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1997 DIGILAW 245 (RAJ)

Ram Karan v. State of Rajasthan

1997-02-11

M.A.A.KHAN

body1997
JUDGMENT 1. - While sitting on June 8, 1981 at about 9.00 a.m. at a Petrol Pump in front of the hotel of PW 4 Sita Ramat Deoli, Distt. Tonk for checking PW 1 Qutbuddin Food Inspector noticed Ram Karan-petitioner carrying milk in three drums (containers) on his Yazdi motor cycle No. RJG 1879 for sale. The Food Inspector stopped the petitioner and purchased 660 ml. of mixed milk for Rs. 1.50 in presence of PW 2 Girja Pd. Sharma. PW 3 Hazari and PW 4 Sita Ram, prepared three samples therefrom and sent one of them to the Public Analyst for examination. On conducting the analysis of the milk on 22.6.81 the Public Analyst, vide his report dated 22.6.81 (Ex. P7) found fat contents at 2.9% and solid non-fat contents at 3.96% as against the prescribed standard at 4.5%% and 8.5%, respectively as per term No. 11.01.11 under the table in Appendix B of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 1955 (the Rules) and reported the same to be adulterated by reasons of its containing about 53%. of added water. The Food Inspector duly sent a copy of the report of the Public Analyst to the petitioner and after obtaining the requisite written consent of the Local (Health) Authority Tonk (Ex. P8) on 1.7.81 launched prosecution against the petitioner by filing complaint in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tonk on 2.7.81. The learned CJM charged the petitioner with the offence u/ Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 (the Act), as required in the trial of a warrant case and on trial found him guilty of the same. He, therefore, convicted the petitioner of the offence u /Sec. 7/16 of the Act and sentenced him to 1 year's RI and fine of Rs. 2,000/- vide his judgment and order dated 26.1.89. In appeal the learned Sessions Judge, vide his impugned judgment and order dated 2.7.91 confirmed the order of conviction of sentence of the petitioner and dismissed his appeal. Hence, this application for revision u /Sec. 397, Cr.P.C. 2. Mr. Narendra Jain, the learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that since all the independent witnesses had turned hostile to prosecution case the conviction could not have been based on the single interested testimony of PW 1 Qutbuddin, Food Inspector. I find no merits in this argument. 3. Hence, this application for revision u /Sec. 397, Cr.P.C. 2. Mr. Narendra Jain, the learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that since all the independent witnesses had turned hostile to prosecution case the conviction could not have been based on the single interested testimony of PW 1 Qutbuddin, Food Inspector. I find no merits in this argument. 3. In our system of administration of justice no particular number of witnesses is necessary to prove or disprove a fact. If the testimony of a single witness is found worth reliance, conviction of an accused may safely be based on such testimony. In our system we follow the maxim that evidence is to be weighed and not counted. It is the "quality" and not the "quantity" of the evidence which matters in our system. This cardinal principle of appreciation of evidence in a case has been given a statutory recognition in Section 134 of the Evidence Act of 1872 which has materially altered the law in Section 28 of Act 2 of 1855 which like the law in some of the enactments in England stressed upon the requirement of certain specified number of witnesses in cases involving certain specific offences. There is no rule of law that the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness cannot be believed and relied upon. The only rule applicable in the cases of single testimony is that of prudence and care and caution and such rule requires that such cases must be approached with the view as to whether the evidence of the witness, when read as a whole, appears to be having a ring of truth in and around it. The maxim "Falsus in Uno. Falsus in Omnibus" does not apply criminal trials as it is the duty of the Court to separate the grain from chaff and to disengage the truth from falsehood. The easy course of rejecting the evidence in its entirety on non-foundational infirmities and discrepancies cannot be adopted in the search of truth in the evidence. The real test to be applied in the appreciation of evidence in a given case is as to how consistent the story is with itself, how it stands the test of cross-examination and how far it fits in with rest of the evidence and the circumstances of the case. The real test to be applied in the appreciation of evidence in a given case is as to how consistent the story is with itself, how it stands the test of cross-examination and how far it fits in with rest of the evidence and the circumstances of the case. The veracity of a witness is to be judged not solely from his individual statement but from his testimony taken is conjunction with all other facts brought out in the course of his testimony. 4. In the instant case four witnesses including PW 1 Qutbuddin. Food Inspector, were examined at the trial. Three of them PW 2 Girja Pd. PW 3 Hazari and PW 4 Sita Ram denied that the sample was taken by the Food Inspector from the petitioner in their presence. They, however, admitted that their signatures were taken by the Food Inspector on certain memos, which memos evidenced sealing of the sample milk purchased by the Food Inspector from the petitioner. PW 1 Qutbuddin, Food Inspector, has narrated all the relevant facts as stated above. His working as a Food Inspector at the relevant time is evidenced by his letter of appointment Ex. P1. dated 10.12.75. Entrusted with the duties to be discharged as Food Inspector it was not unusual on his part to have gone to and sit at the Petrol Pump for checking of carriers of milk for sale. On seeing the petitioner carrying milk cans on his motor cycle it was not also abnormal on his part to have asked the petitioner to show his licence to sell milk and to have purchased sample milk from him. The relevant memos prepared by him after the purchase of the milk bear the signature of the other witnesses. It s not believable that for no reasons the witnesses would sign those memos on mere asking by the Food Inspector. The subsequent conduct of the witness in promptly sending one of the three samples to the Public Analyst and two to the Loyal (Health) Authority, Tank and on receipt of the result of analysis sending one copy of the report of the Public Analyst through Regd. Post A.D. to the petitioner and obtaining the requisite written consent of the Local (Health) Authority for launching prosecution and on receipt of such written consent promptly filing the complaint in Court speaks of the truthful character of his testimony. Post A.D. to the petitioner and obtaining the requisite written consent of the Local (Health) Authority for launching prosecution and on receipt of such written consent promptly filing the complaint in Court speaks of the truthful character of his testimony. He was not alleged to be inimical to the petitioner in any way. I thus find that the single testimony of the Food Inspector in this case was trustworthy and reliable and the inferior Court is have committed no error in basing conviction of the petitioner on such reliable evidence which established the guilt of the petitioner beyond doubt. 5. Mr. Jain next urged that since the occurrence in this case was committed in the year 1981 and since then the petitioner had been facing the ordeal of this litigation it would not be proper to send him to jail and the interest of justice would be met if he is released on probation or the period of sentence a ready undergone by him with normal increase in fine be considered sufficient punishment for his guilt in this case. In this behalf Mr. Jain pointed out that this Court has consistently approached such cases from such sympathetic angle and added reference to the decision of this Court in the cases of Gagdish v. State (S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 2.15 of 1996) , Prahiad v. State of Raj., (S.B. Cri. Revision Petition No. 18 of 1990) , Lalva alias Devilal v. State of Raj., (S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 2 of 1991) , Phool Chand v. State of Raj. (S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 155 of 1991) and several other like cases. 6. In the case of Nand Kishore v. State of Rajasthan (S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 24 of 1992). I examined the object behind the necessity of imposing minimum penalty u/Section 16 of the Act with reference to the legislative mandate and judicial approach in the content of the position of law as amended by Act of 1964 and 1976 and have held that after the Amendment Acts of 1964 and 1976 the discretion of the Court to impose punishment less than the minimum prescribed of 6 months RI and fine of Rs. 1,000/- is restricted to the imposition of sentence of three months and fine of Rs. 500/- for adequate and special reason to be recorded in writing and to no more. 1,000/- is restricted to the imposition of sentence of three months and fine of Rs. 500/- for adequate and special reason to be recorded in writing and to no more. The view as held by me on the point, gets, I think, ample support from the views of Tibrewal J. of this Court in the case of Lalva alias Devi Lal v. State of Rajasthan (Supra) as also from the views of the Apex Court on sentencing of the culprits of socio-economic offence, which is undoubtedly the offence committed in the present case. 7. In the body of the petition objections relating to the procedure adopted for the trial of the petitioner, validity of sanction and discharge of his duty u/Section 13 (2) by the Food Inspectors were also raised. However, no special arguments thereto were advanced before me. On examination of the record of the inferior Courts I feel satisfied that there is no substance in objections against those points. 8. Therefore, looking to the long life of this litigation and the circumstances of the petitioner that comes from down-trodden strata of society and may be the only bread earner for his family, as stated before me. I confirm the conviction of the petitioner for offence u/Section 7/16 of the Act but reduce the sentence of the petitioner from one year RI and fine of Rs. 2,000/- to three months' RI and fine of Rs. 500/- or in default of payment of fine to further undergo SI for one month. With this modification in sentence the petition shall stand dismissed.Revision dismissed. *******