JUDGMENT ARUN KUMAR GOEL, J.— Heard learned counsel for the parties and I have gone through the records of the case. This appeal is directed by the appellant-defendant State against the judgment and decree passed by District Judge, Hamirpur, dated 15-2-1990 in Civil Appeal No. 144 of 1986, whereby while dismissing the appeal of the respondents-plaintiffs, under Issue No. 1 plaintiffs have been held to be in possession of the suit land in or about in the year 1950 and findings on Issue No. 3 have been reversed as a whole. While holding so, it was further ordered that these modifications do not result in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs and the appeal of the plaintiffs was dismissed with the said modifications, parties are being referred to as plaintiffs, defendant No. 1 State and proforma defendants hereafter in this judgment. 2. Plaintiffs filed a suit for injunction wherein they prayed that defendants be restrained from interfering in their peaceful cultivating possession as owners or dis-possessing them except in due course of law over the land measuring 6 Kanals 10 marlas, as detailed in the plaint, hereinafter referred to as the suit land. This suit was contested by defendant-State as well as by predecessors-in-interest of respondents No. 13 to 17 original defendant No. 1 Amaru. 3. It is not in dispute that defendant-State is recorded as a owner of the land in question and it is a Shamlat land within the meaning of provisions of HP. Village Common Land (Vesting and Utilisation) Act 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, prior to coming into force this Act since the area where the suit land is a situate formed a part of earstwhile state of Punjab as such it was covered under the provisions of Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) Act, 1961. The case of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit land was that since the land in question had been partitioned amongst themselves and the owners were in possession of the same which was assessed to land revenue, in these circumstances, it was further pleaded that the suit land was never vested in the Panchayat under the Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) Act, 1961 because whole of the shamlat land of Taraf Sidhran was partitioned to them (plaintiffs). Since the plaintiffs have never been dis-possessed, therefore, there was no question of the suit land having been allotted to Amaru original defendant No. 1 who had since died during the pendency of the proceedings and is represented by respondents No. 13 to 17. It seems that after the coming into force of H.P. Common Village Land (Vesting and Utilisation) Act, 1974 hereinafter referred to as the Act, the land in question was allotted by the State-defendant in favour of Amaru. It was in this background that the suit came to be filed by the plaintiffs. 4. This suit was contested and resisted by the defendants who contested the claim of the plaintiffs. Defendant No.1 pleaded that he has been allotted the land in question and he is owner in possession thereof. Since the land was Banjar at the time of its allotment to him, therefore, he reclaimed the same by spending Rs. 10,000/- and it is Do-Fasli1, allotment was pleaded to have been made in favour of the said defendant when the plaintiffs were present and it was never objected by any of them. Suit was pleaded to be not within time as also not maintainable in its present from and plaintiffs being not in possession of the same. In the aforesaid background, parties went to trail on the following issues : 1. Whether the plaintiffs are owners in possession of the suit land as alleged ? OPP 2. Whether the suit is barred under Section 10 of the H.P. Village Common Land (Vesting and Utilisation) Act ? OPD 3. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped by their act and conduct from filing the suit ? OPD 4. Whether the suit is barred by limitation ? OPD 5. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties ? OPD 6. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form ? OPD 7 Whether the defendant No. 1 is in possession of the suit land as owner as alleged ? OPD -1 8. Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action ? OPD 9. Relief. Under Issue No. 1 it was held that the plaintiffs appear to be in possession of the suit land as tress-passers since Kharif 1972, Issue No. 2 was decided against the defendants and under issue No. 3 plaintiffs were held to be estopped from filing the present suit. Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action ? OPD 9. Relief. Under Issue No. 1 it was held that the plaintiffs appear to be in possession of the suit land as tress-passers since Kharif 1972, Issue No. 2 was decided against the defendants and under issue No. 3 plaintiffs were held to be estopped from filing the present suit. Under Issue No. 4 it was held that since plaintiffs were not parties to the suit when its allotment was made to defendant No. 4 Amaru as such the plea of limitation raised by the defendant was un-founded, suit was held to be suffering from non-joinder of legal representatives of Jai Karen, but such non-joinder was further held to be without any effect so far the rights of the plaintiffs were concerned, and thus Issue No. 5 was answered in this manner, issue No. 6 was held against the defendants whereas Issues No. 7 and 8 were decided against the defendants and finally under Issue No. 9 the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed by holding that they have failed to establish their title over the suit land. 5. Plaintiffs preferred appeal before the First Appellate Court wherein the Appellate Court modified the findings under issue No. 1 and heid the plaintiffs to be in possession of the suit land in or about 1950 instead of 1972 as held by the trial court and while reversing the findings under Issue No. 3, it was held that the plaintiffs were not estopped from filing the present suit. It is in these circumstances, that the present appeal came to be filed at the instance of the state. 6. Two questions have been raised by the learned Assistant Advocate General in support of its appeal, firstly that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction under Section 10 of the Act and thus according to him the findings recorded by the courts below regarding the plaintiffs being in possession are of no significance. The other ground urged was that the suit of the plaintiffs was not within the period of limitation on the facts as detailed in the plaint. The other ground urged was that the suit of the plaintiffs was not within the period of limitation on the facts as detailed in the plaint. So far the plea regarding the bar of jurisdiction is concerned, the matter need not detain us further in view of the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge of this court reported in case Dalip Singh and others v. State of H.P. and others, 1992(1) Shim. L.C. 320, Needless to point out in this behalf that so far the matter relating to possession of the plaintiffs is concerned, both the courts have held concurrently that plaintiffs are in possession though trial court has accepted that possession to be from 1972, whereas the first appellate court has held it to be from on or about 1950. After having gone through the evidence both oral as well as documentary, this court is of the view that the possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land stands established with effect from on or about 1950 and the findings in this behalf; recorded by the lower Appellate Court are upheld. 7. Once it is held that the plaintiffs are in possession then they cannot be dispossessed even by the real owner. i.e., defendant-State which claims title to the said property except in accordance with law. So far the matter relating to dispossessing a person who is found to be in possession save and except in accordance with due process of law is concerned, it is no more res-integra in view of the decision of this court in case Dalip Singh and others v. State of H.P. and others (supra) wherein reliance has been placed on different decisions viz., Midnapur Zamindary Company Limited v. Naresh Narayan Roy, 51 IA 293, Lallu Yeshwat Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh and others, (1968) 2 SCR 203, Ram Rattan and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1977) 2 SCR 232 and in Krishna Ram Mehale v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, Judgments Today 1989 (3) SC 489. 8. That being so, in no case the possession of the plaintiffs could be disturbed unless action was initiated by the State, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that State had the right to have allotted the suit land in favour of Amaru defendant since deceased. Shobha Venkat Rao, Judgments Today 1989 (3) SC 489. 8. That being so, in no case the possession of the plaintiffs could be disturbed unless action was initiated by the State, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that State had the right to have allotted the suit land in favour of Amaru defendant since deceased. In this view of the matter in no case the relief of injunction could be denied to the plaintiffs, thus both the courts have fallen into error in doing so, so the findings in this behalf are liable to be reversed and it is ordered accordingly. 9. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly, in the context of the present case, it is unfortunate that the plaintiffs did not file cross-objections against the refusal of decree of injunction to them by both the courts below. But then the further question that a arises is whether in such a situation court will be totally helpless or be a silent spectator, the answer would be obviously no. In order to overcome such situations, legislature has enacted provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC and therefore, while dismissing the appeal, a decree of permanent injunction is passed without either the appeal/cross-objections having been filed by the plaintiffs. Needless to point out that so far findings of the plaintiffs being in possession are concerned, there can hardly be any dispute. In this behalf reference can be usefully made to AIR 1988 S.C. 54, Mahant Dhangir and another v. Sh. Madan Mohan and others. On the basis of the material on record, Shri M.L Chauhan was not in a position to assail those findings though he made an attempt by referring to evidence that such findings are not warranted in the present case. This plea has been raised simply to be rejected. Besides this, the frame of the plaint itself showed that the plaintiffs were asking to protect their possession unless evicted in due process of law. Instead of doing so the defendant-State thought it fit to fight the original case. Needless to point out that there are ample powers vested in the State in respect of Shamlat lands as in the present case. 10. Instead of doing so the defendant-State thought it fit to fight the original case. Needless to point out that there are ample powers vested in the State in respect of Shamlat lands as in the present case. 10. In the context of the present case, a decree of injunction having been passed in favour of the plaintiffs, it will not preclude the State from initiating action against the plaintiffs in accordance with law, so that if the plaintiffs can be lawfully evicted then they will be dealt with accordingly. It is further clarified that in case the State-defendant succeeds in evicting the plaintiffs in due process of law, then the allottee Amaru through his legal representatives shall be at liberty to approach the Collector below for restoration of suit land to him as original allottee. Suit of the plaintiff is consequently decreed for permanent injunction restraining the defendant-State from evicting them in accordance with law and till such time the possession of the plaintiffs is not to be interferred. Costs on the parties. Appeal dismissed.