Present revision petition/application has been filed questioning the propriety/ legality of the order dated 26.8.1996 passed by Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Shillong whereby cognisance of offence was taken of offences under section 500, 503 and 506 of Indian Penal Code, 1869, hereinafter called IPC for short on a complaint which was filed by the opposite party, hereafter called the complainant, against the applicant, hereafter called the accused, in the proceedings under Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, hereinafter called CrPC for short. 2. According to learned counsel for the accused by filing the complaint the complainant has abused the process of the Court for pressurising and harassing him inasmuch as even if allegations which are made by the complainant against him in the complaint and other papers accompanying it are taken on its face would at most show that the accused did the things in his capacity as an officer of the Management Committee of the school wherein the complainant is working as an employee, so as to enforce discipline in the school which could not be the subject matter of a criminal proceedings in criminal Court. Still the learned Magistrate contends the counsel for the accused, going out of way has illegally taken congnisance of the offences which are not at all disclosed in the complaint or in the papers filed with it and in her initial statement on oath made before the Magistrate. Copies of the complaint, the papers filed with it and the initial statement of the complainant recorded by the Magistrate under section 200 of the CrPC have been filed along with the revision petition. 3. On examination of the above documents this Court admitted the revision application of the accused. The application has been filed under section 482 of the CrPC read with sections 397 and 401 thereof. 4. In section 482 inherent powers of the High Court have been saved for enabling it to make orders, if necessary, to give effect to the orders of the Court passed under the CrPC and for preventing abuse of the process of any Court and for securing the ends of justice. Sections 397 and 401 are revisional powers. 4. In section 482 inherent powers of the High Court have been saved for enabling it to make orders, if necessary, to give effect to the orders of the Court passed under the CrPC and for preventing abuse of the process of any Court and for securing the ends of justice. Sections 397 and 401 are revisional powers. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued this revision on the premise of section 482 for supporting the prayer that the proceeding initiated by the Court of Magistrate on the complainant's complaint may be quashed for serving the ends of justice and for preventing the abuse of the process of the Court. 5. The complainant after entering appearance opposed the application on two counts. Firstly that the Court should dismiss the application without going in the merits of the case for the reason that by filing incomplete and incorrect copy of complainant's initial statement, which was recorded by the Magistrate under section 200 of the CrPC the accused has not only suppressed material evidence from the Court so as to mislead it for obtaining favourable orders but has also by indulging in the said unfair and contemptuous practice has successfully obtained favourable orders from the Court by which the further proceedings in the Court of the Magistrate were stayed. Secondly that the power of this Court under section 482 of the CrPC is to be exercised sparingly and not as a matter of course only because a point has been made out to raise a doubt in the correctness of the order of the Magistrate. It was lastly contended that the complaint and its connected papers read with the complainant's initial deposition disclosed the offences of which congnisance has been taken by the learned Magistrate by means of the impugned order, hence revision application deserves to be dismissed. 6. I have heard argument of Shri Bhattacharyya assisted by Smti Minoti Sharma and others on behalf of the accused and Shri BK Sharma for the complainant at a considerable great length. Outlines of the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties have already been noticed herein above. More of it in great detail would be noticed as and when required. 7. Outlines of the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties have already been noticed herein above. More of it in great detail would be noticed as and when required. 7. Before adverting to the merits of the case it is necessary first to consider the charge levelled on complainants behalf on the accused of filing incorrect and incomplete copy of complainant's initial statement which was recorded before the Magistrate. It is to note that this shortcoming was not disclosed in the counter affidavit filed by the complainant but at the time when the matter was taken up for hearing causing adjournment of hearing for clearing the cloud. 8. The complaint, with all its Annexures, as was filed in the Magistrate's Court has been filed as Annexure 1 to the petition extending between pages 22 to 50. Copy of the complainant's initial statement is Annexure 2, it is in six pages extending between pages 51 to 56. A perusal of Annexure 2 would show that signature of the Presiding Officer of the Court as well as of the complainant occurs at page 53 as well as on page 56. Normally such signatures are affixed at the end of the deposition. A correct copy of the said deposition was filed on complainant's behalf with an affidavit. Accused also filed proof showing that the earlier copy of the initial deposition was filed as it was made available to him by the Magistrate's Court. Full text of the initial deposition of complainant runs in 12 pages, in the copy which has been filed by the complainant at the relevant points on page 3 and on page 6 where signatures of complainant and of the Presiding Officer of the Court, appears in the copy filed with revision application, signatures are missing, however, a line in black colour is present whereas in the certified copies of the statement filed by the accused with his affidavit dated 7.7.97 (which was filed after the objection against filing of incorrect and incomplete copy of the statement was raised in the Court on behalf of the complainant) would show that the copy of the initial statement of the complainant has been issued in two parts, 1st part is exactly the same as has been filed with the application, the second part of the statement shows that it is in continuation of the 1st part. The 1st part was issued on 16.12.96 on application dated 14.10.96, whereas the second part was issued on 17.6.97 on application dated 13.6.97, copies of both applications too have been filed with the affidavit of the accused which would show that accused applied for the copy of the initial statement recorded on 26.8.96 on 14.10.96. At the end of page 6, which has been identified herein before as the 1st part, apart from the signature of complainant and the PO of the Court, words "Typed by KKS Shabong" also appears. These words however do not appear at page 3 where too the signatures of the complainant and the PO appear. This would go to show that the accused had not played any mischief so as to project a false or incorrect or incomplete version of initial deposition of the complainant. He filed the copy of the initial deposition as was given to hi m by the copying department of the Magistrate's Court. From the appearance of the copy which was supplied to the accused by the copying section of the Magistrate's Court too the accused could not reasonably believe that what was supplied to him in response to his application dated 14.10.96 was an incomplete text of the initial deposition of the complainant. This circumstance, therefore, should close the chapter of suspicion as has been raised on the conduct of the accused by the counsel for the complainant. The facts and circumstances noticed herein above amply demonstrate that the accused has not played tricks with this Court so as to procure favourable orders. He fell prey to the failings of the clerks of the Magistrate Court who, in a most casual manner, supplied incomplete copy of the initial deposition of the of the complainant to the accused. Merits : 9. Shri AK Bhattacharyya., the learned counsel for the accused read and re-read the complaint, its Annexures and the full text of the initial deposition of the complainant for emphasising the point that the entire material available before the learned Magistrate disclosed none of the offences of which the learned Magistrate has taken congnisance of. According to Shri Bhattacharyya only incriminating, conduct which has been attributed by the complainant against the accused in his personal capacity (though according to him that too is not so) is the writing of letter. According to Shri Bhattacharyya only incriminating, conduct which has been attributed by the complainant against the accused in his personal capacity (though according to him that too is not so) is the writing of letter. Annexure VII on 19th July, 1995 by the accused to the complai­nant and the act attributed to the accused in para 8 of the complaint petition read with her initial deposition occuring at pages 7 to 9. Other acts attributed to the accused, in the complaint and in the complainant's statement, to which too exception has been taken, says the learned counsel, are acts performed by the accused in his official capacity at the direction of the Managing Committee of the school of which the accused was the Secretary. Shri Bhattacharyya further argued that apart from other acts of the accused which are apparently done on the directions of the Managing Committee, the act of writing letter dated 19.7.95 (Annexure VII to the complaint petition) and act of saying things attributed to him in para 8 of the complaint being in connection with the management affairs of the school are also not the acts done in accused's private capacity. According to the learned counsel, whatever role has been assigned to the accused by the complainant, all are the things relating to day to day management affairs of the school for which acts accused cannot be dragged in Court to face trial. Specially when none of the acts attributed in the complaint to the accused can be said to be beyond the authority of the Management Body of the school. According to the learned counsel, if such complaints from employees of the school are entertained by Court for calling employers to face trial in Court the cause of education imparted in the schools would suffer as none entrusted with the management work would unnecessarily buy trouble and die teachers and other employees of the school would then not observe discipline with the result young boys studying in the primary and middle classes in the schools would be the worst sufferers. 10. Shri BK Sharma, appearing for the complainant, however, refuted arguments of Shri Bhattacharyya. He denied that the accused as Secretary of the Management Committee of the school possessed any lawful authority to take upon himself to regulate the functioning of the school teachers so as to restore discipline in them. 10. Shri BK Sharma, appearing for the complainant, however, refuted arguments of Shri Bhattacharyya. He denied that the accused as Secretary of the Management Committee of the school possessed any lawful authority to take upon himself to regulate the functioning of the school teachers so as to restore discipline in them. Learned counsel, further contended that as per Rule 8 of Assam Elementary Education Rules, which have been applied in the State of Meghalaya and are applicable in the school, it is the President of the Managing Committee who alone is vested with the power of issuing warning to teachers and accused as Secretary of the Managing Committee has been given no role in the said Rule 8 to administer the functioning of the school or to restore discipline amongst the teachers of the school. Shri Sharma also contended that whatever was done by the accused (as has been stated in para 8 of the complaint and as is evident from the perusal of Annexure VII to the complaint petition) was his own doing against the complainant without the authority either of an employer or of a Manager as he would pick up any available opportunity to insult the complainant. Shri Sharma further suggested that had the letter dated 19.7.1995 (Annexure VII to the complaint petition) been written by the accused with the concurrence of the Committee of Management of Schools, then like in other letters which he has sent to the complainant the words "I have been directed to say" would also have occurred in that letter too; absence of the above words, contended Shri Sharma, would suggest that it was written by the accused in his personal capacity and not as the Secretary of the Managing Committee. 11. Before dealing with the facts and testing them in the light of the offences of which cognisance lias been taken by the learned Magistrate it would be useful to notice the relevant provisions of the IPC. 12. In the IPC, Chapter XXI deals with offence of defamation. Whereas Chapter XXII deals with the offence of criminal intimidation, insult and annoyance. The learned Magistrate has taken congnisance of the offence under section 500, which falls in Chapter XXI, and sections 503 and 506 which falls under Chapter XXII. 13. Section 499 defines defamation. It's main part (exclusive of the explanations, illustrations and exceptions) reads as follows : "499. Whereas Chapter XXII deals with the offence of criminal intimidation, insult and annoyance. The learned Magistrate has taken congnisance of the offence under section 500, which falls in Chapter XXI, and sections 503 and 506 which falls under Chapter XXII. 13. Section 499 defines defamation. It's main part (exclusive of the explanations, illustrations and exceptions) reads as follows : "499. Defamation - Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations makes, or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of such person, is said except in the case hereinafter excepted to defame That person."' 14. Section 499 would show that if a person makes an imputation, by spoken words or by any communication addressed to another person intended to harm his/her reputation, knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation would harm the reputation of such person will be guilty of defaming that person until his act of defamation is covered by one of the exceptions provided in the section itself. In all Seven Exceptions have been mentioned in the section. According to Shri Bhattacharyya whatever is attributed in the complaint against the accused is covered by exception seventh hence offence of defamation by no stretch of imagination will be made out against the accused. On the other hand, Shri Sharma, refuting the argument of Shri Bhattacharyya, contended that acts attributed against the accused by the complainant make out the offence of defamation and the same are not covered by the Seventh Exception of the section. Exception Seventh and the illustration appended to it reads as follows: "Seventh Exception - Censure passed in good faith by person having lawful authority over another - It is not defamation in a person having over another with any authority, either conferred by law or arising out of a lawful contract made with that other, to pass in good faith any censure on the conduct of that other in matters to which lawful authority relates. Illustration : A judge censuring in good faith the conduct of a witness, or of an officer of the Court; a head of a department censuring in good faith those who are under his orders; a parent censuring in good faith a child in the presence of other children; a school master, whose authority is derived from a parent, censuring in good faith a pupil in the presence of other pupils; a master censuring a servant in good faith for remissness in service a banker censuring in good faith the cashier of his bank for the conduct of such, cashier are within this exception." 15. Section 500 provides the punishment for the offence of defamation. It only says "whoever defames another shall be punished..." Therefore for attracting punishment under section 500 the definition of the offence of defamation given in section 499 has to be borne in mind. Similarly in Chapter XXII, section 503 defines that is criminal intimidation, whereas section 5 06 provides for punishment for that offence. It is, therefore, necessary to know what act amounts to criminal intimidation. Section 503 reads : "503. Criminal Intimidation - Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the persons of reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation." A reading of the section would show that the offence of criminal intimidation would be committed by a person if that person threatens any other person with injury either to his person or to his reputation or property or to the person of reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, for causing alarm to that person or to compel that person to do any act which that person is not legally bound to do or for preventing him from doing an act which that person is legally entitled to do. 16. 16. Learned counsel for the complainant however could not point out any particular allegation in the complaint petition or in the supporting papers as well as in the initial statement of the complainant from which offence of criminal intimidation is said to be made out against the accused. His emphasis was confined to para 8 of the complaint and to Annexure VII which, if read with other Annexures, as per the learned counsel, would constitute the offence of defamation. 17. Hence as per the argument of Mr. Sharma whatever has been said against the accused by the complainant in her complaint petition and in the supporting documents as well as in her initial deposition would constitute the offence of defamation, whereas none of the material available before the learned Magistrate disclosed offences under sections 503 and 506. Thus in the light of the argument of Shri Sharnia himself cognisance of these offences against the accused by the learned Magistrate was illegally taken. 18. Before cognisance of an offence which is punishable under any law can be taken by a Court of Law, the Court must have before it sufficient material for reaching a prima facie satisfaction that the accused is guilty of that offence. Where there is total absence of material before the Magistrate/Court disclosing commission of an offence of which cognisance hag been taken by him, the act of the Magistrate/Court taking cognisance would be without the authority of law, whicii would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. In such a situation the High Court, whose power for preventing abuse of the process of the Court and for securing the ends of justice, has been saved by section 482 of CrPC would be duty bound to intervene so as to prevent the Magistrate or the Court from proceeding further in its abuse of the process of the Court. 19. Now it is necessary to notice relevant judicial precedents in this regard. 20. In Bhajan Lai (State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lai, AIR 1992 SC 604 ) case the Supreme Court while concluding the case spelled out the true scope of interference by the High Court, in exercise of its inherent power either under Article 226 of the Constitution or under section 482 of the CrPC. 20. In Bhajan Lai (State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lai, AIR 1992 SC 604 ) case the Supreme Court while concluding the case spelled out the true scope of interference by the High Court, in exercise of its inherent power either under Article 226 of the Constitution or under section 482 of the CrPC. The criteria for interference are as follows : (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence under section 15 6 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of section 155 (2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under section 155 (2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legaj bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 21. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 21. Earlier the Supreme Court in State of Bihar vs. Murad AH Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1 while dealing with the question relating to the scope of power under section 482 of CrPC held as follows : "Jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. It should not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate when the evidence comes before him. Though no inflexible rules could be laid down to regulate the High Court's jurisdiction, when the Court is called upon to exercise this jurisdiction to quash a proceeding at the stage of the Magistrate taking cognisance of an offence the 'High Court is guided by the allegations, made in the complaint do not inlaw constitute or spell out any offence and whether resort to criminal proceedings would, in the circumstances, amount to an abuse of the process of the Court or not ?” 22. In another case the Apex Court ruled as follows : "The inherent power of High Court under section 482 is intended to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and to secure ends of justice. Such powers are as much controlled by principle and precedent as are its express powers by statute. It cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the Code. If a matter is covered by an express letter of law, the Court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisions of instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by cheaply invoking jurisdiction of the criminal Court. Complainant herein is an Advocate. He lost in both the Courts in the rent control proceedings and has now rushed to the criminal Court. This itself speaks volumes. Add to this the fact that another suit between the parties was pending from 1975. Complainant herein is an Advocate. He lost in both the Courts in the rent control proceedings and has now rushed to the criminal Court. This itself speaks volumes. Add to this the fact that another suit between the parties was pending from 1975. The conclu­sion is inescapable that invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal Court in this background is an abuse of the process of law and the High Court should not have glossed over this important fact while declining to exercise its power under section 482 CrPC." (See Chanurapal Singh vs. Maharaj Singh, AIR 1982 SC 1238 ) 23. From the law settled by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar vs. Murad AH Khan (supra) it is clear that whenever the High Court is called upon to exercise its inherent jurisdiction either on the revisional side or on an application under section 482 CrPC for quashing proceedings at the initial stage when Magistrate has taken congnisance by issuing process, the High Court has to be guided only by the allegations made in the complaint'or in the FIR and the supporting documents and not on the plausible and probable defence that the accused may take in regard to the disclosed material. A reference in this respect may also be had on the decision of the Supreme Court in Smti Chapd Dhawan vs. Jawahar Lai, AIR 1992 SC 1379 . 24. From the guidelines laid down in Bhajan Lai (supra) it is to be seen that the High Court would be justified in quashing an order of the Magistrate taking cognisance of an offence in a case where the material available donot disclose any of the offences whatsoever. Further interference would be justified if from the facts it appears that the complainant by taking recourse to the criminal proceeding against the accused is settling her own course and the proceedings is tainted with her malafide. 25. On behalf of the complainant reliance, however has been placed on the following judgments : (i) Judgment dated 16.6.97 in Criminal Revision No.435 of 1996; (ii) State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal (supra); (iii) (1996) 7 SCC 440 , Mustaw Ahmed vs. Md. Habibur Rahman Haizi & others; (iv) (1996) 8 SCC 164 , State of Bihar vs. Rajendra Agarwal; (v) AIR 1983 SC 622 , Dr. VK Katharia vs. State of Haryana. Habibur Rahman Haizi & others; (iv) (1996) 8 SCC 164 , State of Bihar vs. Rajendra Agarwal; (v) AIR 1983 SC 622 , Dr. VK Katharia vs. State of Haryana. This case relates to the desirability of the High Court and Supreme Court in exercising power under Article 13 6, Article 226 and Article 32 of the Constitution in favour of petitioner, who obtained an order of status quo by making false representation. This case would therefore not relate to scope and purview of the power of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or under section 482 CrPC in the matter of a criminal proceedings. The reference of this case given by the learned counsel appears to be faulty. 26. These reference, except for Dr. VK Katharia (supra), according to the learned counsel, are in relation to the scope of the power of High Court, in the matter of interference against order taking cognisance of offences. Since after Bhajan Lai (supra) there has been no change in the law on the subject and in all the subsequent judgments either by the Apex Court of the land or by the High Courts the very same principles stated in Bhajan Lai (supra) have been adopted/ reiterated it would not be of much benefit to discuss each of the cited cases specially so when Shri Sharma has not indicated as to which part of the cited judgments bear relevance to which of his argument, Shri Sharma's emphasis only was on the scope of the power of this Court. His contention in that regard was that this Court would not really interfere to set aside or quash an order of a criminal Court taking cognisance of offence against an accused person because the accused person does not want to appear before the Court to face trial for the reason that he has got some plausible explanation in his defence. 27. So far the above contention of Shri Sharma is concerned there is no denying the principles of law put forth in his argument. Necessary corolory of his argument apparently would be that this Court has the power to set aside and quash an order of a Court taking cognisance of an offence if the material on which the cognisance is taken does not disclose that offence. Necessary corolory of his argument apparently would be that this Court has the power to set aside and quash an order of a Court taking cognisance of an offence if the material on which the cognisance is taken does not disclose that offence. Hence if no offence is made out from the disclosed material, concedes Shri Sharma, it will be a sheer abuse of the process of the Court to compel the accused to appear in the Court which has issued the process to the accused calling him to face trial. Shri Sharma. however, denies that the material available with the learned Magistrate did not disclose the commission of the offences by the accused of which cognisance has been taken by him. The argument thus revolves around the question as to whether the offences of which the learned Magistrate has taken cognisance by his impugned order do or do not disclose commission of any of those offences; taking the allegations and the material on record on their face value. 28. Having understood the scope of section 482 and the extent of this Court's power it is now necessary to find out whether in the present case accused has been successful in establishing abuse of the process of the Court by the complainant resulting in the Magistrate taking cognisance of the offences against him. For this purpose a general review of the allegations made in the complaint petition and in the supporting documents and in the initial deposition of the complainant will be necessary. 29. Paras 1 and 2 are attributed to complainant's own introduction. In para 3, the complainant has highlighted her own appreciation regarding performance of her duties in the school with reference to the heavy load of work assigned by the school administration to her and the malafide attitude of accused in finding fault with her work without any basis though her work was found commendable by her colleagues, guardians of students, the students and the general public. In paras 4, 5. 6 and 7 she has highlighted the injustice meted out to her in not appointing her on the post of Headmistress of the school after the post had fallen vacant and illegal appointment of Smti L. Barua, her junior on that post; filing of a representation by her against the illegal appointment of Mrs. L. Barua. In paras 4, 5. 6 and 7 she has highlighted the injustice meted out to her in not appointing her on the post of Headmistress of the school after the post had fallen vacant and illegal appointment of Smti L. Barua, her junior on that post; filing of a representation by her against the illegal appointment of Mrs. L. Barua. Copy of the representation filed by her is Annexure VIA to the complaint petition. It would show that it is addressed to the accused with a copy of it to the President of the school. Para 4 and the concluding part of the representation makes an interesting reading, it is as follows: "The present incumbent as the Headmistress of the school has gone on leave from 20.3.95 for a month or so and 1 have not even been given the charge of the Headmistress in her absence as was done by the previous Headmistress. Will it be logical and justified for the Assistant Headmistress of the Lower Primary Section to look after the Upper Primary Section too, if the Assistant Headmistress of the Lower Primary is given the charge? So it appears to me as if there is a design against me to lower down my prestige creating an insulting situation in the school. Under the circumstances, I would like to submit that the deprivation of my legitimate right as well as the insulting situation so created in the school has been standing on the way of or discharging my duty even as a teacher with impetus and zeal. I, therefore, strongly argue that for ends of justice such an unusual procedure for the appointment of Headmistress of the school requires review without any further delay in order to avoid any unpleasant situation. In this context, it may not be out of place to mention that an aggrieved person for no fault of hi s/her part can take all possible steps under the law for safeguarding the legitimate right and bonafide claim and also for redress of his/her grievance. Waiting for your valued decision in the matter within a month from the date of receipt of this representation." 30. It appears, the Managing Committee of the school felt that the representation was written by the complanant in a bad taste. A communication was accordingly sent to her by the Managing Committee through the accused. Waiting for your valued decision in the matter within a month from the date of receipt of this representation." 30. It appears, the Managing Committee of the school felt that the representation was written by the complanant in a bad taste. A communication was accordingly sent to her by the Managing Committee through the accused. The letter which is Annexure VIB in the complaint petition reads as follows : "Madam, I am directed to say that the Enquiry Committee constituted by the Managing Committee held on 31st August 1995 discussed the matter mentioned above and has come to the conclusion that it does not see its way to recommend for favourable consideration of your representation by the Managing Committee more so in view of the fact that the arrangement made by the Managing Committee appointing Smti L. Barua as Headmistress of the school was a stop gap arrangement in the interest of the school. It is also to be noted that it has come to the knowledge of the Sub Committee through the available papers that you hold no less than the post of Assistant Headmistress should undertake part time work in Shillong College without prior permission from the school authority. Your conduct in this respect tantamount to indiscipline and gross misconduct detrimental to the proper management of the school authority. Now, in pursuance of these decisions of the Enquiry Committee (Sub Committee) you are directed to explain your lapses and also to inform whether you are interested to continue in this school. Your reply should reach the undersigned within 15 days of receipt of this letter." 31. Annexure VIC is a review petition which petitioner filed with the Managing Committee addressing it to the accused. A perusal of it would show that though it is titled as review petition it is in fact a rejoinder to the Secretary's (accused) letter Annexure VIB, In paras 8 complainant has narrated the things said and done by the accused to her in the school premises on 18.7.1995, and in para 9 reference of the accused writing to her the letter dated 19.7.95 (Annexure VII to the complaint petition). Since too much emphasis has been attached to para 8 and on the letter dated 19.7.95, it would be useful to quote both of them. . They read as follows "8. Since too much emphasis has been attached to para 8 and on the letter dated 19.7.95, it would be useful to quote both of them. . They read as follows "8. Surprisingly enough the accused accosted the complainant during the school hours in presence of her colleagues on the corridor of the school premises while she was moving on duty and rebuked her in objectionable language within the hearing of others happened to be present on the spot at that relevant point of time. By such unprovoked action on the part of the accused, the complainant suffered in estimation of her colleagues and others happened to be there on 18.7.95. The accused did not stop there. Following day (i.e. on 19.7.95) he wrote an open letter to the complainant whereby irreparable injury was caused and added to the insult already hurled upon her. The accused in the instant case to feed fat to his grudge against the complainant for submission of her representation against the decision of the Managing Committee whereby she was deprived of her right to promotion to the post of Headmistress of the school in violation of rules and regulations of the department and consequently he, without any rhyme or reason or any basis whatsoever, used willfully defamatory words in presence of colleagues of the complainant of the school and others present in the passage of the school building on 18.7.95 and as a result thereof she was lowered in the estimation of her colleagues and others concerned. The Secretary went beyond his jurisdiction in uttering the defamatory words against the complainant who felt highly aggrieved by such illegal acts and deeds of the accused/' Letter dated 19.7.95 read as follows : ' "Madam, On 13.7.95 at about 11.15 AM while I was discussing some important matters with the Headmistress in her chamber, you were found loitering outside the class room thereby neglecting your normal duties. This is an act of gross indiscipline and dereliction of duties. You are hereby asked to explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against you for gross indiscipline and dereliction of duties on your part. This is an act of gross indiscipline and dereliction of duties. You are hereby asked to explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against you for gross indiscipline and dereliction of duties on your part. Your reply should reach the undersigned within fifteen days from the date of receipt of this letter." In para 10 to 13 petitioner has given account of letters exchanged between her and the accused and initiation of the disciplinary proceedings against her on the charge of joining another educational institution as a part time teacher and her own explanation of the charge etc. In para 14, complainant has taken exception to the conduct of the accused writing her letter dated 18.12.1995 giving her some directions. According to her this letter also was defamatory and showed malafide attitude of the Secretary (accused) against her. The letter is Annexure XI and is dated 1.6.96 whereas complainants reply to that letter is Annexure XII and is dated 14.6.96. Perusal of letter dated 1.6.96 would show that it was sent by the accused on the directions of the Managing Committee to inform her about the resolution dated 31.5.96 passed by Managing Committee against teachers of the school taking part time or whole time jobs elsewhere and cancellation of previous permission if already accorded to by anyone and at the same time requiring the complainant to furnish the 'alleged permission' in original which according to her reply dated 21.3.96 was given to her by the accused in that regard; letter of original permission was to be returned to her after verification. In the second para of the letter the complainant was to be directed to improve her conduct and devote whole heartedly to the welfare of the school and to desist from activities which could be .detrimental to the healthy growth of the school. In her reply the complainant was virtually refused to supply the original permission letter on the ground that she was under medical care. She also questioned the authority of the Managing Committee giving her warning without holding proper enquiry after serving charge sheet on her. She attributed the demand of the original letter of permission as a proof of the enquiry proceeding against her being inconclusive. She refuted the charge of serving the school half heartedly or heartlessly. She also questioned the authority of the Managing Committee giving her warning without holding proper enquiry after serving charge sheet on her. She attributed the demand of the original letter of permission as a proof of the enquiry proceeding against her being inconclusive. She refuted the charge of serving the school half heartedly or heartlessly. She stated further that she comes to school before time and is burdened with heaviest routine with mostly major subjects. From these two letters it would not appear that the accused did anything to the complainant of his own so as to undermine her reputation. Communicating to her the decisions taken by the Managing Committee by the accused in his official position as Secretary was taken ill by the accused. In her reply too complainant has not attributed any malafide against the accused. In para 15 the allegation is that on 17.5.96 the Headmistress had gone on leave and had given charge of Headmistress in writing to a teacher of the nursery section instead of the complainant, who happened to be the Assistant Headmistress, presumably on the instruction of the Secretary and President of the Managing Committee. This too was taken by the complainant as an act to defame her. Paras 16,17 and 18 do not relate to any particular conduct of the accused. Para 19 relates to the sending of lawyers notice requiring the accused for making amends for his acts of defamation within 15 days from the receipt of the notice which was however received by her unserved. Paras 20 and 21 are formal paras which needs no reference. Allegations in para 8 of the complaint petition, which has been extracted herein above now may be examined so as to find out whether any of the offences of which the learned Magistrate has taken cognisance against the accused is made out from this para. The allegations in the para are : that the accused accosted the complainant during the school hours in the presence of her colleagues while she was moving in the corridor of the school on duty. the accused rebuked her in objectionable language within the hearing of others (who) happened to be present on the spot at that time. the above unprovoked action of the accused caused her to suffer in the estimation of her colleagues and others who happened to be there. the accused rebuked her in objectionable language within the hearing of others (who) happened to be present on the spot at that time. the above unprovoked action of the accused caused her to suffer in the estimation of her colleagues and others who happened to be there. on the next day the accused wrote an open letter to her causing irreparable injury adding more insult to her; the acts done by the accused (i.e. accosting her. in the school, rebuking her in objectionable language in the presence of her colleagues and next day writing to her letter for compounding the injury to her reputation) was the result of her filing the representation against Managing Committee decision which had deprived her of her lawful right or appointment on the post of school's Headmistress; and that the defamatory words used by the accused in the presence of her colleagues and others on 18.7.95 was unprovoked which has relulted in her being lowered down in the estimation of her colleagues and others. 34. It is noteworthy that in this para or for that matter in no other paragraphs 'of the complaint petition the complainant has mentioned the actual words which were used against her by the accused on 18.7.95 when he had accosted her in the corridor of the school while she was going for her duty. The word used in para 8 only is that the accused 'Rebuked her in objectionable language' but what language was used by the accused which appeared to the complainant objectionable has not been stated. It is, therefore, necessary to examine in this connection her initial deposition so as to find out whether she has mentioned these 'objectionable words' in her deposition which the accused allegedly used against her. Learned counsel for the complainant referred to the following statement of the complainant's initial statement to stress that the same were insulting and defamatory hence objectionable. At page 7 the statement reads as follows : '" in a very harsh manner al the top of his voice shouted at me why are you loitering and neglecting your duty." No other word allegedly used by the accused has been stated by the complainant in her initial deposition. At page 7 the statement reads as follows : '" in a very harsh manner al the top of his voice shouted at me why are you loitering and neglecting your duty." No other word allegedly used by the accused has been stated by the complainant in her initial deposition. She also does not state as to who else heard the loud rebuke administered by the accused to her except that colleagues and students of adjacent room of Class II too heard it and teachers came out from the staff room. She further stated "students looked at me, I felt insulted in front of my colleagues and students." Students are of Class II what had happened would obviously be not known to them due to their age which is such where happenings of the nature could not be understood by them. She has not named one single teacher, who with other teachers came out of the staff room, she has also not examined any other person. Accused is a highly educated person. It appears he is a D. Phil. He has been a Professor of Shankardev College of Shillong. He is the appointing authority of the teachers and employees of the school. As the Secretary of the Managing Committee he is its chief executive. He has to write letters to teachers, employees and Governmental authorities on behalf of the Managing Committee and letters to Managing Committee written by others are addressed to him. He is thus the chief spokesman of the school management. Normally head of the school is appointed as the Secretary so as to have a grip on the school administration. In the present case Secretary is a non employee. Whatever words the accused allegedly used against the complainant on 18.7.95 do not come within the purview either of insult or defamation. In none of her representations, which the complainant filed against her alleged super session by appointment of a junior teacher on the post of School Headmistress, was attributed to complainant's malafide disposition toward the accused. Even in her deposition in the Court she has not said so. From these, it is evident that the accused had no private animosity or a score of his own to settle with the complainant. Even in her deposition in the Court she has not said so. From these, it is evident that the accused had no private animosity or a score of his own to settle with the complainant. In this background even if what is attributed to the accused by the complainant in para 8 of the complaint and writing of letter dated 19.7.1995 by accused to her as substantiated by her own initial deposition at page 7 (referred to herein above) would at the most show that the accused was trying to discipline the complainant. Job of the Managing Committee is not confined only to making orders of appointment, suspension and termination etc. Their job extends also to ensure proper discipline and management of the studies and other academic activities of the students in the school. It is with this purpose in mind that normally the head of the institution is appointed as the Secretary of the Managing Committee so that with his/her constant presence in the school he/she may be able to ensure proper and efficient working by other teachers and employees of the school. In the present case, however, instead of Headmistress being the Secretary of the Managing Committee the accused having teaching background was given the job. In these circumstances visit by the accused in the school premises during the working hours and his accosting and disciplining the complainant for refraining her from loitering ad neglecting her school duties does not appear to be acts of unusual nature. As Secretary of the Managing Committee of the school he enjoyed the status and power of an employer as against an employee. Such acts, therefore, do not either constitute insult or defamation much less intimidation. Shri Sharma taking aid of Rule 8 refuted the authority of the accused to exercise supervisory or managerial functions over the school teachers and employees. Mr. Sharma, however, has not been able to show any rule which identifies the powers of the Secretary and President of the School Managing Committee. Rule 8 of which reference has been given only empowers the President to issue a letter of warning to an erring teacher. It, however, does not state the respective powers of the President or the Secretary. As already noted Secretary is the appointing authority of all teachers and employees of the school. Rule 8 of which reference has been given only empowers the President to issue a letter of warning to an erring teacher. It, however, does not state the respective powers of the President or the Secretary. As already noted Secretary is the appointing authority of all teachers and employees of the school. Though decision to appoint, suspend, punish or terminate an employee is taken by the Managing Committee but effect to such a decision is given by the Secretary who issues the order in his own name and under his own signature. He is the chief spokesman of the Managing Committee. All correspondences with the Managing Committee by outsiders and teachers etc is made through him. The rules do not specify as to who would be responsible for restoration of discipline amongst teachers and employees of the school. Being the principal executive authority and chief whip of the Managing Committee the Secretary is the proper person who has to inspect the school and ensure proper discipline amongst the teachers and other employees of the school on behalf of the Managing Committee of the school. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the suggestion of Shri Sharma that it is only the President of the Managing Committee and not its Secretary who is vested with the power of inspection of the school on behalf of the Managing Committee. In this view of the matter even if whatever is attributed in para 8 and Annexure VII of the complaint petition and in complainant's initial deposition against the accused is accepted on its face value still the offences of which cognisance has been taken against him are not disclosed. In any case Exception Seventh of section 499 would come to the aid of the accused if some harsh words were uttered by him to the complainant, who is an employee of the school. Employer's words of caution or warning if administered to an employee do not come within the purview of defamation in whatever manner those words have been said until it is done in bad faith. There is absolutely no material on the record which may suggest that the accused was not on good terms with the complainant nor there is anything to show that the accused was in the look out of a chance to harm her. There is absolutely no material on the record which may suggest that the accused was not on good terms with the complainant nor there is anything to show that the accused was in the look out of a chance to harm her. In absence of such a circumstance it has to be presumed that whatever was done by the accused to the complainant on 18.7.95 and on 19.7.95 was done by him in good faith in discharge of his managerial/ supervisory duty as Secretary of the school Managing Committee hence no exception against his action could be taken by the complainant as an employee. It is further important to note that none of the alleged objectionable acts of the accused were complained by the complainant either to the President of the Managing Committee or to the Deputy Inspector of Schools or to any other higher educational authority in the Government. As a matter of fact the complainant was highly aggrieved from the appointment of Mrs L. Barua as Headmistress of the school, which she took as a personal affront to her from the Managing Committee. This lead to the developments, which have already been noticed herein above. Provoked from the initiation of disciplinary enquiry against her in which the accused happened to be the Enquiry Officer resulting in the issue of the letter of warning to her on 19.7.95 and 1.6.96 the complainant decided to give vent to her feeling of acrimony by way of filing complaint petition in the criminal Court so as to drag the accused in Court. Recourse to criminal proceedings cannot be taken for shadow boxing. Such proceedings can be initiated when there are strong reasons for it. hi the present case one finds that accused has been summoned to answer charge under sections 500, 503 and 506 on the bare allegation that the accused had warned the complainant of her dereliction of duty in a high pitch and harsh tone saying as to why she was loitering and neglecting her duties. If the chief executive officer of the Managing Committee of a private school is not to be allowed the power even to say these words to the school employees that will be the end of the school administration, and teachers and employees would be free to themselves decide to work or to loiter here and there during school hours. If the chief executive officer of the Managing Committee of a private school is not to be allowed the power even to say these words to the school employees that will be the end of the school administration, and teachers and employees would be free to themselves decide to work or to loiter here and there during school hours. In a school where infants are imparted elementary education responsibility of the management is more intense for ensuring that the teachers and employees of the schools work with devotion. Whereas in schools imparting education at middle or higher levels personal supervision of discipline amongst teachers by the management is not that demanding. Keeping in view the fact that the school was running nursery and primary classes personal supervision of teaching work in the classes of the school by the Secretary of the Managing Committee was a desirable and appreciable work for which he could not be dragged in a Court of law for answering criminal charges which are apparently not disclosed simply because the Secretary tried to discipline an erring teacher of his school. In my opinion there was no legal sanction for the learned Magistrate for taking cognisance of any of the offences against the accused by the impugned order. The learned Magistrate has acted illegally in absence of appropriate material for summoning the accused. His order, therefore, deserves to be quashed. The revision application is accordingly allowed. Impugned order dated 26.8.96 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Shillong in CR Case No.785(S)96 and the proceedings pending in that regard in the Court of the said Magistrate against the accused are accordingly quashed.