JUDGMENT It is an application under Article 227 of the Indian Constitution directed against the order No. 26 passed on 9.9.1991 by the Judge, 9th Industrial Tribunal at Durgapur in Case No. X 25 of 1990. 2. The petitioners are the ex-employees of the Durgrpur cinema hall. In March 1985 there was clash between the local police and some students of the Regional Engineering College mar the cinema hall and as a result two students were killed by firing and the exhibition of the Cinema shows were suspended for some time. Thereafter, when the Cinema show was resumed, these petitioners, who were attached to that Cinema hall as employees since its inception were dismissed from service without assigning any reason by the employer. Naturally they approached the Labour Commissioner and there was an attempt for reconciliation between the employer and the workmen which ultimately failed and the Labour Department referred the matter to the Industrial Tribunal. Before the Industrial Tribunal the Company was represented by one Advocate, namely. Sri S.C. Bose on behalf of the workmen and executive of the Bengal Motion Pictures Association, namely, Sri R.C. Bhattacharjee appeared an raised objection that the company cannot be allowed to be represented through an Advocate without the consent of the workers i.e. other party and without leave of the Tribunal in terms of the provision of Section 36 sub-section (4) of the Industrial Disputes Act. At the time of hearing of that objection the Advocate appearing fop the company raised the plea that R.C. Bhattacharjee was not the authorised representative of the workmen and as such he had no locus-standi to raise such objection. The learned Tribunal by its order dated 27.11.1990 accepted the contention as raised by the representative of the workers and rejected the plea of the employer to be represented by a legal practitioner as the conditions laid down in sub-section (4) of Section 36 of the I.D. Act were not complied with. Against that order the company moved this Hon’ble Court under Article 226 and the matter was disposed of by the then Hon'ble Justice Mr. Against that order the company moved this Hon’ble Court under Article 226 and the matter was disposed of by the then Hon'ble Justice Mr. Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee and the matter was remanded to the learned Tribunal for fresh adjudication on the preliminary objection raised by either party and with this direction also that in case the Tribunal would allowed representation of the workmen by their union representative the Tribunal also should take into consideration the question of allowing the legal practitioner on behalf of the company. The Hon'ble Judge also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1) AIR 1983 SC at page 109. 3. The learned Tribunal after remand asked the representative of the workmen to satisfy the Tribunal that the condition as mentioned under Section 36 (1) (a) of the I.D Act have been fulfilled. At the time of hearing the employer produced two letters written by one Shibnath Chatterjee, alleged to be the Joint Secretary of the Bengal Motion Pictures Employees’ Association in support of their case that the workmen of the Durgapur cinema hall were not members of the Bengal Motion Pictures Employees’ Association and as such their Executive R.C. Bhattacharjee could not represent them and the other letter mentioned that the BMPE Union did not authorise Sri Bhattacharjee to represent the workmen. Out of fairness the learned Tribunal gave an opportunity to the workmen and their representative Sri Bhattacharjee to produce necessary documents for the satisfaction of the Tribunal and it appears from the order that a letter subsequently written by that Sbibnath Chatterjee correcting his earlier stand was also produced along with membership cards of the petitioner• workmen. but the learned Tribunal could not rest his faith on the genuineness of those documents and by his impugned order i.e. dated 9th September, 1991 accepted the contention as raised by the learned Advocate Sri S.C Bose appearing for the employer that R.C. Bhattacharjee who represented the workmen had no authority to do so and as such he had no locus-standi to raise such objection under Section 36 sub-section (4) of the I.D. Act and thus the plea of the workmen virtually has been thrown out of the Tribunal and the prayer of the company to be represented through an Advocate was allowed. On being aggrieved by such order the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution bas been filed by the workmen on the ground that the learned Tribunal acted without jurisdiction and under misconception of the actual position, of law. The learned Advocate for the petitioners made his submissions also on the other day, but unfortunately the opposite party inspite of service did not appear and to ensure fair-play of Justice, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, namely Mr. Santanu Mukherjee was directed to send an intimation of the next date of bearing to the party concerned i.e. employer by registered post with A.D. It is submitted by Mr. Mukherjee that it was duly served but the postal receipt and the acknowledgement card both are lying with his client who has not yet been turned up. Mr. Mukherjee has filed a copy of the letter which was sent to the opposite party employer i.e. respondent No. 1. Let this copy be kept with the record with this direction to the petitioner that the acknowledgement card and the postal receipt be filed as soon as available. 4. The language of Section 36 (4) is absolutely clear. It appears that it contains two conditions for the purpose of being represented by a legal practitioner in an Industrial Dispute. The first condition is the consent of the other party to the proceedings and the second condition which is conjunctive, with, the leave of Tribunal. This particular enactment is absolutely silent that it is necessary on the part of the party which to give consent, to raise written objection before the Tribunal that consent was not given. Such an interpretation goes against the spirit and intention of this particular enactment. The language of Section 36 (4) of the I.D, Act is so clear that it can be construed with confidence that a duly has been cast by the legislature on the Tribunal itself before allowing the prayer for representation by an Advocate or legal practitioner to be satisfied that those two conditions as mentioned above have been fulfilled. It is a legal requirement and, therefore, it is the incumbent on the part of the Court or Tribunal to be sure that those two condition have been fulfilled before allowing such petitions. It is a legal requirement and, therefore, it is the incumbent on the part of the Court or Tribunal to be sure that those two condition have been fulfilled before allowing such petitions. But in the instant case, as I find, the learned Tribunal has committed gross error by transferring the responsibility of the Tribunal to the aggrieved parry i.e. petitioners. It is the view of the Tribunal that the representative of the workmen not being properly authorised in terms of the provision Section 36(1)(a) of the I.D. Act, such representative had no authority to raise such objection challenging the prayer of the company to be represented by an Advocate. Whether the prayer of the O.P. to be represented by a legal practitioner has been challenged or not the duty remains with the Court to see before allowing such prayer that the two conditions as laid down by sub-section (4) of Section 36 duly fulfilled. I feel constrained to say that learned Tribunal has misdirected himself in interpretating the purpose and intention of sub-section (4) of Section 36 of the I.D. Act. Accordingly that part of the impugned order cannot be sustained in law and should be set aside. 5. Regarding the representation of the workmen i.e. the petitioners by their executive office-bearer, namely, R.C. Bhattacharjee, it is necessary to mention that the joint secretary Shibnath Chatterjee on whose earlier letters the company banked such stood corrected by sending a letter explaining the facts subsequently and admitting that those workmen became members of the union and R.C. Bhattacharjee was authorised to represent. 6. Apart from that aspect where the aggrieved workmen are not member of any recognised workers’ union, the law has also provided for their representation under Section 36 (1) (c). It is laid down that where the worker is not a member of any trade union, he may be represented by any member of the executive or other office• bearer of any trade union connected with, or any other workmen employed in the industry in which the worker is employed and authorised in such a manner as may be prescribed. It is laid down that where the worker is not a member of any trade union, he may be represented by any member of the executive or other office• bearer of any trade union connected with, or any other workmen employed in the industry in which the worker is employed and authorised in such a manner as may be prescribed. Just on plain reading of this particular sub-section, it can be construed in this way that where a particular workmen is not a member of any particular union, he may also be represented by executive or any other office bearer of a union which is connected with an identical industry in which the worker is employed. Therefore, in terms of this particular sub-section, it can be said that if for the sake of argument we assume, that the petitioner workmen were not members of B.M.P.E. Union not being employed in a cinema industry any office-bearer or executive connected with that industry are entitled to represent them if duly so authorised as required by law. In the instant case, there is no such allegation that there is any defect in such authorisation made by the workmen petitioners in favour of Sri R.C. Bhattacharjee. Accordingly, I feel constrained to hold that the learned Tribunal also has missed the true intention and purport of this provision of law. In short, the learned Tribunal bas been misdirected and committed error in jurisdiction by mis-interpretation of the provision of Section 36 (1) (c) and sub-section (4) of Section 36. The impugned order as such is set aside and the matter should go back to the 9th Industrial Tribunal at Durgapur for deciding the points at issue afresh according to law and in the light of observations made above as expeditiously as possible, preferably within four weeks from the date of communication of this order and the application under Article 227 of the Indian Constitution is hereby disposed of. The learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner is permitted to take the gist of this order and communicate it to the learned Tribunal and the learned Tribunal may act on such communication.