P. K. MISRA, J. ( 1 ) THE four appellants have been convicted under Ss. 304-B and 498-A, IPC, and sentenced thereunder to undergo R. I. for 7 years and 3 years respectively with a direction that the sentences are to run concurrently. ( 2 ) DECEASED Urmila met a violent death on 1-6-1993. Appellants 1 and 4 are respectively the father-in-law and mother-in-law, appellant No. 2 is the husband and appellant No. 3 is the brother-in-law of the deceased. The sister-in-law of the deceased has been acquitted by the trial Court. FIR was lodged by P. W. 2, the brother of the deceased. It was stated in the FIR that there was a love marriage between appellant No. 2 and the deceased about 4 years back in spite of the reluctance of the parents of the deceased. It is further alleged that about 4 months after the marriage, the father-in-law, mother-in-law, sister-in-law and brother-in-law of the deceased started torturing her due to domestic quarrel. It is further alleged that about a year back, the husband and father-in-law of the deceased were provailing upon her to get her share in the landed property from her father and since she did not accede to such demand, they were torturing her frequently. It is further alleged that on one occasion, poison had been mixed with food, but the same was not taken by the deceased. Subsequently, the problem had been solved by a gentleman of the village, namely Kanduri Sasmal. It is further alleged that about eight months prior to the incident, the deceased and her husband (appellant No. 2) stayed apart from the other accused persons in a rented house belonging to one Manindra Samantaray, but the other accused persons were going to that place quite frequently and torturing the deceased. It is further claimed that 4 to 6 days prior to the incident, the in-laws had gone to the place of the deceased and had threatened her. It is claimed that taking advantage of the absence of Dibakar Samantaray (P. W. 13) and his wife (P. W. 14), the neighbours of the deceased, the accused persons killed the deceased on 1-6-1993. On the basis of these allegations, the case was registered under Ss. 498-A and 304-B/34, Indian Penal Code, against five accused persons. ( 3 ) THE plea of the accused persons was one of denial. On the basis of these allegations, the case was registered under Ss. 498-A and 304-B/34, Indian Penal Code, against five accused persons. ( 3 ) THE plea of the accused persons was one of denial. ( 4 ) IN the trial, apart from the informant who was examined as P. W. 2, the prosecution relied upon the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4, the mother and father of the deceased, and P. W. 14 to bring home the charges under Ss. 498-A and 304-B, IPC. The prosecution also relied upon the factum of seizure of a stick on the basis of statement leading to recovery made by appellant No. 3. Prosecution also examined Kanduri Sasmal as P. W. 9 who had allegedly settled the dispute between the deceased and her in-laws. However, P. W. 9 did not support the prosecution case and was declared hostile. Apart from the above witnesses, the prosecution also relied upon the evidence of the doctor (P. W. 11) to prove that the death was due to asphyxia by strangulation of neck by hard and blunt object. Some villagers were examined as post-occurrence witnesses. Besides, some witnesses to the seizure and to the inquest were also examined. ( 5 ) THE trial Court found that death was homicidal in nature and had taken place within seven years of the marriage. Relying upon the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 4 as well as P. W. 14, the trial Court held that the accused persons other than the acquitted sister-in-law of the deceased had ill-treated and assaulted the deceased in connection with the demand of dowry and accordingly, all the four accused persons were convicted under S. 304-B and 498-A/34, IPC. ( 6 ) IN this appeal, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants while not disputing the death of the deceased in abnormal circumstance, has vehemently challenged the prosecution evidence relating to alleged demand for dowry and consequential torture. The learned counsel appearing for the State has supported the reasonings given by the trial Court. ( 7 ) P. WS. 2, 3 and 4 are the close relations of the deceased and in normal circumstance their evidence regarding demand for dowry or torture is to be given credence, as ordinarily it is expected that the deceased would have disclosed about the demand for dowry as well as torture before them. ( 7 ) P. WS. 2, 3 and 4 are the close relations of the deceased and in normal circumstance their evidence regarding demand for dowry or torture is to be given credence, as ordinarily it is expected that the deceased would have disclosed about the demand for dowry as well as torture before them. However, in the present case, P. Ws. 2, 3 and 4, who were admittedly not in good terms with the accused persons, do not claim to have direct knowledge regarding the alleged claim for dowry, nor any knowledge on the basis of statement of the deceased. Even in the FIR itself, P. W. 2 had not claimed that the deceased had disclosed about the alleged torture et cetera to him. In his evidence he has stated that he heard about such things from P. W. 14. Similarly, P. W. 4, the father of the deceased, does not claim that his daughter had complained about demand of dowry or regarding alleged torture before him on any occasion. It is the admitted case of the prosecution that the marriage between the deceased and the accused had taken place against the wishes of the parents of the deceased and was in fact, a love marriage. P. Ws. 2 to 4 do not claim in evidence that they knew about the alleged demand for dowry or the torture from the deceased herself. On the other hand, P. W. 3, the mother of the deceased, has categorically stated in her evidence as follows :-". . . . . . We were not pulling on well with the family of the accused persons as the deceased had love marriage with Niranjan. We were not having visiting term with the accused. The deceased and the accused Niranjan had not come to our house. "since the family of the deceased was admittedly not happy with the love marriage of the deceased with accused Niranjan and as admitted by P. W. 3, the deceased and the accused had not come to the house of P. Ws. 2 to 4, their evidence regarding the so-called demand for dowry and torture becomes doubtful. "since the family of the deceased was admittedly not happy with the love marriage of the deceased with accused Niranjan and as admitted by P. W. 3, the deceased and the accused had not come to the house of P. Ws. 2 to 4, their evidence regarding the so-called demand for dowry and torture becomes doubtful. The evidence of P. W. 2 in examination-in-chief that the accused persons also persuaded the deceased to claim her share in her parental property and to take the money on sale of the land, strictly, speaking, does not amount of a demand for dowry. At any rate, in view of the categorical statement that the deceased had not come to the house of her parents and brother, the evidence of P. Ws. 2 to 4 regarding alleged demand for dowry is merely hearsay without any evidentiary or probative value. ( 8 ) P. W. 2 claims to have received information from the wife of Dibakar Samantaray who has been examined as P. W. 14. P. W. 14 claims to have intervened and settled dispute between the deceased and her-in-laws. However, she has not stated anywhere that she had discussion about the matter with said P. W. 2 or any other relation of the deceased. The enmity between her family and the family of the accused persons is apparent from the evidence of her husband who has been examined as P. W. 13. From the cross-examination of P. W. 13, it is evident that there is a spateof litigations against him many of which had been started at the instance of accused Nilamani (appellant No. 1 ). The overzealousness of P. W. 14 is apparent from her statement that the in-laws' family of the deceased also used to stay in the rented house of the deceased, which is not at all the prosecution case. The vague and bald assertion of P. W. 14, who cannot be characterized as an independent witness, to the effect that the accused persons had ill-treated and assaulted the deceased in connection with dowry demand, is not worthy of credence without any corroboration, specially in the admitted back-ground of the case that the deceased and appellant No. 2 had married each other on the basis of their mutual love. Even P. W. 13, the husband of P. W. 14, does not whisper a single word about the alleged demand for dowry or torture by any of the accused persons. On the other hand, another co-villager (P. W. 6) has categorically stated that the deceased was having cordial relations with the members of her in-laws' family. It is claimed by the informant that P. W. 9 had settled the dispute between the deceased and her in-laws' family, but he has not supported such assertion of P. W. 2. P. W. 4, the father of the deceased, has stated that he had reported twice against appellants 1 and 2 for their ill-treatment to the deceased in the police station. However, such statement is not borne out from the record and the police officials do not claim that any allegations had been made earlier regarding the alleged ill-treatment. It is the admitted case of the prosecution that about 8 months prior to the incident, appellant No. 2 and his wife, the deceased, were staying apart in a different place. In such state of the evidence on record, it is difficult to come to a conclusion that, in fact, there was any demand for dowry and if so, by which accused person. Similarly, there is lot of doubt regarding the alleged ill-treatment. ( 9 ) IN a case under S. 304-B, IPC, the prosecution is required to prove that soon before the death the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused persons in connection with any demand for dowry. In the absence of any such acceptable circumstances on record that all or any of the accused persons had, in fact, subjected the deceased to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand for dowry, it is difficult to raise any presumption under S. 113-B of the Evidence Act and to sustain the conviction under S. 304-B, IPC. ( 10 ) THE prosecution had relied upon the factum of recovery of a stick on the basis of statement of appellant No. 3 leading to discovery of such stick. The trial Court has not placed any reliance upon such so-called recovery of the weapon of offence and rightly so. ( 10 ) THE prosecution had relied upon the factum of recovery of a stick on the basis of statement of appellant No. 3 leading to discovery of such stick. The trial Court has not placed any reliance upon such so-called recovery of the weapon of offence and rightly so. Though the evidence of the doctor indicates that the death was caused due to strangulation by a blunt and hard substance like lathi, in the absence of any other connecting material, it cannot be assumed that the stick allegedly recovered on the basis of the statement of appellant No. 3 was, in fact, the weapon of offence. In the absence of any other direct or circumstantial evidence, the recovery of the stick would not be sufficient to fasten the liability on appellant No. 3. As a matter of fact, as the trial Court rightly observed, no charge under S. 302, IPC, had been framed against any of the accused persons including appellant No. 3. ( 11 ) THERE is no doubt that the menace of dowry death has assumed alarming proportion. It is, however, well-known that graver is the offence, strictor should be the proof and a conviction cannot be sustained merely on the basis of suspicion. In the present case, the materials on record indicate that a homicidal death had occurred. The prosecution instead of trying to rope in all the accused persons on the allegation that an offence under S. 304-B, IPC, had been committed, should have concentrated upon the case by trying to find out the real culprit who had committed the murder. It is quite possible that some of the accused persons might have had a hand in the alleged crime. But in the absence of any cogent evidence, it is difficult to convict any of the accused persons on the basis of mere suspicion and conjectures. ( 12 ) IN the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed, the order of conviction and sentence is set aside and all the appellants are acquitted of the charges. Appeal allowed. .