ORDER Mathur, C.J. -- 1. This is a reference made by the Division Bench that in an appeal under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, the court-fee should be paid ad valorem or fixed as required under Article 11 of Schedule-II. The Division Bench of this Court has made reference whether the decision given by the Division Bench in Misc. Appeal No. 165 of 1985 (Mukund Das Maheshwari & another v. Union of India), decided on 3.9.1985, lays down the correct law or not. The Division Bench has observed that the decision in the case of Mukund Das Maheshwari (supra) runs counter to the decision of Hon. Supreme Court given in the case of C.G. Ghanshamdas & others v. Collector of Madras, AIR 1987 SC 180 , and a Single Bench decision of this Court in case of Union of India through the Defence State Officer, M.P. Circle, Jabalpur Cantt. v. University of Saugor & others, 1986 JLJ 543 = 1986 MPLJ 678 and also in Indore Development Authority v. Tarak Singh and others, 1995 JLJ 724 = AIR 1995 SC 1828 , wherein the Hon. Supreme Court has approved the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Goverdhandas, 1993 JLJ 280 = AIR 1993 MP 70 . 2. The brief facts giving rise to this reference are that an appeal was preferred under section 11 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1952) and in that an objection was raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that on the memorandum of appeal against order determining the compensation payable in respect of the property of the respondent requisitioned, the ad valorem court-fee has not been paid; therefore, the appeal preferred by the Government of India is liable to be dismissed. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 4. It may be relevant to mention here that there is a direct decision of Hon. Supreme Court in the case of C.G. Ghanshamdas (supra) wherein this question was answered. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 4. It may be relevant to mention here that there is a direct decision of Hon. Supreme Court in the case of C.G. Ghanshamdas (supra) wherein this question was answered. That case arse under the Tamil Nadu Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, for appeals arising under Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 and in that connection, their Lordships observed :- "The court-fee payable on a memorandum of appeal filed under section 11 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (Requisition Act) against the order determining compensation payable in respect of the property requisitioned has to be computed in accordance with section 51 of the T.N. Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955." Section 51 and section 8 of the Court-fees & Suits Valuation Act as adopted by the State of M.P. with amendment in its application to the State of M.P. is pari materia. A similar question also came up before the Full Bench of this Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Seth Gowardhandas, 1993 JLJ 280 = AIR 1993 MP 70 and it was held: "Court-fees Act (7 of 1870), Sch. 1, Art. 1 A, Sch. 2, Art. 11 -- Award of civil Court made in land acquisition cases -- Is a 'decree' in view of amended provisions of section 26 (2) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 -- Memorandum of Appeal (including cross-objection) against it -- ad valorem court-fee under Art. 1A of Sch. 1 and not fixed court-fee under Art.11 of Sch. 2 would be payable." Their Lordships relied on the decision given by the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of CG. Ghanshamdas (supra). This judgment was affirmed by. their Lordships of the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority v. Tarak Singh, 1995 JLJ 724 = AIR] 995 SC 1828, paras 3 & 4 and it was observed in para 3 of the judgment : "The High Court has relied upon its Full Bench decision reported in State of M.P. v. Gevardhandas, 1993 JLJ 280 = AIR 1993 MP 70 . The principal contention of Shri V.R. Reddy, the learned Additional Solicitor General, is that the appellant is not a claimant. The principal contention of Shri V.R. Reddy, the learned Additional Solicitor General, is that the appellant is not a claimant. Section 8 of the M.P. Court fees Act, 1870 (for short, 'the Act') has no application to the facts in this case. Article 11 of Schedule II of the Act is applicable and that, therefore, they are required to pay only- the fixed court-fee prescribed there under. He also seeks to canvass the correctness of the judgment of the Full Bench in that behalf." It was also observed in para 4 of the said judgment: "Having considered the respective contentions, we are of the view that the Full Bench of the High Court of M.P. has laid down the law correctly. Section 3 (d) of the Central Act defines the 'Court' to mean a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Section 19 of the Central Act gives right to the claimant or the owner of the land for seeking reference. The Collector is enjoined to make a reference for the determination of the objection raised by the claimant regarding either the measurement of the land or the amount of compensation. Thereafter, the Collector is obligated to make the statement to the Court in the manner prescribed under S. 19. On receipt thereof under S. 20, the Court is to cause a notice served as mentioned therein. Under S. 22, the Court conducts the proceedings as a civil Court. Sub-section (2) of S. 2 of the CPC defines the decree and S. 2 (14) of the Act defines 'order'. Their Lordship also referred the earlier decision of Hon. Supreme Court in Ghanshamdas (supra). In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Mukund Das Maheshwari (supra) is no more a good law." 5. Their Lordship also referred the earlier decision of Hon. Supreme Court in Ghanshamdas (supra). In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Mukund Das Maheshwari (supra) is no more a good law." 5. Before parting with this case, we may however, observe the decision given in the case of Diwan Brothers v. Central Bank, Bombay, AIR 1976 SC 1503 which was followed in Mukund Das Maheshwari's case (supra), was a case under Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act whereas all the cases pertaining to acquisition and requisition squarely fall under section 8 of the Act which specifically relates to the compensation for acquisition of land for public purposes; therefore, that case which arose under the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, has no relevance so far as the present line of cases which deals with payment for acquisition and requisition of land for public purposes. Section 8 of the Court-fees Act, 1870 reads as under :-• "S. 8. Fee on memorandum of appeal against order relating to compensation. -- The amount of fee payable under this Act on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of land for public purposes, shall be computed according to the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant." This has also been explained by their Lordships of Hon. Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority (supra) in para 8. Their Lordships have also categorically laid down that Diwan Brother's case (supra) has no application to the facts of this line of the cases and it was observed that the Special Tribunal was constituted and an. application was to he made to the Tribunal for determination of disputes. It was also observed that in view of the specific language, this Court held that the criteria prescribed under sub-section (2) of section 2 of the CPC has not been satisfied. Therefore the order is not a decree and the application is not a plaint as required by CPC. Therefore the Lordships distinguished that case -- Diwan Brothers (supra) and specifically held that it is not applicable to these line of cases. Hence, we answer this reference that the view taken in Mukund Das Maheshwari' s case (supra) is not a good law.