is therefore no room for this Court to declare the non-supply to be unfair or arbitrary to warrant interference in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. I say so because even when the horizons of Article 14 have been widened by the Supreme Court in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Others v State of uttar Pradesh and Others , to cover even the contractual rights yet in the absence of any specific challenge in the case set up by the petitioner, it is not possible to pronounce the State's inability to supply the requisite quantities of water at the rates stipulated in the agreement to be per se arbitrary to warrant intervention. If that be so the only remedy open to the petitioner was to claim compensation against the State as a substitute for the specific performance of the agreement set up by it. If that be so the only remedy open to the petitioner was to claim compensation against the State as a substitute for the specific performance of the agreement set up by it. That is so because in the absence of a case justifying interference on the touchstone of article 14, the only other remedy, which the law provides to a party aggrieved of the breach of a concluded contract is a civil action for compensation where the contract breached is not capable of specific performance. Doctrine of promissory or equitable estoppel does not find any application in a situation where the rights of the parties have been concretised in a formal and concluded contract which may itself provide for a remedy in the event of a breach. Even in the absence of any such remedy, the ordinary law of the land provides for the same. ( 13 ) ASSUMING however that the petitioner cannot withstanding the concluded nature of the contract call in aid the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the question is whether the said doctrine would really come to its rescue. The principle underlying the doctrine is that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise or representation, which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise or representation is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise or representation would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so, having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties. The doctrine is one in the field of administrative law and is founded in equity to avoid injustice. It is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. The doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield to equity if larger public interest so requires and if it can be shown that having regard to the facts that have transpired it would be inequitable to hold the Government or the public authority to the promise or representation made by it. The doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield to equity if larger public interest so requires and if it can be shown that having regard to the facts that have transpired it would be inequitable to hold the Government or the public authority to the promise or representation made by it. The Court on satisfaction would not in those circumstances raise the equity in favour of a person to whom the promise or representation is made to enforce the promise or representation against the Government or the public authority. See (1) Union of india and Others v M/s, Anglo Afghan Agencies , (2) M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Company Limited v State of uttar Pradesh and Others and (3) Assistant Commissioner of commercial Taxes (Asst.), Dharwar and Others v Dharnendra trading Company. ( 14 ) LET us then examine the question in the light of the facts of the present case. The respondent Board has in the objections filed by it justified its refusal to go by the terms of the agreement on the ground that it is impossible for it to do so without being subjected to heavy financial losses running into crores of rupees. It has filed a statement-Annexure R-1 justifying the water charge demanded by it from the petitioner. A perusal of the statement shows that having regard to the power charges and other inputs the Board was incurring a sum of Rs. 1,107/- per million litres of water supplied by it as in the year 1987-88. It has also produced the details of the electricity tariff for the year 1971-87 from which it appears that as against a total per unit cost of 9. 5 ps. in the year 1971, the per unit cost of electricity had risen to 0. 65 ps. in the year 1987 thereby involving an increase of 584%. These details and statements which amply establish that it is totally unremunerative for the board to supply water to the petitioner at the rates contracted in the agreement have not been disputed by the petitioner nor has the petitioner filed any rejoinder to the specific case of the respondent Board that it has suffered huge losses on account of the non-payment by the petitioner of the water charges at the rates, which the Board has fixed even on no-profit no-loss basis. It is also not disputed that the Board is supplying water even to domestic consumers at the rate of Rs. 1,170/- per million litre and that the said rate has not been questioned by any one till date. For the non-domestic consumers the rate fixed is Rs. 2,340/- per million litres whereas for commercial and industrial consumption, the same has been fixed at Rs. 3,510 per million litre. Supply of water at the rate of Rs. 177/- per million litre fixed more than 20 years ago therefore bears no nexus or intelligible proportion to the actual cost which the Board is incurring. The situation is thus rendered totally inequitable from the point of view of the Board in case it was directed to continue its supply at the obsolete rate of Rs. 177/- per million litre. It is therefore difficult to see how any failure or omission on the part of the Board to continue the supply at the originally contracted rate can be termed to be inequitable for the petitioner so as to entitle it to seek relief from this Court on the doctrine of promissory estoppel. I have in these circumstances, no difficulty at all in rejecting the submission made by Mr. Iyengar that the withdrawal of the supplies by the Board would result in an inequitable situation for the petitioner so as to justify a direction to it to continue the same. ( 15 ) IN the result, this petition fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs. --- *** --- .