ORDER : S.K. Keshote, J. The applicant who is original petitioner in special civil application No. 2730/ 84 has filed this civil application and prayer has been made for setting aside the abatement of the petition and to order for bringing on record the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 1 on record of special civil application. 2. This civil application has been contested by the opponent No. 1/2. He filed detailed reply, to which the applicant has filed rejoinder. The facts of the case in brief, as pleaded by the petitioner in the special civil application, are that father of the applicant, Bharthaji Bhojaji, was the tenant of the suit land bearing survey No. 39 admeasuring 1 Acre 37 Gunthas situated in thesim of village Varsada in Vijapur Taluka, in Mehsana District, before 1954. Entry No. 579 was also made showing the petitioner's father as protected tenant of the suit land. Father of the applicant died on 19th August, 1976 and thereafter the petitioner has continued to cultivate the land as tenant. Opponent No. 2, Varsoda Kutra Kabutra, is the owner of the land. In the year 1962 the Mamlatdar initiated proceedings under Section 32G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. No notice of the proceedings were issued or served upon the petitioner's father. But one Badarji Bhavanji, father of opponent No. 1, was shown as tenant and notice was issued to him. But he has declined to purchase the land, and the purchase was made ineffective by the Mamlatdar. The Mamlatdar issued notice in November, 1974 to the petitioner's father along with Badarji Bhavanji, father of opponent No. 1, in which it has been stated that they were the tenants, but as the purchase was made ineffective, now they are entitled to purchase the land under Section 32PP of the Act 1948. 3. The petitioner's father made application dated 23rd December, 1974 before the Mamlatdar under Section 32PP of the Act for purchase of the land in dispute. During the pendency of that application, father of the petitioner expired and the petitioner, thereafter, continued those proceedings. The Mamlatdar, under order dated 25th January, 1978 held that the petitioner is not entitled to purchase the land and Badarji Bhavanji is entitled to purchase the land. During the pendency of that application, father of the petitioner expired and the petitioner, thereafter, continued those proceedings. The Mamlatdar, under order dated 25th January, 1978 held that the petitioner is not entitled to purchase the land and Badarji Bhavanji is entitled to purchase the land. The matter was taken up by the petitioner in appeal before the Deputy Collector, which came to be dismissed under order dated 28th November, 1979. The matter was further carried in revision before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and that too was dismissed on 28th July, 1983. Then the petitioner filed special civil application No. 2730 of 1984 before this Court. 4. Opponent No. 2 is a Trust and it was impleaded as party through its Vahivatkarta, Chavda Baldevji Gobarji. Chavda Baldevji Gobarji died and, on the application of the petitioner, his heirs and legal representatives opponents Nos. 2A and 2B were brought on record. But the petitioner failed to serve notice of the special civil application on respondent No. 2B and as such under order dated 1-8-1996 the petition against that respondent was ordered to be dismissed. 5. Respondent No. 1 was not served till 1-8-1996. On that date this Court ordered for issuance of fresh notice to respondent No. 1. Opponent Nos. 1/1 to 1/6 are the heirs and legal representatives of deceased respondent No. 1. From the civil application it appears that it is not in dispute that respondent No. 1 had expired on 23rd November, 1987. It is also not in dispute that respondent No. 1 had expired at Kalol, District Mehsana. The application for bringing heirs and legal representatives of deceased respondent No. 1 has been filed by the applicant before this Court on 17-12-1996, i.e. after about more than 9 years from the date of death. The explanation which has been furnished for the delay in filing this application is that respondent No. 1 was not residing in the village; and he was in Government service. Notice was not served upon him, and upon making inquiry the applicant had come to know that he had since expired at Kalol many years back. He has also taken certificate from the Varsoda-Gunma Juth Gram Panchayat to the effect that death of respondent No. 1 is not registered at the panchayat in record. So the petitioner has pleaded that he was ignorant of the death of respondent No. 1. 5A. He has also taken certificate from the Varsoda-Gunma Juth Gram Panchayat to the effect that death of respondent No. 1 is not registered at the panchayat in record. So the petitioner has pleaded that he was ignorant of the death of respondent No. 1. 5A. Reply to this civil application has been filed by opponent No. 1/2, son of deceased respondent No. 1. In the reply, opponent No. 1/2 has come up with the case that the dead body of his father, respondent No. 1, was brought to Varasoda, District Mehsana and it was cremated there. After-death ceremonies were performed at the aforesaid village in the presence of the applicant amongst others. So the case of opponent No. 1/2 is that the say of the petitioner that he was not knowing about the death of respondent No. 1 is totally false and unbelievable because the applicant was also residing in the very village, and he is a distant relative of respondent No. 1. 6. Rejoinder has been filed by the applicant to the reply of opponent No. 1/2. In the rejoinder, the applicant denied that the dead body of respondent No. 1 was brought to village. It has further been stated that he was also not aware that the cremation of the deceased was performed at the village and applicant is not aware that after death ceremony was performed in his presence. He has denied any of his relationship with the deceased respondent No. 1. 7. So it is a case where there is oath against oath, and the Court has to decide which of the versions has to be accepted. The burden heavily lies on the applicant to prove and establish that he had no knowledge of the death of the deceased respondent No. 1 earlier to the date pleaded by him, in the civil application. The petitioner is an interested person and it is equally true that opponent No. 1/2 is also an interested person. Statement on oath has been made by opponent No. 1/2 that dead body of respondent No. 1 was brought to village Varasoda where the petitioner applicant was residing and is residing; that the dead body was cremated and after death ceremonies were performed at the village. He made the aforesaid categorical statements on oath. Statement on oath has been made by opponent No. 1/2 that dead body of respondent No. 1 was brought to village Varasoda where the petitioner applicant was residing and is residing; that the dead body was cremated and after death ceremonies were performed at the village. He made the aforesaid categorical statements on oath. The petitioner applicant should have produced some independent evidence on record to show that what opponent No. 1/2 stated is incorrect. Instead of producing any other independent evidence in support of his case, the applicant felt contended by filing his own affidavit-in-rejoinder. But in the rejoinder he is not very emphatic in his stand. What he stated is that he is not aware that funeral of respondent No. 1 was performed in the village. So, he has shown his ignorance and no positive statement is made by him that funeral of respondent No. 1 was not performed at the village. Village Varasoda is not a big village, town or city. It is a small village. Even if we go by the fact that the dead body of the deceased was not brought to the village, and the funeral was not performed there, still it is too difficult to accept that the petitioner would not have knowledge about death of respondent No. 1. Though there is no material on record to prove that the petitioner is a distant relative of respondent No. 1, the fact that deceased respondent No. 1 was belonging to the village of the petitioner would go to show that he would have ordinarily got this information. The petitioner was not altogether a stranger or a person unconnected with deceased respondent No. 1. He filed special civil application against deceased respondent No. 1 and he was claiming right in the land in respect of which respondent No. 1 was found to be entitled for purchase of the same. That fact goes in favour of opponent No. 1/2. In view of this position it is difficult for this Court to accept that the petitioner has no knowledge about the death of respondent No. 1 as pleaded by him in the civil application. It is a case where the petitioner applicant has knowledge about death of respondent No. 1, but he has not taken steps to bring on record the heirs and legal representatives of respondent No. 1 within reasonable time. 8. It is a case where the petitioner applicant has knowledge about death of respondent No. 1, but he has not taken steps to bring on record the heirs and legal representatives of respondent No. 1 within reasonable time. 8. During the course of argument, the counsel for the petitioner Mr. J. M. Patel contended that the applicant is illiterate villager residing in the interior village and as such he was not aware of the law that after death of respondent No. 1 his heirs and legal representatives were to be brought on record. On the first flash this argument appears to be appealable, but it is nothing but an afterthought. It is not the case of the applicant in the application that steps could not have been taken in time because of his ignorance of law. The submission appears to have been made by the counsel for the applicant relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Sumiran v. D.D.C., reported in AIR 1985 SC 606 . Otherwise also, it is a contradictory plea taken by the petitioner's counsel during the course of arguments. Moreover, there is no factual foundation for this contention raised by the counsel for the petitioner in the civil application. 9. The counsel for the applicant then contended that the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has further been contended that in the matter of substitution of heirs and legal representatives the Court should take liberal view and approach while considering the question of condoning delay in filing the application. In support of this contention the counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 ; Puran Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1996 SC 1092 ; State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, reported in 1996 (3) JT SC 371; and in the case of A.E.C. v. Electricity Mazdoor Sabha, reported in 1989(2) GLR 823 . 10. 10. In the case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (supra) the Apex Court held that the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual and in the case of State appeal the expression 'sufficient cause' should be considered with pragmatism, justice-oriented approach rather than technical detection. There was delay of about 109 days in filing appeal by the State. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji it was again the case of Government where delay has been made in filing appeal. In the context of the facts of the case, the Apex Court observed that in the matter of condonation of delay the Courts should adopt liberal approach. The reason for adopting liberal approach is stated in para 3 of the judgment as follows : "The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." In the case of Ram Sumiran v. D.D.C. reported in AIR 1985 SC 606 the matter was with respect to abatement for failure to bring legal representatives of deceased respondent on record within time. As this case has been heavily relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner, I consider it proper to refer to the judgment in detail. The High Court in that case dismissed the writ petition on the ground that it has abated as a whole against respondents Nos. 4 and 5 since it abated against respondent No. 5 on account of the legal representatives of respondent No. 5 not having been brought on record within a period of 90 days after the death of respondent No. 5 which occurred on 21-11-1976. In that case the petitioner knew about the death of respondent No. 5; and the application was filed after about six years from the date of death. The Court observed that no steps were taken by the petitioner in the writ petition for bringing legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 5 on record for about six years, though they had knowledge of death. But merely because no application was made by them for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased on record, the Court observed that in the circumstances of the case that would not be a valid ground for refusing to grant the application for setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal representatives of the deceased on record, because they were admittedly from rural area and they were ignorant of law, and being illiterate it was considered to be sufficient ground for condonation of delay. The facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case in hand. Here, as stated earlier, the applicant has not come up with the case that he is illiterate person, living in interior village and ignorant of law. The facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case in hand. Here, as stated earlier, the applicant has not come up with the case that he is illiterate person, living in interior village and ignorant of law. Though during the course of the argument this case was sought to be made out by the counsel for the applicant but there is no factual foundation for the same and it contradicts with the plea taken in the application. The facts of this case are that the petitioner was in the know of the death and still he did not take steps. The ground advanced by the petitioner is not true. 11. In the case of Ahmedabad Electricity Company Ltd. v. Electricity Mazdoor Sabha, 1989 (2) GLR 823 , Division Bench of this Court, while considering the question of condonation of delay in filing the appeal, observed that normally the policy must be to condone delay and see that substantial justice is administered. This Court further held that order condoning delay is a discretionary order. That matter had come up before Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal against the order of the learned single Judge condoning delay of 290 days in preferring first appeal. That case is also of little help to the applicant as the order of condonation of delay in filing appeal is certainly a discretionary order and once the discretion has been exercised by the learned Judge in favour of the litigant, then the L.P.A. court may not interfere. That is not the case here. 12. Now I may advert to the latest decision of the Apex Court, which has been cited by the applicant, in the case of Puran Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 1092 . In that case the Apex Court held that the provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to writ proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. It has further been observed that delay in filing application for condonation of delay does not result in automatic abatement of writ petition. In that case the Apex Court held that the provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to writ proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. It has further been observed that delay in filing application for condonation of delay does not result in automatic abatement of writ petition. But the Apex Court held that non applicability of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure to writ does not mean that the petitioner or appellant in such writ petition or writ appeal can ignore the death of respondent, if right to pursue the remedy, even after death of respondent survives. After death of respondent, it is incumbent on the petitioner or the appellant to substitute the heirs of such deceased respondent within reasonable time. For the purpose of holding as to what shall be reasonable time, the High Court may take note of the period prescribed under Article 120 of the Limitation Act for substituting the heirs of the deceased defendant or respondent. However, there is no question of automatic abatement of writ proceedings. 13. Even if the application is filed beyond 90 days of death of respondent, the court can take into consideration the facts and circumstances of particular case for the purpose of condoning delay in filing application for bringing on record the heirs and legal representatives. This power has to be exercised on well known principles, irrespective of the discretionary powers, by the High Court. If the High Court is satisfied that delay, if any, in making application for bringing on record the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased respondent, was not intentional and sufficient cause has been shown for not taking steps earlier, the High Court can allow the heirs to be brought on record and proceed with the hearing of writ petition or writ appeal, as the case may be. At the same time the High Court has to be conscious that after lapse of time, a valuable right accrues in favour of the legal representative of the deceased respondent and he should not be compelled to contest the claim which, due to the inaction of the petitioner, or the appellant, has become final. In the Puran Singh's case (supra) before the Apex Court the facts were that the respondent therein died on 9th December, 1971. In the Puran Singh's case (supra) before the Apex Court the facts were that the respondent therein died on 9th December, 1971. The dispute related to consolidation of holdings of lands. After the death of respondent the right, title and interest in the land defined to have devolved on his legal representative. As such the right to pursue the remedy against them survived even after the death of respondent. But for pursuing the claim against the legal representative of the respondent, the petitioner ought to have taken steps to substitute him. Admittedly, no steps were taken on behalf of the petitioner till 14th March, 1975. In the facts and circumstances of the case the High Court dismissed the writ petition, and that order of dismissal of writ petition by the High Court has been maintained by the Apex Court. The relevant observation of the apex Court reads as under: "As such the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition and no exception can be taken against the said order." The present case pertains to purchase of agricultural land in dispute under Section 32PP, which right of the respondent has been accepted by the authorities below. So the right to pursue the remedy against the legal heirs and representatives, even after death of respondent No. 1 survives. The petitioner ought to have taken steps within reasonable time to bring on record the heirs and legal representatives of deceased, but he failed to do so. The petitioner sought to explain the delay in filing the application on the ground of ignorance of death of respondent. 14. Net result of the aforesaid discussion is that this civil application fails and accordingly the same is dismissed. No order as to costs. Application dismissed.