DIBYENDU BHUSAN DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) THE present application under Sections 401 and 482 of the Cr. P. C. is for quashing a proceeding being C 732 of 1985 pending before the Court of Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Asansol. ( 2 ) THE facts and circumstances relevant for this application are as follows. ( 3 ) ON 20-3-84, one Kedar Nath Balodia filed an application under Section 144, Cr. P. C. before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Asansol against the present petitioner and five others. The sad application was registered as Misc. Case No. 61 of 1984. The Magistrate drew up a proceeding under Section 144, Cr. P. C. and restrained the petitioner and five others from entering into a particular land and making any construction upon the said land and from disturbing the peaceful possession of the said Kedar Nath Balodia. On 17-4-84, Kedar Nath Balodia filed another application under Sections 144/107 of Cr. P. C. which was registered as M. P. Case No. 143 of 1984. But the Id. Magistrate did not pass any order because an order under Section 144, Cr. P. C. had already been promulgated over the self-same land which forms the subject-matter of dispute. On 18-5-84, Kedar Nath Balodia Filed an application for conversion of the said proceeding under Section 144 to one under Section 145 and for attachment of the property in dispute and the ld. Magistrate by an ex parte order of that date converted the said proceeding to one under Section 145, attached the property under Section 146 and appointed the B. D. O. , Kulti as the Receiver of the property. During the pendency of the aforesaid Misc. Case No. 61 of 1984, Kedar Nah Balodia filed an application under Sections 188 and 447 of the I. P. C. before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Asansol and the ld. Magistrate directed the Receiver, that is to say the B. D. O. , Kulti, to inquire and submit a report. The B. D. O. submitted its report on 15-3-85 and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate sent a complaint before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate. On receipt of the complaint, the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offences under Sections 188 and 447 of I. P. C. , against the petitioner and five others and issued summons. On being summoned, the petitioner and five others duly appeared before the ld. Magistrate. On receipt of the complaint, the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offences under Sections 188 and 447 of I. P. C. , against the petitioner and five others and issued summons. On being summoned, the petitioner and five others duly appeared before the ld. Magistrate. One of the accused namely Jahar Prasad Barman moved an application before the High Court on 17-9-87 in Criminal Revision No. 1210 of 1987 praying for quashing the proceeding on the ground that the complaint did not disclose any offence under Section 188, I. P. C. inasmuch as in the petition of complaint there was only allegation of disobedience of the order promulgated under Section 144, Cr. P. C. , but the petition of complaint did not contain any statement that such disobedience caused or tended to cause obstruction, annoyance, injury or risk etc. as contemplated under Section 188, I. P. C. A. K. Chatterjee, J. , as His Lordship then was, by his order dated 3-7-90 rejected the said revisional application without going into the contention that was raised in challenging the proceeding in so far as it relates to the offence under Section 188, I. P. C. because of the fact that no ground was made out in the revisional application in assailing the legality of the prosecution so far as it involved the other offence namely the offence punishable under Section 447 of I. P. C. His Lordship gave the petitioner the liberty to agitate the ground that was taken in that revisional application with regard to the legality of the prosecution under Section 188 of I. P. C. and directed the Id. Magistrate to dispose of the proceeding with utmost expedition. Therefore, the accused persons filed a petition before the Id. Magistrate praying for quashing the criminal proceeding challenging the maintainability of the prosecution and the ld. Magistrate was of the view that the accused persons' point having been already agitated in Criminal Revision No. 1210 of 1987 before the High Court could not be allowed to be reagitated. He was also of the view that without taking evidence, the question whether a case would be sustainable under Sections 188 and 447, I. P. C. could not be decided at that stage. In such view of the matter and in view of the High Court's decision in expeditious disposal of the proceeding, the ld. He was also of the view that without taking evidence, the question whether a case would be sustainable under Sections 188 and 447, I. P. C. could not be decided at that stage. In such view of the matter and in view of the High Court's decision in expeditious disposal of the proceeding, the ld. Magistrate was pleased to reject the application by his order dated 30-7-91. Hence the present revisional application at the instance of one of the accused persons namely Kali Prasad Barman. 3a. Mr. S. K. Deb, the Id. Counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the criminal proceeding was liable to be quashed in view of the fact that the complaint itself did not prima facie disclose any of the two offences of which the cognizance was taken. As regards the offence under Section 188, I. P. C. , Mr. Deb submitted that the petition of complaint at best disclosed the fact that there was disobedience of an order promulgated under Section 144, Cr. P. C. but mere disobedience will not constitute an offence under Section 188, I. P. C. A disobedience can amount to an offence under Section 188, only if such disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance, injury or risk of the same to a person lawfully employed or danger to human life, health or safety or a riot or an affray. Mr. Deb submitted that since the petition of complaint does not contain any allegation that the alleged disobedience caused or tended to cause one or the other of the consequences as mentioned above, taking of cognizance of an offence under Section 188, I. P. C. on the basis of such a complaint was vitiated and was liable to be quashed. Mr. Deb placed his reliance upon a Division Bench decision of our High Court reported in 1982 Cri LJ 1652, Habibar Rahaman v. Jagannath Mondal and a Single Bench decision of Madras High Court reported in 1970 Cri LJ 1111 : ( AIR 1970 Mad 333 ), In re. V. Subramaniam. ( 4 ) AS regards the other offence, that is to say the offence punishable under Section 447. I. P. C. , Mr. V. Subramaniam. ( 4 ) AS regards the other offence, that is to say the offence punishable under Section 447. I. P. C. , Mr. Deb submitted that an offence under Section 447, I. P. C. can be committed only when a 'criminal Trespass' within the meaning of Section 441 of I. P. C. is committed and a mere entry into or upon the property in the possession of another would not suffice. In order to constitute a criminal trespass, such entry must be coupled with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate or insult or annoy any person in possession of such property. According to Mr. Deb going by the averments made in the petition of complaint, it cannot be said that it discloses the essential ingredients of an offence of criminal trespass, inasmuch as there is no allegation in the complaint to the effect that there was entry into the property in violation of the order under Section 144 with intent to commit any of the acts mentioned above. Accordingly, Mr. Deb submits that the cognizance in relation to the offence under Section 447 is also bad and is liable to be quashed. He placed his reliance in support of his contention on this point in the Supreme Court decision reported in 1983 Cri LJ 173 : ( AIR 1983 SC 159 ), Smt. Kanwal Sood v. Nawal Kishore and the Single Bench decision of Calcutta High Court reported in 1972 Cri LJ 1499, Abul Hussain v. Masadul Haq and also a Division Bench decision of Gujarat High Court reported in 1971 Cri LJ 1013, Madhuben v. Thakarda Lakhaji Sendhaji. ( 5 ) MR. Sudipta Moitra. ld. Counsel appearing for the State, sought to refute the contentions of Mr. Deb by arguing that the petition of complaint does disclose the materials sufficient at least for the purpose of taking cognizance of offences under Sections 188 and 447, I. P. C. and that this is not a fit case for quashing the impugned proceeding. ( 6 ) THE point for my consideration would be as to whether or not the impugned proceeding is liable to be quashed. At the outset, I would like to set out the two Sections viz. Sections 188 and 441 of I. P. C. , with which we are concerned here. "188. ( 6 ) THE point for my consideration would be as to whether or not the impugned proceeding is liable to be quashed. At the outset, I would like to set out the two Sections viz. Sections 188 and 441 of I. P. C. , with which we are concerned here. "188. Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant.- Whoever, knowing that, by an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, he is directed to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management, disobeys such direction, shall, if such disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any persons lawfully employed, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month; or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both; and if such disobedience causes or tends to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or causes or tends to cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. EXPLANATION.- It is not necessary that the offender should intend to produce harm, or contemplate his disobedience as likely to produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the order which he disobeys, and that his disobedience produces, or is likely to produce, harm. ""441. Criminal Trespass.- Whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property. or, having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person. or with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit "criminal trespass. " ( 7 ) SECTION 188 contains four paragraphs. A plain reading of the Section itself would at once make it clear that disobedience simpliciter is not an offence inasmuch as mere disobedience has not been made punishable under the Section in the first paragraph. or with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit "criminal trespass. " ( 7 ) SECTION 188 contains four paragraphs. A plain reading of the Section itself would at once make it clear that disobedience simpliciter is not an offence inasmuch as mere disobedience has not been made punishable under the Section in the first paragraph. The disobedience has been made punishable under the second and third paragraphs only when such disobedience causes or tends to cause (i) obstruction, annoyance, injury or risk to any person lawfully employed or (ii) danger to human life, health or safety or (iii) a riot or affray. Section 447, on the other hand, provides for punishment for 'criminal trespass' and what is criminal trespass is defined in Section 441 of I. P. C. It contains two paragraphs and in the present case we are concerned only with the first paragraph. Here also a plain reading of the Section itself would at once make it clear that mere entry into or upon the property in the possession of another will not amount to criminal trespass unless such entry is coupled with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person who is in possession of the property. There is thus no scope to controvert the proposition of law suggested by Mr. Deb that disobedience simpliciter will not amount to an offence under Section 188 unless the likely result of disobedience is such as mentioned in second and third paragraphs of Section 188, I. P. C. , while for an offence of criminal trespass punishable under Section 447, I. P. C. , mere entry will not suffice unless that entry is coupled with the intent to do any of the acts mentioned in the first paragraph of Section 441, I. P. C. ( 8 ) THE real controversy lies with regard to the question as to whether or not the petition of complaint discloses materials sufficient for taking cognizance of offences punishable under Sections 188 and 447, I. P. C. ( 9 ) THE allegations constituting the alleged two offences as set out in the petition of complaint read as follows :"the accused person being fully aware of the said order of an attachment in utter and contemptuous disregard of the said order has committed the following acts upon the said land and thereby committed an offence punishable u/ss. 188 and 447, I. P. C. The accused persons have changed the character of attached proceeding land during the period between 18-5-1984 and 12-2-85 as noted below :- (1) From the Southern most extremity of the proceeding land some earth has been cut and removed and thereby the high level of the proceeding land in this portion has been much lowered and two pegs have been fixed thereby and the second party are tying their cow there occasionally. (II) The walls and ceiling of the roof of newly made incomplete construction standing on the encroached portion of the proceeding land have been plastered with cement and cemented floor has been constructed. " ( 10 ) IN the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 AIR (SCW) 237 : (1992 Cri LJ 527), the Supreme Court categorised some cases, by way of illustration, wherein the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise, to secure the ends of justice, without, however, laying down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised or inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae or without giving any exhaustive list of different kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. One such category of cases is one where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. According to Mr. Deb, the allegations in the petition of complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie make out a case for prosecution for offences under Sections 188 and 447, I. P. C. Now, in Bhajan Lal's case (supra), the Supreme Court has also sounded a note of caution to the effect that the power to quash criminal proceeding should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases. ( 11 ) BARRING the Division Bench decision of Calcutta High Court reported in 1982 Cri LJ 1652 (Habibar Rahaman v. Jagannath Mondal), all the decisions cited by Mr. Deb dealt with cases after they came up after conviction. ( 11 ) BARRING the Division Bench decision of Calcutta High Court reported in 1982 Cri LJ 1652 (Habibar Rahaman v. Jagannath Mondal), all the decisions cited by Mr. Deb dealt with cases after they came up after conviction. In the Madras decision reported in 1970 Cri LJ 1111 : ( AIR 1970 Mad 333 ) (In re. V. Subramaniam), it was held that there should be evidence and finding that act of disobedience entailed one or other of the consequences mentioned in Section 188 and in the absence of evidence and finding in support of any of such consequences, the conviction under Section 188 was set aside. In Habibar Rahaman's (supra), it had been observed by the Calcutta High Court at paragraph 4 : "in the complaint made by the Executive Magistrate and taken cognizance of by the Id. Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, there is no indication that besides disobedience of the order of the Executive Magistrate any consequence mentioned in Section 188. I. P. C. resulted or was apprehended". In such circumstances, the proceeding was quashed by the High Court. But in the instant case, according to the specific averments in the complaint lodged by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, not only a part of the disputed land was dug out but also there was removal of earth as well as the lowering of the high level of the disputed land. There is also allegation of fixation of pegs and tying of cattle by the petitioners upon the disputed land. The allegations further indicate that there was encroachment upon the disputed land by making of a new construction and that there was plastering of walls and ceiling of the newly made incomplete construction as also construction of the cemented floor. Taking the allegations in the complaint as a whole, it must be held that they sufficiently indicate that the likely result of the disobedience was of the kind that is contemplated under Section 188, I. P. C. The disobedience will amount to an offence if it causes or tends to cause even risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed and according to the Explanation to Section 188, it is sufficient if the offender knows that his disobedience produces or is likely to produce harm and it is not necessary that he should intend to produce harm or contemplate his disobedience as likely to produce harm. Going by the complaint itself, it cannot be said that it does not even prima facie disclose the commission of an offence under Section 188. I. P. C. and the question whether such disobedience did or did not really entail any of the likely results that are mentioned in Section 188, I. P. C. in the strict sense of the terms will be decided during the trial. ( 12 ) IN 1983 Cri LJ 173 (Kanwal Sood v. Nawal Kishore), in view of the materials on record the Supreme Court was pleased to hold that a property was gifted to a trust with condition that the donor would stay in the house till his death and the trust will take over the possession after that. During his lifetime, the donor invited his brother's wife to stay in the house with him. After his death, the widow continued to stay and she was served with a notice to quit. On her failure to quit, a complaint under Section 448 was filed and the widow was convicted. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the appellant widow might be fondly thinking that she had a right to occupy the premises even after the death of the donor and that if a suit for eviction is filed in the Civil Court she might be in a position to vindicate her right and justify her possession. In the facts and circumstances of that case, the Supreme Court held that it is essentially a civil matter which could he properly adjudicated upon by a competent Civil Court and that initiation of the criminal proceeding, in the circumstances, appeared to be only an abuse of the process of the Court. In the case of Abul Hussain v. Masadul Haq reported in 1972 Cri LJ 1499 (Cal), one committed a trespass in the basense of owner in possession of property and after the owner came back and commanded the trespasser to quit, he refused and threatened the owner with injury or intimidated him. It was held that the offence of Criminal Trespass within the meaning of Section 441 was complete and in such circumstances, the High Court upheld the conviction. It was held that the offence of Criminal Trespass within the meaning of Section 441 was complete and in such circumstances, the High Court upheld the conviction. In 1971 Cri LJ 1013 (Guj) (Madhuben v. Thakarda Lakhaji Sendhaji) the respondents entered into property in bona fide belief that he continued to be in possession therein and the High Court held on the basis of materials on record that the trespasser had no intention to insult or annoy the person in actual possession and that he entered into the property in a bona fide belief that they are not doing anything wrong and in such circumstances, the High Court upheld the order of acquittal. ( 13 ) IN the present case, the acts attributed to the petitioner, prima facie indicate that there was at least an intention to commit the offence of mischief by digging the earth and lowering the high level of the disputed land. ( 14 ) IT is true that in the complaint in question, it was not alleged by the complainant Magistrate, in so many words, that the disobedience by the petitioner did entail any of the likely results as mentioned in Section 188, I. P. C. or that the entry upon the disputed land or encroachment thereof was coupled with the intent to commit any offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person lawfully employed. But then, the allegations in the complaint, taken as a whole, do not prima facie indicate the absence of any intent at least to commit an offence of mischief so as to amount to Criminal Trespass within the meaning of Section 441. ( 15 ) THUS, taking the complaint into account as a whole, and having regard to the other materials on record. I am of the view that it cannot be said at this stage that there will be sheer abuse of the process of the Court in case the criminal proceeding is allowed to continue. I have already indicated above that the present case is distinguishable from the facts of the cases that have been cited by Mr. Deb. Taking an overall view of this case, I must say that this is not a fit and proper case for quashing the proceeding at this stage. In the result, the application fails. The revisional application is accordingly dismissed. Stay is vacated. Petition dismissed.