S. N. MALLICK, J. ( 1 ) THE instant second appeal at the instance of the defendant/appellant is directed against the Judgment and decree dated 19. 9. 87 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, Second Court, Hooghly in title appeal No. 341 of 1978 whereby the appeal was allowed reversing the Judgment and decree of dismissal dated 18. 11. 78 passed by the learned Munsif, Second Court, Hooghly in title Suit No. 29 of 1977 renumbered as 127 of 1978 and a decree for eviction of the defendant/ appellant was passed in respect of the suit premises. It may be noted that the trial court dismissed the plaintiff /respondent's suit on the ground that the same was barred by limitation. Although the instant second appeal was admitted on the grounds Nos. 13 and 15 urged in the memo of appeal, the leaned counsel for the appellant was permitted to argue the appeal at the time of hearing also on the grounds taken in the memo of appeal being Nos. 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11. 17 and 20. The appellant has also challenged the order No. 64 passed by the First Appeal Court under No. 64 dated 23. 7. 87 allowing the plaintiff/respondent's application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. By the said order the plaintiff/respondent was directed to take proper steps for adducing additional evidence before the said court as indicated in the said order. The additional evidence was adduced by the plaintiff/respondent on 11. 8. 87. One witness was examined and cross-examined and documents were marked exhibits. It may also be noted that the trial court's Judgment and decree were set aside earlier by the First Appeal Court by Its order dated 11. 5. 81 in title appeal No. 341 of 1978 whereby the suit was remitted back to the trial court with a direction to allow the plaintiff to adduce further documentary evidence. This High Court set aside the said order of remand by its order dated 19. 11. 86 and directed the First Appeal Court to decide the appeal and the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code, de novo and further directed the Lower Appellant Court to examine and consider all the maferials on record. This High Court set aside the said order of remand by its order dated 19. 11. 86 and directed the First Appeal Court to decide the appeal and the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code, de novo and further directed the Lower Appellant Court to examine and consider all the maferials on record. It appears from the Lawer Appellate Court's record that thereafter the title appeal was heard de novo as per directions of this High Court as noted above and the impugned Judgment and decree was passed. ( 2 ) BEFORE considering the merits of the instant second appeal it would be helpful to note the admitted and undisputed facts on record:-I) The disputed property in respect of which decree for eviction of the defendant appeal was prayed for in the aforesaid title suit consist of three brick build rooms of which one is a tin shed and the other two are tile sheds along with varandah and privy appertaining to lay out plot No. 12 of R. S. Plot No. 322 of Khatian No. 359 of Mouza Balagar, J. L. No. 8, P. S. Chinsurah District Hooghly as described in the schedule of the plaint. The aforesaid entire plot No. 322 belonged to on Ejad Box duly recorded in the R. S. Khatian as per ext. 3. II) Ejad Box while in possession of the same sold the disputed properly consisting of 3 (three) Cottah and 4 (four) Chittack of land out of the said property to one Jones Chandra Biswas by a registered deed of sale dated 23. 3. 59. III) It is also admitted that after purchase of the disputed land the said Janak Chandra Biswas on taking loan from the Government constructed a small room on the disputed land by the end of 1959 and started living there. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff/respondent's case is that Janak continued to stay in the suit premises along with other members of his family till 1967. Sometime in 1967 the said Janak left for Godagrir Char in P. S. Jalangi District Murshidabad leaving the suit property under the care and protection of his neighbour and cousin-brother Santosh Sarkar. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff/respondent's case is that Janak continued to stay in the suit premises along with other members of his family till 1967. Sometime in 1967 the said Janak left for Godagrir Char in P. S. Jalangi District Murshidabad leaving the suit property under the care and protection of his neighbour and cousin-brother Santosh Sarkar. At that lime the defendant was living in his father-in-law, house closed to the suit property as the tile shed in which he was living there got damaged he requested Santosh Sarkar to permit him to live in the suit property. The said Santosh Sarkar after obtaining permission from Janak allowed the defendant to live in the suit premises for a few months as a licensee under Janak. The present plaintiff/ respondent thereafter expressed his willingness to Janak to purchase the suit property and accordingly Janak revoked the licence granted in favour of the appellant/defendant and transferred the suit property to the present plaintiff/respondent Rabindra Nath Biswas by a registered deed of sale dated 29. 7. 75. The defendant/appellant in spite of such revocation continued to live in the suit property without vacating the same. Furthermore, he initiated a Criminal Proceeding under section 144 Cr. PC during the pendency of which there was a talk of settlement in pursuance of which the plaintiff/respondent revoked the licence again and the defendant although agreeing to vacate the suit property on the compromise of the proceeding under section 144 Cr. PC ultimately did not vacate and is till in possession of the disputed structure. Hence the suit. The defendant/ appellant in his written statement has dented the story of licence and the revocation of the same either at the instance of Janak or at the instance of the present plaintiff/respondent. His specific case in the written statement is that he has been living in the suit property as a matter of right since 1960 openly. peacefully and to the knowledge of others in assertion of his title being hostile to the title of all others. In para 17 of the written statement the defendant/appellant has sought to clarify his possession by stating that Janak took a loan of Rs. 2,000/- in 1960 from him for purchasing the suit land and for construction of structures there upon while undertaking to repay the same within a year. In para 17 of the written statement the defendant/appellant has sought to clarify his possession by stating that Janak took a loan of Rs. 2,000/- in 1960 from him for purchasing the suit land and for construction of structures there upon while undertaking to repay the same within a year. But as Janak failed to repay the same he i. e. the present appellant drove him out of the suit property by force and trespassing upon the same got 16 (sixteen) annas possession of the property and since 1960 he has been possessing the same. He his also challenged the plaintiff/respondent's Kobala dated 29. 7. 75 for being a forged and fictitious one on the ground that Janak being driven out by him from the suit premises in 1960 1eft India and went to Pakistan and never returned to India from there. The trial court has disbelieved the plaintiff/respondent's case of licensee against the defendant in respect of the suit premises. It is interesting to note that the trial court at the same time has also rejected the defendant/appelltant's story of acquiring title to the suit property by adverse possession. But the trial court has dismissed the suit for being barred by limitation while finding that the defendant/appellant has been in possession of the suit premises as a trespasser since 1960. According to the trial court the suit having been filed in 1977 it is hopelessly barred by limitation for having not been brought within 12 years from the date of dispossession. The learned First Appeal Court has overruled the above finding of the trial court on limitation and has decreed the suit for eviction holding that the defendant is a licensee in possession of the suit premises since 1967 and that the suit having been filed in 1977 is not barred by limitation. The learned appeal court on consideration of the evidence of record has held as follows:-"though the learned Munsif has disbelieved the defendant's case of adverse possession but he has held that the defendant is living in the suit properly since the year 1960 as a trespasser. This finding of the learned Munsif is very erroneous and the same is liable to be set aside. In fact, the defendant's case of adverse possession has not been proved here but, whereas. This finding of the learned Munsif is very erroneous and the same is liable to be set aside. In fact, the defendant's case of adverse possession has not been proved here but, whereas. the plaintiff has been able to prove their case of granting the licence in favour of the defendant during the year 1967. " ( 4 ) THE learned First Appeal Court has considered the admitted fact that the suit property originally belonged to Janak and that he started living in lire suit property after constructing a room there from the year 1959. The learned First Appeal Court has disbelieved the defence story that the present appellant drove out Janak from the suit property in the year 1960 and Jana hereafter left for Pakistan and never came back. It appears from the impugned Judgment that it was contended on behalf of the present appellant before the First Appeal Court that the trial court should not have disbelieved and rejected the defendant's story of adverse possession based on an allegation of advancing loan to Janak which was not repaid by Janak. It was stated that the discrepancy in the story of loan which came out in evidence adduced on the side of the defendant should have been ignored. The learned First Appeal Court has considered this story of advancement of loan on the basis of the evidence on record and has rejected the same in view of glaring in consistencies and discrepancies. The learned First Appeal Court on allowing the plaintiff/respondent's application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC has admitted additional evidence on record consisting of municipal papers relating to the suit property produced by P. W. 7. The learned First Appeal Court without placing much reliance upon the municipal papers as per Ext. 10 series, F-series and G-series produced by both the parties has come to his finding in favour of the plaintiff/respondent on the basis of the title deed and oral evidence on record. He has disbelieved the defence story that Janak after being driven out from the suit premises in 1960 left for Pakistan and never came back to India. It is interesting to note that the said Janak Biswas the vendor of the plaintiff/respondent has been examined before the trial court as P. W. 2 who has been cross-examined at length on behalf of the present appellant. It is interesting to note that the said Janak Biswas the vendor of the plaintiff/respondent has been examined before the trial court as P. W. 2 who has been cross-examined at length on behalf of the present appellant. He has denied the entire defence story on oath. The plaintiff had also examined Santosh Sarkar as P. W. 5 to depose on the story of licence. The plaintiff has also examined other witnesses to speak about the story of possession of Janak till 1967. The learned First Appeal Court on consideration of the evidence on record has held that the "living of Janak Chadra Biswas in the suit property till 1967 has also been proved from the facts and circumstances and evidence adduced by the plaintiff. " The appeal court has rejected the defence story of possession of the suit property since 1960 and the acquisition of title thereto by adverse possession. The learned First Appeal Court has held that possession of the defendant in the suit property cannot be said to be notorious or hostile in character and has held that his possession in respect of the suit property is that of a mere licensee since 1967. ( 5 ) MR. Bhaskar Ghosh the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that the First Appeal Court has not considered the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendant ever resided in his father-in-law's house or licence was granted to him in respect of the suit premises far the reason that the room occupied by him in his father-in-laws house got damaged. It has been contended by Mr. Ghosh that the evidence of Janak, P. W. 2 has not been considered by the learned First Appeal Court. It has also been urged by Mr. Ghosh that the learned trial Judge while coming to a finding of possession of the Janak in respect of the suit premises up to 1967 has not considered. The evidence of Janak stating that he had nothing to prove that he had stayed in the suit ghar upto 1967. In this connection he has referred to an observation of the First Appeal Court made in the Impugned Judgment that the passport of Janak as per Ext. 9 shows that he entered into India on 15. 7. 60. The evidence of Janak stating that he had nothing to prove that he had stayed in the suit ghar upto 1967. In this connection he has referred to an observation of the First Appeal Court made in the Impugned Judgment that the passport of Janak as per Ext. 9 shows that he entered into India on 15. 7. 60. According to him this is absolutely wrong and is not borne out by the passport itself. It must be noted here that in a second appeal there cannot be any re-appreciation of evidence on record, unless it is shown that material evidence on record was not considered by the court below, or that the impugned Judgment is based on inadmissible evidence or it is otherwise perverse and against the provisions of law. But Mr. Ghosh has urged before me for re-appreciation of evidence to a large extent which is not permissible. Admittedly Janak purchased the suit land from the admitted owner Sk. Ejad by a registered sale deed as per Ext. 1 dated 23. 3. 59 and raised structure thereon and started living there with his family. The defence case in the written statement that Janak was driven out by him in 1960 for nonpayment of loan and that Janak thereafter went to Pakistan and lived there and never returned to India has been disproved by the evidence given by Janak himself as P. W. 2 on oath. There is no reason to find fault with the First Appeal Court for accepting the evidence of Janak differing from the findings of the trial court The First Appeal Court is the final court on point of fact Janak has denied the story of taking loan from the defendant. It is Janak's evidence that he lived in the suit premises for five or six years after he bought the same in 1959-60. He has further said that in 1967 he left the suit premises in the custody of his cousin-brother and neighbour Santosh, P. W. 5. He has said that he went to Jalangi in the district of Murshidabad where from he gave consent through Santosh allowing the defendant to live in the suit premises. He has denied the suggestion that for non-payment of loan he was driven out from the suit premises in 1960 and since then he has been living in Pakistan. His passport (Ext. He has denied the suggestion that for non-payment of loan he was driven out from the suit premises in 1960 and since then he has been living in Pakistan. His passport (Ext. 9) shows that he is a citizen of India. From the passport it appears that he left for Pakistan on 15. 7. 60 There is, however, no endorsement of his coming back to India. But this absence of any such endorsement does not by itself prove that Janak had not cone back. Janak has been examined as a witness for the plaintiff. Ext. 2 is the plaintiff's Kobala in respect of the disputed property executed by Janak on 29. 7. 75 Here also the address of Janak is given at Balagar P.S. Chinsuah, District Hooghly. From the deposition sheet of Janak it appears that at the time of giving evidence he was residing at Vairabchandipur within P. S. Haskhali, District Nadia. The identity of Jamak as P. W. 2 being the owner of the suit premises has not been disputed by the defendant. Under the circumstances the learned appeal court has not committed any error of law by placing reliance upon the evidence of Janak himself. Janak is deposed about the licence given by him to the defendant to stay in the suit premises. Mr. Ghosh while relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1995 SC page 1607 (S. V. R. Mudaliar (dead) by Rs. and Others. v. Mrs. Rajabu F. Buhari (dead) by Rs. and Others,) has submitted that the First Appeal Court in its impugned Judgment has not considered the reasons given by the trial court for coming to Its findings and that as such the impugned Judgment must be held to be bad in law. The entire impugned Judgment has been placed before me and I have gone through the same. The learned appeal court in my view, has considered all the reasonings given by the trial court to come to a finding that the plaintiff has failed to prove his story of licence. The First Appeal Court in its impugned Judgment has also considered the reasoning's given by the trial court to come to a finding that the suit is barred by limitation. The First Appeal Court in its impugned Judgment has also considered the reasoning's given by the trial court to come to a finding that the suit is barred by limitation. ( 6 ) IT is needless to say that the entire story of the defendant/appellant is based on his claim of title to the suit property by adverse possession since 1960. It is his case that Janak took a loan of Rs. 2. 000/- from him at the time of construction of his house after purchasing the suit land in 1959 as per Ext. 1, that Janak failed to repay the same and that as such he drove him out forcibly from the suit premises in 1960. This story of adverse possession has been disbelieved by the trial court and has also been disbelieved by the First Appeal Court. The trial court has held that although adverse possession is not proved, the defendant has proved that he is in possession of the suit premises since 1960 and as such the suit for eviction brought in 1977 is hopelessly barred by limitation. The learned First Appeal Court has differed from the trial court's finding in this regard and has held on consideration of the evidence on record that the defendant/appellant has been possessing the suit properly as a licensee, first under Janak then under the plaintiff/respondent since 1967. The year entry in the suit premises as alleged by the defendant/appellant is 1960 when he allegedly drove out the plaintiff/respondent's vendor Janak for his failure to repay the loan. There is no other reason given by the defendant for coming upon the suit premises in 1960. The evidence in this regard being in consistent and contradictory both the courts below had disbelieved the story of adverse possession. In his application under section 144 Cr. PC against the present plaintiff and others dated 22. 12. 75 as per Ext. 5 it was admittedly stated by the defendant that he purchased the possessory right of the disputed property from Janak Chandra Biswas on February, 1960 on paying Rs. 5. 000/ -. The story now made in the written statement in this regard has already been referred to in the earlier paragraph of my Judgment. The appellant/defendant in his evidence before the trial court says that he gave a loan of Re. 5. 000/ -. The story now made in the written statement in this regard has already been referred to in the earlier paragraph of my Judgment. The appellant/defendant in his evidence before the trial court says that he gave a loan of Re. 2,000/- to Janak in the last week of December, 1958, that he demanded for the last tune his money back on 6th March, 1960 and that he fork possession of the suit ghar on that date on which Janak left the place. I have already noted that Janak categorically denied the story on oath in his evidence as P. W. 2. Such a story of adverse possession has been rightly disbelieved by the courts below. Now the question is that if the story of adverse possession of the suit premises by the defendant since 1960 is disbelieved by the trial court can its finding that the defendant is in possession of the suit property since 1960 as a trespasser stand? It cannot and the learned First Appeal Court has rightly disbelieved, this story of trespass and has rightly overrulled the finding of the trial court that the defendant has been living in the suit premises as a trespasser since 1960. The municipal papers which have been produced by the defendant in support of his claim would be of no avail because by municipal papers no title is created. Furthermore, the municipal papers adduced by both the parties do not show that they relate to the suit premises. In neither of the sale deeds as per Ext. 1 and 2 nor in the plaint the suit premises has been described by municipal holding. The evidence of P. W. 7 is wholly useless or at least unhelpful to come to a finding that the papers produced by both the parties relate to the disputed property. P. W. 7 has said that he cannot say/when the holdings came into existence In the register of the municipality. The municipal papers produced by the respective parties relate to different holding numbers. Mr. Ghosh has submitted that there cannot be different holding numbers in respect of the selfsame premises. He is right. In that view of the matter no reliance should be placed upon the municipal papers. The municipal papers produced by the respective parties relate to different holding numbers. Mr. Ghosh has submitted that there cannot be different holding numbers in respect of the selfsame premises. He is right. In that view of the matter no reliance should be placed upon the municipal papers. But even then the finding of the First Appeal Court that the defendant is a licensee in respect of the disputed property under Janak and thereafter under the plaintiff/respondent cannot be said to be illegal or wrong in view of the other cogent evidence on record considered by it. It cannot be said that the finding of the First Appeal Court is based on inadmissible evidence or based on conjectures or surmises or based on no evidence on record. On the other hand, I agree with the contention of learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/ respondent that the findings of the trial court in disbelieving the plaintiffs story of licence is based on conjectures and surmises. Much argument has been advanced for not believing the plaintiffs story that the defendant approached Janak through Santosh for permitting him to live in the suit premises as his room in his father-in-law's house got damaged by a branch of a Salina tree in view of the defence case that he never lived in his father-in-law's house. It is interesting to note that the learned First Appeal Court has taken into consideration the evidence of the defendant that he gave the loan of Rs. 2,000/- to Janka in his father in-law's house. This has rightly prompted the First Appeal Court to come to a finding that therefore, "the living of the defendant in his father-in-law's house at the relevant point of time has been admitted by the defendant himself both by filling written statement and by adducing his oral testimony". The learned First Appeal Court has placed little reliance upon the defendant's medical certificate as per Ext. E and C, his appointment letter etc, to prove his case of adverse possession. Surely these documents will not create a title by adverse possession in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case. The learned First Appeal Court has placed little reliance upon the defendant's medical certificate as per Ext. E and C, his appointment letter etc, to prove his case of adverse possession. Surely these documents will not create a title by adverse possession in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case. The learned First Appeal Court has also considered the observations of the trial court for non-production of ration card, letters and others documentary evidence in support of the plaintiffs case that the defendant was living in his father-in-laws house at the relevant point of time. The learned Appeal Court has rightly held that such finding of the learned Munsif is not sustainable. Mr. Ghosh the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1981 SC page 707 (Kshitish Chandrn Bose. v. Commissioner of Ranchi) and AIR 1968 SC page 1165 (Nair Service Society Ltd. , v. K. C. Alexander and Others,) and has argued that in order to constitute adverse possession it is not necessary to show that possession is so effective as to bring it to the knowledge of the owners. But, in my view, none of the aforesaid reported cases renders any help to Mr. Ghosh in this appeal. In AIR 1981 Supreme Court page 707 it has been held as follows:-"all that the law required is that the possession must be open and without any attempt at concealment. It is not necessary that the possession must be so effective as to bring it to the specific knowledge of the owner. Such a requirement may be insisted on, where an ouster of title is pleaded but that is not the case here". In the instant case the defendant has claimed total ouster of title against Janak, the vendor of the plaintiff/respondent. Accordingly it cannot be said that the above decision of the Supreme Court is applicable to the present case. Against the plaintiffs specific case and evidence of licensee, being granted by Janak to the defendant in respect of the suit premises sometime in 1967 through Santosh Kumar Sarkar there is practically no evidence on the side of the defendant that his possession in respect of the suit premises was effectively hostile to the specific knowledge of the admitted owner i. e. Janak. Janak has categorically denied the story of his ouster from the suit premises in 1960 by the defendant and that story has been accepted by the Appeal Court on due consideration of the materials on record. I do not find any reason to interfere with the same in second appeal. ( 7 ) IN the other case i. e. AIR 1968 SC page 1165 the Supreme Court has held that a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner, and that if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of limitation applicable to the case, his right is forever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title, and that in the event of disturbance of possession by a third party and not the owner, the plaintiff can maintain a possessory suit under the provisions of Specific Relief Act in which title would be immaterial or a suit for possession within 12 years in which the question of title could be raised. In the present case the rightful owner has brought this suit within the period of limitation and as such the above reported case also does not help Mr. Ghosh in any way. ( 8 ) ANOTHER contention of Mr. Ghosh the learned counsel for the appellant is that the order dated 23. 7. 87 passed by the First Appeal Court allowing the plaintiff/respondent's application under Order 41 Rule 27 is bad in law because it does not confirm to the provisions contained in Order 41 Rule 27. This order dated 23. 7. 87 was passed by the First Appeal Court following the directions given by this High Court by its order dated 19. 11. 86 after hearing both the parties. The First Appeal Court allowed the plaintiff/ respondent's application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC to adduce additional evidence for enabling the said court to pronounce Judgment in a more satisfactory manner. I do not find any reason to interfere with the said order which has been passed by the First Appeal Court on due consideration of the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties before It. I do not find any reason to interfere with the said order which has been passed by the First Appeal Court on due consideration of the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties before It. Under Order 41 Rule 27 (1) (b) the Appellate Court can require any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce Judgment or for any other substantial cause. In view of this provision of law it cannot be said that the above order passed by the trial court on the plaintiff/respondent's application under Order 41 Rule 27 is bad in law. Mr. Ghosh in support of his above contention has referred to a decision of this High Court reported in 1996 (2) CLJ page 541 (Sri Surendra Nath Roy, v. Sri Govinda Chandra Dutta and Ors. ,) in which this court took exception, in view of the circumstances of the said case, to the First Appeal Court's order of allowing an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC without proper appreciation of the provisions contained therein specifying the circumstances in which production of additional evidence is to be permitted by the Appellate Court. In the order dated 23. 7. 87 passed by the Appellate Court, as would appear from the Lower Court Record shows that the learned First Appeal Court allowed additional evidence to be produced by the plaintiff/respondent for enabling the said court to pronounce Judgment in a more satisfactory manner. Such order as I have already found is permissible under Order 41 Rule 27 Sub-clause-b of the CPC Therefore, I am of view the above reported decision of this High Court as relied upon by Mr. Ghosh is of no avail. ( 9 ) SO, in view of the above facts and circumstances and the materials on record and after going through the impugned Judgment and decree in the light of the legal provisions and principles as discussed above I do not find any lawful reason to interfere with the impugned Judgment and decree passed by the First Appeal Court. The instant second appeal must fall. Accordingly, the instant second appeal is dismissed on contest. No order as to costs. The impugned Judgment and decree passed by the First Appeal Court stand affirmed. All interim orders are vacated and the L. C. R be sent down forthwith. Appeal dismissed.