JUDGMENT Ruma Pal, J. This is an appeal preferred from an order dated 11th October, 1996 directing the restoration of the electricity line to the respondent No. 1. The restoration was to be made within 48 hours from the date of payment of the amount for which the respondent No. 1 was billed. The billed amount was limited to the claim for six months and was directed to be paid within 7 days from the date of the order. Subsequent to the order the respondent No. 1 paid an amount of Rs. 3,25,218/- and the appellants have restored the connection without prejudice to their rights. 2. The undisputed facts are that the respondent No. 1 carries on the business of manufacturing of ice blocks in its factory. It applied to the West Bengal State Electricity Board (referred to as WBSEB) for the necessary supply of electricity. An agreement was executed between the WBSEB and the respondent No. 1 for such supply on 29th July, 1991. A meter was installed through which the electricity was supplied to the respondent No. 1. The supply was disconnected on 22nd December, 1995. 3. The disputed facts relate to the circumstances under which the supply of electricity to the respondent No. 1 was disconnected by the officers of the WBSEB. According to the appellants the Central Vigilance Squad along with one officer and three home guards of the local police station in the course of physical verification of the meter/metering installation of the factory found that there was a direct tapping line from the transformer secondary site to the L.T. Distribution mains by passing the meter circuit. In other words there was an un-metered consumption. It is the appellant's further case that the vigilance squad also found one plastic seal had been affixed on the front of the meter board and that the movement of the meter was found to be stopped. The installed capacity of the transformer was found to be 250 KVA and the installed load of the meter was found to be 145 H.P. The appellant's officers recorded all this in a physical verification sheet. This was signed by the officers of the Central Vigilance Squad, the officers of the local police station as well as persons, who, the appellants claim, were employees of the factory. This was signed by the officers of the Central Vigilance Squad, the officers of the local police station as well as persons, who, the appellants claim, were employees of the factory. The line was thereafter disconnected from the tapping pole of the 11 KVA feeder line and the meter room was sealed by a plastic seal. 4. The respondent No. 1 on the other hand has submitted that the Central Vigilance Squad came without giving notice to the respondent No. 1 when the factory was not working and broke open the door and padlock of the meter room and obtained signatures of two persons who were not the employees of nor in any way connected with the respondent No. 1. 5. It is not in dispute that an FIR was lodged with the local police station on the same date by the Central Vigilance Suad. On 10th January, 1996 the Superintendent Engineer, South 24 Parganas Circle of the Board sent a supplementary bill for a sum of Rs. 16,09,416/- to the respondent No. 1 for the period December, 1992 to November, 1993 and December, 1993 to December, 1995 together with detailed break up and calculations under two heads : (1) non-recorded consumption of electricity and (2) pilferage of electricity. 6. This was replied to on 6th February, 1996 by the respondent No. 1. In this letter the respondent No., 1 challenged the calculations. It was also alleged that the officers of the WBSEB had broken open the door and padlock of the meter room of the factory and forcibly obtained the signature of two local labourers. It was also disputed that there had been any tapping of electricity. It was accordingly prayed that the bills should be referred to the Electrical Inspector for adjudication. 7. The respondent No. 1 then filed a writ application on 8th March, 1996 challenging the supplementary bill and praying for reconnection. An interim order was passed on 26th April, 1996 directing restoration of the supply of electricity to the factory upon payment of Rs. 25,000/-. These appellants then preferred an appeal from the interim order. The interim order was set aside by the Appeal Court on 10th May, 1996 and the matter was remanded back for hearing by the learned Single Judge. The writ application was allowed by the order under appeal on 11th October, 1996. 25,000/-. These appellants then preferred an appeal from the interim order. The interim order was set aside by the Appeal Court on 10th May, 1996 and the matter was remanded back for hearing by the learned Single Judge. The writ application was allowed by the order under appeal on 11th October, 1996. One of the grievances of the appellant is that the writ application was disposed of without giving any opportunity to the appellants to file any affidavit and only on the basis of the records which had been directed to be produced. 8. The learned Single Judge held that there was no power conferred upon the WBSEB to decide suo moto in administrative capacity the amount of electricity pilferage and raise a demand on the basis thereof and that if the consumer had committed an offence he was to be punished in accordance with law by appropriate prosecution. It was also held that the matter should have been decided by the Inspector under s. 26B of the Electricity Act, 1910. The learned Single Judge also upheld the submission of the respondent No. 1 that the amounts claimed in the supplementary bills were barred by limitation and that service of a notice was a pre-requisite to any disconnection of the electricity line. It was further held that the WBSEB should not have proceeded with the matter to realise any amount on account of the alleged pilferage or default when an FIR had been lodged alleging theft of electricity by the respondent No. 1. The learned Single Judge also held that the matter should also be referred to arbitration. 9. It is not necessary to go into the facts insofar as they are disputed. Indeed the nature of the jurisdiction being exercised under Art. 226 does not permit the court to resolve disputes save in exceptional cases. This case does not fall within such exception. The Learned Single Judge also did not go into any question of fact. 10. At the hearing which took place over a number of days several points were raised viz.- 1. Whether the WBSEB has the authority to disconnect the supply on the basis of allegations of pilferage without any notice? 2. Whether WBSEB had the authority to determine the quantum of un-metered consumption/in cases of pilferage and raise bills on the basis thereof? 3. Whether the WBSEB has the authority to disconnect the supply on the basis of allegations of pilferage without any notice? 2. Whether WBSEB had the authority to determine the quantum of un-metered consumption/in cases of pilferage and raise bills on the basis thereof? 3. Whether any part of the claim of WBSEB in the supplementary bill is barred by limitation? 4. Whether WBSEB Officers had illegally entered into the factory premises of the respondent No. 1 in violation of s. 20 of the Electricity Act, 1910 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Re. 1. 11. Clause 25 of the Agreement for the supply of electrical energy an agreement was executed, dated 29th July 1991 between the WBSEB and the respondent No. 1 as also clause 20(b) of the General Conditions of Supply have been specifically relied upon by the appellants as empowering than to disconnect the respondent No. 1's supply of electricity on the basis of the report of the Central Vigilance Squad of the WBSEB without notice. Clause 25 reads : "25. The. Board shall have the right to disconnect supply of electrical energy to a consumer forthwith without any notice if and when the Board is of the opinion that the Metering installations including Meters. CTs. PTs and associated Circuitry or such of them is/are found to have been handled and/or tampered with wrongfully and in that event a First Information Report shall be filed with the Local Police Station not later than 24 hours from such disconnection." 12. This clause is a verbatim reproduction of clause 20(b) of the General Conditions of Supply framed by the WBSEB under s. 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 which is also binding on the respondent No. 1 under cl. 27 of the Agreement. Therefore in terms of the agreement and conditions of supply, disconnection can be made without notice provided the Board is of the opinion that the circumstances mentioned in the clauses exist. 13. A similar situation came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in M.P. Electricity Board, Jabalpur vs. Harsh Wood Products and Another AIR 1986 SC 2256. The Supreme Court said : "The only question is whether the consumer is entitled to hearing before disconnection? 13. A similar situation came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in M.P. Electricity Board, Jabalpur vs. Harsh Wood Products and Another AIR 1986 SC 2256. The Supreme Court said : "The only question is whether the consumer is entitled to hearing before disconnection? In view of the conditions to which the respondents had agreed at the time of Installation and also the prima facie conclusion reached by the authorities, it was not necessary to give further hearing to the respondents. The action taken by the appellant is not violative of Arts. 20(1) & 14 of the Constitution and principles of nature justice." 14. It was contended by the respondent No. 1 that this decision was per incuriam in that it was contrary to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court which had not been taken note of. The earlier decision, according to the respondent No. 1 was the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. M/s. Ajanta Iron & Steel Co., AIR 1990 SC 682 . Reliance on this case by the respondent No. 1 is misplaced. It is clear from that judgment that the consumers suit had been decreed solely on the ground of non-service of notice which was required under Condition No. 36 of the Condition of Supply of Electricity as a pre-requisite for disconnection. The Supreme Court held that the supplier "cannot be allowed to go back upon his words and refuse the consumer the benefit of the notice as contemplated by the agreement." The decision has no application in this case where the conditions of supply and the agreement contain express clauses entitling the Board to disconnect the electricity without notice. 15. A similar view has also been taken by other High Courts in Sree Jee Plastics vs. Karnataka Electricity Board AIR 1995 Kant 57 and Aditya Rotor Spin (P) Ltd., Kanpur vs. U.P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow AIR 1991 All 196 . In both the cases there were specific regulations framed which allowed the Board to disconnect the installation forthwith and without notice in case it was found that the consumer was guilty of any offence of theft of electricity etc. The Division Benches of both the High Courts distinguished the decision reported in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. M/s. Ajanta Iron & Steel Co. (supra) on the same ground. 16. The Division Benches of both the High Courts distinguished the decision reported in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. M/s. Ajanta Iron & Steel Co. (supra) on the same ground. 16. In fact both the High Courts upheld the power of disconnection of electricity without notice on the basis of the agreement and the conditions of supply. It was also held that there was no question of violation of principles of natural justice in making such a disconnection and a post decisional hearing could be given. 17. We therefore see no reason not to follow the principle expressed by the Supreme Court in MP Electricity Board vs. Harsh Wood Products (supra). The other decisions cited by the respondent No. 1 of Learned Single Judges viz., Tamil Nadu Electricity Board vs. K. Vinayan 1982 (1) MLJ 16 (Note) : AIR 1935 Cal 298 : Gautam Roy vs. CESC Ltd & Ors. Cal LT 1994 (1) HC 444 : Auckland International Ltd. & Anr. vs. The CESC Ltd. & Ors. CLT 1992 (2) HC 176 : John Earnest Edward and Anr. vs. Rai Jogendra Chandra Ghosh Bahadur AIR 1935 Cal 296 in so far as they hold to the contrary must be held to be no longer good law. 18. It was then submitted by the respondent No. 1 that clause 25 of the agreement authorised the Board to disconnect the supply of electrical energy "if and when the Board was of the opinion" that circumstances had arisen justifying the disconnection. The respondent No. 1 says that the word "Board" means the WBSEB itself as constituted under s. 12 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and not its officers and that there was no material before this Court to show that the WBSEB had formed any opinion prior to the disconnection. 19. This is not a point which was taken by the respondent No. 1 either in its writ petition or before the learned Single Judge at the hearing. If it was so taken it has certainly not been decided in its favour. The point has not even been pleaded in the affidavit in opposition filed in answer to the stay application of the appellant. No cross objection has also been filed. We therefore do not permit the respondent to raise that point at this stage. Suffice it to say that the Board operates through its officers appointed for this purpose. 20. The point has not even been pleaded in the affidavit in opposition filed in answer to the stay application of the appellant. No cross objection has also been filed. We therefore do not permit the respondent to raise that point at this stage. Suffice it to say that the Board operates through its officers appointed for this purpose. 20. Incidentally it may be noted that s. 12 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 provides : "12. Incorporation of Board.-The Board shall be a body corporate by the name notified under sub-section (1) of section 5 having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to acquire and hold property, both movable and immovable, and shall, by the said name, sue and be sued." 21. In its writ petition the respondent No. 1 did not sue the Board so nominee although reconnection of electricity had been sought for on the basis of the agreement between the respondent No. 1 and the WBSEB. If s. 12 were to be applied, as contended by the respondent No. 1, the writ application itself will have to be dismissed as the WBSEB was not made a party in terms of s. 12. The respondent No. 1 clearly treated the officers of the WBSEB as being sufficiently representative of the WBSEB in filing the writ petition that cannot now question the authority of the WBSEB officers to represent WBSEB. 22. The last submission on this aspect of the matter is that there was no material on the basis of which the requisite opinion could be formed. That there was an inspection has not been challenged. It is also not challenged that the inspection was done by the Central Vigilance Squad of the WBSEB comprising of competent officers. In addition to the officers of the Central Vigilance Squad, Officers of the local police station who had accompanied the squad signed on the inspection report. What has been challenged is the fact that the physical verification report was not signed by any employee of the respondent No. 1. The stand of the respondent No. 1 in this case is inconsistent. In its letter dated 8th February 1996 written to the WBSEB the respondent No; 1 refers to the two witnesses as "local labourers". But in the affidavit in opposition it is said that they were not the employees of the factory and not the "local persons". The stand of the respondent No. 1 in this case is inconsistent. In its letter dated 8th February 1996 written to the WBSEB the respondent No; 1 refers to the two witnesses as "local labourers". But in the affidavit in opposition it is said that they were not the employees of the factory and not the "local persons". In the face of such a contradiction it is not possible to accept the respondent No. 1's version. However even if one accepts the stand of the respondent No. 1, the fact remains that the Report was prepared in the presence of 10 or more persons. The report cannot be disregarded. There is no allegation of mala fides against the officers of the squad or the police personnel. For the purposes of judicial review under Art. 226 the Court will only see whether there is some relevant material which could support the opinion formed. The facts recorded are sufficient to form an opinion or prima facie view that there had been a theft of electricity justifying the disconnection of the line under clause 25 of the Agreement without notice. Re. 2 23. The supplementary bill raised by the WBSEB covers two periods. According to the letter dated 16th January 1996 written by the WBSEB to the respondent No. 1, for the period December 1992 to November 1993 the respondent No. 1 was liable to pay the amount of Rs. 2,62,389.08 on account of defective meter recording. Under this head it has been claimed by the WBSEB that the Central Testing Wing of the WBSEB inspected the meters and meter circuits at the respondent No. 1's factory on 16.12.93 and found the B-phase C.T. Circuit open. The KVA rh meter was also found defective. The defects were set right on the same day. It is WBSEB's case that as a result the energy meters only recorded the 2/3rd of the electrical energy actually consumed. 24. The second claim of the WBSEB is for the period December 1993 to December 1995. This was on the basis of the findings of the Vigilance Squad that the respondent No. 1 had tapped electric energy directly from the transformer to the LT distribution board by passing the meter circuit. An amount of Rs. 15,47,029.26 has been claimed on this account. 25. This was on the basis of the findings of the Vigilance Squad that the respondent No. 1 had tapped electric energy directly from the transformer to the LT distribution board by passing the meter circuit. An amount of Rs. 15,47,029.26 has been claimed on this account. 25. The learned Single Judge has referred both claims/disputes to the arbitration of the Inspector under s. 26B of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. 26. As far as the first claim of the WBSEB is concerned in our view the submission of the respondent No. 1 that it was not open to the WBSEB to determine the amount in respect of period for which the meter was defective is wrong. There is no dispute that the meter was found defective. The letter dated 8.2.96 written by the respondent No.1 to the appellants also records "we have many times complained you for the defective meter but you did not remove the defect............". That the meter was found to be defective appears from the meter card annexed to the writ petition in which the following entry against the date 16.12.93 has been made "Sticky KVARH and others rectified." 27. The agreement between the parties itself does not provide for the determination of the amount under charged on account of defective meters. But the conditions of supply which are binding on the parties to the agreement by virtue of clause 27 of the agreement specifically provides for determination of disputes as to the defective recording of the meter. Condition 17(iiii) lays down the formula for determination and provides : "(iii) In the event of any Meter showing abnormally low or high reading in comparison to the reading of a reasonably comparable period of Metering system and/or the Meter not functioning properly or reasonably or the Meter being found defective, the power and energy consumption during the period when the Meter(s) shall give such low or high reading of the meter or the Metering system not functioning properly or reasonably or the Meter (s) was/were deemed to be defective shall be determined by taking an average consumption and other parameters for the proceeding and or succeeding three months or during any previous and/or subsequent period that may be reasonably comparable." 28. The other relevant conditions are 17(v) and 17(viii). The other relevant conditions are 17(v) and 17(viii). They read : "(v) If either party is dissatisfied with the accuracy of any meter of the consumer's premises, the following procedure shall be adopted. If the Board challenge the accuracy of any meter, they may with the consumer's consent themselves test the meter, but shall if the consumer so desires have the meter tested by the Electric Inspector to the Government in accordance with s. 26 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 or any statutory modification for the time being in force. If the consumer challenges the accuracy of the meter he may have it tested either by the Board upon payment of the. fee stated in the scale of miscellaneous charges of the Board or by the Electric Inspector to the Government upon giving due notice and paying the fee laid down in the table of fees issued by the Government under the Indian Electricity Rules for the time being in force and the Board will arrange for the meter to be tested accordingly. (viii) In the event of any meter ceasing to be a correct meter, the charges payable by the consumer for such period as the meter has been considered not to be correct shall, except where a dispute has been referred to the Electric Inspector under s. 26(6) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 or any revision thereof; be based on the average in accordance with the provisions of the Board." 29. Under the Conditions of Supply the Electrical Inspector only tests the meter if called upon to do so but does not determine the amount. Otherwise the WBSEB tests the meter and the determination of the amount is to be made by WBSEB unless the dispute has been referred to the Electrical Inspector under s. 26(6) of the 1910 Act. There has been no such reference to the Electrical Inspector by either party in this case. In the absence of such specific reference, the WBSEB was competent to test the meter and compute the amount according to the formula provided in 17(iii). There has been no such reference to the Electrical Inspector by either party in this case. In the absence of such specific reference, the WBSEB was competent to test the meter and compute the amount according to the formula provided in 17(iii). Clause 28 of the agreement provides that : "The agreement shall be read and construed as subject, in all respects, to the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and all the rules for the time being in force thereunder so far as the same respectively may be applicable." 30. We read the last portion of the Clause as meaning that the clauses of the agreement will apply unless the statutes expressly provide to the contrary. 31. The reference to s. 26B in the judgment under appeal is clearly a typographical error. What was referred to was s. 26(6) of the 1910 Act. It reads as follows : "(6) Where any difference or dispute arises as to whether any meter referred to in sub-section (1) is or is not correct, the matter shall be decided, upon the application of either party, by an Electrical Inspector; and where the meter has in the opinion of such Inspector ceased to be correct such Inspector shall estimate the amount of the energy supplied to the consumer or the electrical quantity contained in the supply; during such time, not exceeding six months, as the meter shall not, in the opinion of such Inspector, have been correct; but save as aforesaid, the register of the meter shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive proof of such amount of quantity : Provided that before either a licensee or a consumer applies to the Electrical Inspector under this sub-section, he shall give to the other party not less than seven days notice of his intention so to do." (Emphasis supplied). 32. In other words, unless and until an application is made under s. 26(6) to the Electrical Inspector, s. 26(6) will not apply. There has been no such application by either party in this case and s. 26(6) will not apply until such application is made. 33. The decisions cited by the Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 in this connection viz. There has been no such application by either party in this case and s. 26(6) will not apply until such application is made. 33. The decisions cited by the Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 in this connection viz. Shree Jee Plastics vs. Karnataka Electricity Board (Supra) are Aditya Rotor Spin (P) Ltd., Kanpur vs. U.P. State Electricity Board (Supra) are both cases where the special regulations framed by the States of Karnataka and UP respectively under s. 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948 which specifically provided for the determination of the disputes of the nature which have arisen in this case were enforced. Here too the General Condition of Supply framed under s. 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 are similarly enforceable. 34. In our opinion therefore the claim against of the respondent No. 1 for the period December 1992 to November 1993 would fail to be determined by the WBSEB itself in accordance with 17(iii) quoted above. That is what WBSEB claims to have done. However, if the respondent No. 1 is dissatisfied with the decision of the WBSEB it is always open to it to ask WBSEB to reconsider the matter or to file an application before the Electrical Inspector under s. 26(6) of the 1910 Act. 35. As far as the claim arising out of the alleged tampering, there are no rules whatsoever nor any regulations nor any clause in the conditions of supply or the agreement (at least none have drawn to notice of this Court) which lay down the authority by whom or the procedure by which the amount payable on account of the theft should be determined. 36. Under the second proviso to s. 26 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1946 the provisions of clause VI of the Schedule of the 1910 Act is applicable in respect of those areas where distribution mains have been laid by WBSEB and the supply through any of them has commenced. 37. 36. Under the second proviso to s. 26 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1946 the provisions of clause VI of the Schedule of the 1910 Act is applicable in respect of those areas where distribution mains have been laid by WBSEB and the supply through any of them has commenced. 37. Clause VI (iii) of the Schedule to the 1910 Act provides : "(3) Where any difference or dispute arises as to the amount of energy to be taken or guaranteed as aforesaid, or as to the cost of any service-line or as to the sufficiency of the security offered by any owner or occupier or as to the position of the meter board or as to the improper use of energy, or to any alleged defect in any wires, fittings, works or apparatus, or as to the amount of the expenses incurred under the third proviso to sub-clause (1), the matter shall be referred to an Electrical Inspector and decided by him." 38. The phrase "improper use of energy" means use of energy in an unauthorised manner. The consumption of electricity by direct tapping as alleged in this case would, in our view, come within the phrase. We would therefore uphold the finding of the learned Single Judge that the dispute as to the claim arising out of the allegation of theft should be decided by the Electrical Inspector. But the proposition that the matter is to be decided by arbitration is untenable. There is no question of either of the disputes being referred to arbitration. The procedure for resolution of certain disputes by arbitration have been specifically provided for. Section 52 of the 1910 Act makes it clear that matters shall be referred to arbitration if it is "by or under this Act directed to be determined by arbitration". Neither s. 26(6) nor the Conditions of Supply nor the agreement nor clause VI of the Schedule contain any such direction. 39. The principles of natural justice will have to be followed by the Electrical Inspector in deciding both disputes although there is no express provision under clause VI(iii) of the Schedule to the 1910 Act. The Electrical Inspector will have to take a decision after giving an opportunity to the parties affected of being heard. 39. The principles of natural justice will have to be followed by the Electrical Inspector in deciding both disputes although there is no express provision under clause VI(iii) of the Schedule to the 1910 Act. The Electrical Inspector will have to take a decision after giving an opportunity to the parties affected of being heard. This is in keeping with the established law that where a decision of even an administrative authority entails civil consequences he should be heard in this case the consumer is sought to be subjected to a huge liability, failure to discharge which entails the serious consequence of non-supply of electricity to its factory. In addition the decision must be a reasoned one. The right to appeal from the decision of the Electrical Inspector implies this [See s. 36(2) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910]. 40. The argument that once there is an allegation of theft and criminal proceedings are initiated by filing an FIR, then by reason of provisions of s. 39 the Board loses its right to claim compensation or the price of the electricity alleged to have been stolen until the determination of the criminal prosecution is erroneous. The criminal liability of a dishonest consumer is distinct from his civil liability to pay for the amount abstracted. Section 48 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 provides : "48. Penalties not to affect other liabilities.-The penalties imposed by section 39, section 39-A or sections. 40 to 47 (both inclusive) shall be in addition to and not in derogation of, any liability in respect of the payment of compensation or, in the case of licensee, the revocation of his licence, which the offender may have incurred." Re. 3 41. The reliance on s. 26(6) of the 1910 Act by the respondent No. 1 for the purpose of contending that the WBSEB's entire claim under both heads must be limited to a period six months is unacceptable. 42. In the present case the amount on account of defective meter reading is to be determined by WBSEB. Under condition 17 of the General Conditions of Supply there is no question of the claim of the WBSEB being limited to six months. 42. In the present case the amount on account of defective meter reading is to be determined by WBSEB. Under condition 17 of the General Conditions of Supply there is no question of the claim of the WBSEB being limited to six months. Nevertheless having regard to the fact that a statutory period of limitation has been provided under s. 26(6) it would be irrational to hold that the same limitation does not apply to a determination under clause 17 of the Conditions of Supply, more so when the consumer retains the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the Electrical Inspector under s. 26(6). There has been a regular reading of the respondent No. 1's meter by the representative of WBSEB. All the bills raised by WBSEB except for the impugned supplementary bill have been paid by the respondent. No complaint regarding defective meter was entertained or acted upon by WBSEB prior to 16.12.93. To quote the learned Single Judge in H.D. Shourie vs. Delhi Municipal Corporation Am 1967 Del 219 : "The maximum period for which a bill can be raised in respect of a defective meter is six months and no more. Therefore, even if a meter has been defective for, say, a period of five years, the revised charge can be for a period of five years, the revised charge can be for a period not exceeding six months. The reasons for this is obvious. It is the duty and obligation of the licensee to maintain and check the meter. If there is a default committed in this behalf by the licensee and the defective meter is not replaced, then it is obvious that the consumer should not be unduly penalised at a later point of time and a large bill raised. The provision for a bill not to exceed six months would possibly ensure better checking and maintenance by the licensee." (See also M/s. Sree Krishnarajendra Mills Limited vs. The Chairman, Karnataka Electricity Board AIR 1991 Kant 349). 43. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. Private Limited vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay AIR 1978 Bom 369 cited by the appellants does not hold to the contrary. 43. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. Private Limited vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay AIR 1978 Bom 369 cited by the appellants does not hold to the contrary. In that case the claim on account of electricity dues arose out of replacement of a particular transformer as a result of which it became necessary to multiply the readings recorded on the dial of the existing meter by 2 to arrive at the correct number of unit of energy consumed by the appellant consumer. It was therefore not a dispute covered by s. 26(6) of the 1910 Act at all, the claim not being based on a faulty meter but on the basis of failure to multiply the readings by 2 "which was an entirely different thing". This was clarified by the Bombay High Court in the subsequent decision of Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1958 Bom 415 which went on to say : "A dispute as to the amount due in case the meter is not correct is not left to be decided in the arbitrary discretion of either party. It must be decided on reference under s. 26(6) by the Electrical Inspector. If having regard to all these circumstances the legislation had thought it expedient not to vest power even in the Electrical 'Inspector who is an expert to determine that the meter was defective for a period of more than six months, obviously neither the licensee nor the consumer could be deemed to have that right." 44. We respectfully adopt this reasoning of the Bombay High Court. We therefore hold that the period of limitation of 6 months would apply to the first claim of the WBSEB i.e. on account of the defective meter. We however hold that limitation of 6 months would have no application to any amount claimed by WBSEB towards the electricity stated to have been wrongfully consumed by the respondent No. 1. This claim is to be determined under clause VI(iii) of the Schedule of the 1910 Act which does not restrict the power of recovery to the period of 6 months. Re. 4 45. Section 20 of the 1910 Act provides for the power of licensees to enter premises and to remove fittings or other apparatus of licensee. This claim is to be determined under clause VI(iii) of the Schedule of the 1910 Act which does not restrict the power of recovery to the period of 6 months. Re. 4 45. Section 20 of the 1910 Act provides for the power of licensees to enter premises and to remove fittings or other apparatus of licensee. According to the respondent No. 1 the entry in this case was illegal and contrary to the section because the WBSEB officers had not informed the respondent No. 1 of their intention to enter the premises prior to such inquiry. 46. It is not clear whether this point had been urged at any stage of the proceedings by the respondent No. 1 before the learned Single Judge. There is, in any event, no finding of the learned Single Judge on this. No cross appeal has been filed by the respondent No. 1 challenging the implied rejection of this case. We therefore do not entertain the plea. Relief 47. Section 24 of the 1910 Act empowers the WBSEB to : "discontinue the supply until such charge or other sum, together with any expenses incurred.................. in cutting off and re-connecting the supply, are paid but no longer." 48. Although the disconnection was not made by reason of default in payment of any bill, the principle underlying the section applies so that the consumer is not entitled to claim supply of electricity unless all charges for supply of energy etc. are paid. This assumes that the charges are lawfully claimed. 49. As far as the claim on account of defective meter recording is concerned, WBSEB was competent to raise the supplementary bill but it could not claim an amount for more than six months on this account. Furthermore, the respondent No. 1 has questioned the calculation before us on various grounds. It was contended that the WBSEB had failed to take into account the special circumstances which existed in this case including the seasonal nature of the business and that therefore the amount could not be claimed by WBSEB as a precondition to restoration. With regard to WBSEB's claim on account of pilferage it follows from our earlier findings that the dispute as to the amount to be paid is to be resolved by the Electrical Inspector. With regard to WBSEB's claim on account of pilferage it follows from our earlier findings that the dispute as to the amount to be paid is to be resolved by the Electrical Inspector. The WBSEB had no authority to calculate the cost of pilfered energy and cannot insist on payment thereof as a precondition to the restoration of supply. WBSEB can only call upon the respondent No. 1 to cease to commit the offence alleged and reconnect the supply upon such cessation (vide the second proviso to clause VI of the Schedule to the 1910 Act). We therefore affirm the finding of the learned Single Judge that the supplementary bill raised by the WBSEB is unenforceable. 50. The respondent No. 1 has however already paid the WBSEB the sum of Rs. 3,25,218/- pursuant to the order of the learned Single Judge and restoration has been effected. This amount appears to cover the claim of the WBSEB on account of defective meter recording as raised, although it no doubt leaves the WBSEB's claim on account of pilferage uncovered. The Appellants had fairly agreed that the Appellants to give a hearing to the Respondent No. 1 as to the accuracy of the claim of WBSEB in connection with the defective meter recording. However, having in regard to the fact that the appellants have to an extent disclosed their minds in this appeal it would be appropriate to allow the respondent No. 1 to invoke the jurisdiction of the Electrical Inspector under s. 26(6) to present any allegation of bias. 51. In the circumstances we uphold the learned Single Judge's order directing reconnection subject to payment of Rs. 3,25,218/- by the respondent No. 1 to the WBSEB although we are unable to agree with the bases for the direction. 52. We therefore partially allow the Appeal and direct : (i) The claim on account of the alleged improper use of energy is referred to the Electrical Inspector. The Electrical Inspector will determine the dispute after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and with a reasoned order within 8 weeks from the date of service of the copy of this order upon him. (ii) The respondent No. 1 will apply to the Electrical Inspector under s. 26(6) within 2 weeks from date with notice to the WBSEB. (ii) The respondent No. 1 will apply to the Electrical Inspector under s. 26(6) within 2 weeks from date with notice to the WBSEB. The Electrical Inspector will give the respondent No. 1 and the representative of the WBSEB an opportunity of being heard with regard to the claim on account of the defective meter recording and dispose of the matter with a reasoned order within 8 weeks from the date of service of a copy of this order upon him. This claims of WBSEB must be limited to the period of 6 months. The decision must be communicated to the respondent No. 1 within a week from the taking thereof. (iii) In default of the respondent No. 1 applying in accordance with Clause (ii) above, the WBSEB may enforce its claim on account of defective meter recording limited to 6 months in accordance with law. (iv) In the event either of the decisions of the Electrical Inspector is in favour of the WBSEB, the WBSEB will be entitled to raise a claim on the respondent No. 1 on the basis of such decision and after giving credit for any amounts paid enforce the decision in accordance with law. (v) If as a result of either of the decisions of the Electrical Inspector any amount is found to have been paid by the respondent No. 1 in excess, such excess amount shall either be refunded to the respondent No. 1 together with interest thereon calculated from the date of deposit by the respondent No. 1 at the same rate at which the WBSEB claims from the consumers on default payment within 2 weeks from the date of the decision or may be adjusted together with interest calculated as aforesaid by the WBSEB against the bill for the month immediately following such decision. 53. (vi) No order as to costs. Appeal partially allowed. D.K. Jain, J.: I agree.