V. Dutta Gyani, J.- This Writ Appeal No.250 of 1997 is directed against the judgment and order dated 29.1.97 as passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Rule No.4204 of 1996 thereby setting aside the award of contract to the appellant with a further direction to the Airport Authority of India (respondent No.2) to negotiate afresh with the writ petitioner (respondent No.3) as well as the present appellant and explore the possibilities of attaining optimum price. 2. By order dated 7.5.97 status quo as regards granting of licence of CCTV as obtained on the date of order i.e. 7.5.97 was directed to be maintained and continued thereafter. This writ appeal is connected with Writ Appeal No.251 of 1997 which has been preferred by the Airport Authority of India against the same judgment and order dated 29.1.97 as passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Rule No.4204 of 1996. Both these appeals were heard together and being disposed of by a common judgment. Few basic facts necessary for disposal of these appeals may now be noted. 3. The Airport Authority of India invited sealed tenders for installation, maintenance and operation of Closed Circuit Colour TV and also for operation of PA System at Guwahati Airport on annual rental basis for three years vide notice inviting tender (NIT), Annexure 1 to the writ petition. In response to the said advertisement. M/s Sangita Advertising Agency and M/s World Watch International along with one Maa Kamakhya Advertising Agency submitted their tenders. It was found that Maa Kamakhya Advertising Agency was the highest bidder followed by M/s World Watch International and M/s Sangita Advertising Agency was the 3rd in order. Although Maa Kamakhya Advertising Agency was the highest bidder, but despite repeated opportunities granted it failed to submit required documents. M/s World Watch International, the 2nd highest tenderer was finally settled with the contract after holding negotiations. The contract was awarded vide letter dated 8.8.96 (Annexure III) issued by the Airport Authority of India who was respondent No.2 in the original writ petition and appellant in the present Writ Appeal No.251 of 1997. M/s World Watch International, the 2nd highest tenderer was finally settled with the contract after holding negotiations. The contract was awarded vide letter dated 8.8.96 (Annexure III) issued by the Airport Authority of India who was respondent No.2 in the original writ petition and appellant in the present Writ Appeal No.251 of 1997. It would thus be seen that both the respondents M/s World Watch International who has been awarded the contract and the Airport Authority of India who awarded the contract both have come in appeal against the aforesaid judgment and order dated 29.1.97 as passed by the learned Single Judge. 4. The rights asserted by the parties are basically contractual although in the realm of public contracts, therefore the availability of judicial review key to the problem posed by learned counsel Mr. Dutta for the respondent, is not to be found in the terms of the contract, but the protection it affords to every bidder. It is this protection, its scope and extent which to my mind plays an important role in arriving at a decision. 5. It must be concealed that an authority like the appellant (in Appeal No.251 of 1997) is conferred or equipped with a package of powers for different purposes and it would not be proper to restrict that however, so long as it is exercised within the bounds of authority and of course bonafide. 6. Is it not the contract in question made by the appellant authority within the purview of its authority? The answer is definitely in affirmative. The second question that arises for consideration is. Is not the contract a part of commercial liberty enjoyed by the appellant authority? It cannot be disputed that advertising is a commercial activity, but this commercial liberty of the authority cannot be equated with the liberty of a private organisation or industry. Being a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, it has to prevent unfairness and abuse, move so while enjoying monopoly. 7. It is in the area of its commercial activity of giving contract to an advertising agency that a complaint of unfair procedure has been made by the writ petitioner respondent. The solitary ground on which the learned Single Judge has made the impugned direction as noted by him is - “The sole cause for calling upon the respondent for negotiation was for enhancement of the price bid. The solitary ground on which the learned Single Judge has made the impugned direction as noted by him is - “The sole cause for calling upon the respondent for negotiation was for enhancement of the price bid. The petitioner was also similarly situated person and the participation of the respondent No.3 in the negotiating table would have brought a fair competition. The bid offered by the respondent No.3 was accepted by the respondent No.2 without assessing the offer by calling upon the other eligible competitor. The participation of the petitioner would have changed the and would have made the drill a meaningful one. The respondent No.2 in their venture to promote the price bid, ought to have explored every avenue for inviting a competitive bid from the eligible contestants. The methodology adopted in this case by confining the negotiation with one person, in such an undertaking is also susceptible to favouritism and partiality. The procedure adopted by the respondent No.2 in awarding the contract without allowing the petitioner to participate therefore seems to be arbitrary and unfair.” 8. Whether the writ petitioner was in fact denied the opportunity of being negotiated with? Let some hard concrete facts may now be placed on record. “In this connection, it will be permitted to mention herein that as the petitioner-was the third highest tenderer and as he did not increase his offer from 57,500.00 (including all charges), the AA1 decided not to call the petitioner for negotiation and he offered Rs.50,000.00, Rs.55,000.00 and Rs.60,500.00 per annum as licence fee for 1st, 2nd and 3rd year respectively and also offered to pay room rent at the rate of Rs.1501.00 per annum per square meter, electricity charge on actual basis on commercial rate, disc antenna space charge at the rate of Rs. 1501.00 per annum per square metre. If the aforesaid fee and charges are taken into consideration, the AAT earns an amount of Rs.75,000.00 to Rs.90,000.00 per year compared to that offered by the petitioner. In this connection, I further say that the petitioner having failed to secure the contract in question is taking an after thought plea that he would have also accepted the rate negotiated by the AAI if he would have been invited for negotiation. In fact, when-the first NIT was issued and sealed tender were invited the petitioner being the highest tenderer was only invited for negotiation. In fact, when-the first NIT was issued and sealed tender were invited the petitioner being the highest tenderer was only invited for negotiation. Therefore, no discrimination has been caused by inviting the highest tenderer for negotiation. I say that the petitioner has taken the plea that they came to know about the negotiation only on 27.8.96 for the purpose of covering his negligence.and laches in challenging the awarding of contract to the respondent No.3 in time. It will be pertinent to mention herein that the petitioner came to know on 9.8.96 that he was not awarded the contract when he was asked to clear all outstanding dues and to remove the installation and materials from Airport premises by letter dated 9.8.96 within 15 days of receipt of the said letter and on expiry of ad hoc extension i.e.31.8.96. The allegations made in the said paragraph with regard to arbitrary, unfair, unreasonable and capricious exercise of power and also violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India are without any basis and the same are hereby specifically denied. The AAI acted legally, fairly, reasonably and also complied with the mandatory provisions of the NIT while awarding the contract in favour of respondent No.3.” 9. It is not a case where the writ petitioner respondent was refused illegally, disqualified or excluded from tendering for the job. He only submitted his tender and the same was considered by the Auction Committee, and not only that, he was also negotiated with, but he was not prepared for increasing the rent. The petitioner is making a grievance that the appellant authority did not negotiate with him at the subsequent stage. 10. Mr. Choudhury, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the appellant authority questioned how far the judicial review is to be expanded or extended? And where does it leave the scope of fair play in joints as propounded by the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular case. If the authority in discharge of its public function is not allowed this much of fair play? He submitted that considering the past conduct the writ petitioner respondent was not found acceptable. 11. And where does it leave the scope of fair play in joints as propounded by the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular case. If the authority in discharge of its public function is not allowed this much of fair play? He submitted that considering the past conduct the writ petitioner respondent was not found acceptable. 11. To permit judicial review even in widest outer limits to the writ petitioner, seeking to establish that the decision of the appellant authority was discriminatory, he must establish that he was entitled to the right that he is claiming to be negotiated with which indisputably had in fact been exercised once. Repetition of this exercise needs exploration. 12. The Supreme Court in a recent judgment as reported in (1997) 1 SCC 738 , Asia Foundation & Construction Ltd vs. Trafalqar House Construction (I) Ltd:, refused to interfere with the award of a contract, in absence of exercise of power for collateral purpose ulterior motive, favouritism, malice or malafide. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner respondent, however, tried to distinguish this case on the ground that it involve International Monetary Agencies funding the project whereas there is no such situation obtaining in the instant case. 14. It cannot be gain said that the authority has the right to reject any or all the tenders as provided by clause 14 of the tender notice which reads as follows: “The Airport Authority of India reserves the right to reject any or all tenders in full or in part including the highest bid without assigning any reason what so ever or to negotiate with the tenderers for securing best offers.” 15. Even according to the learned Single Judge such a discretion vests in the authority, but this discretion is not an unruly horse observed the learned Judge recalling Justice Douglas. The sole question, therefore, is whether this discretionary power as exercised by the authority stands vitiated? On account of the reason that the writ petitioner respondent was not invited to negotiating table. The learned Judge has observed that while examining the matter it was found that the petitioner was not given the opportunity to improve his bid, followed by copious reference to (i) Ram and Shyam ( AIR 1985 SC 1147 ) and (ii) Ramanna Shetty vs. Airport Authority ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ). The learned Judge has observed that while examining the matter it was found that the petitioner was not given the opportunity to improve his bid, followed by copious reference to (i) Ram and Shyam ( AIR 1985 SC 1147 ) and (ii) Ramanna Shetty vs. Airport Authority ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ). The basic principles of judicial review are fairly simple, it is in their material application that difficulties abound more so when it is in relation to exercise of discretionary power. This not the place for jurisprudential exigencies on the nature of discretion. To put it in the simplest form possible the discretion as existing is in regard to the power to make choice between the two, or between the courses of action. Even Ram and Shyam (supra) recognises the Govt.'s right not to accept the highest bid and even to prefer a tender other than the highest bidder, of course, subject to the rider that there exists good and sufficient reasons and the same is to be found in Ramanna's case though differently worded in para 12 of this judgment, has been quoted by the learned Judge in the impugned judgment. 16. It would be too late in the day for any one to deny judicial review to contractual powers exercised by the Govt.. As has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular vs. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 as follows : “The principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by Govt. bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. However, it must be clearly stated that there are inherent limitations in exercise of that power of judicial review. Govt. is the guardian of the finance of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available to the Govt.. But, the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if the Govt. tries to get the best person or the best quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. But, the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if the Govt. tries to get the best person or the best quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down.” The following principles have been laid down in the Tata Cellular (supra)- (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in the administrative action; (2) The Court does not sit as a Court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The term of the invitation to tender cannot be opened to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Govt. must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by malafides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. 17. The principles which can be deduced from the above are (i) the modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action; and (ii) if review of the discretion exercised by the authority is required, the Court does not have the expertise to correct the discretion exercised by the authorities. 18. 17. The principles which can be deduced from the above are (i) the modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action; and (ii) if review of the discretion exercised by the authority is required, the Court does not have the expertise to correct the discretion exercised by the authorities. 18. In Sterling Computers Limited vs. M & N Publications Ltd, (1993) 1 SCC 445 , the Apex Court has recognised certain measure of freedom of play in joints to the executive and the same view has been reiterated in the Asia Foundation case (supra) in the following words : “Though the principle of judicial review cannot be denied so far as exercise of contractual powers of Govt. bodies are concerned, but it is intended to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism and it is exercised in the larger public interest or if it is brought to the notice of the Court that in the matter of award of a contradict power has been exercised for any collateral purpose. It is not within the permissible limits of interference for a Court of law, particularly when there has been no alle­gation of malice, ulterior motive and particularly when the Court has not found any malafide or favourtism in the grant of contract in favour of the successful bidder.” 19. It is significant to note that there is no finding in malice, ulterior motive or malafide or undue favouritism shown to the appellant in Writ Appeal No.250 of 1997. There was sufficient reason for the Airport Authority, the appellant in Writ Appeal No.251 of 1997 in taking into account the past experience in dealing with the writ petitioner respondent which as rightly argued by Mr. Choudhury provide the sufficient cause for not negotiating with the writ petitioner respondent in the second round of the whole process. 20. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner respondent however tried to distinguish this case on the ground that it involved International Monetary Agencies funding the project. Whereas there is no such situation obtaining in the instant case. This distinction is no doubt there but the underlying principle is the same. 21. Although the petitioners has alleged malafide against the appellant but it is a mere insinuation and the allegation is not at all substantiated. Whereas there is no such situation obtaining in the instant case. This distinction is no doubt there but the underlying principle is the same. 21. Although the petitioners has alleged malafide against the appellant but it is a mere insinuation and the allegation is not at all substantiated. Merely because the learned Judge was of the opinion that if the writ petitioner had called for negotiation that would have changed the scenario and would have made the deal meaningful one; to sanction interference to such an extent merely because of the Court's opinion; such judicial intervention merely speaking runs counter to the fundamental assumption on which issuance of writ of Certiorari is based. It would be nothing sort of entailing a reallocation of power from the administrative authority to the Court. Garner's Administrative Law, Seventh Edition, page 154 may prove instructive : “Abuse of discretionary power : This ground of challenge requires further sub division for purposes of exposition though here perhaps more than elsewhere the categories overlap. Where the enabling statute, expressly or impliedly, confers powers for a particular purpose or purposes there will be abuse of power if the power is in fact exercised in order to achieve, instead some other purpose. Alternatively, there maybe abuse of power by taking improper considerations into account, or by failing to take all proper considerations into account: the meaning 'proper' and 'improper' being elicited from the express or implied terms of the statute conferring the power. A further category of abuse of power relates not so much to 'how' or 'why' the decision was taken, but to the quality of the decision itself. The Court of review will be careful not simply to substitute its own views on the merits of the exercise of the power for that of the appointed agency. That would be to assume an appellate function. Nevertheless, if the reviewing Court can be persuaded that the power has been exercised in a manner such as no reasonable authority could have exercised it the Court will intervene. The idea here is that although reasonable authorities may come to a variety of differing decisions on a particular matter, there may be certain decisions that no authority could come to without forfeiting its description as 'reasonable'. This power of intervention is justified on the basis that the legislature could not have intended to authorise patently unreasonable action.” 22. The idea here is that although reasonable authorities may come to a variety of differing decisions on a particular matter, there may be certain decisions that no authority could come to without forfeiting its description as 'reasonable'. This power of intervention is justified on the basis that the legislature could not have intended to authorise patently unreasonable action.” 22. As for judicial review, the learned author HWR Wade in his celebrated commentary in Administrative Law (1988, 6th Edition page 36) dealing with the question of judicial review has noted as follows : “The system of judicial review is radically different from the system of appeals. When hearing an appeal the Court is concerned with the merits of the decision under appeal. When subjecting some administrative act or order to judicial review. the Court is concerned with its legality. On an appeal the question is 'right' or wrong? On review the question is 'lawful' or 'unlawful'? Judicial review is a fundamentally different operation. Instead of substituting its own decision for that of some other body, as happens when an appeal is allowed, the Court on review is concerned only with the question whether the act or order under attack should be allowed to stand or not. But the Court's duty is to confine itself strictly to the question of legality. If the administrative authority has acted within its powers and according to law, it is no business of the Court to interfere. The law draws the boundaries within which the administration is a free agent.” 23. In view of the foregoing discussion, it cannot be said that the appellant Airport Authority acted unreasonably, much less illegally, in awarding the contract. A mere insinuation of malice even though made, does not make out a case for malice or malafide. The facts as pleaded even it taken on their face value do not constitute malafide. 24. In the result, both these appeals deserve to be allowed, they are accordingly allowed and the impugned judgment and order set aside. However, there shall be no order as to costs.