M. Ramakrishna, C.J.— This appeal is presented by the Union of India and the GOC, Eastern Command, Fort William, Calcutta, challenging the judgment and order made by the learned Single Judge in Civil Rule No. 1002 of 1992 dated 8th December, 1995 (1995 (2) GLJ 506), by which the learned Single Judge concluded as follows : “This being the position and looking into the background of the deceased, I am not inclined to give any compensation but want to give some payment by way of palliative to the mother. Earlier she has been paid an amount of Rs.30,000.00 (Rupees thirty thousand) only and further sum of Rs.70,000.00 (Rupees seventy thousand) only will be paid to her by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The payment shall be made within a period of four months from today.” It is this order which is called in question in this appeal for the grounds taken therein. 2. We have heard Mr. A.R. Borthakur, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of India. 3. At the outset, the learned counsel for the appellants, argued that regard being had to the finding recorded by the inquiring authority (learned District Judge) and the' documentary evidence referred to in the course of the conclusion reached by the inquiring authority, the learned Single Judge having referred to the same, arrived at the conclusion that this is not a fit case for awarding compensation either invoking the provisions of Article 21 or 22 of the Constitution. 4. The second submission of Shri Borthakur is that even if the learned Single Judge accepted and endorsed the finding recorded by the inquiring authority that the deceased, Kamal Bhattacharyya, though brutally killed by the Army but the fact remains that the said Kamal Bhattacharyya was a hardcore ULFA activist. In other words, according to him, if a person being a member of an illegal forum which is banned by the State, if such a person by virtue of his conduct received bullet injuries and died, he has to face the consequences of his own conduct. In other words, according to him, if a person being a member of an illegal forum which is banned by the State, if such a person by virtue of his conduct received bullet injuries and died, he has to face the consequences of his own conduct. Indeed, it was pointed out that the learned Single Judge having seen this finding recorded by the inquiring authority, reached the conclusion that this is not a fit case for granting compensation in accordance with the law, though taking sympathetic consideration for the agony of the mother, the writ petitioner, as a palliative measure, a certain sum of money had been awarded to be given to the mother. The argument of the learned counsel is that as on today, the palliative is no longer there since she died and passed away and that the legal representatives (LRs) who have been brought on record, shall not be entitled for the sum, referred to in the course of the order, directed to be given to the mother since the provisions of Order XXII Rule 10A CPC cannot be applied for the purpose of enabling these persons (legal representatives) to seek for the relief as though it is a right of inheritance. The submission is that section 2 (2) CPC cannot be invoked for granting relief in favour of these persons (LRs). 5. As against the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants, the arguments of Mr. SK Barkataki, the learned counsel for the respondents, is that: It is true that in paragraph 15 of the order appealed from, the learned Single Judge, though awarded a certain sum of money, which was not by way of compensation but on sympathetic consideration, but still, this Court can look into the finding recorded in paragraph 14 of the said order. His argument is that so long as the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in that paragraph, it indicates that the finding recorded by the inquiring authority can be reconsidered in judicial review, by referring to the evidence adduced before him, as a part of the case and that the writ Court could have recorded a finding in favour of the petitioner. Although such a finding has not been recorded by the learned Single Judge, it is open to this Court to consider that view to extend the benefit to the respondents. 6. Although such a finding has not been recorded by the learned Single Judge, it is open to this Court to consider that view to extend the benefit to the respondents. 6. In so far as the argument advanced raising objections to the title of the respondents to seek for the amount of money by the appellants, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents, is that though section 2 CPC could not be invoked in a case of this type and though this is not a right heritable by the legal representatives (the four sons) of the mother, the writ petitioner, since an order has been made by this Court on 31st July, 1996, permitting the legal representatives (the four sons of the writ petitioner) to be brought on record who are now respondents in the appeal, this Court will consider this aspect also. 7. The last submission of the learned counsel for the respondents, is that there is an order made by this Court on 24th May, 1996, by the Division Bench of this Court by virtue of which while granting stay order, an amount of Rs.20,000/-by way of a cheque was ordered to be paid to the legal representatives/respondents. That being so, the appellants now cannot turn down and say that the LRs are not entitled to the balance of the amount payable as directed by the learned Single Judge in the latter part of his order in the writ petition. 8. We will now consider the technical point raised by Mr. Borthakur as to the eligibility of the LRs on the death of the writ petitioner. 9. It is not dispute that Smti Snehalata Debya died on 23rd May, 1996 and that thereafter, by an order made by this Court invoking the provisions of Order XXII Rule 1OA, an application presented by her sons was allowed and permission was granted to these persons to come on record. But the question remains as to whether these four sons, the respondents herein, would be entitled for the balance of the amount payable in terms of the order of the learned Single Judge? 10. But the question remains as to whether these four sons, the respondents herein, would be entitled for the balance of the amount payable in terms of the order of the learned Single Judge? 10. There is no difficulty for this Court to arrive at a conclusion at the outset that regard being had to the conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge in paragraph 15 of his judgment and order, which we have extracted above, the learned Single Judge declined to award any compensation either invoking the provisions of Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution on the ground that her son was killed by the Army or he died in custody. No such findings are recorded. Secondly, a sum of Rs.70,000/- was ordered to be paid not by way of compensation, but by way of palliative to the mother. In other words, this sum of money ordered to be paid to the mother was not by way of compensation. Therefore, the question that remains to be answered is as to whether this amount could be treated as a decree under section 2 (2) of the CPC? 11. Clause (3) of section 2 CPC referring to the decree holder lays down that 'decree holder' means any person in whose favour a decree has been passed or an order capable of execution has been made. Therefore, we have got to record a finding as to whether this sum of money payable in the light of the order made by the learned Single Judge could be considered as a 'decree' under section 2 (2) of the CPC ? It could be construed as a decree only in favour of the decree holder, Snehalata Debya, in whose favour this sum was ordered to be paid. But whether the four sons, who are now brought on record as legal representatives on the death of the lady, could be said to be the persons entitled to inherit the sum is the next question. Referring to the hereditary right and hereditary succession in the Black's Law Dictionary, the word is defined as follows : “Inheritance by law; title by descent. The title whereby a person, on the death of his ancestor, acquires his estate by right of representation as his heir at law” ! 12. Referring to the hereditary right and hereditary succession in the Black's Law Dictionary, the word is defined as follows : “Inheritance by law; title by descent. The title whereby a person, on the death of his ancestor, acquires his estate by right of representation as his heir at law” ! 12. Therefore, in the light of the above definition, we will have to find out as to whether on the death of the mother, Snehalata Debya, could the amount payable to her by virtue of the order of the learned Single Judge be said to be an 'estate' left by her The answer to this question would be a plain 'no'. In other words, so long as this amount could not be construed to be an 'estate' of the lady, late Snehalata Debya, her sons would not be entitled to inherit the same by way of right of inheritance either under the Hindu Succession Act or under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Merely because an order was made by the Division Bench of this Court in the month of May, 1996 (24th May, 1996) directing to pay Rs.20,000/- by way of a cheque and which is encashed by them, this does not allude that these persons would be entitled to the remaining sum as though they have acceded right of inheritance. We may mention here that at the relevant point of time when this Court passed the order directing payment of Rs.20,000/- to these persons on the death of the writ petitioner, that order could not be construed as an order conferring upon them any right to seek for the balance amount payable in accordance with the law. 13. In otherwords, we are satisfied that the learned counsel for the respondents has not been able to convincingly make out a case contrary to the argument advanced by Mr. AR Borthakur that these four legal representatives of the deceased mother would not be entitled for the amount of money payable in terms of the order of the learned Single Judge as on today. 14. The learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of DK Basu vs. State of West Bengal as reported in (1997) 1 SCC 416 . 14. The learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of DK Basu vs. State of West Bengal as reported in (1997) 1 SCC 416 . The learned counsel has brought to our notice the observation made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 26 of the judgment. We have perused the same. It is seen from the judgment of DK Basu (supra) that the Supreme Court declared the law as follows : “Victim of custodial violence and in case of his death in custody his family members are entitled to compensation under Public Law in addition to the remedy available under private law for damages for tortious act of the police personnel.” 15. In otherwords, it is true that the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the above case fairly goes to show that the members of the family of the victim shall be entitled for award of compensation. Only in a case where such compen­sation is awarded invoking the provisions of Article 21 or 22 of the Constitution, such award money by way of compensation can be made heritable by the legal representatives by applying the provisions of Order XXII Rule 10A of the CPC. But in the instant case, unfortunately, as there is no amount awarded by way of compensation in favour of Snehalata, and that finding having not been challenged in the appeal by the aggrieved persons, it is not possible for the respondents to seek for any remedy in the appeal filed by the Army. In these circumstances, we are afraid that the respondents would not be entitled for any relief. 16. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Single Judge made on 8th December, 1995, in Civil Rule No. 1002 of 1992, stands modified to the extent indicated below : 17. Out of the farther sum of Rs.70,0007- ordered to be paid in favour of late Snehalata Debya, the writ petitioner, it is stated by Mr. Borthakur that a sum of Rs.20,000/- has been paid. Therefore, the balance amount would not be paid to the respondents. 18. Out of the farther sum of Rs.70,0007- ordered to be paid in favour of late Snehalata Debya, the writ petitioner, it is stated by Mr. Borthakur that a sum of Rs.20,000/- has been paid. Therefore, the balance amount would not be paid to the respondents. 18. We make it clear that since a sum of Rs.20,000/- has already been paid to the legal representatives (respondents), as there is no application presented by the Army seeking refund of the said sum, we do not pass any order in that behalf. Ordered accordingly. Parties to bear their own costs.