V. Dutta Gyani, J.— This appeal arises out of judgment dated 30th April, 1994, delivered by learned Sessions Judge, Dhubri in Sessions Case No. 17/93. thereby holding the appellant guilty of offence punishable under section 302 IPC and sentencing her to undergo imprisonment for life, with fine of Rs.500/-, or in default of payment of fine, to suffer three months' RI. 2. Prosecution case stated in brief was that the appellant Sukurjan Bibi and Mariam Bibi, PW 3 are the two wives of PW 4 Zabed Afi and at the material time they were all living together under the same roof. It was in the month of June, 1990 and to be precise on 6.6.90, that a marriage ceremony was being held in the house of one Jonab Ali, PW 7, which was quite adjacent to the appellant's house. This marriage ceremony was attended to by almost all the villagers and Mariam. PW 3 had gone to work in the house of one Kolu, leaving behind her daughter aged about one year in the care and custody of the accused appellant. To her shock, when she returned from the work, she did not find her daughter in the house. She started weeping and wailing, which attracted quite a few number of people who had gathered to attend the marriage in the adjoining house. They came to the appellant's house at being asked. It was alleged that the appellant Sukurjan had concealed the child and she took the witness to the nearby ditch where from the dead body of the child was recovered. A report, Ext. 1, was lodged at Police Station Mankachar next day morning by PW 1, which led to the registration of a case under section 302 IPC, which was investigated by PW 11, Giasuddin Ahmed. On completion of investigation the accused appellant was charge sheeted and tried for the above offence. Her defence at the trial, as can be gathered from her statement recorded under section 313 CrPC, and the trend of cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, was one of plain denial of the prosecution case and her own false implication. The trial Court however rejected her defence stand, found her guilty of the offence, charged and convicted her as already noted above, hence this appeal. 3. The trial Court however rejected her defence stand, found her guilty of the offence, charged and convicted her as already noted above, hence this appeal. 3. Since the accused-appellant was unassisted and unrepresented- by any counsel, we requested Ms.B. Choudhury, who having agreed was appointed at State expense to prosecute this appeal which was submitted through jail. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant raised the following points : (i) that admittedly there being no eye witness to the occurrence, the prosecution case hinges on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances relied upon by the trial Court, firstly, are not established and secondly, do not conform such a chain as to unerringly point to the accused and accused alone, as the perpetrator of the crime. According to her the conviction is based on conjecture and surmises; (ii) that the extra judicial confession allegedly made by the accused to the PW1 is wholly unreliable and should not have been acted upon for basing an order of conviction, since the confession was not voluntary, it was under coercion. 5. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent State, on the other hand, maintained that the circumstances as established in the case afford clinching evidence to held the appellant guilty. The conviction as recorded by the trial Court is well supported by evidence. Mere persistance in asking about a missing child according to him would not amount to such a coercion or compulsion so as to render the confession involuntary as made by the accused. It was also pointed out that the defence stand was absurd, a child hardly one year of age could not on its own reach the ditch, that too in the night. The trial Court has rightly rejected the same. Dealing with the submissions raised by the learned counsel, it would not be out of place to record the findings of post mortem examination. According to PW 10. Dr. Ralimat Ali Ahmed, who performed autopsy on the dead body, the body was swollen, foul smell was coming therefrom, four teeth were found, the tongue was protruded and froth mixed with blood was coming through nose and mouth. He was positive in his opinion that the death was due to asphyxia as a result of drowning which was ante mortem in nature. He was positive in his opinion that the death was due to asphyxia as a result of drowning which was ante mortem in nature. The fact that froth mixed with blood was seen coming through nose and mouth is clearly indicative of a manual force being applied, even otherwise, a child hardly aged one year would not drown on its own. Accepting the suggestion as made by the learned counsel mat the child might have walked right upto the ditch and fallen therein, which resulted in the drowning and dying, ordinarily, in such a situation the froth coming out of the nose and mouth would not have mixed with blood unless there was some amount of external manual force so applied as in gagging and strangulation. 6. The findings recorded by the PW 10 are noted below : "In my opinion the death is due to Asphyxia as a result of drowning, which is ante-mortem in nature." 7. Coming to the first point as raised by the learned counsel, as a proposition of law. it cannot be disputed that the pieces of circumstantial evidence must be so inter linked as to provide a chain unerringly pointing to the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. These circumstances must be firmly established. The law on the point has been well settled by series of decisions of the Supreme Court, to name only a few. Sharad Birchand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 and Jaharlal Das vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1991 SC 1388 may be referred to with advantage. 8. Adverting to the circumstances, it is an admitted position that the accused appellant's husband PW 4 Zabed Ali has another wife Mariam, PW 3 and they were living together in the same house under the same roof. It is not uncommon that a lady member of the family while moving out if the house, leaves her child in the care and custody of any other adult left behind in the house and in the instant case it was none else than the accused appellant. Mariam on her return from work found her child missing, her reaction in weeping and wailing is quite natural and it does not call for any corrobotation as suggested by the learned counsel. The marriage function was going on not too far from their house. Mariam on her return from work found her child missing, her reaction in weeping and wailing is quite natural and it does not call for any corrobotation as suggested by the learned counsel. The marriage function was going on not too far from their house. It was just the fourth house in the row and those who heard the wailing of Mariam were naturally attracted and came to the house and enquired of her as to what happened. Of course, there is slight variation in the distance between the two houses as given by the witnesses but it would be too much to expect of them to give any exact measurement, as indeed it would be artificial, when the witnesses were describing the distance it was their oral assessment and nothing material turns on the difference in the distance as given out by the witnesses. The fact remains that the weeping and wailing of Mariam was heard in the marriage house where from some persons came to the house. The other point on distance is the ditch, where from the dead body of the child was found. According to PW 1, it is about seventy cubics, whereas the PWs 2, 7, 8 and 9 given the distance as 100-150 cubics. It cannot be overlooked that these rustic villagers had given the distance in their own way, no accuracy can either be expected or insisted upon. 9. Learned counsel urged that PW 3, Mariam having gone to the house of Koku, could not be seen in the house where marriage function was going on. It is nothing put taking a too artificial view of the realities of life. As testified by Mariam she had gone to the house of Koku for work and having returned therefrom after finishing her work she found that the baby was missing and she started weeping aloud. Learned counsel referring to the FIR, Ext 1. submitted that as per FIR she had gone to attend the marriage. True it is that the FIR, Ext 1, contents a recital to the fact that Mariam had gone to attend the marriage and PW 3 in her evidence testified that she had gone to work at Koku's house, it is not such a discrepancy which cannot be reconciled. Firstly, PW 3 is not the person who lodged the FIR. True it is that the FIR, Ext 1, contents a recital to the fact that Mariam had gone to attend the marriage and PW 3 in her evidence testified that she had gone to work at Koku's house, it is not such a discrepancy which cannot be reconciled. Firstly, PW 3 is not the person who lodged the FIR. it was lodged by PW 1 and the place of marriage is not situated at such a distance as to totally rule out Mariam having attended the marriage function and these contradictions as contained in the FIR by no stretch of imagination can be used against the maker of the FIR. i.e. PW 1. So far as the PW 1 is concerned, he has been confronted with the above recital contained in the FIR and his answer is - "It is not a fact that I stated in the FIR and also before the 10 that on the night of occurrence Mariam had gone to attend marriage in the house of one Koku Sheikh." In view of this categorical statement made by the witness, the recital contained in the FIR that Mariam had gone to attend the marriage, is of no avail to the accused-appellant nor can it be said to have been duly proved. The witness has denied the recital contained in the FIR which was got written by someone else. In these circumstances even if this recital is taken on its face value, it hardly helps the appellant. 10. Now coming to the extra judicial confession a scathing attack was made by the learned counsel on this piece of evidence, to start with she submitted that it is a weak type of evidence and should not have been made the basis of conviction. The notion that prevails that extra judicial confession is a weak type of evidence, has not found favour with the Apex Court. No Court can start with such an presumptuous approach while dealing with the extra judicial confession that it is a weak type of evidence as indeed., such an approach had been disapproved by the Supreme Court in Narayan Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1985 SC 1678 . There are other attending circumstances which cannot be ignored. When Mariam returned to her house she found the accused-appellant coming from outside. Her clothes were wet upto knee and her feet mud stained. There are other attending circumstances which cannot be ignored. When Mariam returned to her house she found the accused-appellant coming from outside. Her clothes were wet upto knee and her feet mud stained. When asked about the child she kept mum and it is this silence on her part which is more eloquent exposing her to the culpability of the crime. If it was not enough, as testified by Mariam. PW 3. she was found trembling in her feet. Viewed in the ordinary circumstances of day to day life, all these symptoms militates against an innocent conduct. 11. It was argued that the appellant was coerced to confess the crime by Kobat Hussain. PW 1. Kalu Sk. PW 9 and Jonab Ali PW 7. Let us now examine their evidences to determine as to what their coercion was. We would like to note that of course the words used are 'persuasion and pressure" and it was in the context of interrogation but there is not even a suggestion in the cross examination of this witness. Mere user of words "pressure" and 'interrogation' would not make it 'coercive". Similarly in the evidence of PW 7. the same words 'interrogation' and 'repeated query" have been used while recording the statement of the witness. In his cross examination the same witness denied the suggestion and has stated: "It is not a fact that Sukurjan did not confess before us that she killed the child of Mariam Bibi. It is not a fact that we have concocted a case against Sukurjan as she is from different village and with an intention that Jabed Ali should divorce her." 12. PW 9. who was one of those to whom the extra judicial confession was made, stated : "We came to the house of Jabed All and asked Mariam why she was making hue and cry. Mariam told us that she had kept her child under the care of Sukurjan but on her return she found her child missing. On being pressed and interrogation Sukurjan told us that she had kept concealed the child." 13. PW 8 stated : "On repeated query Sukurjan told us that she had kept concealed the child of Mariam. Mariam told us that she had kept her child under the care of Sukurjan but on her return she found her child missing. On being pressed and interrogation Sukurjan told us that she had kept concealed the child." 13. PW 8 stated : "On repeated query Sukurjan told us that she had kept concealed the child of Mariam. On being asked to find the child Sukurjan led us to a nearby ditch and recovered the dead body from under the water bycinth." It was on the basis of the above statement that a criticism was made that the extra judicial confession was not voluntary. Of course, the words used are interrogation, pressure, repeated query but there is not a slighest indication as to what was the element of coercion, force or threat which was used against the appellant so as to compel her to confess, not even suggested in the cross examination of any of these witnesses. So much so, when being specifically questioned about it all that she has stated in answer is : "I did not confess my guilt nor I recover the dead body from the ditch." 14. It was not her case that she was coerced or compelled to make her confession. We do not for a while intend to suggest that if such a plea is not taken, it cannot be considered even if not taken by the accused in the statement as recorded under section 313 CrPC. Still it is the duty of the Court to examine whether the extra judicial confession as made was a voluntary one and having examined from that angle, along with the statement made by the accused, we do not find any such element of compulsion, force or intimidation so as to render the confession involuntary. As rightly pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor, there is an inherent absurdity in the arguments advanced that the child could have rolled up to the ditch, as if it was a case of accidental fall. A criminal trial is not a fairytale, it is to be used and appreciated on the basis of the evidence adduced at the trial. The medical evidence available on record rules out the possibility of any accidental fall. Surprisingly enough there was not even a suggestion to this effect made to the PW 10. the Medical Officer, who performed autopsy. A criminal trial is not a fairytale, it is to be used and appreciated on the basis of the evidence adduced at the trial. The medical evidence available on record rules out the possibility of any accidental fall. Surprisingly enough there was not even a suggestion to this effect made to the PW 10. the Medical Officer, who performed autopsy. The age of the child is also amply established by the number of teeth found by the Doctor, it could not be 5. 6 or 7 years of age as suggested during the course of the argument. The child was hardly around one year at the time of the unfortunate incident which is to be viewed in the totality of circumstances and not in isolation, piece by piece. When Mariam returned to the house and the condition in which she found the appellant, her silence when asked about the child, unnerved her she was literally shivering. Now these facts cannot be overlooked or ignored in appreciating the circumstantial evidence. 15. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any reason to interfere with the conviction and sentence as recorded by the trial Court. This appeal fails, it is accordingly dismissed and the conviction and sentence as recorded by the trial Court is maintained except for the imposition of fine, which to our minds appear to be redundant. The imposition of fine of Rs.5007- is therefore set aside. Appeal dismissed. 16. Before parting with the file, we would like to place on record our appreciation of the able assistance rendered by the learned Amicus Curiae in disposal of this appeal. She is entitled to her remuneration as permissible under the rules.