JUDGMENT Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J.: This revision petition is being disposed of on merits at the admission stage with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner has assailed As order of District Judge, Kinnaur Sessions Division at Rampur, in case No.62/6 of 1996 passed on 31.10.1996 whereby the petition filed under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short the Act) by Smt Vidya Devi respondent herein has been allowed and die petitioner is ordered to pay maintenance at the rate of 1000 - per month during the divorce petition and Rs.2000/- as litigation expenses to the respondent 3. The short facts of the case are that respondent Vidya Devi filed a petition against the petitioner for seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty. In her petition, she alleged that the marriage was contracted with the petitioner in the year 1989 in a temple at Jakhu, Shimla. Petitioner has rebutted and denied the solemnisation of the marriage with the respondent and contended that the respondent had already contracted marriage with one Sh. M.L. Ghumta Forest Contractor and she is residing with him till date. During the pendency of these annulment proceedings, respondent filed a petition under section 24 of the Act, which was allowed by the impugned order as stated above. 4. The petitioners counsel vehemently argued that the respondent was earlier married to Sh. M. L. Ghumta, thus, according to him she is not his legally wedded wife and further that the petitioner has never contracted marriage with her. He has contended that the respondent is not entitled to claim maintenance under section 24 of the Act. In support of his contention, he has relied upon Mukan Kunwarr. Ajeet Chand (AIR 1958 Rajasthan 322), Govindrao Ranoji Musale v. Sou. Anandibai & anr., AIR 1976 Bombay 433, Smt. Gtmgu Ptundlik Waghmare, v. Pundlik Maroti Waghmare & anr, AIR 1979 Bombay 264,Am/. Sarvo Deviv. Shri Lashari 1983 Sim.L.C. 221 and Laxmibai v. AyodhyaPrasad alias Ramatihar AIR 1991 Madhya Pradesh 47. 5. In the Act, the status of a wife is not defined. Anandibai & anr., AIR 1976 Bombay 433, Smt. Gtmgu Ptundlik Waghmare, v. Pundlik Maroti Waghmare & anr, AIR 1979 Bombay 264,Am/. Sarvo Deviv. Shri Lashari 1983 Sim.L.C. 221 and Laxmibai v. AyodhyaPrasad alias Ramatihar AIR 1991 Madhya Pradesh 47. 5. In the Act, the status of a wife is not defined. Section 24 of the Act clearly lays down that where in any proceeding under this Act it appears to the Court that either the wife or the husband, as the case may- be, has no independent sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses, of the proceeding, it may, on the application of the wife or the husband, order the respondent to pay the petitioner the expenses of the proceedings, and monthly maintenance. 6. In Mukan Kunwars case (supra), the Court observed that the award maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings under section 24 is doubt in the discretion of Court. But that discretion is-a judicial one exercised on sound legal principles and not by caprice or chance or humour. No hard and fast role can however be laid down, the exercise of the discretion depending upon the circumstances of each particular case. The question is that was not directly connected with the determination of the status of parties the facts of that case are not applicable in the present case. In Govindrao Ranoji case (supra), the learned Single Judge while dealing with an applicant under section 25(1) of the Act said as under: Lastly, if the words "wife" and "husband" were construed in their strict literal sense, then they would refer only to parties to a subsisting marriage and in the case of divorced wife or divorced husband or those who have obtained decree of annulment of voidable marriage they cannot strictly be described as wife and husband. But one has to concede that such persons Would be included within the scope of the words "wife" and "husband". If this is so, then no objection could be taken to the interpretation of the words "wife" and "husband" so as to include in them a man and a woman who have gone through a ceremony of a Hindu Marriage which would have been valid but for the provisions of section 11 read with Clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of section 5 of the Act. The learned Single Judge has also held that the Hindu Marriage Act is a Social Welfare legislation. It was with this end in view that certain rights were conferred on Hindu women by the Act. Therefore, such a piece of legislation should be construed by adopting progressive and liberal approach and not a narrow pedantic approach. I am afraid that this decision is not supporting the case of the petitioner in the present case. 7. In Smt. Sarvo Devis case (supra), the then learned Chief Justice of this Court Sh. V.D. Misra, held that the question whether the wife is chaste or not has no relevance to the question of the grant of maintenance. Therefore, the wife was entitled to claim maintenance pendenle lite and expenses of proceedings under section 24 of the Act According to the ratio of that case, even un-chaste wife is entitled for maintenance pendente lite during the proceedings under the Act. This decision goes against the petitioner. 8. In Laxmibai scase (supra), the learned Single Judge held that when an application for maintenance pendents lite under section 24 of the Act is made, it is the duty of the matrimonial Court to hold to summary enquiry to determine prima facie- the merits of the case as also the question of means of the parties for maintenance. The scope of enquiry under S.24 of the Act can be compared with the scope of enquiry in a civil matter where some interim relief in the nature of temporary injunction or appointment of receiver is claimed by one of the parties The scope of enquiry under S.24 of the Act is not as wide as the full-fledged trial of the suit or proceedings but would be certainly an enquiry based on oral evidence or affidavits of the parties sufficient enough to decide the question of grant of interim relief, in the present case, the respondent filed certain documents along with the petition for divorce, prima facie showing the existence of the marriage between her and the petitioner. In paragraph-8 of the judgment, the learned Judge further observed that the Act confers wide powers on the matrimonial Court so as to regulate the matrimonial relationship between the parties and such powers are to be exercised by the Court even in a case of alleged or proved invalid bigamous marriage, it is for the purpose of exercise of those powers by the Court that the Court has been further empowered to fix some interim maintenance to one of the needy spouse so as to sustain herself himself during the pendency of the proceedings in the Court and to meet the expenses of the litigation. It is with this benevolent object to assist the parties and the Court for passing adequate reliefs under the Act that section 24 has been enacted providing for maintenance pendente lite. It is further observed that keeping in view the aims and object of die Act and the wide powers conferred on the matrimonial Court in that respect, the learned Judge was of the view that the expression "wife and husband" used in S.24 have not to be given strict literal meaning as to convey only legally married wife and husband. In the contest of this section and scheme of the Act should mean a person claiming to be a wife or husband.: Thus, it is seen from this decision that it is not necessary for the matrimonial court to decide at the initial stage of the application filed under section 24 of the Act, the question whether the parties to the proceedings are legally married wife and husband. Ratio of this judgment is against the petitioner and on die contrary supporting the case of the respondent - 9. In Gopals case (supra), the learned Judge of die Madhya Pradesh High Court said that the ground for maintenance pendente lite under S.24 of the Act, is not dependent either on the merits of the petition or on the decision of any particular issue. This decision also squarely covers the case of the respondent and answered the question that the respondent in the present case is entitled for the grant of maintenance pendente lite. 10. In Mrs. This decision also squarely covers the case of the respondent and answered the question that the respondent in the present case is entitled for the grant of maintenance pendente lite. 10. In Mrs. Arti Singhs case (supra), the learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court held that exercise of power under S.24 of the Act for maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings is not dependent on the defence raised by opposite party and the legality or otherwise of the marriage in dispute was a mixed question of law and fact and it depends upon the determination of the. issue to be decided on merit 11. In Manjeet Singh v Parson Kaur 1990 (2) Punjab Law Reporter 97, the facts were that the applicant-respondent sought annulment of marriage with the appellant under section 11 of the Act and prayed that marriage of the applicant-respondent with the appellant he declared as nullity as the husband had a living spouse when the respondent was married to him The trial Court found that the husband was already married that the marriage was subsisting. and that the spouse was alive at the of alleged marriage with the applicant-respondent. Thus, the applicants marriage undeclared to be void. During the pendency of the appeal, wife I an application- under S.24 of the Act. Relying upon Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adkav& anr.. AIR 1988 Supreme Court 664, the learned Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that "a marriage in violation of section 5 of the Act has 10 be ignored as non-existing in law. He further held" thus, in the eye of law the applicant- respondent never attained the status of a wife, which has a definite connotation as observed above law understood by the society. Section 24 of the Act statutorily confers a ht of maintenance on a spouse during the pendency of the proceedings under Act but when the marriage itself is void and none of the spouse enjoys the status of husband /wife, neither of the spouse can stake claim for maintenance during the pendency of the proceedings" and thus, the petition was dismissed. 12. In Smt. Yamunabai Anr.ntraes case (supra), the wife filed a petition under S. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 12. In Smt. Yamunabai Anr.ntraes case (supra), the wife filed a petition under S. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Apex Court held that "a Hindu woman who is married after coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in accordance with the Hindu rites with a Hindu Bale having a living lawfully wedded wife is a complete nullity in the eye of law and she is not entitled to the benefit of section 125 Cr. P.C, as such, the marriage is void ipso jure under S.11 of the Act. While interpreting the word wife used in S.125 (1) (a) Cr P.C. the Supreme Court held that reference to personal law can be made. Their Lordships observed that "the word wife is not defined in the code except indicating in the Explanation : inclusive character so as to cover a divorcee. A woman cannot be a divorcee unless there was a marriage in the eye of law proceeding that status, he expression must, therefore, be given the meaning in which it is under-I in law applicable to the parties, subject to the Explanation (b) which snot relevant in the present context. It is only where an applicant establishes her status on relationship with reference to the personal law that an application for maintenance can be maintained. Once the right under the section is established by proof of necessary conditions mentioned therein, it cannot be defeated by further reference to the Personal law." 13. Thus, it is obvious that in Smt Yamunabai Anantraos case (supra), the relevant provisions of section 125 (1 (a) were interpreted by the Supreme court with the help of explanation given, thereunder which gives an inclusive definition of the word wife. From this explanation, the intention of the legislation became clear as to claiming of status of wife under the Code, but under the Act status of wife is not defined at all. 14. In Jit Singh v. Jasbir Kaur 1992 (1) Punjab Law Reporter 305, another Single Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has considered the provisions of section 24 of the Act in a petition which was led under S. 11 of the Act. 14. In Jit Singh v. Jasbir Kaur 1992 (1) Punjab Law Reporter 305, another Single Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has considered the provisions of section 24 of the Act in a petition which was led under S. 11 of the Act. In that case, the wife filed a petition under 11 of the Act seeking declaration by a decree of nullity that the marriage was void but she filed a petition under S.24 of the Act during the pendency of the divorce petition The learned Single Judge considered the Supreme Court authority in Bakulabai & anr. v. Ganga Ram anr.l988 (1) Recent CR. 304 and observed that in that case, the Apex court in Bakulabais case (supra) is not applicable. The provisions of section 125 of the code of Criminal Procedure on the one hand and section 24 of the Act on the other hand are not in pari materia with each other and thus, the maintenance was granted to the wife. 15. In Hemraj Shamrao Umredkarv. Smt. Leela AIR 1989 Bombay 146, the learned Single Judge observed that "the expression wife used in Ss.24,25 does not presuppose an existing jural relationship of husband and wife, but is merely descriptive of the person who may lay a claim to any other reliefs which can be granted under the Hindu Marriage Act. It cannot therefore be said that term wife denotes wife whose marriage is subsisting, unaffected by decree of divorce. 16. Another Single Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Mohan Lai Sharma v. Parveen Sharma 1995 (2) Punjab Law Reporter 706, has also held that section 24 of the Act covers within its scope any proceedings under the Act. The learned Single Judge also held that section 24 of the Act merely provides for summary relief which may be granted to either party who has no independent source of income for his or her support, to claim maintenance pendente lite during the pendency of litigation. It also prescribes that necessary expenses of that litigation may be claimed by the petitioner from the opposite party. The dispute with regard to validity or legality of the marriage is not to be gone into in such a petition and it is a matter which is to be considered in the main petition. It also prescribes that necessary expenses of that litigation may be claimed by the petitioner from the opposite party. The dispute with regard to validity or legality of the marriage is not to be gone into in such a petition and it is a matter which is to be considered in the main petition. For the purposes of application under section 24 of the Act, the Court is only called upon to make summary consideration of the amount which the applicant is to be awarded by way of maintenance pendente lite and for expenses of litigation. 17.Again in Sarabjit Singh v. Charanjit Kaur AIR 1997 Punjab and Haryana &6, the learned Single Judge, of that Court held that the word: wife/husband are to be interpreted liberally as petitioner or respondent claiming to be wife or husband. This is beneficial legislation which provides that if a party, may be wife or husband, is not possessed of sufficient means for her/his maintenance and to bear the expenses of the litigation and if the opposite party is possessed of sufficient means, opposite party should be ordered to pay maintenance and litigation expenses to the petitioner. 18. Thus, analysing the settled position of law, in my considered view, the trial Court has not fallen into any error in granting maintenance and litigation expenses to the respondent-wife in the present case under S.24 of the Act, though the wife has filed a divorce petition under section 13 of the Act, which is yet to be decided on merits. 19. Consequently, I see no merit in the revision petition, it is hereby dismissed with costs of Rs 500/-. 20. However, the views expressed hereinabove, will not be taken note of at the time of deciding the divorce petition, pending in the trial Court on merits. The record of the trial Court be remitted forthwith. 21. Interim stay granted on 13.12.1996 shall stand vacated. -