R. R. JAIN, J. ( 1 ) COMMUNICATION Annexure c dated 2-8-1996 sent by competent Authority to the petitioners refusing to grant permission for sale under s. 26 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), is challenged by invoking writ jurisdiction. ( 2 ) A few relevant facts giving rise to this petition are stated as under : the petitioners were the tenants of land bearing Survey No. 75/2 corresponding to F. P. No. 177 of the Town Planning Scheme No. 90. Subsequently, by friction of law the petitioners were declared as deemed purchasers and thus became owner of the land. All the petitioners agreed to sell their respective sub-plots to the petitioner No. 25, a Co-operative Housing Society. The petitioners entered into separate sale deeds and the same were presented on 1-6-1996 for registration in the office of Sub-Registrar, Ahmedabad (Memnagar ). Thereafter on 6-6-1996 the petitioners served notice under S. 26 (1) of the Act informing respondent No. 2 about the intended sale to enable to exercise option. The respondent No. 2 instead of exercising option to purchase, sent this communication Annexure c dated 2-6-1996 refusing to grant permission for sale. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioners have filed this petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of india. ( 3 ) BEFORE I discuss on merits, I may state that in between some more developments like filing of appeal, partition and sub-division into plots amongst petitioners, etc. , had taken place but these facts not being relevant for this petition, are not referred in detail. Similarly, while deciding form under S. 6 of the Act, no surplus land has been declared and that the holding of individual petitioner is held to be within the ceiling limit. The controversy raises a very short question about scope of S. 26 and powers of competent authority. The question would be that upon receipt of an intimation under S. 26 (1) from the land-holder about intended transfer (may be sale, gift, mortgage or in any mode), the competent authority is required to exercise option only or is also empowered to refuse to grant sanction for such transfer ? ( 4 ) TO appreciate this controversy, reference to S. 26 of the Act would be very much necessary and the same is reproduced as under :-"26. ( 4 ) TO appreciate this controversy, reference to S. 26 of the Act would be very much necessary and the same is reproduced as under :-"26. Notice to be given before transfer of vacant land :- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person holding vacant land within the ceiling limit shall transfer such land by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise except after giving notice in writing of the intended transfer to the competent authority. (2) Where a notice given under sub-S. (1) is for the transfer of the land by way of sale, the competent authority shall have the first option to purchase such land on behalf of the State Government at a price calculated in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or of any other corresponding law for the time being in force and if such option is not exercised within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of the notice, it shall be presumed that the competent authority has no intention to purchase such land on behalf of the State Government and it shall be lawful for such person to transfer the land to whomsoever he may like : provided that where the competent authority exercises within the period aforesaid the option to purchase such land the execution of the sale deed shall be completed and the payment of the purchase price thereof shall be made within a period of three months from the date on which such option is exercised. "thus, on plain reading of the section, it becomes obvious that the scheme of s. 26 of the Act engrafts a provision of statutory pre-emption-cum-acquisition by authority to fulfil the object and scheme of the Act, i. e. , avoid concentration of land in the hands of few, speculation and profiteering. The prospective seller has to serve a notice in writing intimating authority about the proposed transfer. If the authority exercises discretion-cum-statutory right of pre-emption, the transfer in favour of competent authority would prevail and the intended transfer in favour of private party would fail. In making this provision, the legislature could foresee its draconian effect like exploitation and holding such intended transfer in ransom by the authority hence has also provided for limitation and deeming effect. If the authority exercises discretion-cum-statutory right of pre-emption, the transfer in favour of competent authority would prevail and the intended transfer in favour of private party would fail. In making this provision, the legislature could foresee its draconian effect like exploitation and holding such intended transfer in ransom by the authority hence has also provided for limitation and deeming effect. The authority is bound to exercise the statutory right of pre-emption within sixty days failing which presumed to have no such intention contemplated under S. 26 (2) of the Act. In such event the private transaction as per notice shall go through and be implemented. In case of such private sale contemplated under S. 26 (1) the registering authority cannot register the document unless such notice under Sec. 26 (1) or cogent evidence thereto is produced and thereupon the registering authority shall wait at least for sixty days unless competent authority exercises statutory right of pre-emption. ( 5 ) ). Thus, S. 26 envisages only two options, i. e. , upon receipt of notice under s. 26 (1) the authority has to make up mind either to purchase or to let go in favour of private purchaser. No third option is available. Under the scheme the authority is not required to apply mind to the legality of the transaction, validity of title and has no authority to accord or refuse sanction for such sale. Such an act is illegal, unjust arbitrary and without jurisdiction. ( 6 ) ). Learned A. G. P. Ms. Harsha Devani has argued with great vehemence in support of the order but unfortunately has failed to point out any provision of law to fortify her contentions. On the contrary, on plain reading of S. 26, she has been fair enough to agree that the section does not contemplate grant or rejection of permission to transfer but it envisages exercise of option for pre-emptive purchase and the authority has either to say yes and purchase the property or say no and allow the private transfer to materialise. Mr. Jayant Patel for the petitioners has relied upon judgments of this High Court as well as the Supreme Court in support of his contentions challenging validity of the order. The ratio squarely fortifies my aforesaid observation, scope and interpretation of the Act. Mr. Jayant Patel for the petitioners has relied upon judgments of this High Court as well as the Supreme Court in support of his contentions challenging validity of the order. The ratio squarely fortifies my aforesaid observation, scope and interpretation of the Act. In an unreported judgment of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 5084 of 1982 delivered on 28-1-1994 (Coram : A. N. Divecha, J.) the question was whether the competent authority in exercise of powers under S. 26 (1) in response to the notice under S. 26 (1) by the land-holder can inquire into the title of property. The Court held as under :". . . . . . . . . this Court has come to the conclusion that the competent authority under s. 26 (1) of the Act was not justified in calling for any other particulars and he had only to communicate whether or not he wanted to purchase the land on behalf of the State Government. "while setting aside the order, the Court further held that the competent authority was not justified in calling for any such particulars and that it was not necessary for the respondent (Competent authority) to inquire into petitioners title to the property in question or to ascertain whether or not his holding was within the ceiling limit. In another judgment, in the case of J. D. Pathak v. S. Barot, 1982 (2) GLR 633, while dealing with S. 26 of the Act, the Court held that the said provision has been made with a view to making scheme for statutory pre-emption-cum-acquisition effective. If the competent officer exercises his discretion and chooses to purchase the land, the sale in favour of the competent authority would prevail and the intended sale in favour of the private purchase will fall through. Section 269-UD of the income-Tax Act also deals with pre-emptive purchase of immovable property by income-Tax Department. Under the Income-Tax Act, the prospective seller has to file statement of proposed transfer under S. 269-UC of the Income-Tax Act whereupon the authority has to either exercise right to purchase and if no order is passed then it is imperative and obligatory on the part of the competent authority under S. 269-UC (3) of the Income-Tax Act to grant permission for private sale. While interpreting these provisions, the Apex Court of India in the case of appropriate Authority and Anr. While interpreting these provisions, the Apex Court of India in the case of appropriate Authority and Anr. v. Tanvi Trading and Credits P. Ltd. and Ors. , 191 (1991) ITR 307, has held that only two alternatives are open under the scheme of the legislation to purchase the property or to allow the private transfer to go through. The authority has no power to exercise any third option in the nature of either to grant or refuse sanction for transfer. Any attempt to exercise third option would be de hors the provisions of law, without jurisdiction, arbitrary and illegal. ( 7 ) KEEPING in mind the aforesaid proposition of law and observations the scope of S. 26 cannot be expanded to control the transaction and permit the authority to refuse or grant express permission for transfer. The competent authority in all its wisdom shall only exercise the powers conferred and ensured under the Act and shall not suo motu invest such powers as are not intended under the Scheme of the act. ( 8 ) ). In this case, prospective seller by issuing notice simpliciter intimated to the competent authority to exercise its discretion of pre-emption within the stipulated period. The answer shall be either in negative or affirmative. In case of negative answer, the private sale takes place, in case of affirmative answer, competent authority should take further steps for execution of sale deed and payment of consideration as provided under the Act. This should have closed the chapter under S. 26. The authority could not have controlled the transaction and refused permission for sale assigning some reasons. The impugned order clearly suggests that the authority has refused to grant permission for sale. This is beyond the scope of S. 26 and demonstrates non-application of mind by the authority. The order is clearly in beach of the relevant provisions, without jurisdiction, unjustified and unsustainable. ( 9 ) ). In the impugned notice the authority has also given some reasons in support of its conclusion. But in this case, I do not want to go into question whether reasons are required to be given and their legality, as is not a controversy before me. However, by way of a passing reference I say that even the reasons given are also not legally tenable and sans legal foundation. But in this case, I do not want to go into question whether reasons are required to be given and their legality, as is not a controversy before me. However, by way of a passing reference I say that even the reasons given are also not legally tenable and sans legal foundation. In absence of any express intention to exercise option to purchase the property, by sending the impugned communication, the authority shall be deemed to have not exercised right of statutory pre-emption as contemplated under S. 26 (2) not only within sixty days but even till today allowing private sale to materialise. This has paved way for the registering authority to register the documents treating that the competent authority is not willing to purchase the property. ( 10 ) ). In the result, the petition is allowed. The communication, i. e. , impugned order dated 2-8-1996, Annexure c addressed by respondent No. 2 to the petitioners is quashed and set aside. Annexure c having no existence in the eyes of law is to be ignored and is of no consequence. Rule is made absolute accordingly with noorder as to costs. .