I. M. QUDDUSI, J. These are three ap plicants registered as separate cases filed under Section 482, Cr. PC. for invoking inherent jurisdiction of this Court. In Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 2925 of 1996 Bimal Barua v. State of U. P. and others the applicants have prayed for the quashing of the proceedings of case No. 77 of 1996 Farhad Shikoh Khan v. Bimal Barua pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi and the registration and investigation of case crime No. C. 10/1996 under Section 392,i. P. C. registered at police station Cantt. , Varanasi against the applicants. In other two applications i. e. in Criminal Misc. Application No. 2951 of 1996 and 2952 of 1996, the same applicants have prayed for quashing of the proceedings of the Criminal Case Nos. 13 of 1996 and 84 of 1996, Jafar Khan v. Bimal Barua & others and Nasar Jama Khan v. Bimal Barua & others, respectively pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi. 2. The brief facts of the cases are that Tata Engineering Locomotive Co. Ltd. (Herein after referred to as "telco") has launched a hire purchase scheme, according to which if a person is willing to buy a Tata Diesel vehicle from its authorised dealers Show Room, he may do so under that scheme on Hire purchase basis. The ap plicants are Chief Executive Manager and Asstt. Manager in a firm namely M/s Rohit Automobiles Pvt. Ltd. , Varanasi, which is an authorised dealer of TELCO. As per terms and conditions of the Hire purchase, a cus tomer desiring to buy a vehicle on hire pur chase basis, would have to deposit initially an amount as required under the hire pur chase scheme with the dealer and thereafter the dealer would handover the Tata Diesel Vehicle manufactured by the TELCO. In the present cases the concerned three respondents i. e. respondent No. 3 in each case, namely Mohd. Farhad Khan, son of Zafar Ali Khan, respondent No. 3 in Criminal Misc. Application No. 2925; Jafar Khan son of Zafar Ali Khan, respondent No. 3 in criminal Misc. Application No. 2951 of 1996; and Nasar Jama Khan son of Late Ali Jama Khan respondent No. 3 in Criminal Misc. Application No. 2952 of 1996 paid a sum of Rs. 77,732/-, 87. 500/- and 87,500/- respectively towards initial pay ments. Application No. 2925; Jafar Khan son of Zafar Ali Khan, respondent No. 3 in criminal Misc. Application No. 2951 of 1996; and Nasar Jama Khan son of Late Ali Jama Khan respondent No. 3 in Criminal Misc. Application No. 2952 of 1996 paid a sum of Rs. 77,732/-, 87. 500/- and 87,500/- respectively towards initial pay ments. It is also significant to indicate here that in fact, four separate hire purchase Agreements were executed by four persons in which three are aforementioned respon dent No. 3 in the above noted three cases and one. Mr. Jayanti Pathak, who was busi ness associate of respondent No. 3 Mohd. Farhad Khan. Jafar Khan is his brother and Nasar Jama Khan is his cousin. Thereafter Mohd. Farhad Khan issued a cheque dated 28-4-95 amounting to Rs. 1,50,464. 00 as hire purchase amount of installment but the same was dishonoured but this amount was deposited by him in cash with the applicants. Thereafter he again submitted a cheque of Rs. one lac dated 9-8-1995 which was again bounced and then he deposited a sum of Rs. 37. 500/- in cash. The other three persons did not prefer to buy the vehicle and they requested to adjust the amount of their initial deposit of Rs. 87,500/- towards the hire purchase instalment of Mohd. Farhad Khan to whom the vehicle was delivered Body of the vehicle was got prepared by Mohd. Farhad Khan in the shape of a bus. According to the applicants he committed default in making payment as per terms of hire purchase Agreement and, as such the Company was entitled to seize the vehicle. Thereafter before seizure of the vehicle Far-had Khan filed a civil suit having an ap prehension that the vehicle may be seized but no interim injunction was granted in his favour. According to the applicants he committed default in making payment as per terms of hire purchase Agreement and, as such the Company was entitled to seize the vehicle. Thereafter before seizure of the vehicle Far-had Khan filed a civil suit having an ap prehension that the vehicle may be seized but no interim injunction was granted in his favour. According to the applicants they engaged a private security of Bodh Gaya i. e. Kumar Security Services for the purpose of taking possession of the vehicle and the Company after taking over the possession of the vehicle in quest ion from Kumar Security Service prepared an inventory list of the vehicle seized and informed about the same to the officer- in-charge of police station Bodhgaya (Bihar) and also filed written statement in the civil suit being Civil Suit No. 318 of 1996 Farhat Khan v. TELCO and others in which it was stated that the Com pany has taken over possession of the vehicle. 3. On the other hand Farhad Khan filed an application before the Chief Judi cial Magistrate, Varanasi supported by an affidavit stating therein that the applicants along with three other persons had forcibly taken away the bus of respondent No. 3 from the his residence in his absence in the morning of 12-7- 1996 when he was not present at his house and his brother Mohd. Farooq was present there who resisted the taking over of the bus but VK, Jain and Rajesh Mishra showed pistol and targetted at his fore- head (KANPATI) and threatened that in case he shouts or cries or protests they will kill him. On this due to fear his brother could not do any thing and by showing pistol Mr. Bimal Barua and VK. Jain along with his as sociates namely Rajesh Misra, and S. ft. Sinha got seated in his car and followed the bus. He has further alleged that he spent a sum of Rs. five lacs in the construction of the body of the bus besides making payment of instalments. Respondent No. 3 by the said complaint prayed for getting investigation of the incident by the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station Varanasi Cantt. and to rfgister the first information report but vain. Then he sent application to the Senior Superintendent of Police and met him also but nothing has been done by them. Respondent No. 3 by the said complaint prayed for getting investigation of the incident by the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station Varanasi Cantt. and to rfgister the first information report but vain. Then he sent application to the Senior Superintendent of Police and met him also but nothing has been done by them. On this complaint the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate directed the officer-in-charge police station, Varanasi Cantt. to investigate the matter and register the first infor mation report. 4. In other two cases separate applica tions were moved before the Chief Judicial Magistrate by Jafar Khan and Nasar Jama Khan. It has been indicated that they have paid Rs. 87,500/- each but they were not provided vehicles and the money has not been refunded to them nor any interest has been paid to them. On 16-7-1996 when a contact was made with the accused persons they refused to accept the receipt of money, started abusing and pushed them out. On these two applications moved separately also the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate directed the Officer-in-charge Police Sta tion Varanasi Cantt. to investigate the mat ter and register the first information reports. 5. It has been allowed that the ap plicants apprehend that they will be ar rested by the police as the police has registered cases against them as case crime Nos. C. 10/1996 under Section 392, I. P. C. case Crime No. C. 11/1996 under Sections 419,420,504 and 506,i. P. C. and case crime No. C. 12/1996 under Sections 419,420,504 and 506,1. P. C, It has been averred that the police is trying to make arrest of the ap plicants treating the same as police case. 6. The contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the applicants are that under Section 156 (3), Cr. P. C. the Magistrate can only direct investigation but he has no jurisdiction to direct the police register a case. The second contention of the learned Counsel for the applicants is that the matter is a civil dispute between the parties and according to hire purchase agreement the petitioners have every right to take the possession of the vehicle in ques tion and the same is no offence and the proceedings are mala fide against the ap plicants. 7. The second contention of the learned Counsel for the applicants is that the matter is a civil dispute between the parties and according to hire purchase agreement the petitioners have every right to take the possession of the vehicle in ques tion and the same is no offence and the proceedings are mala fide against the ap plicants. 7. With regard to the first contention raised by the learned Counsel for the ap plicants to the effect that the Magistrate has directed officer-in-charge of the police sta tion to register a case and investigate in accordance with law, it is necessary to peruse the provisions of Sections 154 and 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They are: "154. Information in cognizable cases.- (1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant and every such information whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it and the substance there of shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such from as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf. (2) A copy of the information as recorded under subsection (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost- to the informant. (3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the pan of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of police concerned who, if satisfied that such infor mation discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence. " "156. " "156. Police Officers power to investigate cognizable cases.- (I) Any officer in charge of police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chap ter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this Section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Sec tion 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned" A perusal of sub-section (3) of Section 156, Cr. P. C. shows that any Magistrate empowered under Section 190, Cr. P. C. may order for investigation in the manner indi cated in that Section meaning thereby that the Magistrate may order for an investiga tion in the manner provided in the Code, in the case of a cognizable offence. Section 154, Cr. P. C. provides that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally, shall be reduced in writing and every such information whether given in writing or reduced to writing shall be signed by the person giving it and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by the Officer-in-charge of the police station in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf. In the case of a direction of investigation by the Magistrate on the application of a person i1 is incumbent upon the Officer-in- charge of the police station to enter the substance of such application to the Book as aforesaid and then only he can proceed with the investigation as indicated in Section 157, Cr. P. C which is reproduced as below: "157. P. C which is reproduced as below: "157. Procedure for investigation.- (1) It from information received or otherwise, an office in charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith sent a report of the same to a Magistrate, empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person or shall depute one of his subordinate officers no being below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order, proscribe in the behalf, to proceed, to the spot, to investigate tin facts and circumstances of the case and, if neces sary to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the of fender: Provided that: (a) When information as to the commission of any such offence is given against any person by name and the case is not of a serious nature, the officer in charge of a police station need not proceed in person or depute a subordinate officer to make an investigation on the spot. (b) if it appears to the officer in charge off police station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case. (2) In each of the cases mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to sub-section (1) the officer in charge of the police station shall state in his report his reasons for not fully complying with the requirements of that sub-section, and, in the case mentioned in clause (b) of the said proviso, the officer shall also forthwith notify to the inform ant, if any, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the fact that he will not investigate the case or cause it to be investigated. But in the matter when the Magistrate himself directs an investigation the provisions of Section 154, Cr. P. C. would be followed first and there after would proceed to investigate the case and, if necessary, take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender, and, as such, it is immaterial whether the Magistrate directs to register a F. I. R. and then to investigate or directs only to inves tigate the matter to the officer-in- charge of the police station. 8. 8. Besides this, Section 190 (1) also provides that any Magistrate may take cog nizance of any offence upon a police report and, as such, the police report may be ob tained before taking cognizance by the Magistrate on completion of investigation directed under Section 156 (3), Cr. P. C. of course under Section 190 (1) (a) the Magistrate may entertain a complaint of facts which constitute such offence and take cognizance on it in the manner provided on Chapter XV, Cr. P. C. But this complaint under Section 190 (1) (a), Cr. P. C. is quite different to the order passed on the applica tion in exercise of powers by the Magistrate under Section 156 (3), Cr. P. C. As no inves tigation under the law is possible without first recording substance of the com plaint/application regarding the commis sion of a cognizance offence in the Book prescribed by the State Government and hence in the instant matter if the Magistrate has directed the Officer Incharge of the police station to register a case and then investigate, and there is no illegality therein. It is hereby clarified that this does not mean that the Magistrate instead of directing the police investigate the case cannot register the application as complaint case. 9. With regard -to the second conten tion raised by the learned Counsel for the applicant to the effect that the matter is of civil dispute between the parties and ac cording to hire purchase Agreement the petitioners have every right to take posses sion of the vehicle in question and the same is no offence and the proceedings are mala fide against them; to appreciate the argu ment of the learned Counsel for the ap plicants a close scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of the present case is neces sary. One of the documents relied upon by the petitioner in support of his contention is the hire purchase Agreement annexed as Annexure "1" to the affidavit filed in support of the application numbered as Criminal Misc. Application No. 2925 of 1996 accord ing to which the amount was to be paid in 35 instalments starting from May, 1995, pay able in each succeeding calendar month. According to the Hire purchase Agreement the hirer had to nay a sum of Rs. 97,732. 00 as initial payment by way of hire on the execu tion of the Agreement. Application No. 2925 of 1996 accord ing to which the amount was to be paid in 35 instalments starting from May, 1995, pay able in each succeeding calendar month. According to the Hire purchase Agreement the hirer had to nay a sum of Rs. 97,732. 00 as initial payment by way of hire on the execu tion of the Agreement. The first instalment of Rs. 19,601. 00 and the remaining 34 instal ments were of Rs. 16,400/ -. The applicants have not indicated as to whether at the time of the execution of the Agreement they had received a sum of Rs. 97,732. 00 or not as they knew that in case they make a dispute on it, the whole execution will become Dad, as it is the condition of the Agreement that the initial payment at the time of the execu tion of the Agreement the hirer shall pay a sum of Rs. 97,232. 00and that was the condi tion precedent for giving delivery of the vehicle by the Owner/financer to the hirer. Any how, they have mentioned in their af fidavit that the following amount has been paid: l. Rs. 77,732. 00 2. Rs. 1,59,646. 00 3. Rs. 37,500. 00 Total Rs. 2,74,696. 00 Besides the above, three persons who had requested for adjustment of their amount of initial deposit towards the hire purchase Agreement of Mohd. Farhad Khan had deposited the following amounts: Nasar Jama Khan Rs. 87,500. 00 Jafar Khan Rs. 87,500. 00 Jayanti Pathakrs. 87,500. 00 Total Rs. 2,62,500. 00 Thus the total amount in deposit with the applicants was Rs. 5,37,196. 00 on 12-7-1996 when the vehicle in question was seized. Till that date even in accordance with the hire purchase Agreement only 13 instalments covering an amount of Rs. 2,13,000/- had become due. Thus according to the conten tion of the contesting opposite party No. 3 only a sum of Rs. 2,13,000/- had become due whereas a sum of Rs. 5,37,000/- were already in deposit with the applicants. On the other hand the applicants have taken a plea that the initial deposits of the other three applicants amounting to Rs. 87,500/- each were towards the booking of a vehicle under separate hire purchase Agreement and on cancellation of the same, some deduction had to be made. 5,37,000/- were already in deposit with the applicants. On the other hand the applicants have taken a plea that the initial deposits of the other three applicants amounting to Rs. 87,500/- each were towards the booking of a vehicle under separate hire purchase Agreement and on cancellation of the same, some deduction had to be made. Any how, even if it is presumed that a handsome amount was li able to be deducted from Rs. 87,500/- each deposited by the three applicants, it cannot be presumed that the applicants of the present petition would be entitled to deduct the whole amount. Thus, prima facie it can not be said that on the date when the vehicle was seized any amount was due against the opposite party No. 3, namely, Farhad Khan after adjusting the amount of the other three persons as requested by them even after deducting the initial cancellation char ges, if any. 10. Now coming to the contents of the application which has been registered as First Information Report, giving rise to case crime No. C. 10 of 1996 under Section 392, I. P. C. at police station Cantt, Varanasi, it has been alleged that the applicants Bimal Barua and V. K. Jain had shown pistol and had put the same on the fore-head of the brother of respondent No. 3, in the absence of the opposite party No. 3 while they were snatching away the bus. It is but natural that in the absence of opposite party No. 3, who had possessed the vehicle and knew the full facts and details about the payment of ins talments etc. , his brother must have resisted in taking away the possession of the vehicle by the applicants and his companions. At this stage it also can be said to be unusual to show pistol to get away from the said resistance by the brother of opposite party No. 3. However, all this is the matter of evidence. , his brother must have resisted in taking away the possession of the vehicle by the applicants and his companions. At this stage it also can be said to be unusual to show pistol to get away from the said resistance by the brother of opposite party No. 3. However, all this is the matter of evidence. Besides this the case of the present ap plicants is that they had taken away the physical possession of the vehicle in ques tion with the help of private security and not under the search and recovery issued by a Magistrate to the regular police, the ap prehension in the mind of the brother of opposite party and other persons present could not be ruled out that the vehicle was being taken away by some unauthorised per sons and naturally they must have resisted to the same. It is also the matter of evidence, as, prima facie, the registration number of the vehicle has not been given by the parties, there was no other way out except to presume that the applicants would must have confirmed the identification of the Vehicle and in that circumstance also it might be possible that the Financers would must have accompanied the private security personnel in case they were engaged by the present applicants. However, all this depends upon the evidence which can only be given in the trial or during the course of investigation and at this stage while exercis ing the jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. PC. this Court cannot hold a trial and thus no finding can be recorded in this regard by Court. 11. Learned Counsel for the applicants has placed reliance on the certain case laws, including the law laid down by Honble the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Sardar Trilok Singh and others v, Satya Deo Thpathi, (1979) 4 SCC 396 . In that case the dispute between the parties was relating to the purchase of a truck. The total cost in curred in the purchase of the truck was near about 60,0007 -. In that case the dispute between the parties was relating to the purchase of a truck. The total cost in curred in the purchase of the truck was near about 60,0007 -. On March 29, 1973 and Agreement was entered into between the respondent and his then partner one Bhagwati Prasad on the one hand and M/s Sardar Finance Corporation, Kanpur on the other, which firm was represented by appellant No. 1, as its partner, in accordance with which about half the money was advanced by the said firm which enabled the com plainant and his partner to acquire the truck. According to the complainants case the amount advanced by the said firm was by way of loan while according to the case of the appellant it was on the basis of a hire-purchase Agreement entered into between the parties in support of which formal agreement in writing was also executed. The complainants case was that only a blank form was got signed by him along with other several papers bearing stamps and the form had not been duly filled up. The complainants case further was that he had paid back two monthly instalments the total of which was Rs. 3,566 and the third instal ment was payable on July 31, 1973. But before that all the accused in a high-handed manner during his absence came to his house and in spite of protest by his wife forcibly under threat of arms removed the truck and thus they are said to have com mitted the various offences including the offence of dacoity. The case of the appel lants was that according to the hire- pur chase agreement a sum of Rs. 1. 783/- was to be paid every month by the 15th day of the month. The complainants case was that only a blank form was got signed by him along with several other papers bearing stamp and the form had not been filled up. The complainants case further was that he had paid back two monthly instalments the total of which was Rs. 3,566/- and the third instalment was payable on July 31,1973. The complainants case was that only a blank form was got signed by him along with several other papers bearing stamp and the form had not been filled up. The complainants case further was that he had paid back two monthly instalments the total of which was Rs. 3,566/- and the third instalment was payable on July 31,1973. But before that all the accused in a high-handed manner during his absence came to his house and in spite of protest by his wife forcibly under threat ot arms removed the truck and thus they are said to have com mitted the various offences including the offence of dacoity. The case of the appel lants was that according to hire purchase Agreement a sum of Rs. 1,7837- was to be paid every month by the 15th of the month. The first instalment payable was on May 15, 1973, second on June 15,1973 and the third on July 15,1973 and so on. The entire sum due was to be cleared in 23 instalments. On default of any one monthly instalment the financier had the right to terminate the hire purchase Agreement even without notice and seize the truck. Since July instalment was not paid by the 15th of that month the complainant and his partner surrendered the truck on July 24,1973. In a nutshell the case of the appellants was that the respondents case against them and others that they committed any offence on July 30, 1973 was absolutely false. One more impor tant fact in that case was that the respon dents previously lodged a first information report with the police on August 20,1973 in respect of thealleged occurrence. There was prolonged investigation by the various police officers and ultimately a final report was submitted by the Investigating agency. The respondents filed objection/protest petition before the Magistrate who dealt wills the final report. But the Magistrate accepted the report by his order dated April 28, 1973. The respondents filed revision before the Sessions Judge from the order of the Magistrate accepting the final report. The revision was dismissed by the Sessions Court, The respondents then went ta the High Court under Section 482, Cr. P. C. The High Court by its order dated April 16,1976 summarily dismissed tae same. Thereafter the complaint was filed on May 1,1976. 12. The revision was dismissed by the Sessions Court, The respondents then went ta the High Court under Section 482, Cr. P. C. The High Court by its order dated April 16,1976 summarily dismissed tae same. Thereafter the complaint was filed on May 1,1976. 12. In the instant matter the fact is that only the Magistrate has directed the inves tigation and no report has been filed by the police so far. The matter is under investiga tion. Besides this according to the own statement made by the applicant in the affidavit filed in support of the application, the aforementioned sum was in deposit with them when they had taken possession of the truck. In this way the facts of Sardar Trilok Singhs case are entirely different from the facts of the present case. In the present case, in case it is proved that according to the hire purchase Agreement no amount was due on the date when the possession of the vehicle in question was forcibly taken over by the applicants, it cannot be ruled out that in getting the possession of the truck mensaria to commit offence was there and, as such, it is not a fit case for interference at this stage. 13, The other case law referred to by the learned Counsel for the applicants are K. A. Maihai alias Babu and another v. Kara Bibbikutty and another, (1996) 7 SCC 212 . In this case also it has been held by the Honble Supreme Court that in the event of non-pay ment of the instalments due, the financer had every right to take possession of the bus. This will also depend upon the finding as to whether, in fact, any amount was due or whether an excess amount of the applicant and his companions were already in deposit with the Financer, a prayer for which had already been made by them earlier. Of course, in case any default is found to have been committed in making payment of ins talment, the applicants would be able to justify their action of taking away the vehicle. Of course, in case any default is found to have been committed in making payment of ins talment, the applicants would be able to justify their action of taking away the vehicle. But of course, it bas to be decided by investigating Agency or a competent Court that if a handsome amount was already in deposit with the applicants, forcibly taking away the possession of the vehicle in ques tion establishes mensaria on the part of the applicants for the crime and, as such, the criminal proceedings or investigation of a complaint cannot be quashed at this stage. 14. The other two cases are with regard to the offences punishable under Sections 406, 419, 420, 504 and 506,i. P. C in which also the learned Magistrate h-as directed the officer-in- charge police station to register a case and investigate the matter in accord ance with law. The contents of the applica tions moved under Section 156 (3), Cr. P. C. before the Magistrate are not related to any hire purchase Agreement and taking for cible possession of the vehicle but they re late to some incident allegedly taken place on 16-7-1986 and also for cheating the com plaints of a sum of Rs. 87,500. A bare read ing of the complaints do show a prima facie cognizable offence and this is also a matter for consideration by the Court or the Inves tigating Agency as to whether the applicants adjusted the amount of Rs. 87,500/- deposited by the complainants towards the dues of Farhad Khan after deducting the cancellation charges, if any. Then, of course, the applicants may get success in proper accounting of the money deposited by the aforesaid three persons, and may show that there was no mensaria to commit the of fence. In this way, in these two cases also this Court cannot interfere in its inherent juris diction under Section 482, Cr. P. C. 15. A Rill Bench of this Court in the case of Ramlal Yadav v. State of U. P. , 1990 All. LJ 47 has held: ". . . . . . . . Even if the power of investigation is exercised by a police officer mala fide, the High Court cannot quash the investigation in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P. C. . LJ 47 has held: ". . . . . . . . Even if the power of investigation is exercised by a police officer mala fide, the High Court cannot quash the investigation in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P. C. . " Further, in the case of A. E. Rani v. S. R. Sharma, 1995 (1) SCC 265 the Honble Supreme Court has held as under: ". . . . . . . . The High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings on the ground that the dispute was of civil nature and the complaint about removal of movable articles and proceed ings to that regard could not be said to bf abuse of process of law. " The Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Devinder Singh, 1983 (2) SCC 384 has given the guideline that the High Court cannot arrive at a con clusion under on the guilt or innocence of the accused on the basis of aiaterial on record at a stage prior to the leading of evidence by the prosecution. 16, In the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Cr. LJ. 527 the Honble Supreme Court has held as under: ". . . . . The power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. The extraordiaary or inherent powers do sot confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice. " Similar is the observation of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of State Tamil Nadu v. Thirukhuralperumal, (1995) 2 SCC 449 where it has been held that the High Courts power to quash first information report and criminal proceedings should be exercised sparingly keeping in view the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in various decisions. 17. In view of the above discussions and keeping in view the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in various cases, including the cases cited above, I am of the opinion that these are not fit cases for inter ference in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. P. C. 18. In the result, the petitions fail and are hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 19. P. C. 18. In the result, the petitions fail and are hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 19. After the delivery of judgment a request has been made for the supply of the certified copy of the order. A certified copy of this order may be given to the learned Counsel for the parties on payment of usual charges within 48 hours. Petition dismissed .