In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has prayed for a direction on the respondents to restore possession of an area of .0365 acres of land under Patta No.255 covered by CS Dag No.4420/4491 and an area of .275 acres of land under Patta No.255/258 covered by CS Dag No.4491/ 4497 to the petitioner and to pay compensation of Rs.6,00,0007- for illegal deprivation of his aforesaid private properties and for a further direction on the respondents to pay a sum of Rs.3.50 lakhs towards cost of the building which the petitioner had erected on the said land. 2. The relevant facts as stated in the writ petition are that under merger agreement between the Maharaja of Manipur and the Union of India, the Palace compound remained the sole private property of late Maharaja Budhachandra Singh and on his death his legal heirs including his second son Laxmi Kanta Singh inherited the said Palace compound jointly with other legal heirs. On 9.12.92, Maharaj a Laxmi Kanta Singh executed a registered deed of gift in favour of his wife Smti Shanti Devi whereunder he transferred an area of 70 ft x 40 ft of land out of the land under CS Dag No.4420 comprised in the said Palace compound. Out of the said land measuring 70 ft x 40 ft, the petitioner purchased an area of 40ft x 30 ft from Smti Shanti Devi for a consideration of Rs. 1,00,000 by a registered Sale Deed (Annexure 17 to the writ petition) and thereafter by another registered Sale Deed dated 3.6.93, the remaining portion of land was purchased by the petitioner for a consideration of Rs.50,000/- from Smti Shanti Devi. The a petitioner, therefore became the absolute owner of the land under Patta No.255 covered by CS Dag No.4420/4491 having an area of .0365 acres and the land wider Patta No.255/258 covered by CS Dag No.4491/4497 having an area of .0215 acres and was in possession of the said land. The said land is situated adjacent to the Ukhrul Road and was an ideal place for development of shopping eomplex. The petitioner in consultation with the Architect and Engineers prepared a scheme for construction of multi storeyed building for using the ground floor for shopping complex and the other floors for residence-cum-office purpose. The said land is situated adjacent to the Ukhrul Road and was an ideal place for development of shopping eomplex. The petitioner in consultation with the Architect and Engineers prepared a scheme for construction of multi storeyed building for using the ground floor for shopping complex and the other floors for residence-cum-office purpose. The petitioner completed the foundation work of the said multi storeyed building but as he did not have necessary funds to complete the multi storeyed building, after raising the columns and pucca brick walls upto the first floor level, the petitioner put CGI sheet roof on Iron truss on a portion measuring 25ft x 60 ft of the ground floor. The total cost for constructing the said portion of the building was worked eut at Rs.4,00,000/-. The petitioner thereafter let out the constructed portion of the building to different businessmen and was earning a monthly rent of Rs.5,0007-from the tenant. The petitioner also spent a sum of Rs.50,000/- for construction of septic tank and water reservoir near the said building. While the petitioner was in peaceful possession of the said properties and was earning income out of it, on 2.3.94, a police team under the command of Superintendent of Police, Imphal District, Manipur, came with crane*and bulldozer and without any notice to the occupants of the building and the petitioner, forcibly dismantled the entire building. The dismantling of the building started at 3 PM of 2.3.94 and ended at 9AM of 3.3.94. On demolition of the building, the building materials became useless and e some of the materials were taken away by the police team in a police van without the knowledge and consent of the petitioner. 3. On the basis of these facts, Mr. LNK Singh* learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that under Article 300A of the Constitution, every person has been guaranteed the constitutional right of not being deprived of his properties saved by the authority of law. The petitioner, therefore, could not be deprived of his properties by the respondents except by a procedure laid down by law. But no procedure as laid down by law was followed and no notice was given to the petitioner before the aforesaid properties of the petitioner were demolished by the police team and before the petitioner was evicted from the said properties. But no procedure as laid down by law was followed and no notice was given to the petitioner before the aforesaid properties of the petitioner were demolished by the police team and before the petitioner was evicted from the said properties. According to Mr.LNK Singh, the petitioner is entitled to restoration of possession of the said properties as well as compensation from the respondents. He further submitted that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can direct the restoration of possession of the aforesaid properties of the petitioner. In support of his aforesaid submission, Mr. LNK Singh relied on the unreported Division Bench judgment dated 19.9.89 of this Court in Civil Rule No.172/82/ 258/83 (Shri MK Lakshmikanta Singh vs. Shri Iringbam Tompok Singh & /j others). He also cited the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1961 SC 1570 in the case of Shri Bishan Das vs. State of Punjab, in AIR 1982 SC 32 in the case of M/s Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan vs. State of UP and in AIR 1986 SC 180 in the case of Olga Tellis & others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation & others. He relied on the decisions reported in AIR 1994 SC 2663 in the case of N. Nagendra Rao & Co vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and in AIR 1996 SC 922 in the case of Bodhistawa Gautam vs. Subhra Chakraborty for his submission that the Court can also grant compensation to a party whose rights have been affected by another party and argued that this is a fit case in which the Court should direct the respondents to pay compensation of Rs.6,00,000/- to the petitioner. 4. In reply, Mr. SK Singh, learned GA, Manipur, appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos 1 and 2 and Mr. TNK Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos 3 and 4 submitted that the writ petition was not maintainable as disputed question of facts as well as a title were involved in this writ petition and the proper remedy for the petitioner was to approach the civil Court to establish his title over the disputed land as well as his claim for compensation. Mr. Mr. TNK Singh, in particular, referred to the various averments made in the application filed on behalf of the respondent Nos 3 and 4 for deciding the question of maintainability of the writ petition. In the said application the respondent Nos 3 and 4 have stated that the Palace compound of the State of Manipur is one of the private properties held by the then Maharaja of Manipur in his capacity as a Ruler of Manipur and after the enforcement of Constitution of India 26th Amendment Act, 1971, the Palace compound cannot be claimed as private properties of the legal heirs of the ex-Maharaja of Manipur. It was further been averred in the said application that the land covered by CS Dag No.4420/4491 to which the petitioner has made a claim in the writ petition is not situated within the boundary walls of the Palace compound and it is a part of the State Highway known as Imphal-Ukhrul Road. It has been further stated in the said application that the said land is also situated within the Imphal Municipal area and under section 2 (49) of the Manipur Municipal Act, 1994, public road includes footway attached to such road, drainage attached to such road and the land on the either side of the roadways upto the boundary of adjacent properties. On the basis of the said provision of law, it has been pleaded in the said application that the Imphal-Ukhrul Road covered the land upto the boundary walls of the Palace compound and it has been further stated that the land covered by CS Dag No. 4420/4491 to which the petitioner is making a claim is outside the boundary of the Palace compound and is a part of the Imphal-Ukhrul Road. It is also pleaded in this application that neither Maharaja Laxmikanta Singh nor his wife Smti Shanti Devi had any right whatsoever on the said land which is a part of the State Highway and as such they could not have transferred the said land in question to the petitioner. The respondent Nos 3 and 4 have further stated in the said application that under section 119 of the Manipur Municipal Act, 1976, sanction of the Municipal Board is required before erection of any building. But the petitioner has not obtained any sanction from the Municipal Board for constructing the said building on the land in question. The respondent Nos 3 and 4 have further stated in the said application that under section 119 of the Manipur Municipal Act, 1976, sanction of the Municipal Board is required before erection of any building. But the petitioner has not obtained any sanction from the Municipal Board for constructing the said building on the land in question. It is further stated that the petitioner had constructed only an unauthorised kutcha shed on the said land and he had notconstructed any pucca construction or pucca latrine with septic tank or pucca water reservoir as claimed by him in the writ petition. The respondent Nos 3 and 4 have denied that any police team was sent under the command of the respondent a No.4 armed with crane and bulldozer for forcible demolition of the structures standing on the said land and instead they have made a statement in the said application that the petitioner as a law abiding citizen has voluntarily removed the unauthorised construction constructed on the land in question after the Govt of Manipur requested the petitioner to remove the said unauthorised construction from the land in question in order to avoid road accidents and inconvenience to pedestrians. Mr. TNK Singh cited the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of DLF Housing Construction vs. Delhi Municipal Corporation, (1976) 3 SCC160 and in the case of Md Ibrahim vs. City Magistrate, Varanasi, (1983) 2 SCC 153 feu: the proposition that rival questions regarding rights to properties can only be decided in a suit and not by a writ petition. Mr. TNK Singh further contended that the allegations in the writ petition that the respondents had dismantled the construction of the petitioner are denied by the respondents and, therefore, the question as to whether the petitioner himself has pulled down his construction or the respondents had demolished the construction of the petitioner is a disputed question of fact which cannot be decided in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. He finally submitted that any direction to restore possession of j the properties to the petitioner would have the effect of permitting the petitioner again to do the illegal act of constructing a building on the public road for which he has not obtained sanction'from the Board under the Municipal Act. 5. He finally submitted that any direction to restore possession of j the properties to the petitioner would have the effect of permitting the petitioner again to do the illegal act of constructing a building on the public road for which he has not obtained sanction'from the Board under the Municipal Act. 5. It is true that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot decide disputed question of facts and title to properties as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of DLF Housing e Construction vs. Delhi Municipal Corporation (supra) and in the case of Md Ibrahim vs. City Magistrate, Varanasi (supra). Thus the title of the petitioner to the properties in question which is disputed by the respondents cannot be decided ki this writ petition. But the fact remains that the petitioner was in possession of the said properties before 2.3.94 which has not been disputed by the respondents in this writ petition. In the application for deciding the question of maintainability of the writ petition filed by the respondent Nos 3 and 4 and numbered as Civil Misc Case No.530 of 1997, it has been clearly stated that the writ petitioner had constructed unauthorised katcha shed on the land in question and that the Govt of Manipur during the President's Rule requested the writ petitioner to remove the said unauthorised construction from the aforesaid land in order to avoid road accidents and for the convenience of pedestrians going on the said State Highway, namely Imphal-Ukhrul Road. This goes to show that according to respondents, the land in question was under the occupation of the writ petitioner and that on the said land the petitioner had raised an unauthorised construction. This being the admitted factual position, I am of the considered opinion that the respondents could remove the unauthorised construction on the land in question and evict the petitioner from the said land only by following due procedure of law. In case of Bishan Das vs. State of Punjab (supra) cited by Mr. This being the admitted factual position, I am of the considered opinion that the respondents could remove the unauthorised construction on the land in question and evict the petitioner from the said land only by following due procedure of law. In case of Bishan Das vs. State of Punjab (supra) cited by Mr. LNK Singh, learned counselfor the petitioner, the Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in the case of Wazir Chand & another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 415 in which the Supreme Court has held that the State or its executive officers cannot interfere with the rights of others unless they point to some specific rule of law which authorises their acts. Similarly, in the case of M/s Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan vs. State of UP (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner it was held: "Article 300A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State Govt cannot while taking recourse to the executive power of the Stateuader Article 162, deprive a person of his property. Such power can be exercised only by the authority of law and not by a mere executive fiat or order. Article 162, as is clear from the opening words, is subject to other provisions of the Constitution, It is, therefore necessarily subject to Article 300A. The word 'law' in the context of Article 300A must mean an Act of Parliament or of a State Legislature, a rule, or a statutory order, having the force of law, that is positive or State made law." 6. In the case of Olga Tellis & others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation & others (supra) cited by Mr. LNK Singh, the Supreme Court further held that removal of enchroachment from the pavement and public streets can only be done after following reasonable procedure as laid down by law. 7. As a matter of fact, adequate provisions for removal of such encroachments on a public road and for the constructions made without the sanction of the Municipal Board were available in the Manipur Municipalities Act, 1976 (for short 'the Act') which was in force on 2.3.94. Sections 111, 119 (1), 121 (1) and 124 (1) of the Act are extracted herein below : “111. Sections 111, 119 (1), 121 (1) and 124 (1) of the Act are extracted herein below : “111. Power to remove obstructions, encroachments, and projection in or on public road etc • The Board may notwithstanding any proceedings which may have been started against him under this Act, issue a notice requiring any persons to remove any building which he may have built or any fence, rail post or other obstruction or encroachment which he may have erected or stacked, on any part of a public road, house gully, public drain, sewer, aqueduct, water course, ghat or any land vested in the Board; and, if such person fails to comply with such requisition within forty-eight hours of the receipt of the same, the Magistrate may, on the application of the Board, order that such obstruction or encroachment be removed; and thereupon the Board may remove any such obstruction or encroachment and the expenses thereby incurred shall be paid by the person who erected or stacked the same. ''119. Erection of building without sanction- (i) No person shall erect, materially alter, or re-erect or commence to erect, materially alter or re-erect any building without sanction of the Board. 121. Powers of Board to sanction or refuse - (1) Within one month after the receipt of the notice required by sub-section (2) of section 119, the Board may refuse to sanction the building or may sanction it either absolutely or subject to such modification as it may deem fit in respect of all or any of the matters specified in bye laws and the persons erecting, materially altering or re-erecting any suchbuilding as aforesaid shall comply with the sanction of the Board as granted in every particular. 124. 124. Powers of Board in case of disobedience • (1) If the construction of a building is started or if a building is materially altered or erected - (a) without sanction as required by section 121 (1); or (b) without notice as required by section 119; or (c) when sanction has been refused; or (d) in contravention of the terms of any sanction granted; or (e) when the sanction was lapsed; or (f) in contravention of any bye laws made under clause (vi) of sub-section (1) of section 204; the Board may, by notice to be delivered within a reasonable time, require the building to be altered or demolished as it may deem necessary, within the period of thirty days from the date of service of such notice : Provided that the Board may instead of requiring the alteration or demolition of any such building accept by way of composition such sum as it may deem reasonable." It is ctear from tlje provisions of section 111 of the Act that the Municipal Board, Impnai, could,-if it found that the petitioner had encroached upon the public road, issue a notice requiring the petitioner to remove the building which he had built and any other obstruction or encroachment which he may have erected d on a part of the public road or any land vested in the Board, and if the petitioner failed to comply with such requisition within forty eight hours of the receipt of the same, the Board could have applied to the Magistrate and the Magistrate could have ordered such obstruction or encroachment to be removed and thereupon the Board could have removed such obstruction or encroachment at the expenses of the petitioner. Even though the respondents have taken a plea that the land e which was under the occupation of the petitioner and on which the petitioner has constructed a katcha shed was a part of the public road, the respondents have not brought to my notice that any requisition was made for removal of the encroachment or obstruction constructed by the petitioner on the said public road in accordance with the provisions of the said section 111 of the Act. Similarly, a reading of section 119 of the Act quoted above, shows that the petitioner could not have erected any construction on the land in question without sanction of the Municipal Board, Imphal. Similarly, a reading of section 119 of the Act quoted above, shows that the petitioner could not have erected any construction on the land in question without sanction of the Municipal Board, Imphal. But section 125 of the Act quoted above further provides that if the construction of building is started or erected without sanction of the Board as required by section 121 (1) of the Act, the Board may by notice to be delivered within a reasonable time require the building to be demolished within a period of 30 days from the date of such notice. Therefore, if the respondents were of the * view that the petitioner had made a construction on the land in question without sanction of the Board as provided under section 119 of the Act and 121 (1) of the Act, a notice ought to have been served giving reasonable time to remove the construction. The case of the petitioner in the writ petition is that no notice whatsoever was received by the petitioner for demolition of the structure on the fr land. The respondents have not stated in their application numbered as Civil Misc Case No.530 of 1997 that any such notice was served on the petitioner to removethe construction. The respondent Nos 3 and 4, however, have taken a stand in their said application that the police team did not demolish the construction on the land in question and that the Govt of Manipur during the President's Rule requested the petitioner to remove the unauthorised construction from the land and the petitioner who knew that the construction was unauthorised and was causing obstruction to the increasing traffic of the State Highway, namely Imphal-Ukhrul Road, removed the said unauthourised construction voluntarily as a law abiding citizen. 8. It is not necessary for this Court to go into the controversy on the exact manner in which the construction on the land was demolished because the fact remains that the petitioner now stands dispossessed from the land without the procedure of law as laid down in the aforesaid sections of the Manipur Municipalities Act, 1976, being followed and State of Manipur is now in possession of the said land. In the case of Sohanlal vs. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 529 , the Supreme Court held that where the eviction of a displaced person in contravention of the express provisions of section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction) Act is illegal and the Union of India is in possession of the premises, a writ of Mandamus can issue to or an order in the nature of Mandamus can be made against the Union of India to restore possession of the premises to him, Applying the aforesaid law to the facts of the present case, since the petitioner has been dispossessed of the land without following the procedure as laid down by law and in particular the procedure as laid down by the Manipur Municipalities Act, 1976, the petitioner is entitled to a writ of Mandamus or for an order in the nature of Mandamus for restoration of possession of the land. For this conclusion, I am also supported by the unreported Division Bench judgment of this Court in Civil Rule No. 172/82/258/83 (Shri MK Lakshmi Kanta Singh vs. Shri Iringbam Tompak Singh) in which this Court has held in paragraph 10 of the judgment that the State cannot use police power to dispossess a person from any property without taking action under the provisions of law even where it is of the view that the property belongs to the State. Such restoration of possession of land in favour of the petitioner, however, will not entitle the petitioner to construct again on the said land without obtaining sanction for construction of the building in accordance with the provisions of section 124, 125, 126 and 127 and other relevant provisions of the Manipur Municipalities Act 1994 which has come into force with effect from 24.5.94. 9. Coming now to the claim of the petitioner for compensation, although the petitioner has alleged in the writ petition that the building erected by him in the land in question was dismantled by the police team on 2.3.94 and 3.3.94, the said allegation has been expressly denied by the respondent Nos 3 and 4, namely the Director General of Police, Manipur and the Superintendent of Police, Imphal District, Manipur and instead they have stated in their application numbered as Civil Misc Case No.530 of 1997 that it is the petitioner who voluntarily removed the unauthorised construction from the land in question. Thus there is a dispute on this basic question of fact as to whether the police team has dismantled the construction of the petitioner on the land in question. Further the petitioner in his writ petition has stated that the construction was a pucca structure with CGIsheet roofing on iron truss and the cost of the said construction was Rs.4 lakhs and that in addition a septic tank, water reservoir and latrine were also constructed at the cost of Rs.50,000/- and all these structures have been dismantled by the a respondents. But the respondents in their application numbered as Civil Misc Case No. 530 of 1997 have denied the aforesaid statements of the petitioner and have instead stated that there was no such pucca construction or septic tank or water reservoir or latrine but there was only a katcha shed on the land in question. Hence the value of construction on the land which is relevant for determining the quantum of compensation is also disputed by the respondents. I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot possibly award any compensation to the petitioner on such disputed questions of fact and it is only the civil Court which can resolve these disputed questions of fact and decide the question relating to compensation. 10. In the result, this writ petition is partly allowed. The respondents are directed in restore possession of an area measuring .0365 acres of land in Patta No.255 covered by CS DagNo.4420/4491 and an area measuring .0275 acres of land underPatta No.255/258 covered by CS Dag No.4491/4497 to the petitioner forthwith. But it is made clear that the petitioner will not erect any construction on the said land without obtaining sanction from the competent authority under the provisions of the Manipur Municipalities Act, 1994. It is made clear that such possession of the petitioner in respect of the aforesaid land in question will be subject to the decision that a civil Court may make with regard to title and possession over the said land initiated by any party or any order of eviction that may be passed in accordance with law. But considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.