D. Biswas, J.- This writ appeal has been preferred by the Life Insurance Corporation of India. Gauhati, hereinafter referred to as the Corporation, against the judgment and order dated 19.8.96 passed by the learned Single Judge in Misc. Case No. 1035 of 1996 (review) arising out of CR No. 1829 of 1994. 2. The admitted factual position is that the respondent was appointed as Development Officer on certain terms and conditions including the minimum business to be secured by him as specified by in para 9 of the appointment letter dated 28.11.88 and was placed on probation for a period of one year. Because of his unsatisfactory performance, the period of probation was extended for another one year with effect from 1.12.89. On expiry of the extended period of probation, his service was confirmed with effect from 1.12.90 vide letter dated 28.12.90, keeping all other terms and conditions set in the appointment letter undisturbed. On 11th November. 1993. the Corporation issued a notice calling upon the respondent to show cause as to why his service would not be terminated for his unsatisfactory performance. The Corporation, eventually, on consideration of his reply, terminated his service with effect from 7.5.94. The respondent challenged the order of termination in Civil Rule No. 1829 of 1994. The learned Single Judge vide order dated 24.7.94 passed on consent, quashed the termination order and also directed the Corporation to appoint the respondent in Class III (Administrative Work) within a period of 15 days. The; Corporation made an abortive attempt to rescind the aforesaid order in Writ Appeal No.508 of 1995. The writ appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court with the observation that proper course would be to move the learned Single Judge for review of the order, if the consent was given under some mistake of law. Accordingly, an application for review (Misc Case No. 1035 of 1996) was filed. But the said application was also dismissed on the ground that the impugned order was passed on consent. Being aggrieved the Corporation has preferred this appeal. 3. We have heard the argument advanced on behalf of both the parties, perused the grounds taken in appeal and the documents made available on record. 4. Mr. But the said application was also dismissed on the ground that the impugned order was passed on consent. Being aggrieved the Corporation has preferred this appeal. 3. We have heard the argument advanced on behalf of both the parties, perused the grounds taken in appeal and the documents made available on record. 4. Mr. BR Dey, the learned counsel for the appellants argued that the order of termination having been passed in strict conformity with the statutory rules, the impugned order although on consent is against law and. therefore, cannot be sustained. According to him the conditions of service of a Development Officer are governed by the provisions of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Development Officers (Revision of Certain Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules. 1989. hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1989, and a Development Officer whose service has been terminated is eligible for reemployment in Class III (Administrative Work) if he had completed 10 years of service as such on the date of Ms termination. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, disputed the grounds of termination and argued that the respondent was appointed on 28.11.1988 when Schedule III of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulation. 1960 was in force and, as such, his case is governed by the provisions of Schedule III as it stood prior to the introduction of Rules of 1989 wherein the qualifying service of 10 years was non-existent. 5. In order to appreciate the stand taken by the parties as stated above, it is considered imperative to refer to the provisions of clause 9 (2) of Schedule III as it stood prior to the amendment made in 1989. Clause 9 (2) read as follows : "9. Promotion of Development Officer : (2) Any Development Officer whose services are liable to be terminated under this Schedule, may, with his consent, be appointed to do administrative work in Class III on such terms as may be decided by the Corporation. 6. In the amendment Rules of 1989, in Rule 19, provisions akin to that of clause 9 (2) have been incorporated with certain changes. We may now refer to the provisions of Rule 19. "19. 6. In the amendment Rules of 1989, in Rule 19, provisions akin to that of clause 9 (2) have been incorporated with certain changes. We may now refer to the provisions of Rule 19. "19. Re-appointment of terminated Development Officer : If a Development Officer, whose services are terminated in pursuance of Rule 8 has completed at least 10 years of service in Class II on the date on such termination and has not completed 55 years of age, he shall be eligible for re-appointment in the service of the Corporation to do administrative work in Class II either as Assistant or Record Clerk in accordance with such qualification and suitability as may be specified under clause (cc) of sub-section (2) of section 48 of the Act: Provided that ...... " 7. It would appear that the Central Govt. in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) read with clause (cc) of sub-section (2) of section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956 framed the Rules of 1989 with retrospective effect from the 1st day of April, 1988. Thereafter, the Chairman of the Corporation, in exercise of power conferred by Regulation 4 of the Staff Regulations, 1960, issued certain instructions to give effect to the provisions of Rules of 1989. After going through the Rules of 1989 and the instructions referred to above, we find that the eligibility criteria has been prescribed as 10 years of service as Development Officer for reappointment in Class III (Administrative Works). This provision is foreign to the provisions in the repealed clause 9 (2) and they operate as a debarring factor rendering the respondent ineligible for appointment in Class III (Administrative Work) for lack of statutory eligibility. 8. The question of law which calls for adjudication, in view of the discussion above, is whether the provisions of Schedule III of Staff Regulation of 1960, which was in force on the date of appointment, but repealed by the amendment Rules of 1989 subsequent to his date of appointment with retrospective effect from 1.4.88, will govern the case of respondent. 9. The answer to this question of law is available in the decision reported in Govt. of AP & others vs. Sayed Yousuddin Ahmed, reported in 1997 SCC (L&S) 1587 wherein the Apex Court held as follows : "The relationship between the Govt. 9. The answer to this question of law is available in the decision reported in Govt. of AP & others vs. Sayed Yousuddin Ahmed, reported in 1997 SCC (L&S) 1587 wherein the Apex Court held as follows : "The relationship between the Govt. and its servant is like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant but a legal relationship is something in the nature of status. Origin of Govt. service is contractual; but once appointed to his post or office, the Govt. servant acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by consent of both parties but by a status or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by the Govt. . The Legislature under Article 309 of the Constitution can make law determining the service conditions of the Govt. employees and such law can also be retrospective." 10. This part, we may further refer to another decision of the Supreme Court in the State of MP vs. RN Mishra as reported in (1977) 7 SCC 644 where a similar view was expressed in the matter of status of an employee governed by statutory provisions. 11. Keeping in mind the principle highlighted in the above two cases, we may examine the repeal and savings clause of the amendment Rules of 1989 which reads as follows : "20. Repeal and Savings : (1) Schedule III of the staff rules and the Life Insurance Corporation Development Officers (Alternation of Remuneration and other Terms and Conditions of Services) Order, 1978 are hereby repealed except in respect of things done or omitted to be done under Schedule III to staff rules and Life Insurance Corporation Development Officers (Alteration of Remuneration and other Terms and Conditions of Service) Order, 1978 as so repealed. (2) Nothing contained in these rules shall be deemed to affect the right of the competent authority to discharge, retire, or determine the service of a Development Officer in accordance with the staff rules or to affect the right of the disciplinary authority to impose any penalty on him under Rule 39 of staff rules on any grounds specified therein or to apply the staff rules to Development Officers in respect of matters not dealt with in these rules." 12. It would appear from Rule 20 that the Schedule III of the Staff Rules, 1960 and the Life Insurance Corporation Development Officers (Alternation of Remuneration and other Terms and Conditions of Service) Order, 1978 were repealed except in respect of things done or omitted to be done. In sub-rule (2) of Rule 20, it has been made clear that nothing contained in these rules shall affect the right of the competent authority to apply the provisions of Staff Rules of 1960 to discharge, retire or determine the services of a Development Officer in accordance with the staff rules. The language used leaves no scope for interpretation about the intention of the rule making authority (Central Govt. ) that the provisions of Rules of 1989 are intended to be retrospective. Therefore, it can be concluded that the service conditions of the respondent are governed by the Rules of 1989. 13. The power to terminate the service of a Development Officer can be located in Rule 8 of the amendment Rules of 1989. Rule 8 reads as follows : "8. Termination of service in certain cases : (1) Where a Development Officer has failed to conform to the expense limit and where no opportunity to conform to such limit could be given under the provisions of Rule 7, the Zonal Manager may terminate his services after giving him three months notice or salary in lieu thereof: Provided that the Development Officer shall be given an opportunity to show cause against the proposed termination of his services. (2) An appeal against an order passed under sub-rule (1) shall lie to the Managing Director and the provisions of Rule 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45 of the Staff Rules shall, so far as may be, apply to any such appeal. (3) In the case of an appeal under sub-rule (2) the Managing Director shall consider the records of the case and pass orders on merit having regard to the circumstances of the case." 14. Let us, at this stage, in the light of the above provisions, examine the validity of the termination order. It would appear from the show cause notice dated 11.11.93 that the respondent was informed of his unsatisfactory performance during the appraisal year ending on 30.11.92. Cost of ratio during that appraisal year was 54.8% against the prescribed cost ratio was of 26%. It would appear from the show cause notice dated 11.11.93 that the respondent was informed of his unsatisfactory performance during the appraisal year ending on 30.11.92. Cost of ratio during that appraisal year was 54.8% against the prescribed cost ratio was of 26%. As a result, no opportunity to conform to the expense limit as per Rule 7 of the Rules of 1989 could be given to him. There is no doubt that the performance was far below the statutory requirement. In the reply to the show cause notice (Annexure D to the writ petition) the respondent also did not dispute the above situation. That being so, his service was terminated with effect from 7.5.1994. 15. The entire exercise as detailed above have been done in compliance with the statutory provisions as laid down in the amendment Rules of 1989. The learned counsel for the respondent wanted to make out a case by arguing that the Corporation quoted the provisions of Schedule III in its show cause notice as well as termination order and not the provisions of Rules of 1989. To this, our answer is that the reference to the repealed provisions of Schedule III itself will not be an invalidating factor unless steps taken are in violation of the rules in force. There being no appeal preferred, and the grounds of termination being in conformity with the statutory requirement and having been preceded by a show cause notice and due consideration of the reply thereto, the validity of the termination order cannot be questioned. Consequently, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge quashing the order of termination cannot be sustained. 16. Now, we would like to place on record that the decision in Dishergarh Power Supply Co Ltd vs. Its Workmen reported in AIR 1986 SC 1486 and M/s Gurucharan Singh Baldev Singh vs. Yashwant Singh & others ( AIR 1992 SC 180 ) referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent, have no application. We fail to understand as to how the ratio of the decision in these two cases would be of any assistance to the respondent. 17. We .have also taken note of the provisions of section 6 (e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. We fail to understand as to how the ratio of the decision in these two cases would be of any assistance to the respondent. 17. We .have also taken note of the provisions of section 6 (e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. We are of the opinion that the provisions of the repealed clause 9 (2) at best can be construed as a 'hope' to the respondent to get an appointment in the event of termination of service. The accrual of this right of reappointment was contingent on happening of an event i.e. termination of service. In the instant case, the termination came long after the amendment Rules of 1989 came into force. As such, the claim of the respondent has to be considered only under the provisions of the Rules of 1989. Admittedly, the respondent did not acquire the minimum statutory eligibility of 10 years of service. As such, the Corporation has no statutory obligation to accommodate him. 18. The discussion above leads to an irresistible conclusion that the alternative remedy granted by the learned Single Judge directing the Corporation to appoint the respondent in Class III (Administrative Work) within 15 days is in violation of the provisions of Rule 19 and, therefore, cannot stand. This view gets support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Mrs Asha Ramachandra Ambedkar reported in AIR 1994 SC 2148 wherein it has been held as follows : "Thus, apart from the directions as to reappointment on compassionate grounds being against statutory provisions, such direction does not take note of this fact. Whatever it may be, the Court should not have directed the appointment on compassionate grounds. The jurisdiction under Mandamus cannot be exercised in that fashion. It should have merely directed consideration of the claim of the 2nd respondent. To straightway direct the appointment would only put the appellant Corporation in piquant situation. The disobedience of this direction will entail contempt notwithstanding the fact that the appointment may not be warranted. This is yet another ground which renders the impugned judgment dated 19.10.93 unsupportable. For these reasons, the civil appeal will stand allowed. There shall be no order as to costs." 19. The disobedience of this direction will entail contempt notwithstanding the fact that the appointment may not be warranted. This is yet another ground which renders the impugned judgment dated 19.10.93 unsupportable. For these reasons, the civil appeal will stand allowed. There shall be no order as to costs." 19. The next question to be examined is whether the order passed by the learned Single Judge on consent in the writ petition could be interferred with by this appellate Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Here, we may take aid of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Admane Anita Moti reported in AIR 1995 SC 350 . In this case, the Supreme Court interferred with an order passed by the High Court on consent as the order was against the law. We have already held hereinbefore that the impugned order directing the Corporation to appoint him in Class III (Administrative Work) is against the law in force. Therefore, from this decision of the Apex Court we may draw conclusion that this appellant Court has the powers to set aside the impugned order passed on consent out against law. 20. We may now refer to the order of stay granted on 17.5.94 by the learned Single Judge in the original writ application suspending the operation of the termination order. In our opinion, the effect of this order cannot in any way improve the case of the respondent. This view rests on the decision of the Apex Court in Committee of Management, Arya Nagar Inter College vs. Sree Kumar Tiwari, (1997) 4 SCC 388 . Relying on the principles of law enunciated in the above case, we find that the period after termination till date cannot be computed to the credit of the respondent so as to enlarge his period of service to make him eligible for appointment in Class III (Administrative Work) or to make out a case for appointment on compassionate ground. Even if such computation is undertaken his tenure falls short of 10 years of service. 21. Consequently, this appeal is allowed. The order dated 19.8.96 passed in Misc Case No. 1035 of 1996 (Review petition) is set aside. As a necessary sequence, the order dated 24.7.95 passed on consent in Civil Rule No. 1829 of 1994 is also set aside. Even if such computation is undertaken his tenure falls short of 10 years of service. 21. Consequently, this appeal is allowed. The order dated 19.8.96 passed in Misc Case No. 1035 of 1996 (Review petition) is set aside. As a necessary sequence, the order dated 24.7.95 passed on consent in Civil Rule No. 1829 of 1994 is also set aside. In our considered opinion, no effective purpose will be served by remanding the case to the learned Single Judge at this stage and. hence, we dismiss the writ petition (Civil Rule No. 1829 of 1994). No order as to costs.