D. K. SETH, J. Ex-parte decree dated 17-2-1995 passed in original suit No. 61 of 1993 was sought to be set aside by means of an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure filed sometimes in April 1995. The said application was registered as Misc. Case No. 16 of 1995 and was allowed by an order dated 17-6- 1995. In the said order it was stipulated that the ex pane decree would stand set aside on payment of rupees one thousand as costs. The next date was fixed on 18th July 1995 for issues. On 18-7-1995 an application was made for granting one months time to file written statement and for payment of costs. The said application was rejected by an order dated 18th July, 1995. On 17-8-1995 the defen dant- petitioner filed an application for recalling the order dated 18-7-1995. The said application was registered as Misc. Case No. 27 of 1995. By an order dated 5th June, 1996 the said Misc. Case No. 27 of 1995 was dismissed. The present revision application has been filed against the said order. 2. An interim order was passed on the said revision application on 3rd July, 1996. The said order has been sought to be va cated by means of present application filed on 31st July, 1996. 3. The learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party Sri Rajiv Joshi vehemently pressed the said application. Sri Shashi Nandan, learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner opposed the same with equal vehemence. In fact both of them had ad dressed the court on the merit of the Revision application itself ia order to justify their respective cas namely in support and against the interim order so granted. While the petitioner was justifying the interim order the opposite party was justifying its vacation. Both of them had based their argu ment on the merit of the case. 4. The decision on the application for vacating the interim order would virtually require a decision on merit itself. Both the counsel have agreed to the disposal of the Revision application since both of them have already advanced their argument on merit as well. Accordingly the Revision ap plication is being disposed of along with the application for vacating the stay. 5. Both the counsel have agreed to the disposal of the Revision application since both of them have already advanced their argument on merit as well. Accordingly the Revision ap plication is being disposed of along with the application for vacating the stay. 5. The learned counsel for the Plaintiff opposite-party contends that the order dated 17-6-1995 being conditional one stipulating particular time on account of non-compliance thereof, nothing remains to be decided by the court and the decree had never been set aside Therefore, there was no scope for extension of time. Second ly, he contends that the order dated 18-7-1995 was subject to revisions and the same was not challenged in Revision. The ap plication for review, therefore, is not main tainable. He thirdly contends that the present revision application can not be maintained only against the order dated 5-6-1996 unless the order dated 18-7-1995 is challenged. He next contends that the con duct of the defendant-petitioner appears to lack deligence. Inasmuch as though he could have challenged the order dated 18th July, 1995 instead he had challenged the only order dated 5-6-1996 to delay the process. His last contention was that even on merit no ground has been made out for reviewing the order dated 18-7-1995. In as much as the defendant petitioner himself has pleaded contradictory case in the ap plication for review and in the case made out in the application filed on 18th July, 1995. 6. The learned counsel for the defen dant petitioner on the other hand con tended that in view of Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Court was em powered to extend time even if it had ex pired. In the present case the order dated 18th July, 1995 does not disclose as to on which ground it was so rejected. Therefore, the application for review was filed. He also relied on serveral decisions in support of his contention. He pointed out that sufficient grounds were made out for recalling of the order dated 18-7-1995. While exercising his jurisdiction the learned court below had acted wholly illegally and with material ir regularity and has thereby failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it in the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. He pointed out that sufficient grounds were made out for recalling of the order dated 18-7-1995. While exercising his jurisdiction the learned court below had acted wholly illegally and with material ir regularity and has thereby failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it in the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. After having heard the learned counsel for both the parties it appears that ex pane decree dated 17-2- 1995 was set aside by an order dated 17-6-1995. The operative part of the said order is re-produced below: "the application for restoration is allowed conditional on defendant applicant paying Rs. 1000/- as costs. Fixed 18-7-1995 for issues in the original suit. " 8. A plain reading of the said order clearly shows that the order was conditional. The decree was set aside on the condition of depositing of Rs, 1000/-, while the date was fixed on 18-7-1995 for issues. By reason of the framing of the said order is such manner it was sought to be contended that the cost was to be deposited before 18-7-1995. In as much as unless it was so done there is no scope of fixing 18th July, 1995 for issue since the suit could be fixed for issues only when ex pane decree is set aside and which can only be done upon payment of the said sum of rupees one thousand. But the fact remained that the said order does not in clude any default clause nor did it stipulate any time frame for payment of the cost. The fixation of date on 18-7-1995 for issues can not be substituted for the time frame or the default clause simply by analogy. In cases where it is stipulated that in default ex pane decree would stand affirmed and the order setting aside the same would stand recalled without the aid of the Court or without anything being done by the court, in that event it can be said that the court had be come functus officio on the expiry of the said date. It is not necessary to go into such question for two simple reasons namely; (i) that there was no time frame fixed and no default clause was incorporated, (ii) the date was fixed on 18-7-1995 which even if is taken to be the last date, on which date itself the application for extension of time was made, and the order was passed viz. before the expiry of time fixed. 9. Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure expoweres the Court to extend time even when the time had expired. For the reasons given above, it is not a case where the court did not have any jurisdic tion to extend time. 10. The order da ted 18-7-1995 does not reflect that any mind was applied to the facts and circumstances of the case. The said order reads thus: "rejected. The restoration application remains dismissed for non-compliance. " 11. The above order does not indicate the mind of the Court as to which weighed with him for rejecting the application and now there was non-compliance when exten sion of time was asked for. Once the court had passed an order dated 17-6-1995 it can neither substract nor add anything to the said order, though, however, condition could be imposed while extending time. The order dated 17-6-1995 having not been made mandatory to the extent of having the effect of dismissing Misc. application without aid of the court, the same can not now be inserted in the said order by reason of the order dated 18-7- 1995. Whether the grounds made out in the application dated 18th July, 1995 were sufficient or not had not been gone into. The said order clearly reveals that the learned court while passing the said order had failed to exercise its juris diction vested in it and acted illegally and with material irregularity while passing the said order, in the facts and circumstances of the case, which is apparent on the face of record. 12. Admittedly, the order dated 18-7-1995 is revisable. But revision of the said order would be a remedy illusory. Inasmuch as if the said order was sought to be revised in that event the only material available would have been the application filed on 18-7-1995 by the learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner which did not disclose reasons why the order could not be com plied with. But revision of the said order would be a remedy illusory. Inasmuch as if the said order was sought to be revised in that event the only material available would have been the application filed on 18-7-1995 by the learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner which did not disclose reasons why the order could not be com plied with. It was the application made by the lawyer since the petitioner could not reach the Court on 18th July, 1995 and could not disclose full particulars, which prevented the petitioner from complying with the said order. Therefore, in such cir cumstances the application under Section 151 is very much maintainable. 13. The provision for review as con tained in Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Order XLVII provides that review can be filed where the remedy by way of appeal is provided but no appeal has been filed. The same analogy can be applied where the revision lies and no revision has been filed remedy by way of review can very well be availed of. The learned court below has completely misdirected itself, as is ap parent from the face of the order dated 5-6-1996 in holding that since there is alter native remedy by way of revision, therefore, the review is not maintainable. The said approach is wholly misconceived ind contrary to law, which does not require any enumeration. 14. Then again it is only application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Pro cedure through which the facts relating to the petitioners inability to comply with the order could be brought on record. Section 151 is the jurisdiction inherent in a court which can be exercised where there is no remedy available or where though such remedy is available it is just and expedient in the interest of justice that such jurisdiction is to be exercised. The very purpose engraft ing Section 151 in the body of the Code would be lost if the technical view is taken as has been sought to be taken in the present case. The procedure is handmaids of Justice. The said question would be best reflected in the passage which the Apex Court had ob served in the case of Mis. The procedure is handmaids of Justice. The said question would be best reflected in the passage which the Apex Court had ob served in the case of Mis. Konkan Trading Company v. Suresh Govind Kamat Tarkar and others, AIR 1986 SC1009 which runs as under: "has Justice become the lip-aim of Courts instead of their life aim ? Instead of dispensing justice is justice being dispensed with? It is a fact that only the spelling of the word (Justice) is remembered and the content of the concept is forgotten? Were it not so, would a court in its professed anxiety to do justice, dismiss a suit as incompetent on the ground that a sum of Rs. 100/-ordered to be paid as costs whilst granting leave to withdraw the earlier suit with liberty to file a fresh suit was deposited after the institution of the fresh suit and not before the institution there of?" 15. In the said case the order was passed permitting withdrawal of the suit with a liberty to file fresh suit with the ex pression "this application is granted but on payment of cost of Rs. 100/ -. " In the said case it was sought to be contended that by reason of such order leave to file suit was condoned and the said sum of Rs. 100/- was payable before fresh suit is instituted. The said sum having not been pusued before the fresh suit was instituted, the High Court had taken a view that the suit was not main tainable. In that context in the said case of Mis Konkan Trading Company (supra) the Apex court was pleased to observe: "even if the order for costs in a given case is construed as directing payment of costs as a condi tion precedent for filing a fresh suit, the defect, if any, may be cured by depositing in Court or paying to the defendants concerned the costs within a reasonable time to be fixed by the Court before which the second suit is filed. If the plaintiff fails to comply with the said direction then it will be open to the court of reject the plaint, but if the amount of costs is paid within the time fixed or extended by the Court the suit should be deemed to have been instituted validly on the date on which it was presented. If the plaintiff fails to comply with the said direction then it will be open to the court of reject the plaint, but if the amount of costs is paid within the time fixed or extended by the Court the suit should be deemed to have been instituted validly on the date on which it was presented. This view appears to be in consonance with Justice whatever may have been the views expressed on the subject by the various High Courts so far, it does not militate against any express provision of law but on the other hand it advances the cause of Justice. This view is also in accord with the spirit behind Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. All contrary views expressed by the various High Courts therefore, stand overruled. " 16. The order dated 17-6-1996 was not a conditional decree. It was at best in es sence in terrdrem. In the case of Mahantha Ram Das v. Ganga Das, AIR 1961 SC 882 , the Apex Court had considered the question of extension of time fixed premptprily for payment of deficit court fees, which was made before the time had expired. But at the time of passing the order time stood ex pired. In such context the Apex court had held: "section 148 of the Code, in terms, allows extension of time even if the original period fixed has expired and Section 149 is equally liberal. A fortiori these sections could be invoked by the applicant, when the time had not actually, expired. That the application was filed in the vacation when a Division Bench was not sitting should have been considered in dealing with it even only 18th July, 1954, when it was actually heard. The order, though passed after the expiry of the time fixed by the original Judgment would have operated from July 8, 1954. How undesirable it is to fix time peremptorily for a future happening which leaves the Court powerless to deal with events that might arise in between it is not necessary to decide in this appeal. These orders turn out, often enough to be in expedient. Such procedural orders though peremptory (Conditional decrees apart) are, in essence, in terrorem so that dilatory litigants might put themselve in order and avoid delay. These orders turn out, often enough to be in expedient. Such procedural orders though peremptory (Conditional decrees apart) are, in essence, in terrorem so that dilatory litigants might put themselve in order and avoid delay. They do not however, completely stop a court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. For example it cannot be said that if the appellant had started with the full money ordered to be paid and came well in time but was set upon a robbed by thieves they day previous, the could not ask for extension of time that the court was powerless to extend it. Such orders are not like the law of the Medes and the Persians. Cases are known in which courts have moulded their practice to meet a situation such as this and to have restored a suit or proceed ing even though a final order had been passed. We need cite only one such case and that is Lachmi Narain Marwari v. Balmukund Marwari, ILR 4 Pat 61: AIR 1924 PC 198. No doubt as observed by Lord Phillimore we do not wish to place an impediment in the way of courts in enforcing prompt obedience and avoidance of delay, any more than did the Privy Council. But we are of the opinion that in this case the Court have exercised its powers first on 13th July, 1954 when the peti tion filed within time was before it and again under the exercise of its inherent powers when the two petitioners under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure were filed. If the High Court had felt disposed to take action on any of these occasions, Sections 148 and 149 would have clothed them with ample power to do justice to a litigant for whom it entertained considerable sympathy, but to whose aid it erroneously felt unable to come. " 17. Admittedly, no written statement was filed when the order dated 17-6-1995 was passed. After the decree is set aside time is granted for filing written statement. There can not be any scope for fixing date for issue on 18-7-1995 without allowing time to file written statement. Unless writ ten statement is filed no issue can be framed or settled. Therefore, the order itself does not appear to lie happy when it fixes 18-7-1995 without granting time to file written statement. There can not be any scope for fixing date for issue on 18-7-1995 without allowing time to file written statement. Unless writ ten statement is filed no issue can be framed or settled. Therefore, the order itself does not appear to lie happy when it fixes 18-7-1995 without granting time to file written statement. The order appears to be void one so far as it relates to fixation of date of 18-7-1995 for issue. The first stage after ex-pane decree is set aside is to file written statement. Order VIII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not require any good cause being shown by the defendant before he is allowed to file written state ment late. Then again in the present case no time at all was fixed for filing written state ment, therefore, there can not be any ques tion of being late in filing written statement. Fixing date for issue on 18-7-1995 was a mistake committed by the court. A mistake committed by the court is expected to be corrected by the court itself when applica tion was made on 18-7-1995, the court ought to have applied its mind to the same. The order dated 18-7-1995 does not reflect that the court had applied its mind to the situa tion. 18. The question with regard to filing of written statement and the Courts power to extend time had cropped up in the case of Soda Ram v. Delhi Development Authority, AIR 1947 Del. 35 wherein it was observed: "there is no agreement amounts the judi cial decisions as to whether Order VIII, Rule 10 applies when the Court requires the written state ment to be filed under Order VIII, Rule 9 only or whether it applies even when the written state ment has to be filed by the defendant under Order VIII, Rule 10 CPC. But we need not enter into this controversy because the words "make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit" used in Order VIII, Rule 10, CPC, give the trial Court a very wide discretion in passing such order as it thinks fit as may be suitable in the circumstances of a particular case. But we need not enter into this controversy because the words "make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit" used in Order VIII, Rule 10, CPC, give the trial Court a very wide discretion in passing such order as it thinks fit as may be suitable in the circumstances of a particular case. It would appear to me how ever that the impugned order as also the order of 13th January, 1972 could be passed under order VIII, Rule 10, CPC because they were passed on the failure of the defendant to file the written statement within the time fixed by the court. Just as an order passed under Section 151, CPC could be the subject of a revisions similarly the order passed under Order VIII, Rule 10, CPC could also be the subject of revision. It is immaterial whether and under which of these provisions of the Civil Procedure Code the impugned order was passed in considering its revisability. The condi tions to be satisfied by the impugned order under Section 151, CPC would be the same in either case. Both under Order VIII Rule 10 and Section 151, CPC the discretion of the trial court in pass ing an appropriate order is very wide. This enhan ces the difficulty of the plaintiff to show that the trial court exercised the jurisdiction in passing the order either illegally or with material irregularity. " 19. In the case of Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal Kotah, AIR 1955 S. C. 425 the Apex Court had observed: "a Code of Procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends; not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties not a thing designed to trip people up (page 8 ). . . . . . . . Next there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard that decisions should not be reached behind their backs that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participat ing in them (9 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . But broadly speaking after allthe various factors have been taken into con sideration and carefully weighed, the endeavor should be to avoid snap decisions and to afford litigants a real opportunity of fighting. . . . many cases and in others the court has almost unlimited discretion about the terms it can impose provided always the discretion is judicially exercised and is not arbitrary (page 16 ). . . . . . The general rule founded on principles of natural justice, that proceedings in a court of justice, should not be conducted behind the back of a party in the ab sence of an express provisions to that effect is no less compelling (para 17),. . . . . . . If these considera tions are to weight then surely the sounder rule is to leave the court with an unfettered discretion so that it can take every circumstances into con sideration and do what seems best suited to meet the ends of justice in the case before it (page 19)" The rule is of course, subject to an exception that it the facts of the case are such that the defendant should be harshly dealt with, the court may not allow him to file a written statement but allow him to participate in the case only from the stage of which he has appeared and then deliver a judg ment which would be most probably against him. " 20. The above observation supports the view which I have taken. Learned coun sel for the plaintiff opposite party relied on the decision in the case of Gokuldairy Farm and others v. Canara Bank, Agra and others, 1996 H. YD. (C) Vol 1 page 381. Relying on the said case the leaned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party contended that since the real relief is by way of appeal, no review can be maintained as was held in the said case. On the same analogy in the present case the order dated 18-7-1995 being revisable or at best appealable it was not open to review. In the said case it was held that the order rejecting application under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC being ap pealable under Order XLIII the review and/or revision would be incompetent. On the same analogy in the present case the order dated 18-7-1995 being revisable or at best appealable it was not open to review. In the said case it was held that the order rejecting application under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC being ap pealable under Order XLIII the review and/or revision would be incompetent. The said order having not been challenged in appeal and sought to be recalled by means of application under Section 151, CPC or to be reviewed under Order 47 since been rejected the revisions was incompetent. 21. The ratio decided in the said case is distinguishable in the facts and circumstan ces of the present case. The principle enun ciated therein does not apply, in view of facts and circumstances of the present case. In the said case order under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC stood rejected by efflux of time for non compliance of the order. Here there was no question of rejection on account of efflux of time by reason of framing of the order dated 17-6-1995, as observed earlier. Secondly, it is not the order dated 17-6- 1995 which he has challenged. On the other hand it is the order dated 18-7-1995 which was challenged. Admittedly the said order was not an order passed under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC Therefore it was not appealable order. Inas much as by the said order ap plication for extension of time was rejected. With regard to the application for restora tion it was observed, that the same remains dismissed for non- compliance. " In any event the order dated 17-6-1995 was com plete in itself. By no stretch of imagination the order dated 16th July, 1995 can form part of the said order dated 17th June, 1995. It was merely a pious observation. Then again it was made wholly without any ap plication of mind and out of context without having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Thus the facts of the present case are distinguishable. Then again in view of observation quoted above, as ob served by the Apex Court, the observations made in the said case of Gokul Daisy Farm, (supra) does not seems to affect the view, I have taken. 22. Now the question. Thus the facts of the present case are distinguishable. Then again in view of observation quoted above, as ob served by the Apex Court, the observations made in the said case of Gokul Daisy Farm, (supra) does not seems to affect the view, I have taken. 22. Now the question. as to whether revision could be maintainable in absence of challenge thrown to the order dated 18-7-1995 as raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-opposite party does not appear to be of substance. Inasmuch a Section 115 CPC does not prescribed any application to be made for invoking the said jurisdiction. It is Courts prerogatives to all for the record and the power is invested with the High Court. When the record of a case is brought before this court it is open to this court to look into any order passed in the said case even though the same is not challenged and the limitation for challenging the same stands expired. The power under Section 115 is a power to correct illegalities and irregularities and to set right such orders passed in excess of jurisdiction or in cases where such orders reflects, failure to exer cise jurisdiction. In the case of In re M/s Dwarika Raghubir Prasad Chowdhary, 1987 (1) CLJ 479 the Calcutta High Court had taken similar view. High Court is perfectly right to see that proper orders are made when matter comes before it. The mere fact that the plaintiff did not challenge the order would not stand in the way of making ap propriate orders when the parties are repre sented. Videjitendra Nath Nandy v. Krishna Mohan Nandy, 56 CWN 858, Mahendra Dutta & Company v. Uma Charan Das, 68 CWN 179. 23. The above view may derive support from the view that the revisional jurisdic tion is regarded as part and parcel of the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, as it was so held by the Privy Council in the case of Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey, AIR 1932 PC 165. The relevant pas sage from the said judgment was quoted with approval and followed by the Apex court in the case afshankar Ram Chandra Abyankar, AIR 1970 SC 1 wherein it was held that the exercise of revisional jurisdic tion "is part of the general appellate juris diction of the High Court as a superior court. " 24. The relevant pas sage from the said judgment was quoted with approval and followed by the Apex court in the case afshankar Ram Chandra Abyankar, AIR 1970 SC 1 wherein it was held that the exercise of revisional jurisdic tion "is part of the general appellate juris diction of the High Court as a superior court. " 24. In the facts and circumstances of the case the matter is already delayed. As observed earlier the order dated 18th July, 1995 suffering from illegality and ir regularity and failure to exercise jurisdic tion can very well be corrected when notice of this court, is drawn to it and it is dealing with the record of the said case. 25. In the facts and circumstances of the case the order dated 5th June, 1996 can not be sustained and is hereby set aside. In view of the observations made above the order dated 18th July, 1995 is also set aside. In order to show its bonafide the defendant petitioner shall deposit a sum of rupees ten thousand in the learned court below within a period of three months from the date of this order. In default the present order shall stand recalled, without any further order from this court which is made a condition precedent. The said deposit, if made, shall be subject to further order by the Trial Court. The defendant petitioner shall also file his written statement within the said period of three months before the learned court below. If such a written statement is filed all procedure for discovery and admis sion of documents etc. shall be completed within a period of two months from the date of the settlement of issues. The issues shall also be settled within the same period. The hearing of the suit should be expedited. The parties shall be at liberty to file appropriate interlocutory applications, if they are so ad vised and obtain appropriate orders from the court below as the same may deem fit and proper by the trial court. The defendant- petitioner shall not take any adjourn ment unless it is exceptionally unavoidable. This court hopes and trusts that hearing of the suit would be expedited and be com pleted preferably within a period of two years from today. The revision application thus stands allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Revision allowed. .