SUDHIR NARAIN, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition is directed against the order of the Consolidation authorities whereby the application filed by the petitioner for mutation of his name in the revenue record was rejected. ( 2 ) THE facts in brief are that Raghava prasad executed registered sale-deed dated 11th March, 1974 in favour of his nephew narain Prasad, the petitioner, in respect of his entire share in the chak belonging to him for a sale consideration of Rs. 17,000 The petitioner filed application for mutation of his name under Section 12 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (in short the Act) on the basis of the aforesaid sale-deed in the life time of Ragho Prasad. On a notice being issued, Ragho Prasad, the vendor, appeared before the Consolidation Officer on 10th november, 1974. He admitted the execution of sale-deed. The Assistant Consolidation officer, after recording the statement of Ragho prasad, directed the petitioner to file copy of the Sanad Bhumidhari. In the meantime. Raghva Prasad died on 30. 12. 1974. After his death, his two daughters. Smt. Deoraji and smt. Hira Devi, respondents 4 and 5, filed objection before the Assistant Consolidation officer, challenging the execution of sale-deed by Ragho Prasad. The matter was referred to the Consolidation Officer. ( 3 ) THE Consolidation Officer held that the execution of the sale-deed by Raghava prasad was proved but the petitioner failed to prove that any sale consideration was paid by him to Sri Raghava Prasad. It was further found that the petitioner had already more than twelve and half acres of land before the execution of the sale-deed and the sale was hit by Section 154 of the U. P. Zarnindari abolition and Land Reforms Act and further the sale was bad for want of permission of the settlement Officer, Consolidation. The application was rejected. The appeal filed against this order was dismissed by the Assistant consolidation Officer. The petitioner filed revision against the said order before the deputy Director of Consolidation. The Deputy director of Consolidation held that the sale-deed was neither invalid for want of permission of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation nor it was hit by the provisions of Section 154 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land reforms Act. The petitioner filed revision against the said order before the deputy Director of Consolidation. The Deputy director of Consolidation held that the sale-deed was neither invalid for want of permission of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation nor it was hit by the provisions of Section 154 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land reforms Act. The revision was, however, dismissed on the finding that the petitioner failed to prove that he paid sale consideration to Raghava Prasad, the vendor. ( 4 ) THERE are two basic questions, Firstly, whether the sale-deed will be void if it is found that the sale consideration was not paid, as mentioned in the sale-deed, and the second question is whether Raghava Prasad executed sale-deed in favour of the petitioner. ( 5 ) SECTION 54 of the Transfer of Property act, 1882, defines sale as a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Section 55 (4) (b) of the Transfer of Property Act provides that the seller is entitled where the ownership of the property has passed to the buyer before payment of the whole purchase money to a charge upon the property in the hands of the buyer. The question came up for consideration in various cases as to whether the sale-deed would be valid when the sale-deed recites that the price had been paid but in fact the Court finds that the sale consideration was in fact not paid. ( 6 ) IN Baijnath Singh v. Paltu and Ors. a division Bench of this Court held that if the sale-deed recites that the sale consideration has passed but it is found by the Court that no sale consideration passed, the non-payment of purchase money does not prevent the passing of the ownership of the purchased property from the vendor to the purchaser and the purchaser can notwithstanding such non-payment, maintain a suit for possession of the property. This legal principle was accepted in Gayatri Prasad v. Board of Revenue and Ors. 2. ( 7 ) IN Chandrashanker Mainishanker v. Abhla Mathur and Ors, the Bombay High court held that the mere fact that a sale-deed recites the payment of consideration which is not proved, cannot render the document invalid. The price may be paid or promised wholly or in part. 2. ( 7 ) IN Chandrashanker Mainishanker v. Abhla Mathur and Ors, the Bombay High court held that the mere fact that a sale-deed recites the payment of consideration which is not proved, cannot render the document invalid. The price may be paid or promised wholly or in part. The Court has to find out the intention of the parties at the time of transaction. It was observed:"if according to the tenor of the document the consideration was not actually paid but the document shows that there was an intention to pay, then in that case the document cannot be rendered invalid on account of the nonpayment of the consideration. If, on the other hand, the intention was not to pay any consideration, then the document is of no effect. " ( 8 ) THE intention of the purchaser can be ascertained from his conduct and the surrounding circumstances. The burden of proof is, however, on the person who challenges the sale-deed on the ground that there was no intention to pay the sale consideration The vendor executes the sale-deed for a price which is mentioned in the sale-deed, it is the promise made by the vendee, the vendor executes the sale-deed and gets it registered ( 9 ) IN Sukalu and Anr. v. Punam, wherein the sale-deed recited the payment of the sale consideration but it was found that no sale consideration had passed, the Court held that the sale shall not be void and the burden of proving that there was no intention of the vendee to pay the sale consideration is on the party who asserts this fact. It was hardly relevant whether the whole consideration or part of it remained unpaid. ( 10 ) IN Motilal Sahu v. Ugrah Narain sahu and Ors, the Court found that the sale-deed recited the passing of full consideration and delivery of possession to the vendee but actually no sale consideration had passed and further the possession of the property sold and the registered sale-deed remained with the vendor, it was held that the intention of the vendor was that the title shall not pass unless the full consideration was paid. ( 11 ) THE decision in Chandrashekhar prahraj and Ors. v. Pitambari Debya, relied upon by the counsel for the respondent is distinguishable on facts. ( 11 ) THE decision in Chandrashekhar prahraj and Ors. v. Pitambari Debya, relied upon by the counsel for the respondent is distinguishable on facts. The Court accepted the principle that when a sale-deed is executed and registered, there is a prima facie completion of transfer of title to the vendees and more non-payment of the consideration will not arrest the passing of the title. But whether the vendor really intended to transfer the ownership by mere execution and registration, or contracted to do so only after receipt of consideration as a condition precedent will depend upon the terms of the contract between the parties. If there is stipulation in the sale-deed itself that title to and ownership of the property would vest in vendee after payment of the purchase money, the reasonable inference would be that until the condition is fulfilled there is no effective transfer of ownership. It was found that there was a clear recital that the receipt of consideration and the transfer of title should be simultaneous and on facts of that case it was held that the recital about the receipt of consideration having found to be incorrect and the consideration having not been paid the intention of the parties was not to effect the transfer of ownership by the mere execution and registration of the document. . ( 12 ) THIS Court in Durga Singh v. W. Ram Singh and Ors, held that the mere nonpayment of the consideration would not arrest the passing of the title. The Court can. however, direct that there will be a charge upon the property transferred under the sale-deed for payment of the sale consideration with interest. ( 13 ) THE Court has to find out the real intention of the parties at the time the sale-deed was executed and got registered. The sale-deed shall not be treated as invalid merely because the sale-deed recites payment of sale price but in fact, it was not paid. If the vendee intended to pay the sale price but, in fact, he did not pay, though a recital of such payment was made in the sale-deed, such sale-deed would not be invalid. But if the intention of the vendee was not to pay, it will be only a colourable transaction and will have no effect. If the vendee intended to pay the sale price but, in fact, he did not pay, though a recital of such payment was made in the sale-deed, such sale-deed would not be invalid. But if the intention of the vendee was not to pay, it will be only a colourable transaction and will have no effect. The Court has to examine as to what was the intention of the parties on the basis of the evidence which may be produced in the case. The title to the property will pass on the execution and registra tion of the sale-deed even if the whole or part of the sale price has not been paid unless the intention of the vendor was that the title should not pass till the sale price is paid. In this case the contesting respondent did not lead any evidence to show that there was no intention of the vendee to pay the sale price or the title should not pass in the property till the sale price is paid. ( 14 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent contended that the transaction will be void in case the sale consideration had not passed in view of Section 25 of the CONTRACT ACT, 1872, Section 25 of the CONTRACT ACT, 1872 provides that an agreement made without consideration is void unless it is covered by the exceptions mentioned therein. Section 25 of the CONTRACT ACT, 1872 has no application in the case of completed contract. The vendor having executed sale-deed, the contract is complete. It is not an agreement for sale. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act itself makes a difference between the sale and contract for sale. The vendor having executed the sale-deed, it looses the character of contract of sale. In case the consideration has not passed as agreed upon, the provisions of Section 55 (4) (b) of the Transfer of Property Act will be applicable where the unpaid amount shall remain a charge on the property. ( 15 ) THE next question arises as to whether the sale-deed was executed by Raghava Prasad in favour of the petitioner or not? The petitioner produced Kedar Nath, attesting witness of the sale-deed executed by Raghava Prasad and Sita Ram, one of the members of the consolidation Committee, before whom raghava Ptasad had admitted the claim of the petitioner. ( 15 ) THE next question arises as to whether the sale-deed was executed by Raghava Prasad in favour of the petitioner or not? The petitioner produced Kedar Nath, attesting witness of the sale-deed executed by Raghava Prasad and Sita Ram, one of the members of the consolidation Committee, before whom raghava Ptasad had admitted the claim of the petitioner. He also produced expert evidence of Sri Majumdar, who compared the signature of Raghava Prasad on the disputed sale-deed as well as the sale-deed executed in favour of baijnath. husband of Smt. Heera Devi, respondent no. 5. The petitioner also appeared in the witness box to prove the execution of the sale-deed. On behalf of the objector-respondents Smt. Deoraji, respondent No. 4, appeared as a witness before the Consolidation officer and produced Alexendar, a handwriting expert. The Consolidation Officer recorded a finding that the execution of the sale-deed by Raghava Prasad in favour of the petitioner was proved but he failed to prove that the consideration as alleged by him was paid to the vendor. This finding was affirmed by the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation. ( 16 ) THE Deputy Director of Consolidation made a casual observation that Raghava prasad used to live with his son-in-law and, therefore, it does not appear that he might have executed a sale-deed without any consideration being paid. The Deputy Director of consolidation did not consider the evidence on which the Consolidation Officer and the settlement Officer Consolidation relied upon. It is also relevant to note that Raghava Prasad had made statement before the Assistant consolidation Officer on 10. 11. 1974 that he had executed sale-deed in favour of the petitioner. The respondents did not lead any evidence to show that Raghava Prasad had not made statement before the Assistant consolidation Officer and his signature did not appear on the record. The petitioner produced Sita Ram who was member of the consolidation Committee and before whom raghava Prasad had made statement before the Assistant Consolidation Officer. The respondents had filed objection and in the said objection, there is no allegation that Raghava prasad had not executed the sale-deed, or it was obtained by practising fraud on undue influence upon him. On the other hand, Smt. Deoraji, respondent no. The respondents had filed objection and in the said objection, there is no allegation that Raghava prasad had not executed the sale-deed, or it was obtained by practising fraud on undue influence upon him. On the other hand, Smt. Deoraji, respondent no. 4, in her statement made before the Consolidation Officer showed complete ignorance regarding execution of the sale-deed on 11th March, 1994 executed by Raghava Prasad in favour of the petitioner. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has not specifically reversed the finding recorded by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement officer, Consolidation that the sale-deed was executed by Raghava Prasad in favour of the petitioner. ( 17 ) THE Supreme Court in Ram Autar and ors. v. Ramdhani and Ors, considering the powers of Deputy Director of Consolidation under Section 48 of U. P. Consolidation of holdings Act, held that the Deputy Director of consolidation cannot act as Court of Appeal so as to reappreciate the evidence on record for recording findings on questions of fact. In this case, there was no material basis before the Deputy Director of Consolidation for reversing the findings recorded by the consolidation Officer and the Assistant consolidation Officer on the question of execution of the sale-deed by Raghava Prasad in favour of the petitioner. ( 18 ) FOR the reasons given above, the writ petition is allowed, the order dated 28. 8. 1978 passed by the Consolidation Officer, order dated 13. 12. 1978, passed by the Assistant settlement Officer, Consolidation and the order dated 12. 10. 1979, passed by the Deputy director of Consolidation are quashed. The petitioner shall pay the amount of the sale consideration as mentioned in the sale-deed and shall pay interest at the rate of 12 per cent on such sale consideration with effect from the date of execution of the saledeed to respondents 4 and 5 within six months from today. In case the petitioner does not comply with this order, the application for mutation of his name in the revenue records shall stand rejected. Writ allowed with the direction to pay sale consideration with interest. .