JUDGMENT M. SRINIVASAN, C.J.— This appeal is against an Award made by the Addl. District Judge, Mandi, in reference petition No. 40 of 1985. The following facts are not in dispute. The possession of the land was taken somewhere in 1972 for the purpose of construction of Kullu-Nagar left bank road. The notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 6-5-1980. The Land Acquisition Collector passed the award on 28-12-1984, granting compensation of Rs. 18,330/- representing the market value + 30% solatium being Rs. 5499/- making a total of Rs. 23,829/-. On a reference under Section 18 of the Act, the Addl. District Judge has awarded a sum of Rs. 75,000/-as compensation in all inclusive of the sum of Rs. 18,330/- awarded by the Collector. The District Judge has also awarded on the enhanced amount of Rs. 56,670/- interest @ 9% from 1972 for a period of one year and thereafter @ 15% till the deposit of the amount in Court by the Collector. The District Judge further declared that the claimants were entitled to interest @ 9% on the compensation amount awarded by the Collector for a period of one year from 1972 and thereafter @ 15% till the date of deposit. That part of the award of the District Judge was obviously under Section 34 of the Act. 2. In this appeal, the following contentions are raised by the learned Advocate General: (i) There is no legally admissible evidence whatever to prove the market value of the land, inasmuch as no party to any of the documents placed before the Court was examined by the claimants, it is contended that reliance is placed by the District Judge on Ex. P-7, which is only a statement of analysis of the sales in the area giving the rates for which the sales were effected. That document cannot be treated as evidence at all. This contention is well founded. (ii) The basis of fixation of value for the land in question is erroneous. According to the claimants, there was a ghrat in existence and the District Judge has awarded compensation separately for the ghrat on the basis of the income which would have been derived by the claimants from the date of dispossession in 1972 till the date of the award passed by the Collector. According to the claimants, there was a ghrat in existence and the District Judge has awarded compensation separately for the ghrat on the basis of the income which would have been derived by the claimants from the date of dispossession in 1972 till the date of the award passed by the Collector. It is contended that the proper method of assessing the compensation is to take the entire land and ghrat together and treating it as one unit and fixing the market value on the basis of the ghrat with a kuhal on which it depends. At one stage, the learned Advocate General contended that there was no ghrat in existence when the possession was taken and no amount could have been awarded for the said ghrat. But it is found from the records that there was a clear reference to the ghrat even in the award of the Collector and when the matter was referred under Section 18 of the Act, there was a separate claim made by the claimants for the value of the ghrat and there was no challenge to that statement by the Collector in the reply, on the footing that there was no ghrat in existence, though no doubt, the value claimed was challenged by the Collector. The learned District Judge has also held that no evidence was adduced by the State Government to prove that there was no ghrat in existence when the land was taken possession. Even the award statement referred to the existence of the ghrat and there was ample evidence before the District Judge to hold that there was a ghrat in existence. Hence we proceed on the footing that there was ghrat in existence. 3. However, we accept the contention of the learned Advocate General that compensation should be fixed on the basis that there was a Gharat and Kuhal on which the ghrat was depending. But neither the Collector nor the District Judge has kept this aspect in mind, but proceeded to consider the market value or compensation for the land and ghrat independent of each other It is also not in dispute now that the materials at present on record are not sufficient to enable this Court to decide the market value or the compensation on that basis. Hence there is a necessity for remanding this matter to the Addl. Hence there is a necessity for remanding this matter to the Addl. District Judge for fresh consideration in accordance with law for fixing the market value and compensation. 4. It is the third contention which we propose to decide in this appeal. The said contention is that the District Judge is in error in awarding interest on the enhanced compensation from 1972 to 1984, as Section 28 will not apply in this case. According to the learned Advocate General, the said Section would apply only in cases where possession is taken by the Collector under the acquisition proceedings as per the provisions of the Act. The second limb of this part of argument is that the Addl. District Judge has chosen to award interest under Section 34 of the Act on the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector from 1972 till the date of payment, which he is not entitled. According to the Advocate General, it is only the Collector who can award such interest under Section 34 and the District Judge has no jurisdiction to do so. it is contended that if the claimants are aggrieved by the Collectors award in which there is no provision for interest, the remedy is elsewhere and not under Section 18 of the Act. 5. The last contention can be disposed of immediately both on the facts and on the relevant provision of law. In the award of the Collector, while rejecting the contention of the claimants that compensation should be paid for the period 1972 to 1984 because possession was taken even in 1972, the Collector held that they would be entitled only to interest till the date of award from 1972. The relevant paragraph in the award of the Collector reads as follows : "However, the land is not far away from Kullu town and has the potential of its being used for construction of house etc. and an increase of 20% over the average market value will compensate the owner. The following amount is thus, awarded as compensation : Value of 1 -1 -0 bigha 18,330.00 Add 30% as sum for compulsory acquisition under Section 23(2) of LA Act as amended. 5,499.00 23,829.00 The land owner has contended that the land was occupied by PWD in 1972 and compensation should also be paid for the loss of interest etc. The following amount is thus, awarded as compensation : Value of 1 -1 -0 bigha 18,330.00 Add 30% as sum for compulsory acquisition under Section 23(2) of LA Act as amended. 5,499.00 23,829.00 The land owner has contended that the land was occupied by PWD in 1972 and compensation should also be paid for the loss of interest etc. The proceedings before the issue of the notification under Section 4 of the Act are beyond the purview of the Land Acquisition Collector. There has, however, been steep rise in the market value of the land and owner would not have got more that what has been awarded by assessing the market value as on the day of taking over of possession, i.e., in 1972 and interest till date." 6. Section 34 of the Act provides that when the amount of compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon @ 9% per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited. Under the proviso, if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest @ 15% per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof, which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry. There can be no doubt whatever that under Section 34, the claimants would be entitled to get interest at the rate mentioned therein from the date of taking of the possession. In this case, possession was, admittedly, taken in 1972 and on the amount of compensation fixed by the Collector, namely, Rs. 23,829/-, the claimants are entitled to get interest @ 9% for one year from 1972 and 15% from the expiry of one year till the date of deposit of the amount. Thus, we find in the award of the Collector that he has held that the claimants will be entitled to such interest. But, unfortunately, when the amount was calculated and actually paid to the claimants, the interest was omitted and the amount paid to the claimants was only the principal amount of compensation if we can use that expression, namely, Rs. 23,829/-. But, unfortunately, when the amount was calculated and actually paid to the claimants, the interest was omitted and the amount paid to the claimants was only the principal amount of compensation if we can use that expression, namely, Rs. 23,829/-. That was divided into two halves and one half was paid to each of the claimants. Thus, there is a case of mistaken calculation on the part of the concerned authorities inspite of there being an award of interest by the Collector. That was sought to be rectified by the District Judge, when he passed the award on the reference under Section 18 of the Act, when he observed that the petitioners are entitled to interest @ 9% on the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector with effect from 1972 for one year and thereafter, they are entitled to interest @ 15% till the said amount is deposited by the Collector in the Court. It only meant that he was reiterating what the Collector awarded and he was rectifying the mistake committed by the concerned authorities who calculated the amount actually payable to the claimants. 7. The contention of the learned Advocate General is that the remedy of the claimants would be elsewhere and not under Section 18 of the Act, as according to him, the amount of compensation mentioned in Section 18 would not include the interest payable thereon. We are unable to accept this contention, particularly, when the Collector has awarded interest and the amount was not paid. When the matter was referred to the District Judge under Section 18, he is certainly entitled to consider what exactly is the amount payable to the claimants for the deprivation of their land and hold that they are entitled to that much amount which is payable to them in law in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Thus, the Award of the District Judge, in so far as the amount payable by way of interest under Section 34 is concerned, has only reiterated what the Collector has done and he was well within his limits to declare that the claimants are entitled to the payment of interest. Hence this part of the contention of the learned Advocate General is rejected. 8. The other part of the contention is that Section 28 is not applicable in this case. The Section reads as follows : "28. Hence this part of the contention of the learned Advocate General is rejected. 8. The other part of the contention is that Section 28 is not applicable in this case. The Section reads as follows : "28. Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation : - If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of 9 per centum per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into Court : Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that where such excess or any part thereof is paid into Court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of 15 per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into Court before the date of such expiry." Reliance is placed strongly on the words "he took possession of the land". According to the learned Advocate General if possession had been taken by the Collector after the award or in pursuance of proceedings under this act, then only Section 28 can come into play and interest can be awarded under that Section. According to him, in this case, possession was taken long back in the year 1972, not in pursuance of acquisition proceedings or by the Collector but by some other official of the Government who had no right whatever to take possession at that time, it is contended that it is only a legal taking of possession under the Act which is contemplated in Section 28. We are unable to accept this contention for the following reasons. 9. The Land Acquisition Act does not anywhere say that possession should be taken only after a particular date contemplated by the Act. The Act itself contemplates taking of possession even before the Award is passed and even on a prior date before a declaration is made under Section 6. 9. The Land Acquisition Act does not anywhere say that possession should be taken only after a particular date contemplated by the Act. The Act itself contemplates taking of possession even before the Award is passed and even on a prior date before a declaration is made under Section 6. Section 17 provides an instance where possession could be taken immediately after Section 4 notification is made. Section 23(1-A) talks of possession having been taken before the passing of the award. Under Section 23(1-A) interest is payable on the market value of the land for the period commencing on and from the date of publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in respect of such land till the date of the Award by the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land whichever is earlier. If possession had been taken prior to the issue of notification under Section 4(1) with a view to acquire the land it could be regularised by a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. Thus, when the government took possession in 1972 and issued notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in 1980, it did so only to regularise; the taking of possession by acquiring the land and awarding of compensation ton the owners of the land as per the provisions of the Act. The taking of possession, even if it could be said, was not in accordance with law in 1972, it had been regularised by the subsequent notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in 1980. Hence it is not open to the government to contend that original taking of possession was unlawful and, therefore, it could not be treated as taking of possession by virtue of the provisions of the Act. 10. Secondly, when Section 28 uses the expression he took possession of the land, it only means that the possession of the land had been taken by the Government which acquires the land. After all, the Collector is only an official of the Government acting on its behalf. It is not as if he takes possession actually by himself. 10. Secondly, when Section 28 uses the expression he took possession of the land, it only means that the possession of the land had been taken by the Government which acquires the land. After all, the Collector is only an official of the Government acting on its behalf. It is not as if he takes possession actually by himself. It is only a subordinate Revenue Official who takes possession on his behalf which, in turn, is on behalf of the Government, Thus, if the Government had taken possession through one of its officials and had issued notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in order to pay compensation to the claimants, it meant that the taking of possession by the other official was on behalf of the Collector appointed under the Act to conduct the proceedings under the Act and it would mean in the eye of law that the Collector had taken possession of the land prior to issue of notification under Section 4(1). The possession was and had always been that of the Government. Thus, the requirement of Section 4(1) of the Act remains satisfied. 11. Thirdly there is no presumption of illegality. When the Government officials took possession of the land \n 1972 for constructing a road it was for a public purpose and when a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, the two can be linked together. It was always open to the Government to legalise its possession of the land taken in 1972 and it was done by the notification under the Act. It must also be noted here that after the initiation of the proceedings under the Act, the Collector never purported to take or record formally the possession of the land. Admittedly, no entry has been made in the revenue records after the acquisition. Can it be said that the Collector has not taken possession of the land even now and he will do so hereafter ? Necessarily, the acquisition proceedings have to be tacked on to the possession taken in 1972. In that view also, the provisions of Section 28 can be and have been rightly invoked. 12. Apart from the above reasoning, we find that there is authority on this question including that of the Privy Council. In Vallabhadas Naranji, Khot of Kanjur v. The Development Officer Bandra, 33 Calcutta Weekly Notes 785 : AIR 1929 PC. In that view also, the provisions of Section 28 can be and have been rightly invoked. 12. Apart from the above reasoning, we find that there is authority on this question including that of the Privy Council. In Vallabhadas Naranji, Khot of Kanjur v. The Development Officer Bandra, 33 Calcutta Weekly Notes 785 : AIR 1929 PC. 163 before the date of notification the Govt. had taken possession of some land and erected buildings upon it. Thereafter, a notification was issued under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The owner of the land contended that he was entitled to get compensation for the buildings also, inasmuch as the buildings had become part of the land once they were completed. That contention was rejected by the Privy Council but the Judicial Committee held that the compensation payable to the land owner was in the form of interest from the date of taking possession till the date of payment. The Privy Council recognised the position that the Govt. could regularise its possession at any time by a notification under the Act. The relevant passage in the judgment of the Privy Council reads as follows : "They agree with what was apparently the view of both Courts in India that under the circumstances of this case, as already set forth, by the law of India, which they appear to have correctly interpreted, the Government officials were in possession "not as mere tres-passers" but under such a colour of title that the buildings erected by them on the land ought not to be included in the valuation as having become the property of the land owner They considered, and their lordships agreed, that the justice of the case was met by holding that the appellant was entitled to compensation for the occupation of the land by the officials before the notification of the 4th November 1920 which, as before stated, was awarded in the form of interest the value of the land computed from the 27th November 1919, the date when the Government took possession. This method of compensation has not been questioned by the respondents." 13. This dictum of the Privy Council was followed by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court .in The Revenue Divisional Officer Guntur v. Vasireddy Rama Bhanu Bhupal and others, AIR 1970 Andhra Pradesh 262. This method of compensation has not been questioned by the respondents." 13. This dictum of the Privy Council was followed by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court .in The Revenue Divisional Officer Guntur v. Vasireddy Rama Bhanu Bhupal and others, AIR 1970 Andhra Pradesh 262. In that case the Municipality of Guntur had taken possession of the land in 1950 for constructing a reservoir for water supply scheme. Subsequently the Government acquired the property under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The Collector passed an Award on 31-3-1968 granting interest from 30-11-1950. the date on which possession was taken. The question was whether such interest was payable under the provisions of Section 28 of the Act when the compensation was enhanced by the District Judge. The Full Bench answered the question in the affirmative. The relevant discussion is found in paragraph 12 of the judgment which reads as follows : "12. The next contention which as has already been observed necessitated the reference to a Full Bench is that interest can be awarded on the enhanced amount of the compensation awarded by the Court only from the date of the award Though it seems to have been argued before Mr Justice Krishnarao that as the possession was taken only by the Municipality under private negotiations and that the Government has not taken possession under the Act, no interest at all was payable by the Government for any period. The argument before us is that interest should have been awarded from the date of the award. To appreciate this contention it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 16. The argument before us is that interest should have been awarded from the date of the award. To appreciate this contention it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 16. "When the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances." Section 28 : "If the sum which in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of 4% per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the dale of payment of such excess into Court." It is, therefore, argued that Section 28 directs the award of interest of the enhanced compensation only from the date when the Collector took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into Court. It is argued that taking possession of the land under this Section could only mean taking possession of the land in pursuance of or under the Act and it is only from the date of taking such possession that interest becomes payable under this Section. Even though the Government according to Government Pleader, did not take possession of the land under the Act at any time, it was submitted that having regard to Section 16 of the Act, it must be deemed that the Government took possession of the land only immediately after the Collector made the award i.e., on 31-3-1958. We do not see any force in this submission. Section 28 of the Act states that the Collector shall pay interest from the date on which he took possession of the land. It does not say that the Collector should pay interest only from the date on which he takes possession under the Act. On a plain reading of the Section, it appears to us that the interest is payable from the date when the Collector takes possession. Whether he takes possession under any of the provisions of the Act or by private negotiations or otherwise in anticipation of valid proceedings under the Act for the acquisition of the land in question. On a plain reading of the Section, it appears to us that the interest is payable from the date when the Collector takes possession. Whether he takes possession under any of the provisions of the Act or by private negotiations or otherwise in anticipation of valid proceedings under the Act for the acquisition of the land in question. That Section 28 of the Act has been so understood is also clear from the provisions of Chapter XXVI of the Land Acquisition Manual relating to payment of interest oh the compensation awarded. Under paragraph 3 of the said Chapter, it is stated as follows : "Independently of the Land Acquisition Act, it may become necessary to take possession of a land urgently. The Officer enterig upon the land should record a statement from the owner agreeing to his entry. When he takes possession he should, if possible, obtain a further statement that the owner will not claim interest from the date of taking possession. In cases in which the owner declines to give such further statement, interest on the amount of compensation should be included in the award." Even assuming that the expression taking possession of the land under Section 28 of the Act would only mean taking possession of the land under or in pursuance of the Act, we do not see any reason why the taking of possession of the land prior to the land acquisition proceedings without any objection by the owner (in this case by private negotiation with his consent) followed by valid proceedings under the Act should not be held to be taking possession of the land under the Act. The Act does not prescribe when the Collector representing the Government should take possession of the land. Under Section 16 of the Act, he may take possession after he has made an award but there is nothing in that Section or in any other provision of the Act which prevents the Collector from taking possession of the land earlier with the consent of the owner. On the other hand, there are provisions in the Act, for instance, Section 17 which authorises the Collector in case of urgency to take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purposes after expiration of 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9(1) of the Act. On the other hand, there are provisions in the Act, for instance, Section 17 which authorises the Collector in case of urgency to take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purposes after expiration of 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9(1) of the Act. The fact that on 30-11-1950 it was the Municipality that took possession and not the Government would not make any difference as the acquisition of the land by the Government was at the instance and for the purpose of the Municipality and it is also stated in the award that the cost of acquisition would be met from the amount deposited by the Municipality under works deposit in the name of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Guntur. Therefore, no distinction can be made between the possession of the Municipality and the possession of the Government in the circumstances of this case.” 14. We are entirely In agreement with the reasoning of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Recently a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider this question in a batch of cases RFA Nos. 94/91, 95/91, 96/91, 98/91 and 99/91, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Dharam Dass etc. etc. In the said Division Bench one of us (A.L. Vaidya, J.) was a party. In the said judgment dated 4-4-1997 the Division Bench referred to the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (Full Bench) in Revenue Divisional Officer, Guntur (supra) AIR 1970 A.P. 262 and also the judgment of the Supreme Court in Satinder Singh v. Umrao Singh, AIR 1961 SC 908. The Divisional Bench also referred to the judgment of a single Judge of this Court in Land Acquisition Collector, HP PWD Solan and another v. Jeet Ram AIR 1987 HP 71. 15. Learned Advocate General contends that the ruling of the Division Bench requires reconsideration as it goes against the express provisions of Section 28 of the Act. We have already given our reasons to reject that contention of the learned Advocate General. We are entirely in agreement with the reasoning given by the Division Bench in the aforesaid case. We dont find any justification whatever to reconsider the matter and place it before a larger bench. 16. We have already given our reasons to reject that contention of the learned Advocate General. We are entirely in agreement with the reasoning given by the Division Bench in the aforesaid case. We dont find any justification whatever to reconsider the matter and place it before a larger bench. 16. The only other aspect of the matter, which was referred to by the learned Advocate General, is that the provisions of Sections 28 and 34 of the Act to the extent to which they were amended by the Land Acquisition Act (68 of 1984) are not retrospective and, therefore, the Sections as they stood prior to the amendment should alone be applied and the rate of interest provided therein should alone be granted. This contention is not acceptable In view of the provisions of Section 30 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act No 68 of 1984). Section 30(1) contains the transitional provisions in the following words : "30. Transitional provisions. -(1) The provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied, also to and in relation to (a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982, the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People, in which no Award has been made by the Collector before that date; (b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date whether or not an Award has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement of this Act." 17. In this case, the Award of the Collector is dated 28-12- 1984 after the amendment came into force. Hence the provisions of Sections 28 and 34, as amended by Act No. 68 of 1984 will apply in this case. Consequently, the Award of I interest at a higher rate is unassailable. 18. In the circumstances while holding that the claimants are entitled to get interest both under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act, as has been held by the Addl. District Judge, we set aside the Award passed by Addl. Consequently, the Award of I interest at a higher rate is unassailable. 18. In the circumstances while holding that the claimants are entitled to get interest both under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act, as has been held by the Addl. District Judge, we set aside the Award passed by Addl. District Judge with regard to the market value of the land and the Ghrat and remand the matter fro fresh disposal in accordance with law. We should also point out that the Supreme Court has given rulings with regard to the method of valuation for land and trees and land and buildings and the said rulings should be kept in mind by the Addl. District Judge when the matter is decided afresh. The Addl. District Judge should also keep in mind that the documents of sale transactions are admissible in evidence only if anyone of the parties thereto is examined in Court and that the statistics of sales are not admissible in evidence. 19. With the above observations, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above and the matter is remanded for fresh disposal. CROSS OBJECTIONS NO. 79/1988 20. The claimants have filed cross-objections challenging the market value fixed by the District Judge. Now that we have set aside the Award and remanded back the appeal to the District Judge, to fix the market value in accordance with the principles laid down by the Court, the Addl. Distt. Judge shall also consider the contentions raised by the claimants in the cross- objections. The Cross-objections are disposed of accordingly. 21. The parties are directed to appear before the Addl. District Judge on 1-9-1997. The Addl. District Judge is directed to dispose of the matter afresh on or before 31-3-1998. CMP NO. 77/1997 22. In view of the disposal of the main appeal his petition is dismissed. It is open to the parties to produce the documents sought to be adduced as additional evidence before the Addl. District Judge, if so advised. Petition dismissed.