Honble SHARMA, J. – These two revisions being identical in nature involving similar issues of fact and law, are proposed to be disposed off by a common judgment. (2). Execution case No.5/86 and 6/86 were dismissed for non-appearance on 25.1.1990. Applications for restoration u/s. 151 CPC were filed on 12.8.1991 along with applications u/s. 5 of the Limitation Act supported by affidavits of Ramesh Chandra and Smt. Shanta Devi. The Executing Court rejected the applications vide orders dated 25.5.1996. Against the said orders present action for filing the revisions has been resorted to. (3). A brief reference to the factual aspects would suffice before I deal with the pivotal questions whether the dismissal of execution application in default of appearance of the decree holder can be treated u/O. 21 R. 105, so as to attract R. 106 or would be u/s. 151 CPC that the executing Court may invoke for its restoration? (4). In Civil Suit No. 1459/69 a decree for permanent injunction was passed on 30.11.71 by the Court of Additional Munsif Court No. 2 Jaipur in favour of Smt. Pad- mawati Devi (since deceased). Smt. Shanta Devi, Padmanand Ojha. Padam Lochan Ojha and Ramesh Chand Ojha and against the Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur. (5). All the five joint decree holders preferred three separate execution applications which were registered as Execution applications No. 4/86, 5/86 & 6/86 in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) Jaipur East at Padmawati Devi vs. J.D.A. These execution applications were respectively preferred by Shri Parmanand Ojha, Smt. Shanta Devi and Shri Ramesh Chand. (6). On 25.1.1990 all the three execution applications were dismissed in default on account of non-appearance of the decree holders and their counsel. On 24.2.1990 Shri Parmanand Ojha filed restoration application in Execution Case No. 4/86, which was restored by the executing Court. But the restoration application filed by Smt. Shanta Devi and Shri Ramesh Chand in Execution Cases No. 5/86, and 6/86, on 12.8.1991 were rejected. (7). The petitioners in ground `D of the revision petition, have stated that Execution applications were pending since November 1983 but no effective action except giving dates was being done by the executing Court in last more than six years. (8). I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced before me and carefully perused the impugned orders. (9). Mr. The petitioners in ground `D of the revision petition, have stated that Execution applications were pending since November 1983 but no effective action except giving dates was being done by the executing Court in last more than six years. (8). I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced before me and carefully perused the impugned orders. (9). Mr. Raj Deepak Rastogi, learned counsel for the J.D.A raised preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the revisions. The contention of learned counsel is that a set procedure has been envisaged in the CPC to deal with such a situation and applications only u/O. 21 R. 106 could have been entertained and applications u/s 151 for restoration of execution cases were not maintainable. The inherent powers of the Court can not be invoked to circumvent the mandatory provisions of the Code. Mr. Rastogi further canvassed that word `hearing simply connotes, taking of the matter by the Court and every date after issuance of notice is a hearing date. Revision petition filed against the order of rejection of restoration application is not maintainable. Since the restoration applications are treated to be filed u/O 21 R. 106 CPC, the orders are appealable u/O. 43 R. 1(Ja) and appeal, would lie in the Court of the District Judge Jaipur City. (10). Reliance was placed on M/s. Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate Jaipur vs. C.I.T. New Delhi (1), in which the Honble Apex Court propounded that the Courts have power, in the absence of any express or implied prohibition to pass an order as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. To hold otherwise would result in quite a number of cases in gross miscarriage of justice. (11). Bhanwar Lal vs. Gyarssi (2), was the case where the D.B. of this Court observed that Sec. 151 can be applied only where there is no other remedy open to the applicant. Simply because the applicant has allowed remedy u/O. 41 R. 19 to become time barred, he cannot be given the benefit of Sec. 151. (12). Mani Lal Mohan Lal vs. Sardar Sayed Ahmed(3), was the case where the Honble Apex Court laid down that the inherent powers of the Court cannot be in- voked to circumvent the mandatory provisions of the Code. (13). (12). Mani Lal Mohan Lal vs. Sardar Sayed Ahmed(3), was the case where the Honble Apex Court laid down that the inherent powers of the Court cannot be in- voked to circumvent the mandatory provisions of the Code. (13). Bhonrey Lal vs. Ram Singh & Ors(4)., was the case where it was held by this Court that Sec. 151 can be invoked only in case where there is no clear provision in the CPC. (14). Sri Tankala A.G.S. Murthy vs. Gopasundrara,(5) was the case where it was laid down that inherent powers vested in Courts u/s. 151, cannot be invoked where the procedure to be adopted in a particular case is expressly provided for by the Code. (15). Refuting the arguments advanced on behalf of non-petitioner J.D.A. Mr. M.C. Surana, learned counsel for the petitioners vigorously canvassed that revision petition is maintainable. The executing Court committed jurisdictional error in dismissing the applications for restoration of execution cases and if the orders are allowed to stand, failure of justice will be occasioned. Mr. Surana placed reliance on the following case laws :– Khem Chand vs. Niranjan Lal (6), Nemi Chand vs. Umed Mal(7), Ram Gopal, vs. State of Raj.(8), Bhanwar Lal vs. Gopi Lal(9), Deo Narayan vs. Jagdish Pandit(10), Khoob Chand Jain vs. Rashi Pd.(11), Smt. Renu Kumar vs. Vishwanath(12), Manohar Lal Chopra vs. Rai Bahadur(13), Smt. Vidhyawati vs. Sh. Deviu Das(14), Nami Gopal vs. T. Prasad Singh(15), Municipality Farid Kot vs. M/s. Chandra Bhan(16), Padmalaya Pandia vs. Masinath(17) and Ram Singh vs. Amra(18). (16). In order to properly appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to refer to the relevant statutory provisions. For the purpose of easy reference Rr., 105 & 106 of O. 21 CPC, are quoted below :– ``105. (1) The Court, before which an application under any of the foregoing rules of this Order is pending, may fix a day for the hearing of the application. (2) Where on the day fixed or on any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned the applicant does not appear when the case is called on for hearing, the Court may make an order that the application be dismissed. (3) Where the applicant appears and the opposite party to whom the notice has been issued by the Court does not appear, the Court may hear the application ex-parte and pass such order as it thinks fit. (3) Where the applicant appears and the opposite party to whom the notice has been issued by the Court does not appear, the Court may hear the application ex-parte and pass such order as it thinks fit. Explanation – An application referred to in sub-rule (1) includes a claim or objection made u/R. 58. 106(1) The applicant, against whom an order is made under sub rule (2) R. 105 or the opposite party against whom an order is passed ex-parte under sub-rule (3) of that rule or under sub-rule (1) of R. 23, may apply to the Court to set aside the order, and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the application was called on for hearing, the Court shall set aside the order or such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit and shall appoint a day for the further hearing of the application. (2) No order shall be made on an application under sub-rule (1) unless notice of the application has been served on the other party. (3) An application under sub-rule (1) shall be made within thirty days from the date of the order, or where, in the case of an ex-parte order, the notice was not duly served, within thirty days from the date when the applicant had knowledge of the order. (17). These two Rules were inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, 1976 and were brought into force with effect from 1.2.1977. The legislative intention in introducing these two Rules to the CPC, was that owing to the inapplicability of the provisions of Sec. 141 to execution proceedings. Order 9 of the Code did not apply to them with the result that the Court found it difficult to decide the circumstances in which an application for execution can be dismissed for non-appearance, where the Court in the absence of any specific provisions relating to restoration of the execution proceeding, can restore such application. Because of such difficulty of non-application of O.9 to execution proceedings. Rule 106 in par- ticular was inserted to give jurisdiction to the executing Courts similar to Rr. 9 & 13 of O. 9 for restoration of cases and for setting aside orders passed ex-parte therein. It is noteworthy that before incorporation of Rr. Because of such difficulty of non-application of O.9 to execution proceedings. Rule 106 in par- ticular was inserted to give jurisdiction to the executing Courts similar to Rr. 9 & 13 of O. 9 for restoration of cases and for setting aside orders passed ex-parte therein. It is noteworthy that before incorporation of Rr. 105 & 106 of O. 21, Courts in India used to take resort to their inherent powers u/s. 151 of the Code for restoration of execution cases or setting aside exparte orders passed therein according to dema- nd of justice. Case Keshar Deo vs. Radha Kishan Chamria (19) may be referred in this regard. But now the difficulty experienced by the Courts earlier has been completely obviated and the Courts in suitable cases and for justifiable reasons, can restore an execution case and set aside exparte order passed therein. (18). Rule 105(2) of O. 21 contemplates dismissal of execution application but only when the application does not appear when the case is called for hearing. Rule 107b, empowers the executing Court to recall the order of dismissal passed exparte and it provides that the Court may set aside the order passed either under Sub-Cl. (1) of R. 105 or of Sub-Cl. (2) of R. 105, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for the non-appearance when the application is called on for hearing. (19). Keeping the aforesaid legal position in view I may now consider as to whether the non-appearance of the petitioners were on the day when the execution cases were called on for hearing. (20). As per facts mentioned in revision petition, the execution cases were pending in the executing Court since November 1983 but no effective action, except adjourning the dates, was being done by the said Court in last more than six years. These facts have not been controverted by the non-petitioner. The only, contention of Mr. Rastogi, learned counsel, in this regard is that, word `hearing simply conno- tes taking of the matter by the Court and every date after issuance of notice is a hearing date therefore it cannot be said that the execution cases were not fixed for hearing on 25.1.1996 when the impugned order was passed. In support of this contention Mr. Rastogi, learned counsel, in this regard is that, word `hearing simply conno- tes taking of the matter by the Court and every date after issuance of notice is a hearing date therefore it cannot be said that the execution cases were not fixed for hearing on 25.1.1996 when the impugned order was passed. In support of this contention Mr. Rastogi, learned counsel, placed reliance on Palat Ahir vs. Baij Nath (20), where it was propounded that `what O. 9 R. 1 contemplates is that the date- for appearance given in the summons served on the defendants is that the date fixed for the hearing of the case but the hearing may be adjourned from time to time. (21). In Deo Narayan vs. Jagdish(21), the Gauhati High Court observed thus:– ``The Trial Court had not fixed the execution application for hearing on 11.7.1980. It had fixed that date for hearing of the petition of the judgment debtor whereby he wanted the stay of the execution proceedings till the harvesting was done. That application was rejected by the Court below as it had become infructuous. The parties were present before the Court. If any steps were required to be taken by the decree-holder for proceeding with the execution, the Court should have granted time, for doing so. Instead, the Court below rejected the application in default. The decree holder therefore, applied for setting aside that order. Such an order not being covered by R. 105 of O. 21 CPC, the application for setting it aside could not be filed u/R. 106 of O.21. The inherent power of the Court was, therefore, invoked to set aside the order. (22). Khoobchand Jain vs. Rashi Prasad,(supra) was the case where the Madhya Pradesh High Court observed thus :– ``In my opinion, the date on which the execution application was dis- missed for default of appearance of the decree- holder, namely 21.8.1979 was not a date fixed for hearing within the meaning of Rs. 105. It was a date awaiting report as to execution of warrant which was support to be issued on submission of a list of movable property by the decree-holders within three days of the earlier order dated 21. 7.1979. Consequently, the dismissal of execution application on 21.8.1979 was not u/R. 105(2) of O. 21 of the CPC and therefore, the provisions of R. 106 are not attracted. 7.1979. Consequently, the dismissal of execution application on 21.8.1979 was not u/R. 105(2) of O. 21 of the CPC and therefore, the provisions of R. 106 are not attracted. The dismissal of the execution application in default of appearance on 21.8.1979 is referable to inherent powers of the Court. (23). In the instant cases also the date 25.1.1990, on which the execution applications were dismissed for default, was not a date fixed for hearing within the meaning of Rs. 105 of CPC. After receiving notices u/R. 22 of O. 21, the judgment debtor Jaipur Development Authority ought to have offered objections to the execution of the decree and the executing Court ought to have proceeded to decide the said objection in accordance with R. 23(2) of O. 21. But it appears that the executing Court did not care to invoke the provisions contained in R. 23(2) of O. 21 and only adjournment process was effected for the last six years. Even if the decree holders would have appeared on 25.1.1990, the execution cases would have adjourned like the proceedings of previous dates. (24). Viewed from other angle also, the restoration applications could not be dismissed. As already stated, five joint decree holders preferred three separate execution applications for executing a decree of permanent injunction passed on 30.11.1971. The provisions related to application for execution by Joint decree holders, have been enumerated in R. 15 of O. 21 CPC, which provides that ``Where a decree has been passed jointly in favour of more persons than one, any one or more of such persons may, unless the decree imposes any condition to the contrary, apply for the execution of the whole decree for the benefit of them all, or where any of them has died, for the benefit of the survivors and the legal representatives of the deceased. Where the Court sees sufficient cause for allowing the decree to be executed on an application made under this rule, it shall make such order as it deems necessary for protecting the interest of the persons who have not joined in the application. It follows that the executing Court, looking to the benefit of all the decree holders ought to have consider that even one execution application by any one of the joint decree holder was competent. It follows that the executing Court, looking to the benefit of all the decree holders ought to have consider that even one execution application by any one of the joint decree holder was competent. When Execution Case No. 4/86 filed by Shri Parmanand Ojha was restored, the other execution cases arise from the same decree also ought to have been restored in view of provisions contained in R. 15 of O. 21. Even in execution case No. 4/86 the interests of other joint decree holders Smt. Shanta Devi and Shri Ramesh Chand can be protected. Following the provisions contained in R.15 of O. 21, it would have been better for the executing Court to consolidate all the three executing cases. (25). It is not, therefore, necessary for me to discuss the reasons given in the restoration applications. Suffice is to say that the applications were supported by affidavits which were not controverted. (26). After weighing all the facts and circumstances I am of the view, that orders dismissing in default the execution cases No. 5/86 and 6/86 were not covered by R. 105 of O. 21 CPC and the applications for setting aside the said orders could not be filed u/R. 106 of O. 21. The applications u/s. 151 were therefore, competent and revisions against the impugned orders are maintainable. Since the execution cases were dismissed on 25.1.1990 under inherent powers, the applications for restoration were also under the inherent powers for which no time limit was prescribed. The Court below, thus committed jurisdictional error in dismissing the restoration applications and if the orders are allowed to stand, failure of justice would be occasioned. (27). Before parting with the case I note with distress that decrees passed on 30.11.1971, has not been executed as yet. It is said that it is easy to get decree but difficult to execute it. This myth should be exploded by the executing Courts by devoting due attention to the execution proceedings. (28). In the result I allow the revisions and set aside the impugned orders. Applications submitted by the petitioners u/s. 151 CPC for restoration of execution cases are accepted and the execution cases are restored. The learned executing Court is directed to execute the decree in accordance with law expeditiously, costs easy.