T. N. VALLINAYA'GAM, J. ( 1 ) - This second is filed against the disposal of Regular Appeal no. 55/1979 on compromise. In fact, I. A. III was filed to record compromise under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure but the same was resisted by the respondent even before the compromise was recorded. The appellate Court went into the. questions-whether ishwarappa, the son of the respondent, was authorised by the respondent to enter into the compromise? Whether the terms of the compromise set out in the. affidavit are proved? if they are. held proved, whether they are lawful and could be enforced? and whether a decree should follow in terms of the compromise? ( 2 ) THIS second appeal has been admitted to consider whether the power exercised by the lower appellate Court in recording the compromise has been legally exercised. When a compromise is sought to be made in a Court and especially when one of the parties to the suit declines to accept the compromise, in my opinion, it is easy for the Court to dispose of the appeal on merits, instead of forcing the parties to enter into a compromise. ( 3 ) ON perusing the affidavit and the counter affidavit filed by the parties before the appellate Court, it is seen that the defendant has specifically stated that he has not authorised his son Eshwarappa to give any sort of instruction to his Advocate. Indirectly, he said that he has not given instructions to his Advocate to enter into a compromise. In my opinion, when a client comes and tells either the Advocate or the Court that he has not given instructions to his Advocate to act in a particular manner or to enter into compromise, the Advocate has no right whatsoever to act dehors such instruction or such: representation. After all the basic structure of advocacy depends upon the instructions given by the clients on facts. In view of the objections filed by the defendant before the lower court, I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the compromise ought not to have been accepted by the Court below. After all the basic structure of advocacy depends upon the instructions given by the clients on facts. In view of the objections filed by the defendant before the lower court, I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the compromise ought not to have been accepted by the Court below. ( 4 ) HOWEVER, it is vehemently contended and brought to my notice by the learned counsel for the respondent that the circumstances of the case are as such that after receiving money and after agreeing to continue tenancy for the reasons best known to himself the landlord is trying to put the blame on his son and trying to retrieve himself of the consequences of the compromise, which his son had instructed the Advocate to act upon. Unfortunately, in this case, no compromise memo was filed nor prepared nor signed by the parties. It was all done on oral evidence basis. That is also one of the grounds in my opinion, for not accepting the compromise. Therefore, the judgment of the Court below is liable to be set aside and the matter remittee: to the appellate Court to dispose it of on merits. However, while disposing of the case the lower appellate Court shall take into consideration the compromise pleaded by the defendant. This does not mean that the terms of the compromise shall be taken as gospel truth to arrive at the conclusion. The Appellate Court has to consider the merits case and dispose it of on merits as has been done by the Court below. But, in equity, it may consider the case as stated above. ( 5 ) IN the result, 1 allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and remand the matter to the lower appellate Court for fresh disposal on merits in the light of the observations made above. ( 6 ) AS the appeal is of the year 1972, I direct the lower appellate Court to dispose of the same within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this judgment. Appeal allowed. Matter remanded. --- *** --- .