Judgment :- C.S. Rajan, J. The first respondent in the Writ Appeal, who is the petitioner in the Original Petition challenged the order of termination of her services as honorary Homoeo Doctor in the Homoeo Dispensary of the appellant-municipality. The petitioner was appointed as a Homoeo Doctor in the Municipal Homoeo Dispensary on an honorarium basis. She was paid a sum of Rs. 400/- per annum as honorarium. Later the first respondent was served with a memo in which it was stated that the 1st respondent behaved rudely towards the members of the committee who came to inspect the dispensary. It was also stated in the memo that the people of the locality complained to the members of the committee that the first respondent was not taking any interest in the affairs of the dispensary. Along with the memo relevant portions of the report of the committee were also enclosed. The first respondent was requested to reply to the above notice. The first respondent filed her reply. Thereafter the first respondent's services were terminated. Though she filed an appeal before the third respondent, the same was rejected as per Ext. P13. 2. The learned Single Judge allowed the Original Petition setting aside Ext. P8 order of termination and Ext. P13 order rejecting the appeal. According to the learned Single Judge, the appellant-municipality ought to have given an opportunity to the first respondent to defend her case. If the Municipality wanted to rely on the report of the committee the first respondent should have been given an opportunity to cross-examine the members of the committee. Therefore, the learned judge was of the view that the termination of the service of the first respondent was against the principles of natural justice. The above judgment is under challenge in this Writ Appeal. 3. Sri. V.M. Kurian, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the first respondent was only an honorary doctor drawing honorarium and not any salary or allowance and therefore, her position cannot be equated to a civil post or to a member of the Municipal Common Service. It was further contended that it cannot be said that principles of natural justice have been violated. According to the learned counsel, it is enough that the report of the committee is given to the first respondent along with the memo so as to enable her to reply. 4. It was further contended that it cannot be said that principles of natural justice have been violated. According to the learned counsel, it is enough that the report of the committee is given to the first respondent along with the memo so as to enable her to reply. 4. As early as 1961 this Court had occasion to consider the nature of the post held by a honorary medical officer. Justice Vaidialingam (as he then was) in Rebecca Chanda Filial v. State of Kerala (1961 KLT 662) considered elaborately the principles to be applied in holding whether honorary medical officer is a member of the civil service and Art.311 can be invoked. In the above case, the State Government framed rules for recruitment and appointment of honorary medical officers. The petitioner therein was appointed under the above rules. R.5 of the above rules enabled the Government to terminate the appointment at any time without any notice and without assigning any reason. Such a termination was challenged in the above case. After discussing the various Supreme Court rulings on the matter the learned judge held that the petitioner therein was a person holding a civil post in the State and as such he would be entitled to the protection afforded under Art.311 of the Constitution, if that Article was otherwise applicable in respect of the action taken by the Government. But the learned judge found that the order in question was not one passed by way of punishment and it was only a simple termination of the petitioner's services under R.5 referred to above. Therefore, it was held that the petitioner was not entitled to call in aid the provisions of Art.311(2) of the Constitution. 5. In this appeal, the first respondent was appointed as honorary Homoeo doctor by the appellant-Municipality. The above post is not part of the Municipal Common Service. The members of the Municipal Common Service or any other employee of the Municipality are not civil servants so as to attract Art.311 of the Constitution. Therefore, the first respondent cannot successfully contend that there was violation of the mandatory provisions contained in Art.311(2) of the Constitution. 6. Now the question is whether there was violation of the principles of natural justice. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision reported in K.L. Tripathl v. State Bank of India & Ors. ((19841 SCC 43). Therefore, the first respondent cannot successfully contend that there was violation of the mandatory provisions contained in Art.311(2) of the Constitution. 6. Now the question is whether there was violation of the principles of natural justice. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision reported in K.L. Tripathl v. State Bank of India & Ors. ((19841 SCC 43). On the basis of the above ruling it was submitted that whether a particular principle of natural justice has been violated or not has to be judged in the background of the nature of charges, the nature of the investigation conducted in the background of any statutory or relevant rules governing such enquiries. In the above case, the infraction of the natural justice complained of was that he was not given an opportunity to rebut the materials gathered in his absence. Now the principle has been accepted universally that it was not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply. Everything depends upon the subject matter. The only requirement is that there must be a fair play in the action. Moreover, some real prejudice also must be caused to the person. A mere technical infringement of natural justice is not enough. Much depends upon the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the action is taken and the subject matter to be dealt with. Thus the Supreme Court observed in the above ruling as follows: "It is true that all actions against a party which involve penal or adverse consequence must be in accordance with the principles of natural justice but whether any particular principle of natural justice would be applicable to a particular situation or the question whether there has been any infraction of the application of that principle, has to be judged, in the light of facts and circumstances of each particular case. The basic requirement is that there must be fair play in action and the decision must be arrived at in a just and objective manner with regard to the relevance of the materials and reasons. We must reiterate again that the rules of natural justice are flexible and cannot be put on any rigid formula. The basic requirement is that there must be fair play in action and the decision must be arrived at in a just and objective manner with regard to the relevance of the materials and reasons. We must reiterate again that the rules of natural justice are flexible and cannot be put on any rigid formula. In order to sustain a complaint of violation of principles of natural justice on the ground of absence of opportunity of cross-examination, it has to be established that prejudice has been caused to the appellant by the procedure followed." In one of the earlier cases also (Union of India v. P.K. Roy (AIR 1968 SC 850)) the Supreme Court set out the principle that the doctrine of natural justice could not be imprisoned within the strait jacket of a rigid formula and its application depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority, upon the character of the rights of the persons affected, the scheme and policy of the statute and other relevant circumstances disclosed in a particular case. The same view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the words of Hidayatullah, C. J. in Channabasappa Basappa Happali v. State of Mysore (AIR 1972 SC 32). 7. Sri. V. Divakaran Potti, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent strenuously argued that the petitioner holds a civil post and therefore, the impugned order has been passed in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. Apart from relying on certain passage in 1961 KLT 662 the learned counsel also brought to our notice another decision reported in C.F. Francis v. State of Kerala (1961 (1) Crl. Q. 657). In the above case, this court held that honorary Magistrate appointed-under S.14(1) of Crl.P.C. holds a civil post. The above appointment was a statutory appointment. Still the first respondent cannot contend that there was violation of Art.311(2) of the Constitution because the first respondent is not a civil servant under the State. He is not a member of the Municipal Common Service. The learned counsel also relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Y. K. Mehta v. Union of India (AIR 1988 SC 1970). In the above case, the Supreme Court was considering the nature of posts held by the staff artists of Dooradarsan who are initially appointed in contract basis. The learned counsel also relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Y. K. Mehta v. Union of India (AIR 1988 SC 1970). In the above case, the Supreme Court was considering the nature of posts held by the staff artists of Dooradarsan who are initially appointed in contract basis. We do not think that the above case is applicable to the facts of this case. 8. Here is a case where there were complaints against the petitioner who was only a honorary Homoeo doctor. A Committee of the Municipality visited the dispensary. At that time, the petitioner was present. The people of the locality who assembled there complained against the conduct of the doctor. Considering these matters the committee reported to the Municipality. Thereafter, the petitioner was given a memo disclosing the relevant portions of the report of the committee. After getting the explanation from the first respondent the petitioner's service were terminated. Considering these aspects in the light of well accepted principles enunciated by the Supreme Court with regard to the applicability of the natural justice we are of the opinion that in the background of facts and circumstances of this case, and the nature of investigation conducted by the committee of the Municipality there is no infraction of the principles of natural justice. We are also convinced that there was no violation of principles of natural justice by the absence of a formal opportunity to cross examine the persons. In this connection it must be remembered that the right to cross-examine and the opportunity to produce evidence are not integral part of quasi-judicial adjudication. We are also convinced that no actual prejudice had been caused to the first respondent by the alleged violation of principles of natural justice. 9. Therefore, we are convinced that the learned judge went wrong in holding that there was violation of principles of natural justice. Accordingly, we allow the Appeal and dismiss the Original Petition.