JUDGMENT : P.K. Tripathy, J. - The petitioner in this case inter alia challenges the order of his termination/dismissal as per Annexure-12 and also the order of the Education Tribunal dt. 29.3.1993 in Appeal No. 15 of 1989 as unreasonable and illegal. 2. In a nut shell, the relevant facts constituting the petitioner's case is that he was appointed as Head Maulabi in Urdu High School, Rourkela, a private recognised High School receiving grant-in-aid from the Government, vide the Appointment letter dt. 25.9.1973, i.e. Annexure-I. He continued to hold the post till the end of Summer Vacation, 1986 and after reopening on 5.7.1986 when the petitioner went to the School, the Headmaster of the School did not permit him to sign in the Attendance register and on such persuasion by the petitioner, the said Headmaster supplied him a copy of Annexure-12 i.e. a letter from the Secretary of the Managing Committee i.e. opp. party No. 1, in which it is indicated that the service of the petitioner was terminated with effect from 25.5.1986. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Inspector of Schools on 6.8.1986, but the decision, if any, on the said appeal petition was never communicated to him. Later, he wrote to the higher authorities. After a long wait, finding no alternative, he approached this Court by filing O.J.C. No. 853 of 1989 and at that time with the view that alternative remedy by way of appeal before the Education Tribunal was available, the aforesaid writ application was permitted to be withdrawn vide order dt. 28.6.1989. On 7.7.1989 Appeal No. 15 of 1989 was filed, but vide is order dt. 29.3.1993, i.e. Annexure-19, the State Education Tribunal dismissed his appeal on the ground that the Urdu High School, Rourkela was an institution belonging to minority community having the protection under Article 30 of the Constitution and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute. Thus, he has approached this Court in the present writ application invoking the jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 3. The petitioner has contended that he was deputed to identify the examinee from the Urdu High School at the examination centre at Uditnagar High School. Thus, he has approached this Court in the present writ application invoking the jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 3. The petitioner has contended that he was deputed to identify the examinee from the Urdu High School at the examination centre at Uditnagar High School. On 23.9.1995, he performed his duly during the 1st sitting, but at the 2nd sitting, due to his sudden illness he was taken to a doctor for treatment and also later obtained the relieve order from the Centre Superintendent. The opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 and the Headmaster being vindictive against the petitioner on different issues relating to payment of dues and other affairs, made the said absence as an issue and served a charge-sheet. He submitted his explanation. The opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 neither supplied him the documents nor the list of witnesses which were relied upon even if the petitioner asked for the same and without affording him the opportunity of hearing the opp. party No. 2 of his own dispose of the matter and got the approval of Managing Committee, which was done in complete violation of the principle of natural justice and the procedural law. He has also challenged from the beginning the competency of opp. party No. 2 to act as the enquiring officer. 4. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of opposite parties 1 and 2, the deponent (opposite party No. 1) has denied to all the, allegations. He has stated that the petitioner intentionally and deliberately mis-conducted himself and the punishment inflicted is due and proper. He has further stated that the petitioner avoided to attend the enquiry after due intimation and there is no violation of the principle of natural justice. 5. It was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the enquiry was wholly illegal and not sustainable since no due opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to defend in violation of the principle of natural justice from the inception of enquiry till the approval of the same by the Managing Committee of the School. Above all, the opposite party No. 2 who was a witness in support of the charge and having a bias against the petitioner, could not and should not have conducted the enquiry. Above all, the opposite party No. 2 who was a witness in support of the charge and having a bias against the petitioner, could not and should not have conducted the enquiry. Learned counsel for the opposite parties 1 and 2 advanced argument supporting their case and said that the writ Court is not a Court of appeal to interfere with quantum of punishment inflicted. Sri S.P. Mishra, learned Addl. Government Advocate argued that opposite parties 3 to 6 i.e. the officials and authorities belonging to the Education Department had no role to play in the entire happenings. He, however relied upon : 1988 (I) OLR 97 (Krishnakant Pandey v. State of Orissa and Ors.) and fairly contended that principle of natural justice was not followed in this case. 6. It is but clear that the petitioner has called upon the Court to set at naught the action of opposite parties 1 and 2. It may be noted here that while exercising the jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution this Court is not a Court of appeal and the power of appellate Court is not conferred upon this Court. The aforesaid Articles only empower and authorise the High Court to make judicial review of the decision making process. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh and Others the Apex Court has thus observed : "However, Judicial review under Article 226 cannot be converted into appeal. Judicial review is directed, not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans (1982) 1 W.L.R. 1155 refers to the merits-legality distinction in judicial review. Judicial review is directed, not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans (1982) 1 W.L.R. 1155 refers to the merits-legality distinction in judicial review. Lord Hailsham said : "The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court." Lord Brightman observed : ".................Judicial review, as the words amply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made.............." And held that it would be an error to think : "................that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision-making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself." When the issue raised in judicial review is whether a decision is vitiated by taking into account irrelevant, or neglecting to take into account of relevant factors or is so manifestly unreasonable that no reasonable authority, entrusted with the power in question could reasonably have made such a decision, the judicial review of the decision-making process includes examination, as a matter of law, of the relevance of the factors...." Keeping in view the aforesaid ratio and the provisions under the Constitution and also the arguments advanced by the parties it is to be judicially reviewed by this Court as to whether the decision-making process by the opposite parties was with due regard to the provisions of law and complying with the principles of natural justice. 7. On perusal of the xerox copy of the file relating to the enquiry, it appears that the enquiry was conducted without participation of the petitioner. According to the opposite parties 1 and 2 the letter Annexure H/1 was the notice to participate in the proceeding. In that regard the petitioner's contention that in reply to Annexure H/1, before the date fixed, he sent the letter Annexure -11 requesting the Secretary (opp. party No. 1) inter alia to supply the documents relied upon and the list of witness proposed to be examined and to intimate the same. In that regard the petitioner's contention that in reply to Annexure H/1, before the date fixed, he sent the letter Annexure -11 requesting the Secretary (opp. party No. 1) inter alia to supply the documents relied upon and the list of witness proposed to be examined and to intimate the same. It is the admitted position in record that not only no reply was given to the petitioner, but also the Annexure-11 was treated as refusal of the petitioner to participate in the proceeding. The said inference was absolutely incorrect and inconceivable. The opp. party No. 1, thus proceeded with the enquiry. 8. Annexure-H/1 was issued on 1.2.1986 and the petitioner 5.2.1986 vide Annexure-11 requested the Secretary to supply the documents and list of witness. As stated above, the petitioner was not given any intimation on that account, but on 7.2.1986 the opp. party No. 2 i.e. the enquiry officer desired to examine two persons as witnesses and on later dates he wanted to peruse certain documents. All the aforesaid evidence was collected behind the back of the petitioner. It further reveals from the enquiry record and resolution of the Managing Committee. Annexure I/1 that there was no order to communicate the findings and the punishment of termination imposed on the petitioner. On the other hand, vide the letter dt. 30.6.1986 Annexure-12, the Headmaster was intimated about the termination and directed not to allow the petitioner to sign the Attendance register and to work in the school. 9. At this juncture, a reference is made to the decision of K.K. Pandey (supra) and the case of Miss Eva Rout v. State of Orissa 34 (1968) CLT 1357. In the former case without calling for show-cause and basing upon the report of the Headmaster the service of the petitioner was terminated and the termination order was quashed by the. Court on the ground that before such termination the statutory principle of natural justice was not observed. In the latter case which is an identical case like the present one this Court quashed the order of termination on the ground that reasonable opportunity of hearing was not afforded and extraneous matter beyond the charge were considered by the Managing Committee in taking a decision to terminate the service of the writ petitioner. In the latter case which is an identical case like the present one this Court quashed the order of termination on the ground that reasonable opportunity of hearing was not afforded and extraneous matter beyond the charge were considered by the Managing Committee in taking a decision to terminate the service of the writ petitioner. In this case also in addition to the aforesaid violation of principle of natural justice in not affording an opportunity of hearing to the present petitioner, opposite party No. 2 as the enquiry officer and the Managing Committee took into consideration some other conduct of the petitioner so as to terminate his service. Thus, the resolution of the Managing Committee dated 18.5.1986 vide Annexure I/1 and consequential order passed by the Secretary vide Annexure-12 are illegal and liable to be quashed. 10. In view of the aforesaid finding and conclusion it is not necessary to go into the other questions relating to bias of opposite party No. 2, his competency to enquire into the matter and the jurisdiction of the Education Tribunal in view of the provisions under Article 30 of the Constitution. 11. To sum up, it is held that the action of opposite parties 1 and 2 in terminating the service of the petitioners is in gross violation of the statutory rule relating to conduct of disciplinary proceeding and also in violation of the principle of natural justice and, therefore, the findings recorded by the opposite party No. 2, in the enquiry, the decision of the Managing Committee Annexure I/1 and the letter by the Secretary to the Headmaster Annexure-12 intimating him about the termination of the petitioner's service are bad in law and are accordingly quashed. In view of that, the petitioner shall be deemed to be in service and is entitled to get all his service benefits inasmuch as vide this Court's interim order dated 1.11.1994 the opposite parties were permitted to fill up the post subject to the result of the writ petition and that condition was ordered to be incorporated in the order of appointment issued in favour of the person appointed against the post of the petitioner. 12. The writ petition is thus allowed. In the circumstances, parties are to bear their respective costs. S. Chatterji, J. 13. I agree. Final Result : Allowed