JUDGMENT 1. - In this case Gauri Shankar, Food Inspector (PW 2) purchased on 2.6.1979 sample chilies powder from the petitioner at his Kirana shop M/s. Tapan Dass Sewa Ram at Ajmer and got the same analysed by the Public Analyst for proof of adulteration therein. On analysis, the Public Analyst reported.that the sample of chillies powder was adulterated by reason of the same not being in conformity with the prescribed standard of purity. On the complaint of the Food Inspector, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ajmer tried the petitioner for offence u/Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 (the Act) and holding him guilty of the same convicted him accordingly and sentenced to one year's RI and Rs. 2,000/- fine. In appeal the learned Additional Sessions Judge confirmed the order of conviction but reduced the substantive sentence of fine to six months' RI. The sentence of fine of Rs. 2.000/- was maintained. Hence this revision petition u/Section 397, Cr.P.C. before this Court. 2. Mr. Manish Bhandari, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, urged that the petitioner was the son of the owner of the business and not a dealer in chillies powder or other articles of food. It was submitted that a casual sale of an article of food by the petitioner to the Food Inspector in the absence of his father would not attract the provisions of the Act. In this behalf the learned Counsel further submitted that the two prosecution witnesses viz.,' PW 1 Leo Michael and PW 2 Gauri Shankar. Food Inspector, being witnesses of the department, should not have been believed. I find no force in either of the arguments. 3. It has been concurrently held by the two Courts below that chillies powder was sold by the petitioner to the Food Inspector. This is a finding of fact based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record of the case and is, therefore, not to be lightly interfered with. On examination of the evidence led by PW 1 Leo Michael. PW 2 Gauri Shankai, Food Inspector and PW 3 Ruchi Ram I feel satisfied that the Courts below have correctly appreciated their testimony. The testimony of Leo Michael (PW 1) and Gauri Shankar, Food Inspector cannot be rejected simply for the reason that they were the officials of the supply department. PW 2 Gauri Shankai, Food Inspector and PW 3 Ruchi Ram I feel satisfied that the Courts below have correctly appreciated their testimony. The testimony of Leo Michael (PW 1) and Gauri Shankar, Food Inspector cannot be rejected simply for the reason that they were the officials of the supply department. It is the quality of the evidence which is material in trials of cases. If on appreciation of the evidence of even an interested witness it is found to be acceptable in the facts and circumstances of a case. It must be accepted. Simply because the departmental witness have to do certain official acts their testimony cannot be rejected. It was a part o? their duties to have checked petitioners shop and obtained sample of the food articles for analysis. The sale of the sample chillies powder by the petitioner to he Food Inspector was accepted in unambiguous words even by PW 3 Ruchi Ram, who is a hostile witness. The objection against the reliability of the testimony of (PW 1) Leo Michael and (PW 2) Gauri Shankar has, therefore, no merits at all and is accordingly rejected.Section 2 (xiii) defines sale as under : (xiii) "kale" with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means the sale of any article of food whether for cash or on credit or by way of exchange and whether by wholesale or retail, for human consumption or use, or for analysis, and includes an agreement for sale, an offer for sale, the exposing for sale or having in possession for sale of any such article, and includes also an attempt to sell any such article : 4. A study of the above definition of sale would indicate that the word "sale" has been given a specific meaning for the purposes of the Act. The definition is wide enough to include every kind, method or manner of sale. Sale for analysis has specifically been regarded as sale for the purposes. of the Act. The sale may be for "human consumption or use or for analysis" and this enlargement of the meaning and scope of the term "sale" shows that the object is to emphasise that whatever be the purpose of the sale it is a sale for the purposes of the Act. of the Act. The sale may be for "human consumption or use or for analysis" and this enlargement of the meaning and scope of the term "sale" shows that the object is to emphasise that whatever be the purpose of the sale it is a sale for the purposes of the Act. The sale of the chillies powder by the petitioner to the Food Inspector was, therefore, sale (See State of Tamil Nadu v. Kinshururuthy AIR 1980 SC 538 ; Ahmed Dada Bhai Advani v. State of Maharashtra 1992 SC (Cr.) 44. 5. In the instant case there was no merit in petitioners plea that the shop belonged to his father and that he was simply a casual visitor thereto in the absence of his father and, therefore, could not be convicted as a 'seller' for an occasional sale. The evidence on record does not establish such a fact. The petitioner himself did not state so either at the time of recording his plea or examining him u/Section 313, Cr.P.C. His own father did not enter the witness box to support such a plea. On the other hand even the hostile witness Ruchi Ram stated in his examination-in-chief that the petitioner carried' on the business at the shop. There is thus no force in his plea and objection now raised before me. 6. It was next urged by Mr. Bhandari that prejudice was caused to the petitioner in the exercise of his right u /Sec. 13(2) of the Act by not sending the sample for analysis to the Director, Central Food Laboratory within the specified time. Again, there is no merit in this contention. 7. It is true that the petitioner had applied u/Section 13(2) on 27.10.79 for sending the second sample to the Director, for analysis but the same could be received from the local authority on 16.9.80. The petitioner supplied the packing material on 7.10.1980 and the Magistrate ordered on that date that he sample be sent to the Director at Ghaziabad. Upto 8.12.1981 the hearing of the case continued to be adjourned for the receipt of the certificate of the Director. On that date the Prosecutor informed the Court that the-second sample had not been sent by them. The sample was thereafter sent with memo dated 4.3.1982' and received by the Director on 12.3.80. The Director prepared the certificate on 27.3.82. 8. On that date the Prosecutor informed the Court that the-second sample had not been sent by them. The sample was thereafter sent with memo dated 4.3.1982' and received by the Director on 12.3.80. The Director prepared the certificate on 27.3.82. 8. The facts, narrated above, loudly speak of the negligence or, maybe, willful dereliction fro duties on the part of the concerned official in the office of the CJM Ajmer, at the relevant time. For almost two years correct information regarding the compliance of the orders of the Court was not given to the Magistrate. This was certainly a shocking state of affairs in the Court of the CJM in relation to the trial of a case involving socioeconomic offence. Avoiding further comments on this aspect of the case but at the same time, great displeasure and disapproval of this Court over the conduct of the officials concerned in relation to the delay caused in obtaining the second sample from the local authority and sending the same to the Director, Central Food Laboratory Ghaziabad (UP), the Distt. Judges. Ajmer is directed to conduct an enquiry into the causes of delay in obtaining the sample from the Local (Health) Authority and sending the same to the Director, CFL Ghaziabad in this case and take appropriate disciplinary action to suitably punish the erring and delinquent official or officials, if need be. 9. Coming to the point on hand, it may be noted that Section 13(2) gives a valuable right to an accused to, get analysed the second sample of the article of food, purchased by the Food Inspector from him On making such a request in writing it is obligatory to send for the second sample from the Local (Health) Authority in whose custody the samples are required to be kept. In this respect the provisions contained in Sub-section (2-A) and (2-B) of Section 13 may be usefully reproduced here : (2-A) When an application is made to the Court -under Sub-section (2), the Court shall require the Local (Health) Authority to forward the part or parts of the sample kept by the said Authority and upon such requisition being made, the said Authority shall forward the part or parts of the sample to the Court within a period of five from the date of receipt of such requisition." (2-B) On receipt of the part or parts of the sample from the Local (Health) Authority under Sub-section (2-A), the Court shall first ascertain that the mark and seal on fastening as provided in Cl. (b) impression, w the case may be is not tampered with, and dispatch the part or as the case may be, one of the parts of the sample under its own seal to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory who shall thereupon send a certificate to the Court in the prescribed form within one month from the date of receipt of the part of sample specifying the result of the analysis." 10. A plain reading of Sub-section (2-A) shows that it casts an obligation upon the Court to call for the )art or parts of the samples from the Local (Health) Authority as well as an obligation on the Local (Health) Authority to send the same to the Court. Since the discharge of these obligatory function.; by the Court and the Local (Health) Authority is essential to the exercise of his right u/Section 13,2) by the accused, that part of this Sub-section is mandatory in character. Its violation is to result in denial of the right of the accused u/Section 13 (2) and, therefore, the non- compliance thereof would be fatal to the prosecution case. 11. But Sub-section (2-A) further obliges the Local (Health) Authority to send the sample to the Court within a period of five days. The purpose of fixing a time-limit for the performance of his duty by the Local (Health) Authority is to expedite the sending of the sample by the Court to the Director. It is in the nature of a statutory direction to the Local (Health) Authority to do an act within a specified period. The purpose of fixing a time-limit for the performance of his duty by the Local (Health) Authority is to expedite the sending of the sample by the Court to the Director. It is in the nature of a statutory direction to the Local (Health) Authority to do an act within a specified period. But a violation of this direction of time-limit is not to result in total loss of the right of the accused u/Section 13(2). Sending the sample within a reasonable time, say within a day or two after the expiry of the prescribed period of five days would he substantial compliance of the rule in that behalf. The fixation of the time-limit is, therefore, directory and substantial compliance thereof would cause no prejudice to the accused in his trial. 12. Under Sub-section (2-B) it is mandatory for the Courts (i) to ascertain that the marks and seal on fastening as provided in clause (b) of Sub- section (1) of Section 11 are intact and the signature or thumb impression, as the case may be, is not tampered with, and (ii) to dispatch the part, or as the case may be, one of the parts of the sample under its own seal to the Director, the Central Food Laboratory. The discharge of second obligation is necessary to obtain the certificate of the Director. Such obligation cannot be discharged unless the first obligation is discharged. Non-compliance of both or either of them is to result in denial of the exercise of right of the accused u/Section 13(2). Those parts of Sub-section (2-B) of Section 13 are mandatory. 13. The third obligation has been caste by Sub-section (2-B) on the Director who has to send his certificate to the Court in the prescribed form within one month from the date of receipt of the part of the sample specifying the result of the analysis. In this obligation of the Director specification of the result of analysis and sending the certificate in the prescribed form are directly concerned with the right of the accused and a breach of such obligation would be fatal to his finding. That part of this provision is mandatory. But the requirement of sending the certificate within the specified period of one month is directory or recommendatory in view of the nature of the offence involved. Its strict non compliance is. That part of this provision is mandatory. But the requirement of sending the certificate within the specified period of one month is directory or recommendatory in view of the nature of the offence involved. Its strict non compliance is. not to result in deprivation of his right u/Section 13(2) by the accused. 14. Now coming to the merits of the present case, though avoidable but condemnable delay was caused by the Court of the learned Magistrate in obtaining the sample from the Local (Health) Authority and sending the same to the Director but since the mandatory obligation was discharged and the late discharge did not affect the testability of the sample by the Director, no prejudice was caused to the petitioner. In his certificate the Director had specifically mentioned that the sample "was in a condition fit for analysis" and that "the sample was free from wild growth, insect infestation and rodent contamination" and that "the seal on the sample container was intact. The seals on the outer cover of sample contained as well as outer cover of sample parcel were also intact and tallied with the specimen impression of seal given on memo and forwarded separately". The Director had sent his certificate to the Court within the specified time. It is thus evident that the mandatory part of Sub-section (2-A) and (2-B) of Section 13 was complied with. There was substantial compliance of the directory parts also. Thus no prejudice in any sense, was caused lo the petitioner and no failure of justice, in any manner, occasioned in this case. The objection. is rejected. 15. In the end Mr. Bhandari urged for release of the petitioner either on probation or with nominal increase in the amount of fine after doing away with the requirement of undergoing sentence anymore. 16. In a number of similar other cases I have taken the view that the beneficial and protective wings of provability measures do not extend to the offender:. under the Act save to the extent provided in Section 20 AA. In this behalf, I can do no better than to refer to the approach of the Apex Court on this point as expressed in Paras 28 and 29 of the decision in the case of P.K. Tejani, 1974 (1) SCC 167 , in the following words : "28. under the Act save to the extent provided in Section 20 AA. In this behalf, I can do no better than to refer to the approach of the Apex Court on this point as expressed in Paras 28 and 29 of the decision in the case of P.K. Tejani, 1974 (1) SCC 167 , in the following words : "28. The kindly application of the probation principles is negatived by the imperatives of social defence and the improbabilities of normal proselytisation. No chances can be taken by society with a man whose anti-social corporations, disguised as a respectable trade, imperil numerous innocents. He is a secutory risk. Secondly these economic offences committed by white collar criminals are unlikely to be dissuaded by the gentle probationary process. Neither casual provocation nor motive against particular persons but planned profit making from numbers of consumers furnishes the incentives not easily humanised by the therapeutic probationary measure. It is not without significance that the recent report (47th report) of the Law Commission of India has recommended the exclusion of the Act to social and economic offences by suitable amendments. It observed : 'We appreciate that the suggested amendment would be in apparent conflict with current trends in sentencing. taut, ultimately, the justification of all sentencing is the production of society. There are occasions when an offender is so anti-social that his immediate and sometimes prolonged confinement is the best assurance of society's protection. The consideration of rehabilitation to give way, because of the paramount need for the protection of society. We are, therefore, recommending suitable amendment in all the Acts, to exclude probation in the above case.' 29. In the current Indian conditions the probation movement has not yet attained sufficient strength to correct these intractables. May be, under more developed conditions a different approach may have to be made. For present we cannot accede to the invitation to let off the accused on probation." 17. The above approach of the Apex Court answers Mr. Ehandari's request for release of the petitioner on probation. The request in accordingly declined. 18. May be, under more developed conditions a different approach may have to be made. For present we cannot accede to the invitation to let off the accused on probation." 17. The above approach of the Apex Court answers Mr. Ehandari's request for release of the petitioner on probation. The request in accordingly declined. 18. For release of the petitioner on the period of sentence already undergone by him or with a nominal increase in fine I fail to overlook the mandatory provisions of Section 16(1) of the Act depriving the Courts of their power to become lenient in awarding punishment for offence punishable under section 16(1) which are socio-economic offences imperiling the health of the people at large. The punishment for such offence must respond to social requirement and people's cry for punishment to adulteraters. Therefore, the legislative mandate, contained in Section 16(1) and having the judicial approval in State of Andhra Pradesh v. S.R. Randappa, AIR 1982 SC 1492 , in the following manner, must be given effect to. "2. We are unable to understand why the High Court reduced the sentence. The statute prescribes a minimum sentence. It does not provide for any exceptions and does not vest the Court with any discretion to award a sentence below the prescribed minimum under any special circumstances. The learned Judge has himself noticed that the sentence imposed is the statutory minimum. Having noticed that the statute prescribes a minimum sentence for the offence, the High Court was clearly in error in doing so. We think we have said enough to correct the error. It is unnecessary to pursue the matter further by granting special leave. The petition is dismissed with the above observation." 19. Looking to the nature of offence, the place of its commission, the likelihood of a large number of consumers falling its prey, I find no adequate and special reasons to disturb the period and extent of sentence awarded to the petitioner by the Courts below in this case. The petition is dismissed. The CJM Ajmer shall see that the sentence is served out by the petitioner. 20. The District Judge, Ajmer is directed to hold or cause to be held an enquiry conducted forthwith to know the causes of delay in obtaining the sample from the Local (Health) Authority and sending the same to the Director. The petition is dismissed. The CJM Ajmer shall see that the sentence is served out by the petitioner. 20. The District Judge, Ajmer is directed to hold or cause to be held an enquiry conducted forthwith to know the causes of delay in obtaining the sample from the Local (Health) Authority and sending the same to the Director. Central Food Laboratory, Ghaziabad and take appropriate disciplinary action against the erring and delinquent officials. If need be. Both the officers shall report compliance of this order within two months from today. Record of lower Courts be sent forthwith.Revision dismissed. *******