JUDGMENT The petitioner in this application has, inter alia, sought for issuance of an appropriate writ directing enforcement of a circular letter issued by the Indian Road Congress and recommended practice for location and layout of roadside motor fuel filling and motor fuel filling-cum-service stations. 2. The said recommendations were made on the basis of certain alleged principles. Clause 4.1 of the said circular provides that as a general rule, the clear distance between two adjacent filling stations (these will also include fuel filling-cum-service stations) should not be less than 300 metres. 3. The fact of the matter lies in a very compass. 4. The petitioner runs a petrol pump in Mouza Padima on plot Nos. 1107 and 1073 which were taken on lease from the Administrator, Digha Development Scheme by the petitioner. The petitioner found that another filling up station would be established just by the side of his Petrol Pump by the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. in violation of the said scheme. 5. According to the petitioner as the principles were arrived at by the Indian Road Congress upon holding a meeting with the representatives of principal oil companies of the country, namely Bharat Petroleum, Indian Oil Corporation, Hindustan Petroleum etc. the same is binding on them. It is further contended that apart from the said circular existence of two fuel filling stations side by side would cause a fire hazard. 6. In its affidavit-in-opposition, the respondent No.2, however, contends that the said circular is not legally enforceable. It is stated that the said rules are merely guidelines and they apply only as a general rule. According to the said respondents keeping in view the fact stated in the affidavit-in-opposition that no other suitable land is available, another petrol pump was allowed to be set up at that place. It is stated :– “It is well-established that the average retail sales of Fuel of all the outlets in the given area (30 K.M. stretch of Highway with Digha at its Centre), is 320 KL per month. The petitioner's outlet has even registered a sale of 400 KL per month during 1995-96. By following the principles laid down in the volume/distant norms, there is valid ground and ample justification for setting up the outlet by the Indian Oil Corporation at the site provided by Digha Development Scheme Authority of the State Government. The petitioner's outlet has even registered a sale of 400 KL per month during 1995-96. By following the principles laid down in the volume/distant norms, there is valid ground and ample justification for setting up the outlet by the Indian Oil Corporation at the site provided by Digha Development Scheme Authority of the State Government. I shall produce the Retail Market Survey report of sale figures of the three retail outlets during the financial year 1995-96 before the Hon’ble Court at the hearing.” 7 It is further contended that there is no established basic principle that there shall always be a gap of 300 Metres in between two Petrol Pumps. 8. Mr. L.C Bihani, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised a short question in support of this application. The learned Counsel submits that the aforementioned policy decision is binding upon the respondent-corporation. According to the learned Counsel; the said policy decision has always been made applicable in the matter of allotment of petrol pumps by the respondent-corporation. The learned Counsel in support of his aforementioned contention has relied on a passage from Wade & Forsyth on Administrative Law, 7th Edition, at page 871, and a decision of (1) House of Lords in Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and Anr. reported in 1986 Appeal Cases 112 : (1985)3 All ER 402. 9. Mr. P.K Roy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-corporation, on the other hand, submitted that the circular in question is not a circular of the Indian Oil Corporation. It is stated that a mere recommendation of •the Indian Road Congress cannot he enforced by filing a writ application. According to the learned Counsel in any event, from a perusal of Clause 4.1 of the said recommendation it would appear that the same applies as a general rule and keeping in view the fact that no land was available although the respondent corporation had tried its best. it had to take settlement of the land in question. In any event, the learned Counsel contends that the petitioner would not suffer business loss It is accepted at the Bar that the allotment of the retail outlet by the. it had to take settlement of the land in question. In any event, the learned Counsel contends that the petitioner would not suffer business loss It is accepted at the Bar that the allotment of the retail outlet by the. Indian Oil Corporation in favour of a private party at the site in question has been set aside by this Court in (2) Dahadaya Samabay Krishi Unnayan Samity Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors reported in 1997(1) CLJ 419 . 10. In that case it has been held that the Indian Oil Corporation went out of its way to procure a land for a private person although in terms of the notice inviting tender one of the essential conditions was that the proposed allottee must have his own land. 11. However, keeping in view the contention. raised in this application. without going into the findings in that case, the question raised in this application my be considered. 12. In (3) Narendra Kumar Maheshwari v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 1990 (Suppl) SCC 440, the apex Court relying on the decisions in (4) R. Abdulla Rowther v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras & Ors. reported in AIR 1959 SC 896 and (5) G.J. Fernandez v. The State of Mysofe and Ors. reported in AIR 1967 SC 1753 and various other decisions held :– “It may, however, be stated that being not statutory in character, these guidelines are not enforceable. A policy is not a prescription of binding criterion. In this connection, reference may be made to the observations of Saganta Investments Ltd. v. Norwich Corpn. Also the observations in British Oxygen Co. v. Board of Trade. See, also Foulkes’ Administrative Law, 6th Edn. at pp. 181-184. In R. v. Secretary of State, ex parte Khan the Court held that a circular or selfmade rule can become enforceable on the application of persons if it was shown that it had created legitimate expectation in their minds that the authority would abide by such a policy/guideline”. 13. In (6) Accounting & Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 13. In (6) Accounting & Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. reported in 1994(1) CHN 205 , a division bench of this Court referring to the decision of (7) Comptroller and Auditor General of India v. K.S. Jaganathan reported in AIR 1987 SC 537 and held :- “It is clear from the above references that it has not been positively laid down anywhere that Office Memorandum has a force of law.” 14. The circular letter had been issued by the Indian Road Congress. It merely contains a guideline. The said guideline is not legally binding upon the Indian Oil Corporation. 15. Wade & Forsyth in their treatise ‘Administrative Law’ do not State that such circular will have force of law. Reference in this connection may be made to (8) Colman (JJ) Ltd v. Commissioners of Customs of Excise reported in (1968) 1 WLR 1286 at 1291. They may be used as a vehicle for conveying instructions to which some statute gives legal force, such as directions to local planning authorities under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1990. They may also contain legal advice of which the Courts will take notice. 16. However, the following observations may be noticed :- “Even where there is no immediate demand or threat, a declaration may be granted to settle some doubtful question of law on which an authoritative ruling is needed. One such case was where a company wished to know whether its quarrying operations required planning permission and obtained an emphatic judgment in their favour from the House of Lords. In two other cases the House granted declarations to settle arguments about the legality of action recommended in circulars issued by Government Departments, which themselves had no direct legal force. One was where nurses were stated to be allowed to perform certain functions under the Abortion Act, 1967. The other was where doctors were said to be entitled to give contraceptive advice to girls aged under 16 in certain circumstances without informing their parents. In both cases the official advice was upheld as it was also where a local authority sought a declaration that a Government circular about the community charge omitted essential details. In none of these cases did the Court object on the ground that the circulars had no legal force. In both cases the official advice was upheld as it was also where a local authority sought a declaration that a Government circular about the community charge omitted essential details. In none of these cases did the Court object on the ground that the circulars had no legal force. But for obvious reasons the Court will not grant a declaration that the British Government is in breach of a treaty.” 17. In Gillick (supra) the questions which have raised in this application, were not raised before the House of Lords nor was it stared that they had a statutory force. Only the advice given by Health Department was the subject matter of challenge on the ground that the same infringed the rights of the petitioners therein. The House of Lords merely held that such advice could be acted upon. 18. Lord Fraser held :- “That a girl aged less than 16 does not lack the power to give valid consent to contraceptive advice or treatment merely on account of her age.” 19. However, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that in the event there exists a policy decision, the same would be enforceable in a Court of law. It appears that all the four Government Oil Companies have adopted a policy decision known as Volume/Distance norms for setting up of retail outlets. The Oil Companies are bound by tee same. It is now well known that any deviation or departure from policy decision would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Reference in this connection may be made to (9) State of Mysore & Anr. v. Srinivasmurthy reported in 1976(1) SCC 817 . However, in the facts and circumstances of this case I am satisfied that the respondent had made out sufficient ground for making out an exception to the aforementioned policy decision and the same can neither be said to be wholly unjust or arbitrary so as to attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and thus, it is not a fit case in which this Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This application is, therefore, dismissed but without any order as to costs.